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This research analyzes and assesses the major issues regarding coordinated response operations 
in destructive earthquakes. The research examines the decision making process in the context of 
seismic risk to exemplify how public managers can utilize the information and communication 
systems in order to create collaborative actions in managing an extreme event.  
Based on the theoretical framework from Complex Adaptive Systems and Socio-
technical Systems, this study is an exploratory case study that explores the factors that hinder or 
facilitate coordinated response operations. This research applies the theoretical framework to the 
two earthquake response systems, the Marmara and Duzce that occurred in Turkey in August and 
November of 1999, respectively. This study investigated initial conditions of existing 
information infrastructure during the 1999 Marmara and Duzce response operations and 
compared the two response systems to discover whether the utilization of information and 
communication technologies significantly affected the performance of the Turkish disaster 
system. The findings of the study revealed that improving communication functions increased 
coordination activities thus eventually improved search and rescue operations from the Marmara 
to the Duzce earthquake.   
This research conducts qualitative, quantitative and network analysis using data from 
content analysis of a national newspapers, Cumhuriyet, semi-structured interviews, archival 
records, professional reports, and official websites of disaster organizations. By using the data, 
the research also focuses on the period of review and redesign of emergency management 
policies and practices following the Marmara and Duzce earthquakes. It analyzes the changes 
introduced into the information infrastructure and organizational structure to evaluate to what 
extent the Turkish disaster management system possesses the characteristics of a socio-technical 
disaster system. Although the findings of the analyses showed that the initiations after the 
Marmara and Duzce earthquake, to some extent, improved the technical and organizational 
capacity of the Turkish disaster management system, the system still needs to be improved 
particularly at the local level to cope with a future destructive earthquake.   
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1.0  INFORMATION PROCESSES IN DISASTER MANAGEMENT 
1.1 MANAGING RISK IN EXTREME EVENTS 
Public managers require different tools and implement different policies to address extreme 
events. Extreme events are rare, sudden occurrences that generate incredible consequences. 
Extreme events such as earthquakes disrupt the ordinary practices of public administration, and 
they pose complex, dynamic and unpredictable challenges to public managers. The complexity 
of such problems increases the need for interdependence and interconnectivity within an 
emergency response system and between the system and its environment. Effective response to 
these problems requires coordinated actions from multiple communities and organizations at 
different jurisdictional levels.  
Public managers must create an appropriate fit between a nation’s socio-technical system 
and its risk environment to coordinate disaster activities among emergency organizations. A 
socio-technical system can be defined as a system in which humans, computers, and 
organizations are integrated in an interactive system that exchanges, stores and acts on valid 
information from the environment (Comfort 2002b). Three elements are essential to create a 
successful socio-technical emergency management system. The first element is technical 
structure that establishes an information technology infrastructure to support the interactions 
among agencies engaged in emergency operations. The second element is organizational 
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flexibility that depends on appropriate organizational design, structure, policies and procedures 
for a successful adaptation to changing conditions in disaster environments. The third element is 
organizational culture which reflects the degree of openness to and willingness to share, new 
information and to adapt new strategies (Comfort 1999). These three conditions determine the 
success of a self-adaptive socio-technical emergency management system under the dynamic 
environment of disasters.  
The decision making process becomes extremely complex for responsible managers 
under the uncertain and dynamic conditions of disasters. Responsible decision makers from 
public, nonprofit and private sectors need timely, accurate information from all components of 
the disaster response system to coordinate actions among emergency organizations. The success 
of coordinated inter-organizational response operations depends heavily upon the ability of local 
communities to access valid, timely information and their capacity to search for, and exchange, 
this information in order to build a shared decision making process. Creating an interactive and 
participative culture within emergency organizations and between the organizations and their 
wider social environments is a fundamental requirement for proper decision making for inter-
organizational response operations. Advanced information systems provide unique opportunities 
to support the decision making process by allowing emergency managers from all levels to 
search for, and exchange, information across disaster organizations. Understanding the potential 
of information systems and effective utilization of the information they provide contributes to 
reducing and preventing the substantial impacts of seismic risk. Could advanced information 
systems be used to develop an appropriate socio-technical system for coordinated activities in 
order to address the interdependent problems of disasters? 
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 The purpose of this study is to define, and assess the major issues regarding coordinated 
response operations in emergencies. The study will investigate the decision making process in 
the context of seismic risk to demonstrate how public managers can adapt the information 
systems to manage an extreme event for a set of communities. The Marmara and Duzce 
Earthquakes which occurred in Turkey in August and November of 1999, respectively, are 
selected cases for this study. 
The 1999 Marmara and Duzce earthquakes served as “a symmetry-shattering event” 
(Kiel 1994) that disrupted the established patterns of the Turkish Disaster Administration and 
created a need for redesigning a socio-technical emergency system that fits the risk environment 
more effectively. After the earthquakes, both authorities and citizens acknowledged the necessity 
of improvements in the socio-technical capacity of the system. In recognition of the need for 
change, the Turkish central government and the provinces of Istanbul, Sakarya, Kocaeli, Bursa, 
Yalova, Bolu, Duzce governments and municipalities, and various international organizations 
(e.g. World Bank) initiated various projects to implement information systems in order to 
increase the organizational and informational capacity of the Turkish disaster system.  
This study will focus particularly on the period of review and redesign of emergency 
management policies and practices following the Marmara and Duzce Earthquakes. It will 
analyze the changes introduced into the information infrastructure following the earthquakes to 
evaluate the potential of utilizing information systems to support coordinated collective behavior 
among emergency organizations.    
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1.2 SEISMIC RISK IN TURKEY 
Turkey is located in one of the most highly seismic regions of the world and has suffered 
remarkable losses of life and property due to earthquakes. Ninety-six percent of the land and 
98% of the population are exposed to seismic risk (Turknet 2000). For thousands of years, a 
destructive earthquake has been occurring in Turkey in every 13 months. Turkey has also 
experienced other natural disasters which resulted in the loss of life and property of its 
inhabitants. Table 1 provides the percentage of destructive natural disasters occurring in Turkey 
from 1902 to 1999.  
Table 1 Natural Disasters in Turkey (1902-1999) 
Type of the Natural Disasters N % 
Earthquake 131                                          61  
Landslide 30                                          15  
Flood 32                                          14  
Rock falls 11                                            5  
Fire 9                                            4  
Avalanche, Storm, and Rain 2                                            1  
Total  215                                        100  
  N=Number of Natural Disasters; %=Percentages of Natural Disasters   
  Source: Ergunay (1999, p.2) 
 
According to information contained in Table 1, earthquakes are the most damaging and 
dangerous disasters affecting Turkey. Sixty-one percent of all recorded natural disasters in the 
last centuries have been earthquakes. Landslide and flood are the most significant types of other 
natural disasters, compromising 15% and 14%, respectively, of such occurrences.  
Earthquakes are the most damaging and problematic type of natural disaster to 
significantly affect the social and economic life of Turkish communities. Table 2 measures the 
effect of earthquakes occurring in 1902-2005 in terms of the number of injuries and fatalities to 
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persons and damage sustained to property (see Appendix B for the detailed data for earthquakes 
that occurred over for period 1902-2005).  
Table 2 Destructive Consequences of Earthquakes, 1902-2005 
Type of Consequences   N 
Number of Earthquakes 145 
Number of deaths 84171 
Number of injured 72934 
Number of damaged properties 799611 
Annual Cost (% of GDP) 0.7 
  Sources: Adapted from Bogazici Universtiy Kandilli Observatory    
              (www.koeri.boun.edu.tr), Earthquake Research Instittution National Earthquake    
   Monitoring Center (www.angora.deprem.gov.tr), Prime Ministry Cirses         
   Management  Center (2000a, 2000b), Belgenet webpage      
   (www.belgenet.deprem), Ergunay, 1999. 
 
As indicated in the table, earthquakes killed 84,171 and injured 72,934 people, and 
damaged to 799,611 properties. On average, the annual cost of earthquake damage is 0.7% of 
Gross Domestic Product of Turkey. The impact of the Marmara Earthquake was estimated at 7% 
of the GDP on the Turkish economy in 1999 (Erdik 2000). The effects of earthquakes are not 
limited only to economic losses. For instance, the Marmara Earthquake hit the heartland of 
Turkey, impacting the economic, social and cultural life of the rest of the country. The loss of 
highly trained individuals also indirectly affects the communities’ capacity building in the long 
run.   
Scientists divide Turkey into six geographic parts characterized by active fault lines: the 
North Anatolian fault, the East Anatolian fault, the Aegean Graben System, the Hellenic-Cyprus 
Arc, the East Anatolian ConTRACtional Province, and Central Anatolian Ova Province 
(Demirtas and Yilmaz 1996). Among these fault lines, the North Anatolian fault line is the most 
active and has produced the mostly deadly earthquakes in the history of Turkey. These include 
the 1939 and 1992 Erzincan earthquakes and the Marmara and Duzce Earthquakes in 1999.  
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The North Anatolian fault line is one of the most seismically active and dangerous fault 
lines in the world. The most deadly earthquake that Turkey experienced in the twentieth century 
was the 1939 Erzincan earthquake that occurred on this fault line.  The city of Erzincan suffered 
near total collapse and approximately 40 thousand people were killed.  After the earthquake, 
several moderate and major earthquakes struck this fault line, including the 1999 Marmara and 
Duzce Earthquakes that killed 17,489 and 763 people, respectively.  
The epicenter of the 17 August 1999 Marmara earthquake was located near the city of 
Golcuk in the Marmara region. The earthquake, Richter magnitude 7.4, caused significant 
damage in the provinces of Kocaeli, Adapazari, Yalova, Bursa, Duzce, Bolu, Istanbul, 
Zonguldak, Eskisehir. The Duzce earthquake occurred on the same fault line on 12 
November 1999.  The earthquake, Richter magnitude 7.2, affected mainly the city of Duzce and 
the province of Bolu. Both earthquakes had enormous impacts on the economic and social life of 
Turkey. The Marmara Earthquake was the most destructive disaster in the history of modern 
Turkey in terms of property loss. The exceptional consequences of this earthquake stem from the 
characteristics of the area where the earthquake occurred. This region is the heartland of Turkey 
in which two thirds of the population lives and more than half of the economic output of the 
nation is produced.  
Even though Turkey has a high level of seismic risk, the Turkish disaster management 
system did not demonstrate sufficient administrative capacity to reduce the damage to the 
communities affected by these two earthquakes. The mismatch between the level of extreme, 
dynamic seismic risk and the information infrastructure of the Turkish disaster management 
system resulted in poor performance. The performance of response operations was criticized as 
uncoordinated and insufficient, especially following the Marmara Earthquake. Those criticisms 
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are well documented. Many argued that the main issues directly impacting the performance of 
effective response operations included: (1) lack of availability of a valid knowledge base related 
to the risk area, (2) lack of a secure communication data network among disaster managers, and 
(3) lack of accessibility to information systems with sufficient information processing capacity 
(Gulkan 2000).   
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
The study will address the following questions:  
1. How effectively did the existing information infrastructure of the Turkish Disaster 
Management System support the organizational response operations in the 1999 Marmara and 
Duzce Earthquakes? 
a. What were the initial conditions of the information infrastructure before the 
earthquakes? 
b. To what extent did the existing information systems provide a knowledge base to 
support coordinated actions among emergency organizations from different 
jurisdictions? 
c. How did the existing information and communication technologies affect the 
interaction and exchange of information among emergency organizations during 
the disasters? 
2. What factors restrain or facilitate information processes among emergency 
organizations from different organizational and jurisdictional levels? 
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a. What internal and external factors create opportunities or deficiencies for better 
information exchange among organizations in the disaster management system? 
b. To what extent do these initial conditions of the information infrastructure need to 
support the organizational structure in order to coordinate response to the 
disaster? 
c. To what extent is it necessary for the organizational culture to support openness to 
new information? 
3. How could advanced information systems be used to improve the performance of the 
Turkish disaster management system? 
a. To what extent has the Turkish disaster management system become a socio-
technical system? 
b. What changes in the organizational structure of the Turkish disaster management 
system, if any, have been made after the earthquakes?  
c. What changes in the technical information structure, if any, have been made, and 
at what governmental levels, since the 1999 earthquakes? 
d. To what extent are the developments in the information infrastructure after the 
earthquakes compliant with changes in the organizational structure? 
e. What changes, if any, can help to create a better fit between Turkey’s socio-
technical infrastructure and the unpredictable and dynamic problem of seismic 
risk to which it is exposed? 
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1.4 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The study aims to accomplish the following objectives. They are: 
1. Identify the role of information and communication technologies in facilitating or 
hindering the interactions among emergency response operations during the 
earthquakes; 
2. Examine the existing technical and organizational capacity of the Turkish disaster 
management system in order to understand the gaps in information processes 
across emergency organizations during the disasters; 
3. Investigate the attempts to construct a new information infrastructure after 1999 
and determine whether these efforts are in accordance with changes in 
organizational structure; and, 
4. Evaluate the new state of Turkish disaster management from criteria defined for a 
“socio-technical” approach.  
1.5 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
 
This study is significant for several reasons, both theoretical and practical. First, it shows the 
utility of an emerging model in organizational theory. Conventional organizational models, 
rational, natural and open systems (Scott 1992), in organization theory are not adequate to 
explain the complex problems of communities. This study indicates that under dynamic, 
uncertain, nonlinear conditions, traditional command-control models fail to achieve 
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organizational objectives. The study of a disaster management system illustrates how a complex 
adaptive organizational system model could serve as an alternative way to address extreme, 
sudden events for communities.   
Second, the study examines the application of advanced information technologies to 
public management problems. Many scholars (Simon 1969; Goodman, Sproull, and Associates, 
1990; Fountain 2001; Hoschka 1996; Coovert 2001; Comfort 2002a; Coakes 2003) have focused 
on the uses of information technologies in societal organizations. These studies examine how 
technology could be used to enhance the capacity of responsible decision-makers in managing 
interdependent social problems. From this perspective, this study documents the primary 
characteristics of “socio-technical systems” where information systems and human beings are 
integrated to overcome the consequences of rapid shifts in the physical and policy environments. 
Third, this study has a practical application as well. Earthquakes create an enormous risk 
to human life and material sources of the communities in Turkey. The Marmara earthquake alone 
caused $16 billion in damage, approximately 7% of the GDP of Turkey (Comfort and Sungu 
2001). Addressing this problem systematically would not only contribute to saving many lives, 
but also would protect the assets of the nation. After the 1999 earthquakes, Turkey began to seek, 
and establish, a system that best minimizes the harmful consequences of natural disasters. Efforts 
have mainly focused on increasing the information capacity of the system for coordinating 
disaster activities. At the same time, there have been efforts to alter existing organizational 
policies and structures. This study analyzes the implementation of information systems into the 
disaster management system as a primary step in Turkey’s continuing efforts to manage seismic 
risk.  
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1.6 PRESENTATION OF THE STUDY 
This dissertation contains nine chapters. Chapter 1 presented the study by defining the problem 
statement, the research questions, and the research objectives. Chapter 2 presents the theoretical 
background and conceptual framework on which the study is based. Chapter 3 presents the 
research methodology and research design. Chapter 4 provides information regarding changes in 
the Turkish disaster policy and management structure.  
Chapters 5 and 6 investigate the initial conditions of information infrastructure and the 
inter-organizational coordination during the 1999 earthquake response operations. In Chapter 5, I 
use interview data to explore the initial conditions of information infrastructure and compare the 
performance of the Turkish disaster system in both response operations. In Chapter 6, I use 
content analysis of a national newspaper, Cumhuriyet, to investigate organizational interactions 
to evaluate how information and communication capacity of the disaster organizations affected 
inter-organizational coordination during response operations.  
Chapter 7 presents joint projects developed after the 1999 earthquakes to increase the 
organizational and informational capacity of the Turkish disaster system. Chapter 8 provides 
information on the current state of information infrastructure, local sustainability of the disaster 
system, and the level of organizational flexibility to identify how changes after earthquakes 
increased mitigation capacity of the system to be ready for future destructive earthquakes.  
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2.0  TOWARD SOCIO-TECHNICAL DISASTER MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the theoretical background and conceptual framework of the study. 
Increasing complexity and uncertainty in today’s dynamic, rapidly changing environments 
require a new understanding of disaster management. Shifting from conventional management 
strategies to new strategies and increasing local capacity to create disaster resilient communities 
are important aspects of a proposed disaster management system. Progress in the science of 
complexity and advanced information systems has brought new opportunities to redesign the 
public sector to cope with natural and artificial disasters threatening the life of communities. This 
chapter briefly summarizes the basic functions of Complex Adaptive Systems and the 
characteristics of Socio-Technical Systems for a more appropriate disaster management 
structure.  
2.2  DISASTER MANAGEMENT IN TRANSITION  
As in many areas of public management, conventional planning models in disaster management 
are based upon linear assumptions. According to linear assumptions, policy actions in public 
management not only produce desired outcomes, but also these actions and outcomes are 
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proportionate. In this model, an analytical approach to address the problem is: “study the 
problem, develop alternatives, choose one, and move on to the next problem” (Mileti 1999, 
146). Organizations work like machines, contain standard operating procedures and formal rules 
that identify responsibilities and ensure that all these procedures are reliably performed (Scott 
1992; Morgan 1997). These organizations can be very effective where the environment is stable, 
problems are well-defined, and organizations can be closed to outside interference. However, in 
uncertain and complex environments, those machine-like organizations are likely to fail to 
achieve desired goals (Osborne and Gabler 1992; Marion 1996; Barzelay 1992; Comfort 1999; 
Axelrod and Cohen 1999). 
In a traditional disaster management system, managers in a centralized system are more 
concerned with the intention to reduce risk and assume that execution of this intention and 
application of existing knowledge will result in proportional advances in hazard reduction 
(Turner and Pidgeon 1997, 4; Mileti 1999, 146). However, disasters create different norms, 
“emerging norms,” from regular norms (Schneider 1995). The discrepancy between “emerging 
norms of disasters” and “bureaucratic norms of disaster administration” represents failures of 
intention (Schneider 1995). The goal of a disaster management system is to find ways of 
diminishing this discrepancy to deal with the fatal consequences of disasters. A process-oriented, 
decentralized, flexible disaster management system with long-term mitigation plans is more 
likely to meet the emerging characteristics of disasters.  
2.2.1 Shift from Disaster Response to Disaster Mitigation  
Scholars generally agree that there are four different cycles in disaster management activities: 
preparedness, response, recovery and mitigation (Mileti 1999; Comfort 1999; Schneider 1995). 
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A traditional disaster management approach is more concerned with response actions. Managers 
take action after a disaster happens. Balamir (1999) calls this type of administration “State as 
Healer.” According to Balamir (2001), the main goal of the “healer state” is to save lives rather 
than to protect them. Balamir calls it a “fatalistic society” with the attributes of “saving strategy,” 
“organizational frustrations,” “healing discourse,” and “crisis planning” (Figure 1).   
 
Figure 1 The Attributes of Fatalist and Risk Society (adapted from Balamir 2001) 
 
On the opposite side of this model is the concept of a risk society (Balamir 2001). 
Balamir’s risk society is a “disaster resilient community” that is aware of future disasters and has 
a sustainable network of physical systems and communities to withstand an extreme event 
without experiencing devastating losses (Mileti 1999). A risk society pays more attention to the 
mitigation process that aims to reduce the vulnerability of a community to damage from future 
disasters (Schneider 1995). “Protecting strategy,” “self-relying organizations,” “preparedness 
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discourse,” and “contingency planning” are the main characteristics of this model (Balamir 
2001). Moving from a fatalistic society model to a risk society model would not only reduce the 
vulnerability of communities and save more lives, but also would be more cost effective. 
2.2.2 Local Government 
Although local communities are more vulnerable to disasters, traditional disaster management 
systems put relatively less emphasis on improving the local capacity of the system. Human and 
material resources and the authority to mobilize these resources are often gathered at the national 
level. In many administrations, this appears to be a fundamental power issue between central and 
local organizations of the system. As Pfeffer (1992) states, every organization involves politics. 
The main sources of power in organizations, according to Pfeffer, are having resources, being in 
the center of a communication network, implementing important tasks, and having the capacity 
to seek and hold information. Thus, managers at the central level are more likely to have power 
and are not willing to share it with local managers. This creates serious difficulties with respect 
to disaster management. 
The centralized system performs slowly and nonflexibly to overcome damage from 
disasters during sudden disruptions. The key resolution to these problems is to foster local 
sustainability (Mileti 1999). “Sustainability refers to the capability of complex systems…to 
cope with changing conditions, to permanently adapt and, nevertheless, satisfy present needs” 
(Possekel 1999, 56). From this point of view, local sustainability represents a system where “a 
locality can tolerate and overcome damage, diminished productivity, and reduced quality of life 
from an extreme event without significant outside assistance” (Mileti 1999,4). Therefore, to 
accomplish local sustainability, local governments and local residents should have more power 
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and should take more responsibility for evaluating and allocating the resources, and designing 
the policies to reduce the impacts of disasters (Platt 1999; Mileti 1999).  
The performance of a disaster management system depends on the system’s capacity at 
the local level. Local conditions represent the initial conditions of the system, govern the 
whole disaster system, and eventually generate and characterize the choices for policies at 
different stages of disaster management. This requires an effective link between central actors 
and local actors. It is crucial to include local perspectives into the policymaking process to 
diminish disaster risk. Increasing the capacity of local components of the system improves the 
performance of the system. In a successful disaster management system, local governments 
and communities are more involved in systems dealing with future disasters. 
2.3  COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS 
Interdependent characteristics of the policy environment clearly show that a classic bureaucratic 
organization of the system is not able to provide the unity, complexity and selectivity required 
for survival (Bennet, A. and Bennet, D. 2000). A new model is needed to design an 
organizational system that best represents the complex characteristics of a changing 
organizational world. 
2.3.1 Complexity and Nonlinearity 
Complexity refers to the emergence, development and evolution of new structures and patterns. 
Prigogine (1980) states that emerging complexity is a transition from being to becoming. 
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Complexity arises from the inter-relationships and inter-connectivity of elements within a system 
and between a system and its environment. Emerging complex systems are composed of 
“context-dependent interactions,” and “these interactions, and the resulting system, are 
nonlinear” (Holland 1998, 121-122). The sequence of the problems is characterized by changing 
patterns, which rarely repeat themselves. They are all sensitive to initial conditions, situational 
context, and external forces (Lewin 1992; Gell-Mann 1994). A small discrepancy in the initial 
conditions can result in completely unexpected outcomes. 
A disaster response system illustrates a good example of a nonlinear complex system.  A 
disaster produces unpredictable consequences that require abrupt changes in reallocation of 
resources in a limited time period. The unexpected consequences may also create changes in the 
exercise of authority in the system to meet the demands of new environment. The system’s 
ability to manage these changes depends on the flexibility of the system in adapting to the new 
environment. The velocity of information absorption and the level of willingness to share 
information among the components determine the adaptability of the system to unpredictable 
sudden changes in the environment. The success of disaster management policies depends upon 
the degree of information that policy makers acquire from and share with others. 
2.3.2 Complexity and Uncertainty 
The theory of complexity deals with “dynamic processes, transformations, and sudden changes 
which are not the exception, but the rule in the continuous becoming of a non-linear system” 
(Possekel 1999, 50). The important consequence of those dynamic processes and 
transformations is uncertainty which directly affects the course of actions (Comfort 1994). 
Uncertainty arises from the lack of adequate information necessary to perform the tasks, and 
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from the scarcity of information about the operational environment. From this uncertainty, it may 
be possible to anticipate future events; however, it is not likely to be able to estimate the 
probability, consequences, or time when events might happen (Possekel 1999, 23). The 
unanticipated consequences of future problems make the decision-making process more 
difficult (Uri 1995; Comfort 1999; Scott 1992; Bolman and Deal 1997).  
People use different strategies to deal with uncertainty (Dovers and Handmer 1992).  
According to Dovers and Handmer, some people are opposed to any change and try to avoid 
those that threaten existing institutional structures. Some accept selected changes in selected 
subjects and allow gradual changes which do not alter fundamental values and structures. 
Finally, there are others who are open to new ideas and are flexible and adaptable. They do not 
object to new conditions that challenge the basic institutional values and structures. They are 
ready to move in a different direction to cope with unpredictable circumstances. Wildavsky 
(1988) calls this characteristic “resilience”. 
Wildavsky (1998) defines two types of behaviors that people use to eliminate the risks of 
uncertainty: anticipation and resilience. In the first type of behavior, people design their policies 
and institutions based on the anticipation of the possible risks and how to avoid them. They 
select predictable and secure activities to control the risk and to diminish their negative effects.  
In contrast, other people prefer resilience as a strategy to cope with uncertainty. These 
people consciously accept risks and design their actions based on this premise. This type of 
behavior (resilience) is capable of accepting uncertainty and of responding flexibly to changing 
conditions. Open information and communication channels that enable information flow among 
actors are important to support resilient patterns of behaviors. The way to deal with this 
uncertainty is to increase the capacity of the systems for obtaining, storing, and exchanging 
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information about the past and present circumstances in order to deal with the possible outcomes 
of future problems. This information gathering has to be acquired in a continuous learning 
process, which maintains the system’s capability to adapt whenever necessary (Possekel 1999, 
p. 49). 
2.3.3 Complex Adaptive Systems 
Borrowing from evolutionary biology (Kauffman 1993), recent theorists in organization theory 
have emphasized Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS) (Holland 1995; Comfort 1999; Axelrod and 
Cohen 1999; Stacey 2000, 2001) as an appropriate model to meet the demand of complexities in 
a dynamic societal environment. CAS theory considers systems as living organisms consisting of 
living subsystems that merge and interact to provide the capabilities of an advanced adaptability. 
The operation of the whole system depends on the well-functioning of the parts, although the 
whole is more than the sum of its parts. These systems are composed of self-organizing subunits 
that seek to maximize their own benefit, but at the same time act according to general system 
rules and in the context of interactions with other components and the external environment 
(Bennet, A. and Bennet, D. 2000).  
Four characteristics of Complex Adaptive Systems are recognized as fundamental 
(Kauffman 1993; Prigogine and Stengers 1984; Kiel 1994; Gell-Mann 1994; Comfort 1994; 
Nicolis and Prigogine 1989). They are: 
1. CAS are very sensitive to initial conditions;  
2. CAS are vulnerable to random events which may affect significantly the 
performance of parts of the system; 
3. CAS have a potential for self organization;  
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4. Performance of CAS depends on information flow among different components 
of the whole system.  
A complex adaptive system is composed of interacting agents seeking to achieve a 
common goal (Cohen and Axelrod 1999, 153). The interaction of agents at the micro level 
determines the macro level behavior of the system. The competing strategies used by the 
component agents attempt to draw the macro level entity, the system, to behave in a particular 
way. It is the dominant strategy that determines how the system behaves. The nature of the 
interaction among agents and the system's sensitivity to initial conditions generates performance 
adaptive to a changing environment rather than a linear relationship that produces the same 
behavior every time (Holland 1995; Kauffman 1993; Morel and Rangaraj 1999).  
Complexity researchers show that CAS exist and operate in the range of action between 
pure stability and complete instability, called “the edge of chaos” (Stacey 2000; Kauffman 
1993). On a continuum ranging from chaos to order, the edge of chaos lies in the middle. At the 
edge of chaos, “the system has its best capacity for the processing of energy and information 
and is thus capable of optimizing its fitness” (Possekel 1999, 19). This is the state where the 
system is able to be creative and innovative, while at the same time maintaining its identity and 
unity (Stacy 2000). This state can be achieved only when information flow and connectivity 
among components (agents or workers) are achieved (Stacey 2000; Comfort 1999). Information 
flow and the connectivity of components are positively related. In order to increase connectivity 
that promotes the collective behaviors of subunits, the communication channels fostering 
information flow should be open. Creating these communication channels is a major task for 
system designers.   
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2.3.4 CAS and Disaster Management 
In disaster environments, three different systems, “the earth’s physical systems,” “human 
systems,” and “the constructed systems,” interact dynamically (Mileti 1999). Increases in the 
size and complexity of human and constructed systems in a given physical environment, for 
example, growing urbanization in a disaster prone area, increases the risk and makes 
disaster problems more difficult to solve (Mitchell 1999; Mileti 1999).  
A disaster management system is a good illustration of CAS in practice, as many 
interacting organizational elements create complexity. Disaster management systems operate at 
central, provincial and local jurisdictions simultaneously. Public, private, nonprofit, and 
international organizations interact and collectively respond to natural disasters. The behavior 
and interaction among these organizations from different jurisdictions determine the success and 
effectiveness of the entire disaster management system. In such a complex system, acquiring and 
exchanging the relevant information among multiple emergency organizations from different 
jurisdictions is vital.  If a subunit of the system fails to attain and transmit the required 
information, the whole system will likely fail to adapt to the requirements of the risk 
environments in which they operate. The success of the whole system is associated with the 
quantity and quality of information that flows among the connected units. This information is 
necessary for coordinated operations across emergency organizations. 
 22
2.4  SOCIO-TECHNICAL SYSTEMS AND SELF ORGANIZATION 
The development of socio-technical system approaches can be traced to the 1950s (Coakes 
2002) and is based on the fundamental idea that organizations are open systems (Katz and Kahn 
1996). Socio-technical systems refer to “the study of the relationships and interrelationships 
between the social and technical parts of any system” (Coakes 2002, 5). In such a system, the 
technology, human actors and organizations are all interdependent (Checkland 1981, 256). 
2.4.1 Technology and Organizations 
Up to the 1990s, scholars studied the relationship between technology and organizations in many 
aspects, exploring technology as a physical element of an organization (Thomson 1967; 
Woodward 1965; Scott 1992); or technology as a manufacturing tool which increases 
productivity and economic benefit (Schonberger 1986; Mokyr 1990). The early studies of 
technology in organizations mostly focused on “task allocation” between machines and human 
actors. Herbert Simon’s pioneering book (1969, 1981), The Sciences of Artificial, captured 
postindustrial development and offered a new way to look at the relationship between technology 
and organizations.  
Simon argued that like technology, organizations and administrations are also artificial, 
or man-made. Unlike natural phenomena, “artificial phenomena have an air of contingency in 
their flexibility by environment” (Simon 1969, preface). He claims that organizational systems, 
or entities, are "artificial" in the sense that they are contingent upon the goals of their designer. 
He sees technology, especially computers, as a stimulus, a source of knowledge, to assist human 
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managers in the decision making process. From this perspective, the manager can utilize 
technology, as a means to manage, change and redesign organizations.  
2.4.2 IT and Socio-technical Systems 
Since the 1990s, remarkable developments in information technologies (IT) have added new, 
fresh viewpoints to the study of socio-technical systems. IT can be described as the means by 
which the acquisition, storage, and dissemination of information using computers can be 
accomplished easily and rapidly (Coakes 2003; Maglitta 1996). This development moved the 
relationship between technology and organizations in different directions. Many scholars 
studied IT as a complementary means of support to human beings in organizations, and 
considered it to be a revolutionizing tool that alters the way of working and administrating. 
According to these scholars, IT can increase individual and group skills that enhance 
collaborative work (Coovert and Thompson 2001). IT collapses the barriers of time and 
distance (Fountain 2001), eventually altering the regulation of authority between central and 
local units within systems. IT can also assist managers to develop models of problems and 
solutions, and to identify inconsistencies between a model and practice (Hoschka 1996), which 
can help to decrease the discrepancy between design and policies. More importantly, IT has 
created the means to facilitate the sharing of information among various subunits by offering the 
advantage of instantaneous access to relevant information (Malhotra 2000). The important 
outcome of this sharing of information is the establishment of a knowledge base for more 
suitable future actions.  
Developments in IT have brought new opportunities to design socio-technical systems as 
network organizations. According to the human view of network organizations, computerized 
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technology created a system in which workers are connected to one another to exchange 
information and other resources easily (Sproull and Kiesler 1991). These network organizations 
enhance communication across social groups that allow free expression of thoughts, and increase 
the level of openness to changes. With the application of IT, socio-technical systems are capable 
of supporting networks of communication among subunits of an organization. This interaction 
increases the information exchange across the system, improving organizational capability to 
make decisions for quick actions.  
There are five components of a socio-technical model: people, tasks, technology, 
structure and the environment within which an organization operates (Laudon and Laudon 2000). 
These five components of the system are closely connected and affect each other (Figure 2). The 
appropriateness of fitness among these parts determines the success of the system. The 
interactions among the components go through continuous change. A process of continuous 
learning is required and can be supported by information systems throughout the progress.  
A socio-technical design is more appropriate for conditions of uncertainty, dynamic 
change, and complexity, where timely, relevant and accurate information is required for 
continuous efforts to adapt to changing parameters of environments. “The goal of social  
technical design is to produce a system capable of self-modification, of adapting to change, and 
of making the most of creating capabilities of individuals for the benefit of the organization” 
Coakes 2002 , 6). 
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Figure 2. The five components of socio-technical system (Laudon and Laudon, 2000) 
 
An important characteristic of socio-technical designs involves “the use of feedback 
loops, and participation” (Bancroft 1992, 94). The flexible organizational structure of these 
systems enables policy makers to learn from their mistakes by providing feedback on actions so 
that they could alter the underlying assumptions of the strategy of their actions (Argyris 1993; 
Argyris and Schon 1996). In that respect, organizational culture appears to be an important 
concept to which responsible managers should pay attention in order to raise the capacity of 
organizational learning.  
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2.4.3 Organizational Culture and Socio-technical Systems  
Organizational culture can affect the functionality of organizational systems. In a successful 
system, the institutional culture should encourage individuals to share information with others. 
People who are accustomed to work under conventional hierarchical authority tend to resist new 
ideas and are not habitually willing to share information. A socio-technical model has an 
advantage over other models by providing an information-rich environment in which individuals 
have more opportunity to learn from others.   
Human beings understand, interpret, and act on meanings derived from information 
(Goodman, Sproull, and Associates 1990; Malhotra 2000; Coakes 2003). Understanding the 
organizational and social environments in which people make sense of their surroundings 
(Weick 1990; Weick 1995) is important in designing a successful socio-technical system. 
Hence, managing change and implementing a socio-technical design requires an 
understanding of organizational and social culture (Bancroft 1992; Comfort 1999). A 
successful socio-technical design should be supported by an organizational culture that facilitates 
“openness to new information” (Comfort 1999). Therefore, training appears to be a key factor 
that enables employees to process the information and manage the knowledge needed for 
effective action. It is essential to create an environment that supports information exchange. 
2.4.4 Socio-technical Systems and Disaster Management 
 To understand the problems that a disaster produces, it is useful to envision a disaster as a 
socio-technical problem in which social, organizational and technical processes interact in 
a dynamic manner (Turner and Pidgeon 1997, 3).  Disasters need to be placed in “the context 
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of the social setting from which they emerge, and upon which, in their turn, they have an 
effect” (Turner and Pidgeon 1997, 25), so that designs, plans, policies and implementation 
will be corresponding.  
In a disaster environment, many individuals representing multiple organizations interact 
under very dynamic conditions. These individuals with different skills, capability, responsibility, 
and ability to access information interact under very dynamic conditions. Their interactions must 
be harmonized for coordinated operations. To achieve this coordination, it is necessary for public 
managers to build an information infrastructure which diminishes the discrepancy among 
responsible disaster managers in accessing valid, timely information and increases the capacity 
of actors to search for, and exchange, information (Comfort 2002b). This discrepancy can be 
minimized by implementing a socio-technical system to support disaster management.  
In a socio-technical disaster management system, IT becomes an agent allowing disaster 
managers to access relevant information easily and quickly as a basis for their strategy of actions 
(Comfort and Sungu 2001). In such systems, individual organizations can be aware of the system 
level goals to produce creative solutions without seeing the other subunits as separate entities 
from the whole. The success of this spontaneous and rapid adaptation depends upon a multi-way 
communication network that supplies timely and accurate information. By supporting flexible 
management structures, socio-technical systems are able to meet technical and organizational 
requirements to respond to the rapidly changing disaster circumstances.  
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2.5  CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
The preceding theoretical discussion provides a preliminary model that will guide this research. 
The main assumptions of the model are: 
1. A disaster response system possesses dynamic, unpredictable, and complex 
characteristics. The complexity arises from numerous interactions among components 
within the organizational system and its environment. The success of the system depends 
on the level of connectedness of the parts and the adaptability of the whole system to 
changing conditions in the environment in which the system operates. 
2. The fundamental characteristics of a disaster management system need to match the 
dynamic and uncertain characteristics of disaster environments. The initial conditions of 
organizational and informational capacity of a disaster system influence its performance 
in an actual event.  
3. The socio-technical system represents a model for disaster systems. Disasters create 
turbulent and complex conditions that require access to valid and timely information. 
Therefore, a disaster management system must possess sufficient flexibility through 
decentralization and lateral coordination to accommodate information search, exchange 
and organizational learning. 
4. Sufficient and timely information processing requires utilization of the necessary 
information infrastructure. Increasing information capacity through the information 
infrastructure increases information search, exchange, and feedback within a system, and 
between the system and its environment. 
5. Improving organizational and informational capacity of local disaster organizations 
increases information flow, enabling responsible decision makers from different 
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jurisdictions to make timely and effective decisions. Timely and effective decisions based 
on continual organizational interactions increase coordination between organizations. 
Thus, well-coordinated operations will save more lives and reduce the cost of disasters to 
communities. 
2.6 SUMMARY 
This chapter reviewed the literature to provide a theoretical background for the development of a 
socio-technical disaster management system. In the first part, the chapter reviewed 
characteristics of the traditional disaster system. This review exposed the inability of the 
bureaucratic, centralized traditional system to cope with problems of seismic risk. The system 
should pay more attention to mitigation efforts and increase the capacity of local communities to 
avoid the destructive consequences of earthquakes.   
This chapter then reviewed literature of complex adaptive systems. The characteristics of 
complex adaptive systems offer a model for dynamic, uncertain, and complex disaster response 
systems. To establish this model, the components of whole disaster system should be well inter-
connected to act simultaneously and to adapt rapidly to changes in the disaster environment. 
Therefore, information flow among the components of the system becomes crucial. The goal of 
responsible managers in disaster organizations is to create an environment in which technology, 
human beings and organizational structure allow adequate information flow among disaster 
agencies. The third section of the chapter analyzes this issue and proposes that the disaster 
system should be established in the form of the socio-technical system by utilizing the benefit of 
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advanced information and communication systems. Finally, in the light of these theoretical 
explanations, the chapter includes a conceptual framework upon which this study based.   
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3.0  AN EXPLORATORY CASE STUDY: CONCEPTS AND METHODS  
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the research design and methods, selection of cases, validity and reliability 
of the research, sampling design, unit of analysis and observations, research questions and 
research assumptions, data sources, processes of data collection, and data analysis and 
interpretation.  
3.2 RESEARCH METHOD 
3.2.1 An Exploratory Case Study 
A case study method will be used to explore the dynamic, nonlinear characteristics of the 
Turkish disaster management system. A case study is considered an appropriate methodology 
when a researcher conducts a detailed investigation of a particular problem (Feagin, Orum, and 
Sjoberg 1991). When a research problem is not yet clearly structured, it is essential to investigate 
a comprehensive profile of its components and their interactions that shape the circumstances for 
a more accurate research design (Yin 1993, 1994; Comfort 1999). A case study is designed to 
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reveal details from the viewpoints of participants by utilizing multiple sources of data (Tellis 
1997a).  
I used the preliminary conceptual framework to conduct the research. The preliminary 
theoretical framework is critical for conducting an exploratory case study. The framework and its 
propositions guide the research and are completed after conducting the study. It is important to 
analyze the case consistent with the theoretical model and the objectives of study. In view of the 
complex and dynamic characteristics of the study on the developments of the Turkish disaster 
system after 1999 earthquakes, an exploratory case study appears the most appropriate research 
methodology.  
3.2.2 Validity and Reliability  
As in all research, the exploratory case research method must take construct validity, internal 
validity, external validity and reliability into consideration (Yin 1989). Using multiple sources of 
data will ensure construct validity (Yin 1994). I used official documents, content analysis of a 
national newspaper, interviews, professional reports, and data collected from field observations. 
These multiple sources of evidence assist me to ensure construct validity.  
A threat to internal validity may occur in evaluating the impact of changes introduced in 
the organizational and informational structure of the Turkish disaster management system after 
the 1999 earthquakes. To avoid this threat, the evaluations are based on the conceptual 
framework which directs the whole study.  
External validity is a generalization issue. Are the findings applicable to other cases, or 
are they solely applicable to certain time periods in certain regions? This question raises issues 
for threats to external validity of the research. Yin (1984) answers the widespread criticism of the 
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case study method that the findings are not widely valid in real life experience. Yin makes a 
distinction between statistical generalization and analytic generalization. Yin (1984) asserts that 
previously established theory is used as a model against which to compare the empirical 
outcomes of the case study in analytic generalization. Therefore, external validity can be attained 
from these theoretical relationships, and generalizations can be made (Yin 1994). The theoretical 
background and framework ensure external validity for this study.  
Consistency in the whole research process and preliminary procedure prepared to conduct 
this study ensure reliability of the research. The research questions, assumptions, sources of data, 
data collection process, data analysis, techniques used for this analysis are developed in advance 
to ensure the reliability of the research.  
3.2.3 Selection of Cases  
This study of the Turkish disaster management system represents a case in which two sequential 
disaster events, the 1999 Marmara and Duzce earthquakes, precipitated significant changes. 
These disasters were severe tragedies that tested the awareness of seismic risk in Turkey. After 
the events, Turkish citizens and public managers acknowledged the need to make 
transformations to cope with continuing seismic risk. Turkish public administration has sought to 
implement significant changes in organizational structure and informational infrastructure since 
the earthquakes. Second, these symmetry breaking events created an environment in which many 
interactions among disaster organizations from different jurisdictions created unique 
opportunities to observe the characteristics of a complex adaptive disaster management system.  
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The study will examine information processes during disaster operations as a baseline for 
investigating the changes made in information infrastructure and policies after the 1999 
earthquakes.  
3.2.4 Unit of Analysis and Unit of Observations 
The unit of analysis for this study is the organization. The unit of analysis is an important issue 
in the exploratory case study. Determining the unit of analysis relies on the initial questions of 
the research (Yin 2003). The unit of analysis is not an individual or group of individuals, but 
rather it is a system of action being examined (Tellis 1997b).  
Organizations are collective actions of individuals and individuals, on the other hand, act 
as components of organizations to adapt to changing conditions of environments (Scott 1992; 
Argyris & Schon 1996). Each responsible decision maker is a component of her organization and 
is thus representative of the organization. Therefore, the unit of observation in this study is the 
responsible decision maker in disaster agencies involved in the Turkish disaster response system.  
This study examines the dynamic characteristics of interactions among disaster 
organizations in the Turkish disaster management system. It examines the whole Turkish disaster 
management system, which consists of a set of interrelated organizations at the national, 
provincial and local levels. The goal of this analysis is to examine the role of information 
systems in relation to patterns of interactions within and between disaster organizations. This 
research examines organizational and system level developments in the Turkish disaster system 
through interviews with responsible managers involved in the 1999 response operations and 
disaster mitigation efforts, following the 1999 earthquakes.   
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3.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS, OBJECTIVES, NEEDED INFORMATION, AND 
SOURCES OF INFORMATION 
3.3.1 Research Questions and Objectives 
This study seeks answers to three primary questions that have detailed sub-questions. These 
research questions aim to achieve the objectives of the study. Table 3 presents the objectives and 
the questions posed to reach these primary objectives.  
Table 3 Research Questions and Research Objectives 
Primary Research 
Questions 
Sub-Research Questions Research Objectives 
1. How effectively did 
the existing information 
infrastructure of the 
Turkish Disaster 
Management System 
support the 
organizational response 
operations in the 
Marmara and Duzce 
Earthquakes? 
1.1. What were the initial 
conditions of the information 
infrastructure before the 
earthquakes? 
1.2.  To what extent did the 
existing information systems 
provide a knowledge base to 
support coordinated actions among 
emergency organizations from 
different jurisdictions? 
1.3. How did the existing 
information and communication 
technologies affect the interaction 
and exchange of information 
among emergency organizations 
during the disasters? 
 
 
1. Identify the role of 
information and 
communication technologies in 
facilitating or hindering the 
interactions among emergency 
response operations during the 
earthquakes 
2. What factors restrain 
or facilitate information 
processes among 
emergency organizations 
at different 
organizational and 
jurisdictional levels? 
 
2.1 What internal and external 
factors create opportunities or 
deficiencies for information 
exchange among organizations in 
the disaster management system? 
2.2 To what extent are these initial 
conditions of information 
infrastructure, along with 
organizational structure, sufficient 
to facilitate information processes 
in the decision making process to 
respond properly to the disasters? 
 
1. Identify the role of 
information and 
communication technologies in 
facilitating or hindering the 
interactions among emergency 
response operations during the 
earthquakes 
2. Examine the existing 
technical and organizational 
capacity of Turkish disaster 
management system in order to 
understand the gaps in 
information processes across 
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Primary Research 
Questions 
Sub-Research Questions Research Objectives 
2.3 To what extent does 
organizational culture support 
openness to new information? 
 
emergency organizations 
during the disasters 
4. Evaluate the new state of 
Turkish disaster management 
from criteria defined for a 
“socio-technical” approach 
3. How could advanced 
information systems be 
used to improve the 
performance of the 
Turkish disaster 
management system? 
3.1 To what extent has the Turkish 
disaster management system 
become a socio-technical system?  
3.2 What changes in organizational 
structure, if any, have been made 
after the earthquakes? 
3.3 What changes in technical 
information structure, if any, have 
been made at what governmental 
levels since the 1999 earthquakes? 
3.4 To what extent are the 
developments in information 
infrastructure after the earthquakes 
compliant with changes in 
organizational structure? 
3.5 What are the opportunities 
which can help to create a better fit 
between Turkey’s socio-technical 
infrastructure and the unpredictable 
and dynamic problem to which it is 
exposed? 
 
3. To investigate the attempts 
in constructing a new 
information infrastructure after 
1999 and determining whether 
these efforts are in accordance 
with changes in organizational 
structure 
4. To evaluate the new state of 
Turkish disaster management 
from the viewpoint of  “socio-
technical” approach 
3.4 DATA COLLECTION 
3.4.1 Primary Data Sources 
Five types of data will be used for this study. They are: 
1. Field observations of disaster sites previously conducted, and operating environments of 
disaster organizations; 
2. Review of official documents, professional reports, archival records, and news analyses; 
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3. Content analyses from a national newspaper, Cumhuriyet1, for 21 days following the 
1999 Marmara and Duzce earthquakes, respectively2; 
4. 58 semi-structured interviews with selected decision makers from public, private, and 
nonprofit institutions; 
5. Content analyses of weekly news reports from a national newspaper, Cumhuriyet. 
Cumhuriyet publishes an additional section called “Science and Technology” every 
Saturday. The web-site of Cumhuriyet permitted me to search the archives of the Science 
of Technology section from May 1998 to May 2005. I collected data to obtain 
information about the projects and changes in informational and organizational structure 
after the 1999 earthquakes; 
6. Official web-sites of disaster agencies. 
3.4.2 Data Collection Process 
I followed five basic steps for the data collection. 
1. I identified the primary organizations involved in the 1999 disaster response operations 
using content analyses of Cumhuriyet for 21 days following the earthquakes. 
2. I identified the primary organizations involved in the projects established to increase the 
organizational and informational capacity of the Turkish disaster response system after 
the 1999 earthquakes by using weekly news reports, and professional reports. 
                                                 
1 Cumhuriyet is a national newspaper published in Istanbul. 
2 The content analysis was conducted by Sitki Corbacioglu (Corbacioglu, 2004). I used the raw 
data from his content analysis of Cumhuriyet for the Marmara and Duzce earthquakes to identify 
disaster agencies involved in response operations and to establish a representative sample for 
interviews. I also used the data set for the network analysis to determine the characteristics of 
response systems and the type of transactions and interactions among disaster agencies. 
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3. I constructed a stratified representative sample of key organizations involved in the 
response systems and the mitigation projects.  
4. I conducted 58 semi-structured interviews with 39 key decision makers from this sample 
of key organizations. 
5. I collected archival data, professional reports, and official documents in reference to the 
organizations and processes involved in developing information infrastructure.  
3.4.3 Needed Information and Sources of Information 
Data gathered from different sources are used to address the questions of the study. Table 4 
presents the needed information and the sources of this information to answer the major 
questions of the research.  
Table 4 Research Questions and Data Sources 
Research Questions Needed Information Data Sources 
1. How effectively did 
the existing information 
infrastructure of the 
Turkish Disaster 
Management System 
support the 
organizational response 
operations in the 
Marmara and Duzce 
Earthquakes? 
• roles of organizations 
involved in disaster 
operations, 
• interaction patterns among 
organizations 
• type of IT used 
• role of shared knowledge 
bases effectiveness of 
disaster operations 
• Interviews (Q2-Q8) 
• situation reports 
• Cumhuriyet content 
analysis  
• official documents 
• post-disaster critiques 
• professional notes 
• archival data 
2. What factors restrain 
or facilitate information 
processes among 
emergency organizations 
from different 
organizational and 
jurisdictional levels? 
 
• Internal and external 
factors affecting 
information sharing 
• willingness to work 
together 
• cooperation among disaster 
units 
• information infrastructure 
• organizational flexibility 
• Interviews (Q7-
Q16,Q18, 
Q19,Q20,Q24) 
• official documents 
• disaster laws and 
regulations 
• post-disaster critiques 
• professional researches 
3. How could advanced 
information systems be 
used to improve the 
• adoption of IT 
• changes in organizational 
• Interviews (Q9-Q25) 
• official documents 
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Research Questions Needed Information Data Sources 
performance of the 
disaster management 
system? 
structure 
• ongoing research projects 
• socio-technical capacity of 
the system 
• deficiencies in current 
system 
• opportunities for future 
development 
• professional researches 
• Cumhuriyet weekly 
newspaper reports 
• On-site observations 
previously conducted 
3.5 SAMPLING DESIGN AND INTERVIEWS 
3.5.1 Sampling Design for Interviews 
Due to the characteristics of the research population, a representative stratified sampling design 
was the most appropriate for the selection of organizations for interviews. According to 
Kerlinger and Lee (2000, 179), stratified sampling is proper when dissimilar groups exist in the 
population. In this sampling method, the population is composed of different groups (strata). The 
sample is chosen from each group that represents the general characteristics of a population 
composed of different groups.  
I used several criteria to establish a sample of organizations to conduct the interviews. 
Three main types of organizations are involved in the disaster response system: public, non-
profit and private. These three different types vary by jurisdictional level: local, national, and 
provincial, and international.  
Other criteria were also taken into account in designing the sample: legal responsibilities, 
size of organizations, closeness to disaster locations, and involvement in mitigation projects. 
Based on documents, professional reports, and a previous study, I identified a set of disaster 
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organizations involved in response operations during the earthquakes and in efforts to change the 
organizational and informational infrastructure after the 1999 earthquakes. I then constructed a 
sample of decision makers from primary organizations for interviews. Therefore, the key 
decision makers, the unit of observations, are selected from each organization in the sample for 
interviews. The main criteria for the selection of the key decision makers are their hierarchic 
positions and specific responsibilities regarding disaster affairs, and their involvement in the 
disaster mitigation efforts. 
3.5.2 Conducting the Interviews 
I conducted field trips to all provinces, Kocaeli, Sakarya, Yalova, Duzce,3 Bolu, Istanbul, Bursa, 
and to two districts, Golcuk and Avcilar, that were primarily affected by the Marmara and Duzce 
Earthquakes to interview the key actors in provincial and local organizations. I also conducted 
interviews with the public-central actors in Ankara, the capital city of Turkey. Field trips were 
carried out from June 1 to July 27, 2004. 
I conducted 39 interviews with key actors in the disaster organizations during this period 
(see Appendix A for interview questions). During these trips, I also collected materials regarding 
the organizations’ operations in disaster affairs, such as archival documents, brochures, 
professional notes, books of disaster laws and policies, progress reports, and disaster plans.    
After identifying the primary organizations, I planned to interview 41 key actors in 
disaster organizations. I was not able to secure all of my planned interviews for several reasons. I 
interviewed some of the actors in different organizations with different positions. One had 
                                                 
3 Duzce was a district administration during the Marmara earthquake and became province right 
after the earthquake. 
 41
resigned from his job,4 another had retired.5 I also had difficulties in contacting some of the 
interviewees as planned.6 Fortunately, I was able to interview the 39 key decision makers from 
disaster agencies. Table 5 presents the information about the organizations in which I conducted 
interviews with responsible decision makers.  
I contacted the most of the sample organizations by telephone. With the assistance of a 
professional advisor,7 I was able to meet the responsible managers from most of the primary 
organizations. I contacted three of the organizations which I sought to interview via email: 
Sayisal Grafik, Japan International Cooperation Agency and TUBITAK Marmara Research 
Center. The selected interviewees preferred to answer the questions in detail via email. The head 
of the Technical and Operational Department from Turk Telecom was not able to meet with me 
and preferred not to answer the interview questions via email. However, he did email to me some 
important documents.   
I conducted a total of 58 interviews with 39 key decision makers. Nineteen of the 39 
interviewees had been involved in both the Duzce and the Marmara operations. I gathered 
information from the interviewees regarding the performance of the disaster agencies during the 
Duzce earthquake to compare the performance of Turkish disaster management in the two 
response systems. 
                                                 
4 I planned to interview with the Deputy Director of Turkish Red Crescent Society (Kizilay) 
during  the earthquakes. He was also the former General Director of Disaster Affairs. During the 
time of conducting interviews, he had just resigned from his job in Kizilay. I interviewed him at 
his new job as the President of Organizational Development in the National Earthquake Council. 
5 The interviewee, the former Deputy Director of Disaster Affairs during the earthquakes, retired 
and was working as a consultant in Middle East Technical University, during the time of 
interview. 
6 The commander of Turkish Land forces Logistic Department first accepted to make the 
interview and  then declined. 
7 I want to thank to the Undersecretary of Turkish Health Ministry, Dr. Ulvi Saran for his help in 
arranging meetings with interviewees. 
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Table 5 Organizational Sample and Distribution of Completed Interviews 
Type of 
Organization 
Name of Organization Location Position of 
Interviewees 
Completed 
Interviews 
     Marmara Duzce 
General Directorate of 
Civil Defense 
Ankara Department Head 1 1 
General Directorate of 
Land Registry and 
Cadastre  
Ankara Project Manager 
(MERLIS) 1  
General Directorate of 
Disaster Affairs 
Earthquake Research 
Center  
Ankara Department Head 
1 1 
BU Kandilli Observatory Istanbul Director 1 1 
General Directorates of 
Central Hydraulic Works  
Ankara Head of 
International 
Hydraulic 
Relations  
1  
Prime Ministry Crisis 
Management Center  
Ankara President 1 1 
General Directorate of 
Turkish Disaster Affairs  
Ankara Retired Deputy 
Director 1 1 
TUBITAK Marmara 
Research Center  
Gebze-
Kocaeli 
Department Head 1 1 
General Command of 
Mapping 
Ankara Department Head 1  
METU Disaster 
Management Center 
Ankara President 1 1 
GDDA Communication 
and Logistic Department 
Ankara Director 1 1 
Civil Defense Rescue 
Teams 
Sakarya Commander 1 1 
Public-central 
Bogazici University 
Earthquake Engineering 
Istanbul Department Head 1 1 
Bursa Province 
Government Crisis 
Management Center 
Bursa Deputy Governor 
1  
Bolu Province 
Government  
Bolu Deputy Governor 1  
Crisis Management Center Duzce Director 1  
Bolu Crisis Management 
Center 
Bolu Director 1 1 
Sakarya Province 
Government 
Sakarya GIS Expert 1  
Sakarya Crisis 
Management Center 
Sakarya Director 1 1 
Istanbul Province Crisis 
Management Center 
Istanbul Deputy Director 1 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Public 
Provincial 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    Marmara Duzce 
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Type of 
Organization 
Name of Organization Location Position of 
Interviewees 
Completed 
Interviews 
Kocaeli Province 
Government 
Kocaeli Deputy Governor 1  
Yalova Crisis 
Management Center 
Yalova Director 1  
Yalova Province 
Government 
Yalova Deputy Governor 1  
Duzce Province 
Government 
Duzce Deputy Governor 1 1 
Public 
Provincial 
Kocaeli Urban Planning  Kocaeli Director 1  
Golcuk Crisis 
Management Center 
Golcuk Director 1  Public-
district Avcilar Crisis 
Management Center 
Avcilar Director 1  
Kocaeli Municipality  Kocaeli Head of Fire 
Department 1  
Bolu Municipality Bolu Director of Land 
Development 1 1 
Earthquake and Soil 
Directorate, Istanbul 
Greater Municipality 
Istanbul Director 
1  
Sakarya Municipality Sakarya Head of Fire 
Department 1  
Istanbul Greater 
Municipality Emergency 
Coordination Center 
Istanbul Director 
1  
Public-
municipality 
Bursa Municipality 
Emergency Coordination 
Center 
Bursa Head of Fire 
Department 1  
AKUT Istanbul General Secretary 1 1 
KIZILAY  Ankara Retired Deputy 
Director 1 1 
Turkish Radio Amateur 
Club 
Istanbul President 1 1 Nonprofit 
KIZILAY Emergency 
Coordination Center 
Ankara GIS expert 1  
International JICA Ankara Director 1 1 
National 
Private 
Sayisal Grafik  Istanbul Product Manager 1  
      
Total    39 19 
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3.6 DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 
Both qualitative and quantitative methods are used to analyze the data and present the 
findings of this study. Qualitative data from semi-structured interviews allowed me to investigate 
the factors that hinder or facilitate the performance of disaster organizations. I also applied the 
concept of N-K method to actual disaster circumstances to measure the frequencies and 
directions of information exchange among disaster agencies (Kauffman 1993; Comfort 1999). 
The analyses illustrate the patterns of communication and interactions, and the gaps between the 
informal and formal disaster system formation. Additionally, UCINET results (Borgatti, Everett, 
Freeman 2002) are used to identify the network structure in the response operations after the 
1999 earthquakes, and to track the progress of adoption of information systems into the Turkish 
disaster management system since the earthquakes. 
3.6.1 Descriptive Analysis 
The semi-structured interviews and other secondary data sources are used for the descriptive 
analysis. One of the purposes of this analysis is to determine the initial conditions of the Turkish 
disaster management system during the 1999 response operations. Then, I describe the progress 
in the Turkish disaster management after the 1999 earthquakes.  
The descriptive analysis is primarily focused on exploring the factors that facilitate or 
restrain the performance of disaster organizations. In this regard, existing informational capacity, 
information sharing ability, local sustainability, and organizational flexibility of the system were 
examined.  
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3.6.2 Statistical Analysis 
3.6.2.1 Paired t-test 
Data collected from interviews are used for a statistical analysis. The statistical analysis is used 
to determine if there is a significant difference between the Marmara and Duzce response 
operations in terms of disaster system performance.  
As previously noted, 19 of 39 interviewees were involved in both response systems. I 
used a method based on paired samples for comparing the means of two populations since there 
is a natural pairing of the members of the two populations (Weiss 2005). Based on the data 
gathered from the respondents, a paired-t test was used to test to what extent the utilization of 
information and communication systems had an impact on the performance of the disaster 
system by allowing information exchange among disaster organizations.  
3.6.2.2 Two Population Proportions Test 
Data collected from the content analysis of Cumhuriyet following 21 days of the 
Marmara and Duzce earthquakes are used for “two population proportions test”. Since there is a 
considerable difference between the number of transactions reported for the two response 
systems, comparing the proportions rather appears more appropriate methods. The transactions 
in the two different response systems were compared to see whether communication and 
coordination functions increased significantly. Therefore, this comparison will assist me to 
determine if there is a significant increase in search and rescue capacity of the Turkish disaster 
system from the Marmara to Duzce earthquakes as a result of increasing communication and 
coordination functions. 
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3.6.3 Network Analysis 
Network analysis is used to discover social network structure among disaster agencies both in the 
1999 disaster operations and in redesigning projects of the Turkish disaster system after 1999 to 
present. Data were gathered from primary sources such as the content analysis of Cumhuriyet for 
21 days following the two earthquakes, data from Cumhuriyet news reports from May 1998 to 
May 2005, official websites of disaster agencies, archival data, semi-structured interviews, and 
professional reports are used for the network analysis. 
Network analysis identifies the interactions among the actors (e.g. disaster organizations) 
rather than the attributes of the actors (Hanneman 2001). I used the UCINET software program 
for social network analysis (Borgatti, Everett, Freeman 2002). The social network analysis is 
based on five basic measurements of centrality and cliques’ data (Hanneman 2001), that the 
UCINET software program (Borgatti, Everett, Freeman 2002) provides to analyze the whole 
disaster system network structure: 
1. Degree Centrality: Measures which organizations have the most ties to which other 
organizations.  
2. Closeness Centrality: Measures the distance of an organization to all other organizations 
in the network by focusing on the shortest distance from each organization to all others. 
3. Betweenness Centrality: Measures which organizations have more positional advantage 
to the extent that they fall on the shortest pathway between other pairs of organizations.  
4. Flow Betweenness Centrality: Measures not only the shortest pathways between the 
two pairs of organizations but also all other alternative pathways that an organization can 
use to reach the others.   
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5. Cliques: In addition to the centrality measures, I analyzed cliques’ data for the network 
analysis. Cliques (sub-groups) statistics are important data for analyzing the whole 
disaster network structure. “A clique is a sub-set of a network in which the actors are 
more closely and intensely tied to one another than they are to other members of the 
network” (Hanneman 2001, 79). These statistics show the sub-network structures within 
the larger network.  
I constructed matrices by using the data collected from the primary data sources. In the 
matrices, I used “binary nominal level of measurement”. If an interaction exists between 
organizations, it is coded “1”. If no interaction exists, it is coded “0”. Then, I imported the matrix 
into the UCINET social network software program (Borgatti, Everett, Freeman 2002). 
I performed two network analyses. First, I conducted a network analysis based on the 
data gathered from content analysis of Cumhuriyet for 21 days following the Marmara and 
Duzce earthquakes to identify the interactions among organizations. This analysis explored the 
patterns of communication and information exchange among disaster organizations during the 
disasters.  
Second, I conducted a network analysis based on the data gathered from content analyses 
of weekly Cumhuriyet news reports from May 1998 to May 2005, official websites of disaster 
agencies, archival data, semi-structured interviews, and professional reports. This analysis 
provided information to measure the advancements in the informational and organizational 
capacity of the disaster system after the disasters. The analysis documented the communication 
and interaction patterns among the disaster organizations in implementing information 
infrastructure before and after earthquakes. 
 48
3.6.4 Quantitative Methods 
The research utilized the concept of Kauffman’s (1993) N-K system developed by Comfort 
(1999). Comfort (1999) applied Kauffman’s (1993) N-K system to actual disaster environments 
to measure the content, frequency, and direction of interactions among disaster agencies during 
earthquake response operations. In an N-K system, the content, direction, frequency of 
information exchange and interactions among the components determine the process of 
progression. In this system, the interacting components have a choice to accept or reject the 
information. This requires both order and flexibility. The interacting parts of the system should 
have the capability to arrange and change their behaviors accordingly. The learning capacity of 
the components signifies the performance of the whole system to behave reciprocally. 
In this study, I utilized this method to explore the types, directions, and frequencies of 
transactions and interactions among disaster organizations from different organizational and 
jurisdictional levels in the 1999 Marmara and Duzce response systems. In this analysis, 
measurements are:  
N= Number of actors involved in disaster response systems  
K= Number of interactions among disaster agencies 
T= Number of transactions among disaster agencies 
D= Duration of interactions  
S= Sources of actors-public, nonprofit, private 
Thus, I compared the results of this analysis with the findings from two social network 
analyses to identify whether the changes after 1999 earthquakes were implemented in accordance 
with actual needs. The analysis illustrates when, where and what are needed for effective, 
coordinated disaster operations.  
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3.7 SUMMARY 
This chapter presented the research design and methods that are applied to the study. It defined 
research questions and objectives, unit of analysis and unit of observation, sampling design and 
identification of key decision makers, data collection, data analysis techniques and 
interpretations.  
The chapter described the data sources and uses of the various data for three major 
analyses: descriptive analysis, network analysis and Kauffman’s N-K system analysis.  The main 
purpose of descriptive analysis is to identify the factors that hinder or facilitate the performance 
of the Turkish disaster system. The chapter defined the network analysis that is performed by 
using UCINET software program (Borgatti, Everett, Freeman 2002) to measure the patterns of 
interactions among disaster agencies in the 1999 earthquake response operations and in the 
projects initiated after the earthquakes. Finally, the chapter defined the N-K system that is 
utilized to investigate the characteristics of transactions and interactions among disaster agencies 
to determine the gaps between informal and formal disaster management structure. 
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4.0  TURKISH DISASTER MANAGEMENT POLICIES AND STRUCTURE 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The characteristics of disaster policies and structure identify a nation’s perception of the problem 
and determine the ultimate capability of the system to anticipate and overcome the consequences 
of the problem. Coordination of organizations before and after earthquakes, and clearly 
determining the authority and responsibilities of disaster organizations are very important factors 
that facilitate or inhibit the performance of a disaster management system. In this respect, 
disaster policies become very important tools that expand the capacity of a disaster management 
system to reach a point in which the system performs at its maximum. A nation should establish 
a disaster policy and structure that captures the nonlinear dynamic characteristics of the problem 
and should have the flexibility to allow individual organizations in the disaster system to act 
upon changing environments.  
This chapter analyzes the Turkish disaster policies and organizational structure. The 
chapter also reviews the changes in disaster policies and disaster management structure after the 
1999 earthquakes.   
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4.2 TURKISH DISASTER POLICIES 
 
In the disaster literature, three historical periods are considered milestones in Turkish 
disaster policy administration (TBMM 1997; TBMM 1999; DPT 2000; Akdag 2002): prior to 
1944, 1944 to 1958, and 1958 to 1999.  In addition to these periods, the year 1999 is a starting 
point for important organizational, technical, and regulational changes. The historical root of the 
Turkish disaster policies illuminates the successes and failures of present disaster policies and 
organizational structure.  
Today, there are several important rules that regulate the Turkish disaster policies. 
Disaster Law (No. 7269), Civil Defense Law (No. 7126), and Disaster Regulation 12777 are the 
primary ones. In addition to these laws and regulations, many consider the development laws as 
important as disaster laws (Keles 2002; Balamir 2001). Although the development laws are not 
considered to be disaster laws, they, indirectly but significantly, affect the success of disaster 
policies. Therefore, the first part of the chapter primarily examines the Disaster Law 7269 and 
the Development Law 3194 in detail as they are two of the most important regulations regarding 
disaster policies.   
4.2.1 The Disaster Law of 7269 
The main law that regulates the Turkish Disaster Management is Disaster Law (No. 7269), which 
was passed by Turkish Grand National Assembly in 1959 (Afet Isleri Genel Mudurlugu 1998). 
This law covers all regulations regarding disaster affairs and mainly identifies the tasks of 
disaster organizations before and after disasters. It remains the primary law governing disaster 
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affairs. Under the light of new circumstances, the law has been partly changed and various 
amendments (1968/1051, 1981/2479, 1985/3177, 1995/4133) were enacted into the law (TBMM 
1997; Akdag 2002).  
The law did not specify detailed emergency planning and organizational schema until 
1988. In that year Disaster Regulation of 1277 was created to clarify emergency planning issues. 
The regulation provided an outline for the national emergency plan and required institutions, 
ministries, province, and district governments to create their own specific emergency plans. 
Disaster Law 7269 awards extraordinary authorities to provincial and district governments to 
undertake necessary actions and to use public, private and even military properties for response 
operations.  
The Disaster Law is considered highly advanced and comprehensive for the era in which 
it was created, however, it has not adapted over time to changing conditions. Although the 
Disaster Law clarifies the tasks to be carried out before and after disasters, it focuses 
fundamentally on the response and recovery stages of disasters (National Earthquake Council 
2002). The major goal of Disaster Law 7269 is to recover and rehabilitate after a disaster 
happens, rather than to reduce seismic risk and create a disaster resilient community (National 
Earthquake Council Report 2002).  
It has been a challenge for Turkish public administration to revise the traditional linear 
disaster policies in order to capture the complexities of risk. The organizational tradition of 
Turkish public administration has characterized the Turkish disaster policies and management 
structure that can be traced back to the Ottoman Era. 
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4.2.2  The Evolution of the Turkish Disaster System  
The first written document regarding Turkish disaster affairs was regarding the earthquake that 
occurred in 1509. Following that disaster which killed 13 thousand people in Istanbul, II Beyazit, 
the emperor of the Ottoman Empire gave orders to assist the earthquake victims. The Ottoman 
administration gave 20 gold pieces to each family, and assigned construction experts to rebuild 
their homes. Similar post-disaster efforts were made during the Ottoman era.  
In 1848, the Ottoman administration established Ebniyye Nizannamesi, a regulation, to 
control construction facilities in Istanbul. In 1877, this regulation was expanded to encompass all 
municipalities within the Ottoman Empire. The law of Ebniyye was extended in 1882 to regulate 
infrastructure and roads. Although these regulations were established to manage urbanization, 
they can be considered the first attempt to reduce the vulnerabilities of Turkish communities to 
disaster.  
After the foundation of the modern Republic of Turkey, the approach to disaster 
management did not differ considerably from that of the Ottoman Empire. In 1933, the Act of 
2290, The Municipality Building and Roads Law, significantly altered the Ebniyye Nizannamesi. 
This law decided all regulations regarding land development, infrastructure, roads, buildings and 
construction activities. Subsequent to The Erzincan earthquake on December 26, 1939, the 
deadliest earthquake in Turkish history, Turkish public administration established some 
temporary regulations and policies to assist the victims of the earthquakes. From 1939 to 1944, 
five destructive earthquakes struck Turkey: Erzincan, Niksar-Erbaa, Adapazari-Hendek, Tosya-
Ladik, and Bolu-Gerede. These earthquakes killed more than 43 thousand people, injured over 
75 thousand and damaged in excess of 200 thousand buildings (Akdag 2002). These incidents 
showed that it is not possible to diminish the negative consequences of a disaster by simply 
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rebuilding homes after an earthquake. In 1944, the Turkish disaster administration took the first 
steps toward mitigation.   
In 1944, Turkey passed The Law for Measures to be Taken Before and After 
Earthquakes. This law (No. 4623) was the first regulation that Turkish public administration 
established for mitigation purposes. It required Turkish public administration to identify seismic 
risk prone areas, create special rules for construction facilities in these areas, develop aid and 
rescue plans before earthquakes, and prevent settlement before geological examination of the 
land (Akdag 2002; TBMM 1997). In 1945, the Public Works Ministry created the first seismic 
risk map of Turkey and established the first regulation of mandatory construction codes for 
disaster prone areas.  
The primary laws, regulations and institutional establishments were established during 
1958-1999, including Disaster Law 7269, the new Development Law 3194, and Civil Defense 
Law 7126. During this period, the key institutions, Public Works and Settlement Ministry, 
General Directorate of Disaster Affairs, and General Directorate of Civil Defense were founded.  
The primary legal and organizational progress in the Turkish Disaster Management 
System from 1958 to 1999 shaped the fundamental patterns of the Turkish disaster system. 
Although these developments indicate an advanced understanding of disaster affairs from earlier 
periods, the system has not shown a significant capacity to build disaster resilient communities. 
The focus on response and recovery phases, policies and organizational structure based on 
traditional linear assumptions, and the lack of sufficient organizational and technical capacity 
constrained the ability of the system to cope with the problems of destructive earthquakes during 
that period. Another important factor affecting the adequacy of the disaster system was that the 
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decision makers did not use land development policy as a tool to establish disaster resilient 
communities in risk prone areas (Balamir 2001; Keles 2002). 
4.2.3 The Development Laws and Disaster Affairs 
One of the main critic issues of Turkish disaster policies is that “disaster policies and 
development policies are not well connected” (Keles 2002; National Earthquake Council Report 
2002). From Ebniyye Nizannamesi in 1848 to the new Development Laws 3194 in 1988, the 
changes in development regulations did not consider the seismic risk, especially in metropolitan 
areas, as an important aspect of development policies.   
According to Municipality Law 1580 and the Municipality Building and Roads Law 
2290, established in 1930 and 1933 respectively, municipalities have the authority and the 
responsibility for land development and construction activities in cities. However, in the 1950s, 
domestic migration toward bigger cities, urbanization, and increasing industrial facilities in 
metropolitan areas created huge problems and construction activities became very difficult to 
control. Therefore, the Turkish Grand National Assembly passed a development law (No. 6785) 
in 1956 to regulate development affairs in cities. However, Development Law 6785 could not 
solve the problems of land development.  
Populist policies to win elections and the willingness of public officials to excuse illegal 
construction activities made this problem nearly unsolvable. In 1988, the Turkey Grand National 
Assembly passed a new Development Law, 3194, to replace the old 6785 in order to deal with 
the increasing level of urbanization problems. Today, Development Law 3194 is the major law 
that regulates the matters of land development, construction, and construction monitoring. 
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As with the previous law, the final Development Law proved insufficient to address the 
problems of illegal construction activities in cities. According to current Turkish officials, today, 
approximately one half of the buildings in Istanbul are illegally constructed.8   
“…there are approximately 1.2-1.3 million buildings, inside the metropolitan city 
of Istanbul. But only 600-700 thousand of them are legally constructed. We 
should have more comprehensive land development laws and these laws should 
be strictly implemented.” 
 
Keles (2002) claims that Development Law 3194 is inadequate and outdated. 
Municipalities with populations over 10 thousand and provincial governments are responsible for 
the preparation of development plans. However, they are not required to incorporate seismic data 
into the plans. Further, many municipalities lack the technical and financial capacity to design 
and implement development plans. Therefore, from planning phases to control phases, 
construction activities pose a huge dilemma for the disaster system. Keles (2002) asserts that 
construction control is almost non-existent in Turkey.  
In conclusion, several issues must be considered in Turkish development and disaster 
policies (National Earthquake Council Report 2002; Istanbul Emergency Master Plan 2003). 
First, populist policies continue to extend illegal settlements into metropolitan areas. Second, the 
Development Law and the Disaster Law are not considered to be two sides of a single coin.  The 
Development Law should consider seismic risk as a basis for land-use and settlement in cities. 
To achieve a successful disaster policy, “the practice of land-use planning and zoning, 
transportation and infrastructure planning, procedures for density assignment, planning the open 
spaces, participation processes, strengthening and devising new methods monitoring building- 
use control, etc., all of these are distinct aspects of disaster concerns that naturally need to be 
                                                 
8 Interview with Emergency Coordination Center, Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, June 22, 
2004 
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covered in the Development Law” (Balamir 2001, 210). A third criticism is that there is an 
uncertainty about the authority and responsibility of organizations over land development issues. 
Many organizations have partial responsibilities for land development and physical planning 
making it difficult to track and enforce the illegal construction activities in metropolitan cities. 
4.3 TURKISH DISASTER MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE 
Local and central Turkish disaster management is structured according to Disaster Law 7269. 
According to this law, the General Directorate of Disaster Affairs under the Ministry of Public 
Works and Settlement is responsible for preparedness, response, and recovery operations and 
coordination of these activities. In addition, several ministries have responsibilities and authority 
at different stages of the disaster management process (Keles 2002), creating a significant 
confusion for coordinating the disaster activities. To avoid this problem at the provincial level, 
the law allocates power to provincial governors to administer provincial branches of ministries.  
The confusion of power and responsibility is a significant problem at the central level of 
disaster administration as well. At the central level, along with the General Directorate of 
Disaster Affairs, the General Directorate of Civil Defense was established under the Interior 
Ministry to carry out the tasks that Civil Defense Law 7126 defines. The GDCD also carries out 
the tasks mandated by Disaster Law 7269, and Disaster Regulation 12777 (Corbaciaglu and 
Kapucu 2005). Other organizations such as the Prime Ministry’s Emergency Coordination 
Council and the Disasters Center Coordination Council have responsibilities and authority for 
coordination of disaster operations after a disaster happens.  
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In order to expose the coordination problems of the Turkish disaster system, we should 
examine the formal Turkish disaster management structure. The Turkish disaster management 
structure is organized at central and local levels. At the local level, the provincial rescue and aid 
committee is responsible for disaster operations. If a disaster exceeds the capacity of disaster 
agencies at the local level, the responsibility and authority go from the local level to the central 
level disaster agencies. The Central Disaster Coordinating Committee is the main body at the 
central level. If a disaster threatens the life and security of the nation, the prime minister declares 
a crisis management situation and the Prime Ministry’s Crisis Management Center takes charge.  
4.3.1 Turkish Disaster Management at Local Level 
Local level organizations are the first response actors in the Turkish disaster system. Disaster 
Law 7269 and the Regulation 12777 require district and provincial disaster organizations to 
prepare emergency plans before a disaster, and respond to the disaster accordingly. If a disaster 
is relatively small, public-district disaster organizations respond under the district managers, 
Kaymakam. If the resources and agencies of districts are insufficient to handle the disaster, 
provincial public disaster organizations take over the authority under the command of the 
provincial governor. Figure 3 shows the local disaster management structure. 
This structure appears ideal since it provides the responsibilities and power to local 
organizations for immediate response to disasters. However, it is not practically functional 
because the local disaster organizations do not posses sufficient technical and organizational 
capacity to cope with a major disaster. In many cases, such as the Marmara and Duzce 
earthquakes, the local communities are overwhelmed by the disasters and do not have the ability 
to perform their responsibilities.  
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Figure 3 Provincial Rescue and Aid Committee 
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4.3.2 Turkish Disaster Management Central Level 
The Central Disaster Coordinating Committee is the main body in the Turkish disaster 
management structure at the central level. The committee is responsible for responding to a 
disaster if provincial rescue and aid groups are not able to overcome the problems of the disaster. 
The schema of this committee is shown at Figure 4. 
There are two main organizations at the central level that are responsible for coordinating 
disaster affairs: the General Directorate of Disaster Affairs and the recently founded General 
Directorate of Turkey Emergency Management (GDTEM). However, when a disaster occurs, 
two other organizations at the central level join these two organizations in coordinating disaster 
operations: The General Directorate of Civil Defense (GDCD) and the Prime Ministry Crisis 
Management Center (PMCMC).  
GDCD operates under the Interior Ministry and is the major organization responsible for 
coordinating rescue operations. In addition to GDCD, PMCMC is another coordinating 
establishment after a disaster threatens the wellbeing of Turkish people. According to the 
regulation of 8716 (1996), if the prime minister declares an emergency situation, the PMCMC 
steps in command and becomes the main body of the disaster management system.  Figure 5 
shows the structure of the Prime Ministry’s Crisis Management Center.  
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Figure 4 Central Disaster Coordination Committee 
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Sources: JICA (2004), Ergunay (1999) 
Figure 5 Prime Minister Crisis Management Center 
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In addition to these organizations, there are others that are fully or partially responsible 
for coordination of disaster operations during a major disaster. As Akdag (2002) ironically 
observes, there are almost more coordination agencies than response agencies in the system 
(Figure 6).  
 
Figure 6 Organizations Responsible for Coordination in the Turkish Disaster System 
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4.4 DEVELOPMENTS AFTER THE 1999 EARTHQUAKES 
After the 1999 Marmara and Duzce earthquakes, several significant legal and institutional 
reforms were introduced into the Turkish disaster system. The General Directorate of Turkey 
Emergency Management and the National Earthquake Council were added to the system to 
improve coordination among disaster organizations before and after disasters. The General 
Directorate of Civil Defense established 11 professional rescue groups in different parts of the 
country to increase the response capacity of the system.  
Some important legal changes were also made after the earthquakes. A mandatory 
earthquake insurance system and cabinet decisions for a new Building Construction Control 
System were the most important legal initiatives for reducing the hazardous effects of 
earthquakes. 
4.4.1 General Directorate of Turkey Emergency Management  
After the 1999 earthquakes, Turkish public administration attempted to address the problems of 
intergovernmental coordination. In order to coordinate efforts before and after a disaster, a new 
organization was established. Based on the Cabinet decision number 583/1999 and 600/2000, 
and with financial support from the World Bank, the General Directorate of Turkey Emergency 
Management (GDTEM) was founded under the Prime Ministry. In 1999, the institution was 
established as a directorate and later in 2000 it was promoted to the level of general directorate.  
The GDTEM became responsible for coordinating public disaster agencies for natural or man-
made disasters that threaten the security of the nation.  The primary tasks of the GDTEM are 
(Corbacioglu and Kapucu 2005): 
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• Coordinating the operations of public organizations, 
• Enabling public organizations to establish emergency management centers, 
• Establishing a disaster database, creating short and long term plans and assessing 
the attempts of disaster organizations to diminish the risk of emergency, 
• Encouraging volunteer activities, 
The GDTEM was established to solve coordination problems among public disaster 
organizations in the disaster system. However, the legal basis of the GDTEM does not allow the 
organization to effectively perform this main goal. In the hierarchical Turkish public 
administration, the GDTEM lacks authority over the primary disaster organizations. The current 
legal and institutional formation of the GDTEM made the coordination issue more complex in 
the Turkish disaster system.  
Some argue that a new organization was not necessary to perform these tasks.9 They 
claim that one of the organizations among the General Directorate of Disaster Affairs (GDDA), 
Prime Ministry Crisis Management Center (PMCMC), General Directorate of Civil Defense 
(GDCD) could be reorganized to perform these duties. On the other hand, some argue that a new 
coordinating agency was required in the organizational structure of the disaster system.10 
However, they assert the GDTEM should be formed at a higher level, such as undersecretary of a 
ministry, to eliminate any power conflict among the agencies. 
 According to one expert, the reason for this conflict was that the GDTEM was 
established in a hurry without much consideration or preparedness.11 The World Bank promised 
millions of dollars in financial assistance after the 1999 earthquakes. The condition for obtaining 
                                                 
9  Interview with Earthquake Research Center, GDDA, June 10, 2004    
10  Interview with The Red Crescent Society, June 9, 2004    
11 Interview with METU Disaster Management Center, June 8, 2004    
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this assistance was the establishment of a new coordination agency in the Turkish disaster 
system. The GDTEM was established before the last day of deadline to obtain this financial 
assistance. In June 2004, the GDTEM lacked the personnel, organizational, and technical 
resources to perform any of its duties.12 
4.4.2 National Earthquake Council 
The Prime Ministry’s Office established a scientific, independent National Earthquake Council 
in March 2000. The National Earthquake Council was created to evaluate and unite discussions 
among experts about future earthquakes. According to the decision 2000/9, the council consists 
of 20 experts selected from universities, public disaster organizations, and professional 
institutions. Turkey Scientific and Technical Research and the Council of Turkey became the 
responsible organizations for the foundation of the council. TUBITAK also performs as the 
secretary of the council. The major missions of this council are (Balamir 2001): 
• To evaluate the assertions and predictions for future seismic risk, and to share the 
findings with the authorities and public, 
• To identify priorities for research activities for reducing seismic risk, 
• To provide consultation for public disaster agencies, 
• To prepare strategic disaster policies, 
The council met on June 16, 2000. In 2002, the council prepared its first report, National 
Strategic Report for Reducing the Harmful Effects of Earthquakes. The council offered the report 
                                                 
12 Interview with General Directorate of Turkey Emergency Management, June 7, 2004    
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to all public institutions, including the Turkish Grand National Assembly. The report identified 
the legal, institutional, land development, informational, and educational aspects of disaster 
administration, and recommended the actions that are to be taken for mitigation. Unfortunately, 
because of changes in the administration of TUBITAK, the council has not been very effective in 
gathering the responsible organizations in order to discuss and implement the policies that the 
strategic report recommended (JICA 2004).    
4.4.3 Increasing Search and Rescue Capacity of the System 
After the Marmara and Duzce disasters, the General Directorate of Civil Defense increased the 
number and competence of professional search and rescue groups to improve the system’s 
response capacity. By Cabinet Decisions 586/1999 and 596/2000, the General Directorate of 
Civil Defense established well-trained rescue groups equipped with advanced technical vehicles 
in 11 cities: Adana, Afyon, Bursa, Diyarbakir, Erzurum, Istanbul, Izmir, Sakarya, Samsun and 
Van. GDCD assigned these rescue teams to some groups of provinces and determined the 
primary responsibilities of teams based on the location of a disaster. Each rescue team includes 
100-120 personnel, and operates as a regional rescue team.  
In addition, the Turkish Armed Forces have founded natural disaster rescue troops 
consisting of members from the Army, Navy, Air Forces, and Gendarmerie (Corbacioglu and 
Kapucu 2005). Further, many volunteer search and rescue groups have been established in 
provinces in the Marmara region. All of these developments significantly increased the response 
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capacity of the disaster system. Many agree that the search and rescue function of the Turkish 
disaster system is the most developed element of the system since the 1999 earthquakes.13      
4.4.4 Mandatory Earthquake Insurance System 
According to Disaster Law 7269, the central government was responsible for rebuilding the 
damaged properties of citizens after a disaster occurs. Experiences have proved this policy to be 
an obstacle in implementing earthquake resistant building codes. The residents in the risk-prone 
areas do not comply with earthquake resistant building codes since the state is the free insurer of 
the damaged properties. This policy creates a huge financial burden for the state. After the 1999 
earthquakes, public managers decided to alter this policy and share the financial burden with 
citizens and encourage citizen compliance with regulations.   
A mandatory earthquake insurance system was established on December 27, 1999 by 
Cabinet Decision 587. After this decision, the state was no longer the free insurer of the damaged 
buildings following a disaster. Earthquake insurance was required for buildings constructed 
inside the borders of municipalities. A Natural Disaster Insurance Agency was founded to collect 
insurance money and administer the system. The insurance system covers 10 million, 71.4% of 
the existing properties (Gulkan 2001). Although this regulation was an important step for disaster 
mitigation, the implementation of this system has not been very effective.14 The residents in 
                                                 
13Interview with General Directorate of Civil Defense, June 8, 2004                                   
Interview with Istanbul Province Government, June 21, 2004    
Interview with Sakarya Civil Defense Rescue Group, June 15, 2004   
Interview with Avcilar Crisis Management Center, June 22, 2004     
14 Interview with Bogazici University Earthquake Engineering, June 24, 2004 
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earthquake risk-prone areas still ignore mandatory insurance and are very reluctant to pay for 
it.15  
4.4.5 Building Construction Inspection 
The most important requirement for reducing seismic risk is to have a building stock that is 
rigorously constructed according to earthquake resistant codes.  The inadequate policies in 
implementing building codes and controlling building construction have been the biggest 
problem of the Turkish disaster management system. The municipalities that have 
responsibilities for development plans and construction activities have proven reluctant to 
enforce the implementation of earthquake resistant building codes. To solve this problem, an 
important policy change was made by the Cabinet Decision 595 in April, 2000. According to this 
Cabinet Decision, the municipalities still had the authority for land development and 
construction permission. However, excluding public constructions, the new policy gave the 
responsibilities of monitoring constructing activities to certified private construction monitoring 
companies. These companies had the power to monitor construction activities from project 
phases to the end of construction. For ten years, they were legally responsible for the buildings 
that they inspected.  
The rule initially applied to the 27 provinces including the provinces that were affected 
by the Marmara Earthquake. Although experts praised this new policy, it did not remain in effect 
very long.16 A political party requested the Supreme Court to abandon this policy, and 
consequently the Supreme Court abolished the Cabinet Decision 595/2000 in 2001. In June 29 
                                                 
15 Interview with Emergency Coordination Center, Istanbul Greater Municipality, June 22, 2004 
16 Interview with METU Disaster Management Center, June 8, 2004       
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2001, the Turkey Grand National Assembly passed a new Construction Monitoring Law 4708. 
The new law significantly altered many aspects of the Cabinet Decision 595. According to many 
professionals, the new law made the system more centralized and inadequate in implementing 
earthquake resistant building codes than it was before the 1999 Earthquakes (Gulkan 2001).  
The changes in the disaster policies and institutional structure after the 1999 earthquakes, 
to some degree, have improved the capacity of the Turkish system. In particular, new civil 
defense rescue teams and numerous volunteer rescue groups in disaster stricken cities 
significantly increased the response capacity of the system. However, the modifications in 
disaster policies are not sufficient to alter the linear, centralized, and bureaucratic characteristics 
of the Turkish disaster management system.  
4.5 SUMMARY 
This chapter reviewed the evolution of Turkish disaster polices and management structure. 
Disasters, especially earthquakes, have created destructive consequences in every aspect of 
community life in Turkey. For centuries, a moderate earthquake has occurred almost every year. 
Turkish public administration has implemented many policies and institutions to address the 
problems of earthquakes since the Ottoman Empire. During the early periods prior to 1944, these 
policies focused on recovery and relief efforts after a disaster hit. After 1944, the Turkish public 
administration began to understand that the problems of seismic risk require a different approach 
in order to decrease the negative impact of earthquakes. During the period of 1958-1999, Turkish 
public administration established the legal bases and institutional structure of the Turkish disaster 
system. The establishment of new policies and organizational structure was distinguished from 
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earlier periods and was considered an advanced step toward more appropriate disaster 
management design. Although the improvement in disaster policies was significant, the policies 
were primarily focused on the later stage of disaster management. The disaster administration 
acted as a healer rather than a protector. The bureaucratic and hierarchical Turkish public 
administration formed by linear policies constrained the ability of disaster agencies to address 
the problems of complex, dynamic risk. The 1999 earthquakes proved that policies primarily 
focused on the later stages of disaster mitigation, and an inflexible, bureaucratic management 
structure is destined to fail in situations of complex, dynamic, and uncertain risk.  
The final sections of the chapter analyzed the attempts of the Turkish public 
administration to reorganize and restructure disaster policies and organizational formation to 
minimize seismic risk. In order to diminish the problems of coordination among the disaster 
organizations, the General Directorate of Turkey Emergency Management and the National 
Earthquake Council were established. The administration significantly increased the response 
capacity of the disaster system by founding rescue teams throughout the country. In addition to 
these organizational changes, some important policies were implemented. A mandatory disaster 
insurance program and the policies to increase enforcement for earthquake resistant building 
codes are important improvements. However, the review showed that these new institutional and 
legal changes have not yet effectively increased the capacity of the Turkish disaster system.  
There are other attempts that the disaster organizations initiated to increase the technical 
and organizational capacity of the system. The next chapters will analyze these initiations to 
measure to what extent the disaster system has been improved. 
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5.0  THE INITIAL CONDITIONS OF INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE DURING THE 
1999 EARTHQUAKES 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter explores the initial conditions of the information infrastructure during the 1999 
earthquakes. The questions of the study addressed in this chapter are: 
How effectively did the existing information infrastructure of the Turkish    Disaster 
Management System support the organizational response operations in the 1999 Marmara and 
Duzce Earthquakes? 
a. What were the initial conditions of the information infrastructure before the 
earthquakes? 
b. To what extent did the existing information systems provide a knowledge base to 
support coordinated actions among emergency organizations from different 
jurisdictions? 
c. How did the existing information and communication technologies affect the 
interaction and exchange of information among emergency organizations during 
the disasters? 
In order to address these questions, I analyzed the data collected from primary actors that 
were involved in response operations and participated in the projects initiated after the 1999 
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Earthquakes. In the first part of this chapter, I provide a descriptive analysis of sample 
organizations and the type of services that they perform. Then, I examine the initial conditions of 
the information infrastructure during the 1999 earthquakes. In this section, I compare the 
performance of the disaster system in both earthquakes to illustrate whether the utilization of 
information and communication means had a significant impact on the performance of the 
Turkish disaster system. 
5.2 DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF THE SAMPLE ACTORS 
5.2.1 Jurisdictions of Respondent Organizations 
This section analyzes the jurisdictional and demographic characteristics of respondent 
organizations in the sample. Table 6 represents a list of organizations that participated in semi-
structured interviews. Members from a total number of 39 organizations were interviewed. 
Thirty-nine interviewees responded to questions related to the Marmara response system, 
whereas nineteen of 39 respondents also answered questions regarding the Duzce response 
system.  
As indicated in Table 6, most of the organizations in the sample are public-central 
organizations. Approximately 33% of organizations in the sample involved in the Marmara 
response operations are public-central organizations while 68.4% of 19 respondent organizations 
are public-central organizations that were involved in the Duzce response operations. Public 
provincial (30.8%) and public-municipality (10.3%) organizations are also important 
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components of the sample for the Marmara response system. There are 2 district organizations 
that were involved in the Marmara response system, but not in the Duzce response system.17  
Table 6 Summary of Semi-Structured Interview Respondents and Organizations 
Type of Organizations Semi-Structured Interview Respondents 
 Marmara Response System Duzce Response System 
 N % N %
Public-central 13 33.3 10 68.4
Public Provincial 12 30.8 4 21.1
Public-district 2 5.1 0 0.0
Public-municipality 6 15.4 1 5.3
Nonprofit 4 10.3 3 15.8
Private 1 2.6 0 0.0
International 1 2.6 1 5.3
Total 39 100 19 115.8
N= Number of Respondents; %= Percentage of Respondents 
Source: Semi-Structured Interviews with Turkish Experts in Disaster                  
    Management (June 1-July 27, 2004) 
 
Interviewing respondents who were involved in both response systems allowed me to 
compare their perceptions of the performance of the Turkish disaster system in the two 
earthquakes. Different organizations from different jurisdictional levels provided evidence to 
evaluate the initial conditions of information infrastructure for two response systems. Comparing 
two different sets of data shows how information search, acquisition and exchange ability of the 
system affected the performance of Turkish disaster system.  
                                                 
17 Duzce city was a district during the Marmara earthquake. Right after the Marmara earthquake, 
The Turkey Grand National Assembly issued a law that made Duzce a province. So, the 
respondent organizations from Duzce were coded provincial organizations instead of as district 
organizations. 
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5.2.2 Demographic Characteristic of Respondent Organizations 
Demographic characteristics of the respondents show the validity of data collected from 
experienced managers in Turkish disaster management. The data in Table 7 represent the 
demographic characteristics of respondents and their organizations. 
Table 7 Demographic Characteristics of Interviewee Organizations 
Years of Experiences in  Emergency 
Management Service 
N % Total Response
1 year or less 0 0  
2-4 years 4 10.5  
5-7 years 8 21.1  
8-10 years 3 7.9  
More than 10 years 23 60.5  
Other (n/a) 1 -  
    100 38 
Staff Size 
1-5 5 15.2   
6-15 7 21.2   
16-25 4 12.1   
26-50 3 9.1   
Over 50 14 42.4   
Other (n/a) 6 -   
    100 33 
Budget 
0-25,000.00 YTL 0 0   
25,000.01-75,000.00 YTL 0 0   
75,000.01-150,000.00 YTL 4 19   
150,000.01- 500, 000.00 YTL 4 19   
More than 500, 000.00 YTL 13 61.9   
Other (n/a) 18 -   
    100 21 
Education 
High school 0 0   
Bachelor’s Degree 26 68.4   
Master’s 5 13.2   
PhD 7 18.4   
Other (n/a) 1 -   
    100 38 
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 N % Total Response 
Age 
20-30 2 5.4  
31-40 14 37.8  
41-50 17 45.9  
51-60 3 8.1  
61 and Over 1 2.7  
Other (n/a) 2 -  
    100 37 
Gender 
Male 35 89.7   
Female 4 10.3   
    100 39 
            N= Number of Respondents; %= Percentage of Respondents 
  Source: Semi-Structured Interviews with Turkish Experts in Disaster   
                   Management (June 1-July 27, 2004) 
 
According to the data above, most of the respondents have worked in the emergency field 
more than 10 years (23 of 38, or 60.5%). In terms of staff size, more than 40% of the 
organizations (14, or 42.4%) have in excess of 50 workers that carry out tasks for emergency 
purposes. Most representatives of organizations did not want to answer the question about their 
budget. Thirteen of the 18 interviewees (61.9%) who answered this question said that their 
organizations have a budget of more than 500,000.00 new Turkish Liras.   
Most of the interviewees were middle-aged males with bachelor’s degrees. All 
respondents have at least a bachelor’s degree, whereas 5 (13.2%) have a master’s degree and 7 
(18.4%) have Ph.D. degrees. Out of 39 interviewees, 35 of them (89.7%) are males. Seventeen of 
37 respondents (45.9%) are between 41 and 50 years old. More than 80% of respondents are 
between 30 and 50 years old. These findings combined with the result of the years of experience 
in service show that the respondents are quite experienced in emergency management.  
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5.2.3 Type of Services of Respondent Organizations 
The respondents work in different organizations performing various tasks related to 
emergency management. Figure 7 depicts the type of services that interviewees’ organizations offer. 
All of the organizations have responsibilities for emergency management to different degrees. 
Fourteen of 39 respondent organizations (35.9%) are primarily responsible for carrying out tasks in 
crisis management. These organizations perform tasks that cover all phases of disaster management.  
There are four organizations (10.2%) that provide services in the field of information 
technology expertise and communication. These organizations are involved in various projects to 
increase the information and communication capacities of the disaster system. Five respondents, or 
12.8%, do research for emergency purposes. These organizations are public-central organizations 
that include universities as well. Four, or 10.3%, are rescue organizations, and 2 of the respondent 
organizations (5.1%) including the only nonprofit organizations in the formal Turkish disaster 
system, the Turkish Red Crescent Society, are responsible for mass care. Since this study assumes 
that land development policies are essential for disaster mitigation, three respondents with authority 
over land development strategies are included in the sample. In addition to these services, six 
respondents, or 15.4%, provide various public services, and one organization (2.6%) is responsible 
for public security. 
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Figure 7 Types of Services Provided by the Organizations 
“What is the primary function of your organizations?” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Service N % 
Crisis Management 14 35.9 
Research  5 12.8 
IT expertise 2 5.1 
Public Affairs 6 15.4 
Mass Care 2 5.1 
Communication 2 5.1 
Rescue 4 10.3 
Land Use Development and Management 3 7.7 
Public Safety 1 2.6 
Total 39 100.0
 
N= Number of Respondent; %= Percentage of Respondent    
Source: Semi-Structured Interviews with Turkish Experts in Disaster Management (June 
1-July 27, 2004) 
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5.3 THE PERFORMANCE OF TURKISH DISASTER SYSTEM DURING THE 1999 
EARTHQUAKES 
In this section of the chapter, I analyze the data primarily collected from interviews to investigate 
initial conditions of information infrastructure during the 1999 response operations. This analysis 
consists of three parts: (1) examining the degree of utilization of existing information and 
communication infrastructure for both earthquakes; and, (2) examining the significance of 
information exchange among disaster organizations during the earthquakes; and, (3) examining 
the impact of information infrastructure on the performance of the Turkish disaster system 
during the earthquakes.  
In this part of the study, I also perform a statistical analysis to test the impact of 
information and communication capacity of the disaster system on the performance of disaster 
organizations during the Marmara and Duzce earthquakes since I have 19 respondents that were 
involved in both response systems. I conducted a paired-t test analysis to see whether there is a 
significant change in information processes from the Marmara response system to the Duzce 
response system.  
5.3.1 Means of Communication and Information during the 1999 Earthquakes 
The initial conditions of informational infrastructure are very important for the performance of a 
disaster system during disaster response operations. The level of information infrastructure 
inhibits or facilitates the ability to obtain and exchange timely and accurate information for 
response operations. Availability of means of communication increases information exchange 
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among disaster organizations so that disaster organizations can act upon timely information to 
respond to a disaster effectively. 
Insufficient information and communication capacity of the disaster system constrained 
timely information gathering and exchange among disaster organizations, especially during the 
Marmara earthquake.18 Table 8 shows the availability of means of information and 
communication technologies during the 1999 response operations.  
According to Table 8, most of the organizations (38.7 %) used cell/mobile phones to 
obtain and exchange the information during the earthquakes. But these were not secure phone 
lines among disaster organizations. During the first three days of response operations, 
responsible disaster managers were not able to use these communication means in many disaster-
stricken places because the main fiber optic cable between Istanbul and Ankara, and the 
backbone connections into this region were damaged.19 The utilization of phones was very 
limited and far from adequate to establish coordination during the disaster operations (Comfort, 
2000).  
Another issue was the utilization of advance information and communication tools. 
According to respondent organizations, utilization of advance information and communication 
tools was even more limited. Only seven of the 31, or 9.3% of respondents, and three of 15, or 
7.5% of respondents, said that they had both Geographic Information Systems (GIS) and Global 
Positioning Systems (GPS) during the Marmara, and Duzce earthquakes, respectively. However, 
                                                 
18 Interview with The Red Crescent Society, June 9, 2004 
19 Interview with  Kocaeli Municipality Fire Department, June 16, 2004  
   Interview with  General Directorate of Turkey Emergency Management, June 7, 2004 
   Interview with  Sakarya Crisis Management Center, June 15, 2004   
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those organizations were primarily research and private organizations.20 Many organizations that 
have responsibilities to cope with immediate response operations were not able to utilize these 
advanced information technologies. Institutions that have GIS (e.g. Istanbul Province, GDDA) 
could not use the system in early days of disaster, since either they did not have trained personnel 
or the system was still under development (Comfort 2000).  
Table 8 Means of Communication/Information 
“What kind of information and communication technologies did you use to obtain and transmit 
information to other organizations involved in the disaster operations process?” 
Means of Communication 
/Information 
Marmara % Duzce % Total Response % 
GIS 7 9.3 3 7.5 10 8.7
GPS 7 9.3 3 7.5 10 8.7
Computer/Computer Networks 5 6.7 2 5.0 7 6.1
Satellite Phones 5 6.7 3 7.5 8 7.0
Megaphone 5 6.7 0 0.0 5 4.3
Radio/ Amateur radio 1 1.3 1 2.5 2 1.7
Internet 7 9.3 4 10.0 11 9.6
TV 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
Intelligent Reasoning 1 1.3 0 0.0 1 0.9
Risk Assessment models 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
Wireless Communication  /Walkie-
talkie 
8 10.7 8 20.0 16 13.9
Cell / mobile Phones 29 38.7 16 40.0 45 39.1
Other (n/a) 8 10.7 4 - 12 -
Total response 75 100.0 40 100.0 115 100.0
N= Number of Respondents; %= Percentage of Respondents 
Multiple responses were accepted. 
   Sources: Semi-Structured Interviews with Turkish Experts in Disaster                       
 Management (June 1-July 27, 2004) 
 
Amateur radio and wireless communication were more useful to the organizations that 
worked fundamentally on the streets to manage and coordinate response and recovery 
                                                 
20 Those organizations are General Directorate of Land Registry and Cadastre, General Directorate of 
Disaster Affairs, Earthquake Research Center, TUBITAK Marmara Research Center, Bogazici 
University, Kandilli Observatory, General Directorate of Central Hydraulic Works, General Command of 
Mapping, and Sayisal Grafik Ltd.  
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operations.21 However, only 10.7% respondents said that they were able to use wireless 
communication. There was only one organization (e.g. TRAC) that was able to utilize amateur 
radio for communication among disaster organizations during the Marmara and Duzce 
earthquakes. 
The important issue is how effectively the organizations were able to use the existing 
information systems. In some cases, these tools existed, but they were not accessible to 
responsible managers who manage the response operations. Particularly during the Marmara 
earthquake, responsible managers had immense difficulties in obtaining information from 
disaster sites and disseminating this information to rescue groups. According to Table 9, more 
than half of the organizations (57.1%) used the information and communication technologies at a 
less than good level during the Marmara response operations. Fourteen, or 40%, of the 
respondents said that they were not at all able to use them to obtain disaster relevant information 
from stricken communities and transmit this information to appropriate disaster organizations.  
Only one interviewee said that they were able to use these technologies to a great extent.22 The 
disaster organizations that are responsible for disaster response operations in practice were not 
able use the information and communication technologies to a good extent.  
Reviewing the responses for the Duzce earthquake, one can see clear differences from the 
Marmara earthquake regarding utilization of existing information infrastructure. Although the 
organizations in the Duzce response system did not significantly differ from the organizations 
involved in the Marmara response system in terms of existing information and communication 
capacity, they were in a better position to utilize these tools effectively. All of the respondents 
                                                 
21 Interview with Turkish Amateur Radio Club, June  2004 
22 Interview with  TUBITAK Marmara Research Center, July 25, 2004 
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claimed that they used the information and communication technologies at great or good 
extent.23  
“Duzce response operations were not like the Marmara. Communication and 
coordination were very good. We were able use satellite phones or amateur radio 
to communicate. Many central organizations were still in the region. I have to say 
that the Turkish state was here. When the earthquake happened we were ready. In 
several hours, we were able to reach every corner of Duzce. We had learned from 
the Marmara.” 
 
Table 9 Utilizing IT during the Marmara and Duzce Response Operations 
“To what extent did your organizations utilize information and communication means 
in disaster operations?” 
Marmara Duzce All Earthquakes  
Responses % Responses % Responses %
Great extent 1 2.9 9 31.6 10 18.5
Good extent 5 14.3 10 69.4 15 27.8
Neither good or bad 9 25.7 0 0.0 9 16.7
Less than good 6 17.1 0  0.0 6 11.1
Not at all good 14 40 0 0.0 14 25.9
Total responses 35 100 19 100 54 100
    N= Number of Respondents; %= Percentage of Respondents 
     Sources: Semi-Structured Interviews with Turkish Experts in Disaster                           
     Management (June 1-July 27, 2004) 
 
The statistical analysis in Table 10 supports the descriptive analysis. Based on the 
answers from the 19 respondents, the statistical results show that the difference is significant 
with a t=7.92 and p-value=0.000 at 5% significance level. When we analyze all data from 35 
observations including 16 respondents who did not participate in the Duzce response operations, 
the result is still statistically significant. In this respect, I examined the extreme possibility that 
all 16 missing responses were the “worst case” (not at all good). Table 1 (see Appendix D) 
shows that the difference of means is significant at the 5% significance level, even with the 
missing data having the extreme value (t=2.04 and p-value=0.025). Thus, there is a statistically 
                                                 
23 Interview with  Duzce Province Government, June 14, 2004 
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significant increase in utilizing information and communication systems in the response to the 
Duzce earthquake from the response to the Marmara earthquake.  
Table 10 The Paired T-test for Utilizing Information and Communication Means 
 “To what extent did your organizations utilize information and communication means in 
disaster operations?” 
Paired T test for Duzce and Marmara     
 
                       N     Mean      StDev     SE Mean 
Duzce            19   4.47368   0.51299   0.11769 
Marmara        19   2.42105   1.26121   0.28934 
Differences    19   2.05263   1.12909   0.25903 
 
95% lower bound for mean difference: 1.60345 
T-Test of mean difference = 0 (vs > 0): T-Value = 7.92  P-Value = 0.000 
 
 Source: Semi-Structured Interviews with Turkish Experts in Disaster                   
     Management (June 1-July 27, 2004) 
5.3.2 Information Exchange among Disaster Organizations during the Earthquakes 
The effective utilization of information and communication technologies for disaster 
management becomes important since timely information exchange is vital for coordination 
among disaster organizations. Because of insufficient utilization of appropriate information and 
communication systems, information exchange was very limited during the Marmara response 
operations. This situation resulted in uncoordinated actions, especially during the first three 
days24. 
“…We were completely unprepared. We were shocked. We did not know where 
the earthquake hit, or how big the disaster was. Communication was totally 
collapsed. We reached some villages or small cities after the second or third of 
day of the earthquake.” 
 
                                                 
24 Interview with Turkish Red Crescent Society, June 9, 2004    
 85
According to Table 11, none of the respondents rated “information exchange” as great for 
the Marmara response operations while six, or 31.6% of respondents rated it as great for the 
Duzce response operations.  Thirteen of 19 respondents, or 69.4%, claimed that the information 
exchange between their organization and other organizations was good during the Duzce 
Earthquake, while only one of the 35 respondents, or 2.9%, said that information exchange was 
good in the Marmara Earthquake.25 Twenty two of 35 respondents, or 62.8%, said that 
information exchange was “less than good” or “not at all good” level during the Marmara 
earthquake. It is obvious that better utilization of existing information and communication 
systems positively affected response operations during the Duzce earthquakes. 
Table 11 Information Exchange during the 1999 Earthquakes 
 “To what extent did information exchange exist between your organization and other 
organizations during response operations?” 
Marmara Duzce All Earthquakes 
Responses % Responses % Responses %
Great extent 0 0.0 6 31.6 6 11.1
Good extent 1 2.9 13 69.4 14 25.9
Neither good nor bad 12 34.3 0 0.0 12 22.2
Less than good 11 31.4 0 0.0 11 20.4
Not at all good 11 31.4 0 0.0 11 20.4
Total responses 35 100 19 100 54 100
   N = Number of Respondents; % = Percentage of Respondents 
   Sources: Semi-Structured Interviews with Turkish Experts in Disaster                 
                  Management (June 1-July 27, 2004) 
 
 The paired t-test analysis in Table 12 shows that information exchange among 
organizations increased significantly during the Duzce operations. Based on the answers from 
the 19 respondents, the statistical results indicates that the difference of means is significant with 
a t=9.87 and p-value=0.000 at 5% significance level. When I include all data from 35 
observations including 16 respondents who did not participate in the Duzce response operations, 
                                                 
25 TUBITAK Marmara Research Center did not have any problems of exchanging information.  
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the result is still statistically significant. Table 2 (see Appendix D) shows that the difference of 
means is significant at the 5% significance level even with the missing data having the extreme 
value (t=2.24 and p-value=0.016). Thus, there is a statistically significant increase in information 
exchange among disaster organizations in responding to the Duzce earthquake versus those 
responding to the Marmara earthquake. 
Table 12 The Paired T-test for Information Exchange among Disaster Organizations 
 “To what extent did the information exchange exist between your organization and other 
organizations during response operations?” 
Paired T test for Duzce and Marmara     
        
                     N        Mean     StDev    SE Mean    
Duzce          19     4.31579   0.47757   0.10956    
Marmara      19     2.10526   0.93659   0.21487    
Differences  19     2.21053   0.97633   0.22399    
        
95% lower bound for mean difference: 1.82212    
T-Test of mean difference = 0 (vs > 0): T-Value = 9.87   
P-Value =0.000 
 Source: Semi-Structured Interviews with Turkish Experts in Disaster                   
    Management (June 1-July 27, 2004) 
 
The lack of an adequate inter-organizational knowledge base was one of the reasons for 
insufficient information exchange among disaster organizations. Establishing this system before 
disasters assists organizations in obtaining, disseminating, updating and storing vital information 
for quick response during any catastrophic event.  According to the data (Appendix D, Table 5), 
many organizations did not have an adequate information infrastructure to create an inter-
organizational knowledge base. Only three of 39 respondents26 said that they were able to use a 
knowledge base during the Marmara earthquake, while only two of the 19 respondents said they 
                                                 
26 Interview with  TUBITAK Marmara Research Center, July 25, 2004 
    Interview with  Sayisal Grafik Ltd., July 25, 2004 
    Interview with  Japan International Coordination Agency, July 25, 2004 
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used a knowledge base during the Duzce earthquake. Respondents claimed that an inter-
organizational knowledge base would be very beneficial for decision makers, if it was there (see 
Appendix D, Table 6). One of three respondents said that using an inter-organizational 
knowledge base did not have a remarkable effect on the performance of the organization during 
the Marmara response operations while two respondents claimed that an inter-organizational 
knowledge base was very beneficial. Two respondents said that an inter-organizational 
knowledge base was utilized effectively during the Duzce operations. These results may indicate 
the benefits of knowledge base; however, in order to measure the effectiveness of an inter-
organizational knowledge base, we should have more organizations in the sample that share a 
knowledge base with other disaster organizations. 
5.3.3 The Impact of Information Infrastructure on the Performance of Disaster System 
The ability of the Turkish disaster system to utilize information and communication 
technologies during the Duzce and Marmara response operations influenced the performance of 
the system. The system performed disappointingly in the Marmara earthquake, but worked better 
during the Duzce earthquake (Comfort, 1999; Comfort and Sungu, 2001).   
Experts in the Turkish disaster system claimed that information systems provided timely 
and accurate information during the Duzce operations, whereas the lack of information systems 
created problems in obtaining timely and accurate information for coordinated actions during the 
Marmara operations. As shown in Table 13, only three respondents, or 8.6%, believed that 
existing information infrastructure supported disaster operations with timely and accurate 
information at great or good extent during the Marmara operations. Twenty-four, or 68.5% of the 
respondents said that the existing information infrastructure supported disaster operations at less 
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than good or not at all good level during the Marmara response operation. When we add the 
number of responses indicated neither good nor bad to this category, the proportion group comes 
to 91.4 %.  All of the respondents said that existing information infrastructure capacity provided 
timely and accurate information to support disaster organizations at either good (47.4%) or great 
extent (52.6%) during the Duzce earthquake.  
Table 13 Effectiveness of Information Systems 
 “To what extent existing information systems provide timely and accurate information 
to support disaster organizations during the disaster operations?” 
Marmara Duzce All Earthquakes  
Response % Response % Response %
Great extent 1 2.9 10 52.6 11 20.4
Good extent 2 5.7 9 47.4 11 20.4
Neither good or bad 8 22.9 0 0.0 8 14.8
Less than good 11 31.4 0 0.0 11 20.4
Not at all good 13 37.1  0 0.0 13 24.1
Total response 35 100 19 100 54 100.0
%=Percentage of Responses  
Sources: Semi-Structured Interviews with Turkish Experts in Disaster                            
     Management (June 1-July 27, 2004) 
 
Timely and accurate information to support disaster organizations was significantly 
improved from the Marmara earthquake to the Duzce earthquake, as supported by paired-t test 
results in Table 14 (t=10.67 and p-value= 0.000), based on 19 observations. When data from 35 
observations, including the 16 respondents who did not participate in the Duzce response 
operations are included in the analysis, the result is still statistically significant at the 5% 
significance level. Table 3 (see Appendix D) shows that the difference in perceived effectiveness 
of used information technology between the two earthquakes is significant, even with the 
missing data having the extreme value (t=2.70 and p-value=0.005). Significant improvement in 
obtaining timely and accurate information during the Duzce operations increased the 
performance of disaster organizations.  
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Table 14 The Paired T-test for Effectiveness of Information Systems 
 “To what extent did the existing information systems provide timely and accurate 
information to support disaster organizations during the disaster operations?” 
Paired T test for Duzce and Marmara     
        
                      N       Mean      StDev     SE Mean 
Duzce           19      4.52632  0.51299    0.11769 
Marmara       19      2.21053  1.08418    0.24873 
Differences   19      2.31579  0.94591    0.21701 
 
95% lower bound for mean difference: 1.93949 
T-Test of mean difference = 0 (vs > 0): T-Value = 10.67  P-Value = 0.000 
    Source: Semi-Structured Interviews with Turkish Experts in Disaster                   
   Management (June 1-July 27, 2004) 
 
Table 15 provides information on the performance of the Turkish disaster system in terms 
of information infrastructure. The table clearly indicates that the disaster system performed 
poorly in terms of exchanging disaster relevant information among disaster organizations from 
different jurisdictions during the Marmara earthquake. None of the respondents rated the overall 
performance of the Turkish Disaster Management system as great for the Marmara response 
operations. Only one of them said the performance of the system was good27 during the Marmara 
earthquake. Thirty two of the 38 respondents, or 84.2%, claimed that the existing information 
infrastructure was less than good to support information flow between disaster organizations.  
 However, from Table 15, we can conclude that this problem was largely solved during 
the Duzce earthquake. Nine of the 19 respondents, or 47.4% rated the overall performance of 
existing information and communication capacity of the system as good whereas 52.6 % of them 
said that existing information and communication capacity was great to support the exchange of 
                                                 
27 Sayisal Grafik Ltd.  
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necessary disaster relevant information and resources among local, provincial, and central 
disaster organizations during the Duzce response operations.  
Table 15 The performance of Turkish Disaster System in terms of Information 
Infrastructure 
“How do you rate performance of the information infrastructure in terms of exchanging 
necessary disaster relevant information and resources with local/provincial/central 
government?” 
Marmara Duzce All Earthquakes 
Responses % Responses % Responses %
Great extent 0 0.0 10 52.6 10 17.5
Good extent 1 2.6 9 47.4 10 17.5
Neither good or bad 5 13.2  0 0.0 5 8.8
Less than good 16 42.1  0 0.0 16 28.1
Not at all good 16 42.1  0 0.0 16 28.1
Total responses 38 100 19 100 57 100.0
                    N = Number of Respondents; % = Percentage of Respondents 
         Sources: Semi-Structured Interviews with Turkish Experts in Disaster   
                       Management (June 1-July 27, 2004) 
 
The statistical analysis of paired t-test in Table 16 supports the differences between the 
two cited response systems above. Based on data from the 19 respondents, the statistical results 
show that the difference of means is significant with a t=17.05 and p-value=0.000 at 5% 
significance level. When data from 35 observations including 16 respondents who did not 
participate in the Duzce response operations are analyzed, the result is still statistically 
significant. In this respect, I examine the extreme possibility that all 16 missing responses were 
the “worst case” (not at all good). Table 4 (see Appendix D) shows that the result is significant at 
the 5% significance level even with the missing data having the extreme value (t=3.10 and p-
value=0.002). The performance of the disaster system significantly improved from Marmara to 
Duzce due to the fact that disaster organizations had a better capability to exchange disaster 
relevant information.  
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Table 16 The Paired T-test for The performance of Turkish Disaster System in terms of 
Information Infrastructure 
 “How do you rate performance of the information infrastructure in terms of exchanging 
necessary disaster relevant information and resources with local/provincial/central 
government?” 
Paired T test for Duzce and Marmara     
        
                       N      Mean     StDev    SE Mean 
Duzce             19   4.52632   0.51299  0.11769 
Marmara         19   1.73684   0.65338  0.14989 
Differences     19   2.78947   0.71328  0.16364 
 
95% lower bound for mean difference: 2.50571 
T-Test of mean difference = 0 (vs > 0): T-Value = 17.05  P-Value = 0.000 
 Source: Semi-Structured Interviews with Turkish Experts in Disaster                   
   Management (June 1-July 27, 2004) 
 
These analyses show that disaster organizations had difficulties in obtaining timely and 
accurate information from disaster sites and exchanging this information with other 
organizations from different jurisdictional and organizational levels during the Marmara 
response operations. The statistical analysis proves that the disaster system was more effective 
during the Duzce operations. At this point, we have to acknowledge that the Marmara earthquake 
was a regional disaster whereas the Duzce earthquake was a local disaster, and it occurred three 
months after the Marmara earthquake. The disaster organizations were more aware and ready 
during the Duzce earthquake. Although the utilization of information systems and information 
exchange was better during the Duzce operations compared to the Marmara operations, the 
disaster system still needed to be improved. The improvement in information infrastructure 
started right after the Marmara earthquake, but the system retained deficiencies in terms of 
necessary information and communication means, and an inter-organizational knowledge base 
during the Duzce earthquake. 
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5.4 SUMMARY 
In this chapter, I investigated initial conditions of information infrastructure during the 1999 
Marmara and Duzce response operations. I primarily used data collected from semi-structured 
interviews for this analysis. I first described the demographic characteristics of respondent 
organizations. Then, I examined means of communication and information used in the response 
operations. I also examined information exchange capacity of the disaster system during the 
earthquake response operations. Finally, I examined the impact of information infrastructure on 
the performance of the Turkish disaster system.  
In the chapter, I compared the two response systems to determine whether there is a 
significant difference in the performance of the disaster system from the Marmara to the Duzce 
earthquake as a result of increasing information exchange capability. The paired t-test along with 
descriptive analysis showed that the Turkish disaster system learned from the Marmara 
earthquake and was significantly improved to respond to the Duzce earthquake. Information 
search, acquisition and exchange were more effective to provide timely and accurate information 
for coordination of response operations during the Duzce earthquake.   
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6.0  INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL COORDINATION DURING THE 1999   EARTHQUAKES 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore how the characteristics of organizational networks 
evolved during the Duzce and Marmara response operations. In the first part of the chapter, I 
analyze the type of organizations that participated in the response systems. Then, I examine the 
types of transactions and interactions among these organizations during the Marmara and Duzce 
response operations. In this part of study, I compare the two response systems based on the 
transactions conducted during the response operations. The comparison shows differences 
between the two response systems in terms of utilization of information and communication 
systems, and local organizations’ involvement in response operations. This examination indicates 
the gaps in the disaster system and provides guidance to close these gaps. Finally, I conduct a 
social network analysis by using the UCINET network analysis program (Borgatti, Everett, 
Freeman 2002) to investigate the network relationships of disaster organizations during the 1999 
response operations. This analysis reveals differences between the actual response system and 
the official Turkish disaster management system. Data collected from content analysis of 
Cumhuriyet newspaper for 21 days after the Marmara and Duzce earthquakes were used for these 
analyses.  
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6.2 TYPES OF ORGANIZATIONS 
In this section, I investigate the organizations that participated in the 1999 response systems. I 
categorize the organizations based on their jurisdictions and sources of funding. This 
investigation reveals the characteristics of disaster organizations involved in response systems.   
6.2.1 The 1999 Marmara Earthquake 
Table 17 shows what types of organizations were involved in the Marmara response system. As 
shown in Table 17, the proportion of national organizations involved in response operations is 
very significant. National organizations (293, or 80.05%) clearly played a more important role in 
response operations than international (73, or 19.95%) organizations.  
The frequency distributions of types of organizations confirm the centralized 
characteristics of Turkish public administration. Public-central organizations play more 
significant roles than other types of public organizations. Twenty-four percent of all 
organizations are public-central, while 15.3% and 5.2% of all organizations are public-province 
and public-municipal organizations, respectively. Only 4.4% of all organizations are public-
district organizations. 
According to the data indicated in Table 17, more national private organizations are 
involved in the response operations than a combination of public-district, public-municipal, and 
nonprofit organizations. Seventy-eight of 366 organizations (21.3%) are national private 
organizations whereas 71 (19.9%) organizations are public-district, public-municipal, and 
national nonprofit.  
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Table 17 Types of organizations in the 1999 Marmara Earthquake 
National Organizations N %
Public-Central 88 24
Public-Province 56 15.3
Public-District 16 4.4
Public-Municipal 19 5.2
Nonprofit 36 9.8
Private  78 21.3
Total National 293 80.05
International Organizations N %
Public-International 52 14.2
Nonprofit-International 13 3.6
Private International 8 2.2
Total International 73 19.95
Total  366 100.0
                       N= Number of Organizations; % = Percentage of Organizations 
              Source: Modified from Corbacioglu, 2004 
6.2.2 The 1999 Duzce Earthquake 
Table 18 provides information about organizations that participated in the Duzce response 
system. According to the table, the national organizations (141, or 77.1%) played a more 
important role in response operations than international (42, or 22.9%) organizations, as it was in 
the Marmara earthquake.  
The findings are very similar to the Marmara response system. Public organizations were 
the heart of emergency management for the Duzce response system as well. Approximately 83% 
of all organizations are national and international public organizations while only 16.4% of them 
are nonprofit and private organizations. The larger section of public organizations is public-
central organizations. Fifty-one, or 27.9% of all organizations that participated in the Duzce 
response system are public-central organizations, while 25.7% and 7.1% of all organizations are 
public-province and public-municipal organizations, respectively. Only nine, or 4.9%, of 
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organizations are public-district organizations. Domestic private organizations are less involved 
(3.8%) in the Duzce response operations than the Marmara response operations (21.3%). 
National nonprofit organizations (7.7%) are relatively more involved in the Duzce response 
operations than private organizations. There is no international private organization while there 
are nine international nonprofit organizations that constitute roughly 5% of the response system. 
Table 18 Types of organizations in the 1999 Duzce Earthquake 
National Organizations N %
Public-Central 51 27.9
Public-Province 47 25.7
Public-District 9 4.9
Public-Municipal 13 7.1
Nonprofit 14 7.7
Private  7 3.8
Total National 141 77.1
International Organizations N %
Public-International 33 18
Nonprofit-International 9 4.9
Private International 0 0
Total International 42 22.9
Total  183 100
   N= Number of Organizations; % = Percentage of Organizations 
              Source: Modified from Corbacioglu, 2004 
In summary, national public organizations constituted a very high proportion of the 1999 
response operations. Among public organizations, public-central organizations played significant 
roles. Public provincial, district and municipal organizations were involved relatively more in the 
Duzce response operations than in the Marmara response operations. On the other hand, 
involvement of nonprofit and private organizations in the Marmara response operations was 
considerably higher than in the Duzce response operations.   
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6.3 ORGANIZATIONAL INTERACTIONS IN THE 1999 EARTHQUAKES  
In this section of the chapter, I classify the types and numbers of organizations involved in the 
1999 disaster operations based on the types of transactions and interactions that the organizations 
made. The patterns that evolved among participating organizations present suggestions for the 
incentives and restraints on the organizational learning process (Comfort 126, 1999).   
Type of Transactions in the Marmara Response Operations\ 
Table 19 presents quite a large set of 1112 transactions reported for the 1999 Marmara 
earthquake response system. The largest proportion, 214, or 19.24% of transactions involved 
disaster relief activities, most of which were initiated by the public-central and public-
international organizations. Domestic nonprofit and private organizations were also involved in a 
considerable number of relief operations. Provincial organizations were involved in 21 disaster 
relief activities. 
The second largest category of reported transactions was donation activities. Public-
international and public-central, domestic nonprofit organizations, and domestic private 
organizations played a considerable role in this category, which registered 106, or 9.53%, of the 
total transactions.  
These categories are followed by medical care/health assistances/medical supplies, 
8.18%, and emergency response, 6.74%. Legal issues and legal enforcement comprise 44, or 
3.96% transactions that indicate the necessity of a legal reform regarding disaster management. 
Damage and need assessment for 5.40%, public announcement for 4.77%, 
recovery/reconstruction for 3.69% are the other important transactions.  
Communication activities involved 61, or 5.49 transactions. Regardless of this proportion 
in communication activities, coordination activities (43 or 3, 87%) do not constitute a notable 
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portion of all transactions. Interestingly, these statistics are less than the ones that represent 
criticisms of coordination and disaster management performance during the disaster operations 
(67 or 6.03%). Combined communication and coordination categories compromise 9.36% of the 
total transactions reported for disaster operations. When we consider the fact that most of the 
communication activities reported took place after the critical first three days following the 
earthquake, we can understand how the lack of communication capacity hampered the 
coordination of disaster operations during the Marmara earthquake.  
The data portray a response system largely directed by the central government and 
provincial government with considerable contributions by international assistance and relatively 
weak participation at the local level. The analysis shows the system’s inability to function 
without basic assistance from local level disaster agencies. The gap in communication between 
the national and local levels of governmental agencies adversely impacted interactions among 
disaster agencies and eventually reduced the performance of the whole response system. 
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Table 19  Frequency Distributions: Type of transactions in Response Operations by Funding Source and Jurisdictions, Marmara 
Earthquake, August 17-September 7, 1999 
N=Number of Organizations; T=Number of Transactions; %=Percentage of Transactions          
            Sources: Cumhuriyet news reports, August 17 - September 7, 1999 (Corbacioglu, 2004)  
 
 
Type of Transactions
T N % T N  % T N % T N % T N % T N % T N % T N % T N % T N  % 
Building inspection/Building Codes Issues 0 0 0.0 6 6 0.5 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 2 2 0.2 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 8 8          0.72 
Communication 9 9 0.8 22 22 2.0 12 12 1.1 1 1 0.1 2 2 0.2 2 2 0.2 12 12 1.1 0 0 0.0 1 1 0.1 61 61          5.49 
Coordination of Response 0 0 0.0 21 21 1.9 10 10 0.9 0 0 0.0 2 2 0.2 0 0 0.0 7 7 0.6 0 0 0.0 3 3 0.3 43 43          3.87 
Critics of Disaster Management 1 1 0.1 25 25 2.2 2 2 0.2 0 0 0.0 1 1 0.1 2 2 0.2 36 36 3.2 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 67 67          6.03 
Damage Assessment/Need Assessment 0 0 0.0 32 32 2.9 15 15 1.3 1 1 0.1 5 5 0.4 1 1 0.1 4 4 0.4 0 0 0.0 2 2 0.2 60 60          5.40 
Death Issues/Certification of deaths 1 1 0.1 9 9 0.8 3 3 0.3 0 0 0.0 1 1 0.1 0 0 0.0 1 1 0.1 0 0 0.0 1 1 0.1 16 16          1.44 
Debris removal/water supply 2 2 0.2 4 4 0.4 3 3 0.3 1 1 0.1 1 1 0.1 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 11 11          0.99 
Disaster relief (food, shelter, aids, and etc) 27 26 2.4 51 49 4.6 21 19 1.9 4 4 0.4 15 11 1.3 5 5 0.4 46 42 4.1 2 2 0.2 43 41 3.9 214 199        19.24 
Donations/Donation Campaigns/volunteer 24 23 2.2 20 20 1.8 5 5 0.4 1 1 0.1 3 3 0.3 10 10 0.9 19 19 1.7 4 4 0.4 20 20 1.8 106 105          9.53 
Earthquake Assessment/Research 1 1 0.1 17 17 1.5 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 2 2 0.2 1 1 0.1 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 21 21          1.89 
Education Issues 0 0 0.0 8 8 0.7 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 5 5 0.4 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 13 13          1.17 
Energy Issues 0 0 0.0 10 10 0.9 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 10 10          0.90 
Evacuation 0 0 0.0 1 1 0.1 2 2 0.2 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 3 3          0.27 
Financial Relief/Loan/Tax Relief 5 5 0.4 8 8 0.7 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 1 1 0.1 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 6 6 0.5 20 20          1.80 
Fire fighting 8 7 0.7 2 2 0.2 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 1 1 0.1 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 11 10          0.99 
Hazardous Materials Releases/Environmental Issues 0 0 0.0 3 3 0.3 9 9 0.8 0 0 0.0 5 5 0.4 0 0 0.0 1 1 0.1 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 18 18          1.62 
Infrastructure 1 1 0.1 3 3 0.3 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 1 1 0.1 0 0 0.0 1 1 0.1 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 6 6          0.54 
Logistic 2 2 0.2 8 8 0.7 5 5 0.4 0 0 0.0 5 5 0.4 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 4 3 0.4 24 23          2.16 
Legal Issues/legislation/Legal Enforcement 0 0 0.0 29 29 2.6 4 4 0.4 1 1 0.1 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 10 10 0.9 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 44 44          3.96 
Medical Care/Health Assistances/Medical Supplies 18 17 1.6 21 21 1.9 20 18 1.8 1 1 0.1 1 1 0.1 1 1 0.1 17 15 1.5 0 0 0.0 12 12 1.1 91 86          8.18 
Official Visit 5 5 0.4 10 10 0.9 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 1 1 0.1 0 0 0.0 1 1 0.1 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 17 17          1.53 
Proposal for Permanent Housing/urban development 0 0 0.0 10 10 0.9 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 2 2 0.2 0 0 0.0 1 1 0.1 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 13 13          1.17 
Physiological and Spiritual Counseling/Child Care 0 0 0.0 10 10 0.9 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 1 1 0.1 9 9 0.8 0 0 0.0 3 3 0.3 23 23          2.07 
Public announcement/expression of condolence 5 5 0.4 33 33 3.0 6 6 0.5 4 4 0.4 1 1 0.1 1 1 0.1 2 2 0.2 0 0 0.0 1 1 0.1 53 53          4.77 
Reconstruction/Recovery/Repair 2 2 0.2 16 16 1.4 1 1 0.1 0 0 0.0 5 5 0.4 1 1 0.1 12 12 1.1 1 1 0.1 3 3 0.3 41 41          3.69 
Search and Rescue 26 21 2.3 24 24 2.2 7 6 0.6 0 0 0.0 6 6 0.5 0 0 0.0 5 5 0.4 0 0 0.0 7 5 0.6 75 67          6.74 
Security Issues 0 0 0.0 6 6 0.5 6 6 0.5 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 1 1 0.1 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 13 13          1.17 
Transportation/Traffic Issues 0 0 0.0 5 5 0.4 1 1 0.1 0 0 0.0 2 2 0.2 0 0 0.0 1 1 0.1 1 1 0.1 4 4 0.4 14 14          1.26 
Warning 0 0 0.0 13 13 1.2 2 2 0.2 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 1 1 0.1 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 16 16          1.44 
Total 137 128 12.3 427 425 38.4 134 129 12.1 14 14 1.3 59 55 5.3 27 27 2.4 196 190 17.6 8 8 0.7 110 105 9.9 1112 1081      100.00 
NationalMunicipal International National InternationalInternational Central Provincial Disrtrict
TOTALSPublic Organizations Nonprofit Private
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6.3.1 Types of Transactions in the Duzce Response Operations 
Table 20 presents a relatively small set of 274 transactions reported for the 1999 Duzce 
earthquake response system. The largest proportion, 69, or 25.18.4%, involved disaster 
emergency response activities, most of which were initiated by public organizations. Public- 
international, public-provincial and public-central agencies played important roles in emergency 
response operations. The second largest category of reported transactions was disaster relief 
activities (45, or 16.42%). Public international, domestic nonprofit organizations played 
considerable roles in this category. The table shows that the transactions involving 
communication activities compromised 18, or 6.37% of the total number, and the transactions 
involving coordination constituted 16, or 5.84%. If we consider the statistics of official visit as 
part of communication and coordination activities that the total number would make up 45, or 
16.42%. As a result of increasing coordination activities, the number of critics of disaster 
management performance decreased from 6.03% to 3.28%. 
These categories were followed by medical care/health assistances/medical supplies, 
8.9%, donations, 5.2%, and earthquake assessment and research activities, 3.2%. According to 
the data, there were not many administrative and legal issues that constrained the performance of 
disaster organizations.  
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Table 20 Frequency Distributions: Type of transactions in Response Operations by Funding Source and Jurisdictions, Duzce 
Earthquake, November 12-Decemebr 1, 1999 
N=Number of Organizations; T=Number of Transactions; %=Percentage of Transactions  
Sources: Cumhuriyet news reports, November 12 - December 1, 1999 (Corbacioglu, 2004) 
Type of Transactions
T N % T N % T N % T N % T N % T N % T N % T N % T N % T N  % 
Building inspection/Building Codes Issues 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 1 1 0.4 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 1 1        0.36 
Communication 3 3 1.1 9 9 3.3 1 1 0.4 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 3 3 1.1 0 0 0.0 2 2 0.7 18 18        6.57 
Coordination of Response 0 0 0.0 13 13 4.7 1 1 0.4 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 2 2 0.7 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 16 16        5.84 
Critics of Disaster Management 0 0 0.0 4 4 1.5 3 3 1.1 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 2 2 0.7 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 9 9        3.28 
Damage Assessment/Need Assessment 0 0 0.0 4 4 1.5 2 2 0.7 1 1 0.4 2 2 0.7 0 0 0.0 2 2 0.7 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 11 11        4.01 
Death Issues/Certification of deaths 0 0 0.0 3 3 1.1 0 0 0.0 1 1 0.4 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 4 4        1.46 
Debris removal/water supply 0 0 0.0 1 1 0.4 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 1 1 0.4 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 2 2        0.73 
Disaster relief (food, shelter, aids, and etc) 21 17 7.7 3 3 1.1 5 3 1.8 1 1 0.4 2 2 0.7 0 0 0.0 10 9 3.6 0 0 0.0 3 2 1.1 45 37      16.42 
Donations/Donation Campaigns/volunteer 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 6 6 2.2 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 1 1 0.4 2 2 0.7 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 9 9        3.28 
Earthquake Assessment/Research 0 0 0.0 7 7 2.6 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 1 1 0.4 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 8 8        2.92 
Education Issues 0 0 0.0 1 1 0.4 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 1 1        0.36 
Evacuation 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 1 1 0.4 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 1 1        0.36 
Financial Relief/Loan/Tax Relief 2 2 0.7 1 1 0.4 1 1 0.4 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 4 4        1.46 
Logistic 0 0 0.0 1 1 0.4 3 3 1.1 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 4 4        1.46 
Legal Issues/legislation/Legal Enforcement 0 0 0.0 1 1 0.4 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 1 1 0.4 0 0 0.0 1 1 0.4 3 3        1.09 
Medical Care/Health Assistances/Medical Supplies 7 5 2.6 11 11 4.0 10 7 3.6 0 0 0.0 3 2 1.1 0 0 0.0 4 4 1.5 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 35 29      12.77 
Official Visit 3 3 1.1 8 8 2.9 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 11 11        4.01 
Physiological and Spiritual Counseling/Child Care 1 1 0.4 1 1 0.4 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 2 2        0.73 
Public announcement/expression of condolence 1 1 0.4 5 5 1.8 0 0 0.0 1 1 0.4 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 1 1 0.4 8 8        2.92 
Reconstruction/Recovery/Repair 1 1 0.4 1 1 0.4 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 2 2        0.73 
Search and Rescue 35 30 12.8 12 12 4.4 14 10 5.1 0 0 0.0 5 3 1.8 0 0 0.0 3 3 1.1 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 69 58      25.18 
Transportation/Traffic Issues 0 0 0.0 2 2 0.7 1 1 0.4 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 1 1 0.4 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 4 4        1.46 
Warning 0 0 0.0 7 7 2.6 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 7 7        2.55 
Total 74 63 27.0 95 95 34.7 49 40 17.9 4 4 1.5 14 11 3.2 1 1 0.4 30 29 10.9 0 0 0.0 7 6 2.6 274 249    100.00 
International NationalDisrtrict Municipal International NationalInternational Central Provincial
Public Organizations Nonprofit Private TOTALS
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6.3.2 Assessment of Emergency Support Functions  
In this section of the study, I compare the two response systems based on the transactions 
reported. In order to do this comparison, I categorize transactions based on emergency support 
functions (ESF)28 (FEMA, 2006) and previous studies (Comfort, 1999)29. Hence, I combine the 
transactions under 15 functions. Table 21 and 22 present the data of emergency response 
functions for the Marmara and Duzce response systems.  
 As shown in Table 21, disaster relief and human service activities compose of the largest 
number of transactions, 361, or % 32.46% in the Marmara response system. The functions of 
health and medical care, 93, or 8.36%, search and rescue, 89, or 8.0%, and public information, 
85, or 7.64% follow disaster relief and human services. According to Table 21, communication 
activities compromise 63, or 5.67% of total transactions whereas coordination of response 
constitutes 39, or 3.51%. Consistent with Table 19, Table 21 shows that critical assessment of 
disaster management performance compromise larger number, 67, or 6.03%. This result 
indicates deficiencies in communication channels that affected coordination of response 
operations which was highly criticized by public during the Marmara earthquake.  
  
                                                 
28 FEMA identified 15 emergency supprt functions for federal response plan. These are the basis 
functions. Based on the specific conditions of risk prone areas, state, or county governments use 
the ESfs in conjunction with more ESFs to operate a response to a particular event.  
29 In her book, Comfort investigated the 1992 Erzincan response system. I utilized this research 
to identify the specific circumstances for the Turkish disaster response system.    
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Table 21 Frequency Distributions: Emergency Support Function in Disaster Response Operations by Funding Source and Jurisdiction, Marmara 
Earthquake, August 17-September 7, 1999 
N=Number of Organizations; T=Number of Transactions; %=Percentage of Transactions          
Sources: Cumhuriyet news reports, August 17 - September 7, 1999 (Corbacioglu, 2004)  
 
Type of Transactions
T N % T N % T N % T N % T N % T N % T N % T N % T N % T N % 
Communication 8 8 0.7 32 32 2.9 9 9 0.8 0 0 0.0 3 3 0.3 2 2 0.2 8 8 0.7 0 0 0.0 1 1 0.1 63 63        5.67 
Coordination of response 0 0 0.0 20 20 1.8 10 10 0.9 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 6 4 0.5 0 0 0.0 3 2 0.3 39 36        3.51 
Critical assessment of DM performance 1 1 0.1 25 25 2.2 2 2 0.2 0 0 0.0 1 1 0.1 2 2 0.2 36 36 3.2 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 67 67        6.03 
Damage assessment 0 0 0.0 30 30 2.7 11 11 1.0 1 1 0.1 4 4 0.4 2 2 0.2 3 3 0.3 0 0 0.0 1 1 0.1 52 52        4.68 
Disaster relief/human services 55 50 4.9 85 84 7.6 28 26 2.5 5 5 0.4 18 15 1.6 14 14 1.3 81 81 7.3 6 6 0.5 69 66 6.2 361 347      32.46 
Financial Assistance 5 5 0.4 8 8 0.7 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 1 1 0.1 1 1 0.1 0 0 0.0 4 4 0.4 19 19        1.71 
Health and Medical Care 18 16 1.6 25 24 2.2 19 17 1.7 0 0 0.0 2 2 0.2 1 1 0.1 16 12 1.4 0 0 0.0 12 12 1.1 93 84        8.36 
Legal issues/legal enforcement 0 0 0.0 35 35 3.1 12 12 1.1 1 1 0.1 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 10 10 0.9 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 58 58        5.22 
Post-disaster research 0 0 0.0 25 25 2.2 1 1 0.1 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 1 1 0.1 1 1 0.1 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 28 28        2.52 
Public information 7 7 0.6 43 43 3.9 16 16 1.4 6 6 0.5 2 2 0.2 2 2 0.2 7 7 0.6 0 0 0.0 2 2 0.2 85 85        7.64 
Public works and engineering 2 2 0.2 26 26 2.3 12 12 1.1 1 1 0.1 7 7 0.6 0 0 0.0 5 5 0.4 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 53 53        4.77 
Recovery/Reconstruction 3 3 0.3 32 32 2.9 1 1 0.1 0 0 0.0 10 10 0.9 2 2 0.2 14 14 1.3 1 1 0.1 4 4 0.4 67 67        6.03 
Resource Support 3 3 0.3 9 9 0.8 5 5 0.4 0 0 0.0 5 5 0.4 0 0 0.0 1 1 0.1 0 0 0.0 4 3 0.4 27 26        2.43 
Search and Rescue 35 33 3.1 27 27 2.4 8 7 0.7 0 0 0.0 6 5 0.5 0 0 0.0 7 7 0.6 0 0 0.0 6 6 0.5 89 85        8.00 
Transportation 0 0 0.0 5 5 0.4 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 1 1 0.1 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 1 1 0.1 4 4 0.4 11 11        0.99 
Total 137 128 12.3 427 425 38.4 134 129 12.1 14 14 1.3 59 55 5.3 27 27 2.4 196 190 17.6 8 8 0.7 110 105 9.9 1112 1081   100.00 
International NationalDisrtrict Municipal International NationalInternational State Provincial
Public Organizations Nonprofit Private TOTALS
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Table 22 Frequency Distributions: Emergency Support Functions in Disaster Response Operations by Funding Source and 
Jurisdiction, Duzce Earthquake, November 12-December 1, 1999 
N=Number of Organizations; K=Number of Interactions; %=Percentage of Interactions  
Source: Cumhuriyet news reports, November 12 - December 1, 1999 (Corbacioglu, 2004) 
 
 
Type of Transactions
T N % T N % T N % T N % T N % T N % T N % T N % T N % T N  % 
Communication 6 6 2.2 23 23 8.4 1 1 0.4 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 2 2 0.7 0 0 0.0 2 2 0.7 34 34      12.41 
Coordination of response 0 0 0.0 13 13 4.7 1 1 0.4 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 1 1 0.4 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 15 15        5.47 
Critical assessment of DM performance 0 0 0.0 4 4 1.5 3 3 1.1 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 2 2 0.7 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 9 9        3.28 
Damage assessment 0 0 0.0 5 5 1.8 3 3 1.1 1 1 0.4 2 2 0.7 0 0 0.0 2 2 0.7 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 13 13        4.74 
Disaster relief/human services 24 19 8.8 5 5 1.8 14 11 5.1 1 1 0.4 2 2 0.7 1 1 0.4 14 13 5.1 0 0 0.0 3 2 1.1 64 54      23.36 
Financial Assistance 2 2 0.7 1 1 0.4 1 1 0.4 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 4 4        1.46 
Health and Medical Care 4 3 1.5 10 10 3.6 5 4 1.8 0 0 0.0 3 2 1.1 0 0 0.0 4 4 1.5 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 26 23        9.49 
Legal issues/legal enforcement 0 0 0.0 2 2 0.7 2 2 0.7 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 1 1 0.4 0 0 0.0 1 1 0.4 6 6        2.19 
Post-disaster research 1 1 0.4 6 6 2.2 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 7 7        2.55 
Public information 0 0 0.0 9 9 3.3 0 0 0.0 2 2 0.7 1 1 0.4 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 1 1 0.4 13 13        4.74 
Public works and engineering 1 1 0.4 1 1 0.4 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 1 1 0.4 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 3 3        1.09 
Recovery/Reconstruction 1 1 0.4 1 1 0.4 1 1 0.4 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 3 3        1.09 
Resource Support 0 0 0.0 1 1 0.4 4 4 1.5 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 5 5        1.82 
Search and Rescue 35 30 12.8 13 13 4.7 14 9 5.1 0 0 0.0 5 3 1.8 0 0 0.0 3 3 1.1 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 70 58      25.55 
Transportation 0 0 0.0 1 1 0.4 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 1 1 0.4 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 2 2        0.73 
Total 74 63 27.0 95 95 34.7 49 40 17.9 4 4 1.5 14 11 5.1 1 1 0.4 30 29 10.9 0 0 0.0 7 6 2.6 274 249   100.00 
Public Organizations Nonprofit Private TOTALS
International State Provincial International NationalDisrtrict Municipal International National
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 Table 22 provides data to compare the Duzce response system to see whether 
improvements in communication increased coordination of response operations. As indicated in 
Table 22, the largest proportion of emergency support functions involved search and rescue 
efforts, 70, or 25.55%, that shows an increase from 8.0%.Disaster relief activities follow search 
and rescue, 64, or 23.36% that shows an approximately 10% drop from the Marmara response 
system. These reported transactions shows that organizations were more effective in search and 
rescue activities. Table 22 reveals the reasons for this effectiveness of the Duzce response 
system.  
According to Table 22, communication functions constitute 34, or 12.41%, while 
coordination of response functions constitutes 15, or 5.47%, of all transactions. Communication 
functions during the Duzce operations doubled communication functions during the Marmara 
operations that eventually raised coordination of response operations from 3.51% to 5.47%. As a 
result, critical assessment of disaster management performance decreased from 6.03% to 3.28%. 
Are these results statistically significant to state that improvements in communication and 
coordination activities fostered a better environment to manage disaster operations? 
6.3.3 Increases in the Turkish Disaster Management Performance 
In this section, I employed two population proportions tests to determine whether there is a 
significant increase in communication, coordination, search and rescue functions, and a 
significant decrease in disaster relief, and critical assessment of disaster management 
performance transactions from the Marmara to Duzce response system.  
I have two different response systems that are composed of different number of 
transactions. The differences between the numbers of transactions are significant. The Marmara 
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response system has four times more transactions than the Duzce response system. Therefore, I 
decided to compare proportions of ESFs rather than the number of ESFs and used “two 
population proportions test” (two sample z-test).  In two population proportions test, I compared 
the proportion of ESFs for the Marmara response system that has a specified attribute (e.g. 
communication) to the proportion of the ESFs for the Duzce response system that has the 
specified attribute (e.g. communication). Before using this method, I checked the three 
assumptions required to use “two sample z-test”: simple random samples, independent 
samples,x1,n1-x1, x2, and n2-x2 are all 5 or greater (Weiss, 2005)30. Four of fifteen ESFs, 
transportation, recovery/reconstruction, public works and engineering, and financial assistance 
do not support third assumptions due to small number of cases. Therefore, I ran “two population 
proportion hypothesis” test for remaining 11 ESFs. The detailed test results are listed in 
Appendix J.  
As shown in Table 23, there is a significant difference in communication, coordination of 
response, and search and rescue activities between the Marmara and Duzce response systems. 
According to the results in the table, the differences of communication proportion is significant 
at the 1% significance level with a z=3.92, and p-value=0.000 at 1% significant level. Therefore 
communication activities increased significantly. Table 23 presents that coordination of response 
function has a z=1.52, p-value=0.066 that is slightly more than 5% significant level, but it is 
strongly significant at 10% significant level. Finally, Table 23 shows that proportion of search 
and rescue increased significantly, with a z=8.16, and p-value=0.00, at 1% significant level.  
 
                                                 
30X=number of successes (e.g. number of communication) 
 n=sample size (e.g. “n” for the Duzce is 274) 
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Table 23 Two Population Proportions Test for Communication, Coordination of Response 
and Search and Rescue 
Communication 
Test and CI for Two Proportions 
H0 : p1 = p2 (percentage of  communication for the Marmara and Duzce is equal) 
Ha : p1< p2  (percentage of  communication for the Duzce is more than for the Marmara) 
 
Sample   X     N   Sample p 
1        34   274  0.124088 
2        63  1112   0.056655 
 
Difference = p (1) - p (2) 
Estimate for difference:  0.0674329 
95% lower bound for difference:  0.0327448 
Test for difference = 0 (vs > 0):  Z = 3.92  P-Value = 0.000 
 
Coordination of response 
Test and CI for Two Proportions  
H0 : p1 = p2 (percentage of  coordination of response for the Marmara and Duzce is equal) 
Ha : p1< p2  (percentage of  coordination of response for the Duzce is more than for the Marmara) 
 
Sample   X     N   Sample p 
1        15   274   0.054745 
2        39  1112   0.035072 
 
Difference = p (1) - p (2) 
Estimate for difference:  0.0196726 
95% lower bound for difference:  -0.00468531 
Test for difference = 0 (vs > 0):  Z = 1.51  P-Value = 0.066 
Search and rescue 
Test and CI for Two Proportions  
H0 : p1 = p2 (percentage of search and rescue for the Marmara and Duzce is equal) 
Ha : p1< p2  (percentage of search and rescue for the Duzce is more than for the Marmara) 
 
Sample   X     N  Sample p 
1          70   274  0.255474 
2            89 1112  0.080036 
 
Difference = p (1) - p (2) 
Estimate for difference:  0.175438 
95% lower bound for difference:  0.130081 
Test for difference = 0 (vs > 0):  Z = 8.16 P-Value = 0.000 
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Table 24 Two Population Proportions Test for Communication, Coordination of Response 
and Search and Rescue 
Disaster relief/human services 
Test and CI for Two Proportions  
H0 : p1 = p2 (percentage of disaster relief/human services for the Marmara and Duzce is equal) 
Ha : p1> p2  (percentage of  disaster relief/human services for the Duzce is less than for the Marmara) 
 
Sample    X     N   Sample p 
1         64   274   0.233577 
2        361  1112   0.324640 
 
Difference = p (1) - p (2) 
Estimate for difference:  -0.0910636 
95% upper bound for difference:  -0.0430937 
Test for difference = 0 (vs < 0):  Z = -2.93  P-Value = 0.002 
 
Critical assessment of disaster management performance 
Test and CI for Two Proportions  
H0 : p1 = p2 (percentage of  critical assessment of disaster management performance for the Marmara and Duzce is equal) 
Ha : p1> p2  (percentage of  critical assessment of disaster management performance for the Duzce is less than for the 
Marmara) 
 
Sample   X     N   Sample p 
1         9    274   0.032847 
2        67  1112   0.060252 
 
Difference = p (1) - p (2) 
Estimate for difference:  -0.0274051 
95% upper bound for difference:  -0.00615783 
Test for difference = 0 (vs < 0):  Z = -1.78  P-Value = 0.037 
 
Legal issues/legal enforcement 
Test and CI for Two Proportions  
H0 : p1 = p2 (percentage of  legal issues/legal enforcement for the Marmara and Duzce is equal) 
Ha : p1< p2  (percentage of legal issues/legal enforcement for the Duzce is more than for the Marmara) 
 
Sample   X     N   Sample p 
1            6   274   0.021898 
2          58  1112   0.052158 
 
Difference = p (1) - p (2) 
Estimate for difference:  -0.0302605 
95% upper bound for difference:  -0.0120458 
Test for difference = 0 (vs < 0):  Z = -2.14  P-Value = 0.016 
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Table 24 presents the statistical analysis that show which ESFs decreased from the 
Marmara to the Duzce response system. According to Table 24, the proportion of disaster relief 
and human services activities significantly decreased in the Duzce response system. This is due 
to the fact that more search and rescue transactions were reported during the first three days 
following the Duzce earthquake, whereas more disaster relief activities were reported after the 
first three days following the Marmara earthquake. Increasing coordination of response 
operations and search and rescue activities, especially in the first three days following the Duzce 
earthquake, decreased the critics of disaster management performance. According to the table, at 
the 5% significant level, critical assessment of disaster management performance decreased 
significantly during the Duzce earthquake (z=-1.78, p-value=0.037). Finally, legal issues and 
legal enforcement activities dropped significantly during the Duzce response operations (z=-
2.14, p-value=0.016).  
This statistical analysis indicates that increasing communication activities increased 
coordination of response operations, and thus created a more effective search and rescue 
operations during the Duzce earthquake. Better coordinated, effective response operations 
decreased criticisms from the public and produced less legal enforcement issues.    
6.3.4 Types of Interactions in the Marmara and Duzce Response Operations 
In this part of the study, I analyze the frequencies of interactions among disaster organizations 
during the Marmara and Duzce response operations. This analysis provides information to what 
extent disaster organizations from different jurisdictions interacted with each other. Table 25 and 
26 present this information. The column-total presents the number of interactions (K) that all 
organizations from a jurisdictional level initiated. The row-total presents the number of 
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organizational interactions for a specific jurisdictional level initiated by other jurisdictional 
organizations.  
 Table 25 presents a total of 514 interactions reported among the participating 
organizations in the Marmara response system. The number of interactions and the number of 
organizations engaged in cooperative operations illustrate the form of interconnectedness of the 
response system. The findings show that the vast proportion of interactions, 493, or 95.9% was 
initiated by public agencies, and within that proportion, the largest component is public-central 
organizations (229 of a total 493). The second largest number of interactions, 120, or 23.3.1%, 
was initiated by the set of public-provincial organizations. International public organizations 
initiated 109, or 21.2% of interactions. Local level organizations, public-district and municipal 
organizations, initiated 35, or 6.8% of the interactions, reported for disaster response operations. 
When we closely look at the table, we can observe that public-central organizations were 
the centers of interactions. Eighty-eight of 514 total transactions (17.1%) occurred between 
public-central and public-provincial organizations, whereas 80 of the interactions (15.6%) were 
between public-central and public international organizations. A total number of 309 (229+80), 
or 60.1% interactions involved public-central agencies. As consistent with the transaction data, 
public-district and municipal organizations involved fewer collaborative operations. Most of the 
interactions involved public-central and provincial organizations. There were only two 
interactions reported that show public-district and municipal organizations cooperated with 
agencies from the same jurisdictional level. 
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Table 25 Frequency Distributions: Types of interactions in Disaster Response Operations by Funding Source and Jurisdiction, Marmara 
Earthquake, August 17-September 7, 1999 
N=Number of Organizations; K=Number of Interactions; %=Percentage of Interactions 
Sources: Cumhuriyet news reports, August 17 - September 7, 1999 (Corbacioglu, 2004) 
 
Table 26 Frequency Distributions: Types of interactions in Disaster Response Operations by Funding Source and Jurisdiction, Duzce 
Earthquake, November 12-December 1, 1999 
N=Number of Organizations; K=Number of Interactions; %=Percentage of Interactions 
Sources: Cumhuriyet news reports, November- December 1, 1999 (Corbacioglu, 2004) 
 
Type of Interactions
K N % K N % K N % K N % K N % K N % K N % K N % K N %
Public-International 5 13 1.0 80 83 15.6 10 11 1.9 3 3 0.6 5 5 1.0 3 3 0.6 3 3 0.6 0 0 0.0 109 121 21.2
Public-Central 64 72 12.5 88 152 17.1 17 18 3.3 9 9 1.8 13 13 2.5 29 29 5.6 9 9 1.8 229 302 44.6
Public-Provincal 37 39 7.2 9 11 1.8 12 15 2.3 2 2 0.4 23 25 4.5 37 51 7.2 120 143 23.3
Public-District 2 2 0.4 2 2 0.4 4 5 0.8 9 10 1.8 12 15 2.3 29 34 5.6
Publical-Municipal 4 4 0.8 2 9 0.4 6 13 1.2
Nonprofit-International 2 3 0.4 1 1 0.2 3 4 0.6
Nonprofit-National 10 17 1.9 7 7 1.4 17 24 3.3
Private 1 2 0.2 1 2 0.2
Total 5 13 1.0 144 155 28.0 135 202 26.3 31 34 6.0 28 31 5.4 22 23 4.3 80 91 15.6 69 94 13.4 514 643 100.0
Private TOTALSPublic Organizations Nonprofit
Municipal International National NationalInternational Central Provincial Disrtrict
Type of Interactions
K N % K N % K N % K N % K N % K N % K N % K N % K N %
Public-International 0 0 0.0 42 43 22.0 0 0 0.0 14 15 7.3 4 4 2.1 0 0 0.0 1 1 0.5 1 1 0.5 62 64 32.5
Public-Central 20 22 10.5 17 24 8.9 19 24 9.9 2 2 1.0 1 1 0.5 4 4 2.1 0 0 0.0 63 77 33.0
Public-Provincal 16 27 8.4 16 16 8.4 8 12 4.2 0 0 0.0 9 10 4.7 1 3 0.5 50 68 26.2
Public-District 6 7 3.1 0 0 0.0 7 10 3.7 1 1 0.5 14 18 7.3
Publical-Municipal 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 1 1 0.5 0 0 0.0 1 1 0.5
Nonprofit-International 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0
Nonprofit-National 1 1 0.5 0 0 0.0 1 1 0.5
Private 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0
Total 0 0 0.0 62 65 32.5 33 51 17.3 49 55 25.7 20 25 10.5 1 1 0.5 23 27 12.0 3 5 1.6 191 229 100.0
Nonprofit
Disrtrict Municipal International
Public Organizations
National National
Private TOTALS
International Central Provincial
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 Table 26 presents a total 191 interactions reported among the participating organizations 
during the Duzce response operations. The matrix of interactions indicates a measure of density 
of the Turkish disaster system in responding to the Duzce earthquake. The table shows a 
relatively lower level of total interactions compared to the Marmara response system. Because 
the Duzce earthquake affected a small geographic area with a small population, this result 
appears reasonable. A total number of 229 organizations participated in these interactions. 
 The findings show that the immense proportion of interactions, 191, or 99.9% was 
initiated by public agencies, and within that proportion, the largest component is public-central 
organizations (63 of a total 191). The second largest number of interactions, 62, or 32.5%, was 
initiated by the international of public organizations, whereas 50, or 26.2%, were initiated by the 
set of public-provincial organizations. Local level organizations, public-district and municipal 
organizations, initiated 15, or 7.8% of the interactions, reported for disaster response operations. 
In terms of the performance of nonprofit organizations, there was a decrease of 
involvement of national and international nonprofit organizations in interactions from the 
Marmara to Duzce. These organizations participated in 102, or 19.9%, of interactions initiated by 
public agencies during the Marmara earthquake (see Table 25), whereas nonprofit organizations 
engaged in 24, or, 12.5%, of interactions during the Duzce earthquake (see Table 26).  
 Frequencies distributions of interactions in both response systems reveal similar results in 
terms of which organizations initiated interactions. In the two response systems, public-central, 
public-international and public-provincial organizations initiated a vast proportion of all 
interactions. Public-district and public-municipal organizations initiated less than 10% of all 
interactions (there was a 1% increase in the Duzce response system). However, when we analyze 
the data on the column total, we can see the differences between the Marmara and Duzce. 
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 The findings display a notable shift to local level agencies for performing a recognized 
set of tasks in disaster operations. According to Table 26, public-district organizations were 
involved in 49, or 25.7% of interactions, initiated by public-central, provincial, international 
organizations. These data illustrates an approximately 20% of increase from the Duzce to 
Marmara response system (25.7%-6.0%). Likewise, there was an increase of involvement from 
public-municipal level. During the Duzce response operations, public-municipal organizations 
engaged in 20, or 10.5% of interactions initiated by public-central, provincial, district, and 
international organizations that represent a 4.9% of increase from the Marmara to Duzce 
response system. These results support the statistical analysis of ESFs. The significant influences 
of enhanced communication and coordination resulted in more local involvement in the Duzce 
disaster operations.  
 The interactions analyses portray two response systems, largely directed by the central 
government, with considerable contributions from provincial governments, international 
organizations. According to the findings, the Turkish disaster management system was more 
adaptive and relatively successful in responding to the Duzce earthquake. Better communication 
and coordination activities resulted in more involvement from local organizations and created 
faster and better coordinated response operations. However, the performance of the disaster 
system during the Duzce earthquake does not assure a sufficient disaster system to deal with a 
bigger and regional disaster such as the Marmara earthquake.   
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6.4 SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS OF ORGANIZATIONAL NETWORK IN 
RESPONSE OPERATIONS 
In this section of the chapter, I employ the UCINET (Borgatti, Everett, Freeman 2002) social 
network analysis program to examine the network relationships between disaster organizations 
involved in the 1999 Marmara and Duzce response systems. Individual disaster organizations 
from different jurisdictions were involved in response operations to different degrees. Some 
organizations that are legally responsible for disaster affairs such as crisis management centers 
performed important roles. Some organizations that are not included in the official disaster 
management structure such as TRAC played very important roles as well. The position of 
organizations during response operations indicates the importance of these organizations and the 
tasks that they carry out. The network analysis illustrates the extent to which the official disaster 
management structure works in a practical disaster environment.  
6.4.1 Centrality Measures for Interactions 
Centrality measurements from UCINET (Borgatti, Everett, Freeman 2002) show the positional 
advantage of the organizations during the response operations. I use binary measurements to 
code relations among disaster organizations. Relations (ties) being absent are coded (0), whereas 
relations being present are coded (1). I utilize four basic centrality measurements that UCINET 
provides (Hanneman 2001). These are: (1) Degree Centrality, (2) Closeness Centrality, (3) 
Betweenness Centrality, and (4) Flow Betweenness Centrality.    
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6.4.1.1 Degree Centrality 
The measurement of Freeman’s degree centrality indicates which organizations have the greatest 
number of connections to others.  The total number of degrees indicates how many connections 
one organization has with others in the network. It is the sum of Out-Degree and In-Degree data. 
Out-Degree data shows how many ties an organization sends to others. In-Degree data shows 
how many ties an organization receives from others. If the organization initiates interactions, and 
ties with others, its Out-Degree value becomes higher. If the organization is the recipient of an 
interaction, its In-Degree value grows larger.   
According to degree centrality data in Table 27 crisis management centers were the 
central organizations during the Marmara response operations (see Appendix E, Table 1 for 
degree centrality of all organizations). Kizilay (actor #7), Interior Ministry (actor #3), Prime 
Ministry Crisis Management Center (actor #1), Military (actor #5), National Educational 
Ministry (actor #83), and Health Ministry (actor #4) were the most influential organizations in 
terms of out-degree centrality. The Kocaeli Crisis Management Center (actor #13), Yalova Crisis 
Management Center (actor # 11), Sakarya Crisis Management Center (actor #14), Bolu Crisis 
Management Center (actor# 9), and Istanbul Crisis Management Center (actor #12) were the 
most influential organizations in terms of in-degree and total degree centrality measurements. 
Kizilay was the only national nonprofit organization that was very active and influential.  
Freeman’s degree centrality shows that provincial crisis management centers have larger 
in-degree centrality than other organizations, but they do not have significant out-degree 
centrality. Provincial and local organizations operated as centers for collecting incoming 
assistance and distributing it to needy communities. In contrast, central organizations have larger 
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out-degree centrality since they operated as centers for sending resources via city crisis 
management centers. 
 
Table 27 Freeman’s Degree Centrality for the Marmara Response System 
Sources: Cumhuriyet news reports, August 17 - September 7, 1999 (Corbacioglu, 2004) 
 
 
Actor#                           OutDegree     InDegree    NrmOutDeg     NrmInDeg 
13                     KOCMC        17.000       49.000        2.560        7.380 
 1                     PMCMC        21.000       25.000        3.163        3.765 
14                     YACMC         4.000       42.000        0.602        6.325 
11                     SACMC         3.000       42.000        0.452        6.325 
 9                     BOCMC        10.000       31.000        1.506        4.669 
12                     ISCMC         6.000       27.000        0.904        4.066 
 7                   Kizilay        26.000        6.000        3.916        0.904 
 5                  Military        18.000       12.000        2.711        1.807 
 3               Interior M.        22.000        1.000        3.313        0.151 
83     National Education M.        13.000        2.000        1.958        0.301 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
                  
                  OutDegree     InDegree    NrmOutDeg     NrmInDeg 
              ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ 
  1     Mean         2.410        2.410        0.363        0.363 
  2  Std Dev         4.018        7.032        0.605        1.059 
  3      Sum       400.000      400.000       60.241       60.241 
  4 Variance        16.145       49.447        0.366        1.122 
  5      SSQ      3644.000     9172.000       82.650      208.031 
  6    MCSSQ      2680.145     8208.145       60.789      186.170 
  7 Euc Norm        60.366       95.771        9.091       14.423 
  8  Minimum         0.000        0.000        0.000        0.000 
  9  Maximum        26.000       49.000        3.916        7.380 
Network Centralization (Outdegree) = 3.596% 
Network Centralization (Indegree) = 7.102% 
SSQ  : Sum of Squares  
MCSSQ: Mean Centered Sum of Squares 
Euc Norm: Euclidian Norm 
KOCMC: Kocaeli Crisis Management Center 
SACMC: Sakarya Crisis Management Center 
YACMC: Yalova Crisis Management Center 
PMCM :  Prime Ministry Crisis Management Center 
BoCMC: Bolu Crisis Management Center 
ISCMC: Istanbul Crisis Management Center 
National Education M.: National Education Ministry 
Regional CMC: Regional Crisis Management Center 
Health M. : Health Ministry 
GOLCMC : Golcuk Crisis Management Center 
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Table 28 Freeman’s Degree Centrality for the Duzce Response System 
Actor#                         OutDegree    InDegree     NrmOutDeg  NrmInDeg 
  3              Duzce CMC       0.000        59.000      0.000        9.105 
  2               Bolu CMC       2.000        19.000      0.309        2.932 
 33              Health M.      13.000         0.000      2.006        0.000 
 16              Military       10.000         7.000      1.543        1.080 
 54                Kizilay       9.000         1.000      1.389        0.154 
  1                  PMCMC       6.000         2.000      0.926        0.309 
 38           Istanbul P.        5.000         2.000      0.772        0.309 
 24                    MTS       6.000         0.000      0.926        0.000 
 25             D.P.Safety       6.000         0.000      0.926        0.000 
 60         Prime Ministry       5.000         1.000      0.772        0.154 
 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
                 OutDegree     InDegree    NrmOutDeg     NrmInDeg 
  1     Mean         1.495        1.495        0.231        0.231 
  2  Std Dev         2.084        5.936        0.322        0.916 
  3      Sum       163.000      163.000       25.154       25.154 
  4 Variance         4.342       35.241        0.103        0.839 
  5      SSQ       717.000     4085.000       17.075       97.284 
  6    MCSSQ       473.248     3841.248       11.270       91.479 
  7 Euc Norm        26.777       63.914        4.132        9.863 
  8  Minimum         0.000        0.000        0.000        0.000 
  9  Maximum        13.000       59.000        2.006        9.105 
 
Network Centralization (Outdegree) = 1.792% 
Network Centralization (Indegree) = 8.956% 
SSQ  : Sum of Squares  
MCSSQ: Mean Centered Sum of Squares 
Euc Norm: Euclidian Norm 
MTS         : The Directorate of Mining and Technical  Search 
Duzce CMC   : Duzce Crisis Management Center 
Bolu CMC    : Bolu Crisis Management Center 
Health M.   : Health Ministry 
Kizilay     : Red Crescent  
Istanbul P. : Istanbul Province 
PMCMC       : Prime Ministry Crisis Management Center 
D.P.Safety  : Duzce Public Safety 
 Source: Cumhuriyet news reports, November 12 - December 1, 1999 (Corbacioglu, 2004) 
As indicated in Table 28, the degree centrality data for the Duzce operations show similar 
outcomes for the Marmara response operations (see Appendix F, Table 1 for degree centrality of 
all organizations). Provincial and local organizations have higher in-degree centrality while 
central organizations have higher out-degree centrality as it is in the Marmara response 
operations. Health Ministry (actor #33), Military (actor #16), and Kizilay (actor #54) were the 
most central organizations in terms of out-degree centrality. Duzce Crisis Management Center 
(actor #3), and Bolu Crisis Management Center (actor #2) were the most influential 
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organizations in terms of in-degree centrality. According to the table, Prime Ministry Crisis 
Management Center (actor #1) that is the institution responsible for coordination of the response 
operations have weaker position in terms of centrality compared to the Marmara response. Since 
the Duzce earthquake was a local earthquake, provincial and local organizations were more 
active in responding to the disaster.  
Table 27 and Table 28 also present descriptive analyses and network centralization of the 
two response network. According to these statistics, on the average, organizations have a degree 
of 2.41, and 1.495, respectively, for the Maramra and Duzce response network. The range of 
variability in degree is larger in the Marmara response network (26 vs 13), whereas the range of 
variability is larger in the Duzce response network (59 vs 49). This shows that some 
organizations played a substantive role during the Marmara earthquake in terms of initiating 
interactions (e.g. PMCMC), whereas some organizations took more central positions during the 
Duzce earthquake in terms of receiving interactions. In addition to these statistics, network 
centralization measures explore the degree of centralization in the networks. Freeman’s graph 
centralization measure indicates that the Marmara response network has 3.59% in-degree, and 
7.02% out-degree centrality, while the Duzce response network has 1.79% in-degree, and 8.96% 
out-degree centrality. Although network centralization statistics do not show highly centralized 
response systems, these data support the claim that the Marmara response network is more 
concentrated in terms of in-degree centrality, whereas the Duzce response system is more 
centralized in terms of out-degree centrality. 
6.4.1.2 Closessness Centrality 
Degree centrality measures only an actor’s immediate ties. One actor could have more direct ties 
with others, so that the actor could be one of the most central actors in the network. However, if 
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the other actors are disconnected from the network, the actor’s position can be defined by its 
local ties. 
Table 29 Closessness Centrality for the Marmara Response System 
Actor#                Farness      nCloseness 
  1      PMCMC        1982.000        8.325 
 13      KOCMC        1988.000        8.300 
  7      Kizilay      2002.000        8.242 
 11      SACMC        2006.000        8.225 
  5      Military     2016.000        8.185 
 14      YACMC        2020.000        8.168 
  9      BOCMC        2023.000        8.156 
  2      PWSM         2032.000        8.120 
 36      BOTAS        2042.000        8.080 
  3      Interior M.  2051.000        8.045 
Descriptive Statistics 
                   Farness   nCloseness 
  1     Mean      3098.321        7.359 
  2  Std Dev      4732.671        1.366 
  3      Sum    501928.000     1192.078 
  4 Variance  22398176.000        1.865 
  5      SSQ 5183638528.000     9074.090 
  6    MCSSQ 3628504576.000      302.179 
  7 Euc Norm     71997.492       95.258 
  8  Minimum      1982.000        0.606 
  9  Maximum     27225.000        8.325 
SSQ  : Sum of Squares  
MCSSQ: Mean Centered Sum of Squares 
Euc Norm: Euclidian Norm 
KOCMC: Kocaeli Crisis Management Center 
SACMC: Sakarya Crisis Management Center 
YACMC: Yalova Crisis Management Center 
PMCM :  Prime Ministry Crisis Management Center 
BOCMC: Bolu Crisis Management Center 
ISCMC: Istanbul Crisis Management Center 
National Education M.: National Education Ministry 
Regional CMC: Regional Crisis Management Center 
Health M.   : Health Ministry 
Interior M  : Interior Ministry 
 Sources: Cumhuriyet news reports, August 17 - September 7, 1999 (Corbacioglu, 2004) 
Closeness centrality can avoid this deficiency. Closeness centrality measures the distance 
of an organization to all other organizations in the network by focusing on the shortest distance 
from each organization to all others.  According to the Marmara response closessness centrality 
data, the Prime Ministry Crisis Management Center (actor #1) is the most central organization in 
terms of closessness centrality (see Appendix E, Table 2). Kocaeli Crisis Management Center 
(actor #13), Kizilay (actor #7), Sakarya Crisis Management Center (actor #11), and Military 
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(actor #5) follow the PMCMC.  Health Ministry (actor #4), National Educational Ministry (actor 
#83), Interior Ministry (actor #3) lost their central positions relative to degree centrality 
measurements.  
 
  Table 30 Closessness Centrality for the Duzce Response System 
Actor#                           Farness    nCloseness 
  3              Duzce CMC      1584.000        6.818 
 16               Military      1630.000        6.626 
 33            Health M.        1635.000        6.606 
 54                Kizilay      1636.000        6.601 
 38            Istanbul P.      1649.000        6.549 
 37      Istanbul G.C. Mu.      1650.000        6.545 
 60         Prime Ministry      1651.000        6.541 
  8         Ankara G.C. Mu      1655.000        6.526 
 22            D. Civil D.      1655.000        6.526 
 65                   SUBA      1655.000        6.526 
Descriptive Statistics 
                   Farness   nCloseness 
  1     Mean      2840.661        5.666 
  2  Std Dev      3059.317        1.740 
  3      Sum    309632.000      617.586 
  4 Variance   9359420.000        3.029 
  5      SSQ 1899736192.000     3829.345 
  6    MCSSQ 1020176768.000      330.149 
  7 Euc Norm     43585.965       61.882 
  8  Minimum      1584.000        0.926 
  9  Maximum     11664.000        6.818 
SSQ  : Sum of Squares  
MCSSQ: Mean Centered Sum of Squares 
Euc Norm: Euclidian Norm 
Duzce CMC   : Duzce Crisis Management Center 
Bolu CMC    : Bolu Crisis Management Center 
Health M.   : Health Ministry 
Kizilay     : Red Crescent  
Istanbul P. : Istanbul Province 
PMCMC       : Prime Ministry Crisis Management Center 
Istanbul G.C. Mu. : Istanbul Greater Municipality 
Ankara G.C. Mu.   : Ankara Greater Municipality 
D.Civil D.  : Duzce Civil Defense 
       Source: Cumhuriyet news reports, November 12 - December 1, 1999 (Corbacioglu, 2004) 
The data indicate that the Duzce Crisis Management Center remains the most central 
organization in the Duzce response network (see Appendix F, Table 2 for closessness centrality 
of all organizations). Similar to the results obtained for the degree centrality measurement, 
Military (actor #16), Health Ministry (actor #33), and Kizilay (actor #54) follow Duzce Crisis 
Management Center. Although, they have very low degree centrality measurements, Istanbul 
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Province Government (actor #38) and Istanbul Greater Municipality (actor #37) are in fifth and 
sixth place, respectively, in terms of closeness centrality. Compared with its degree centrality 
value, Bolu Crisis Management Center has a lower degree of closessness centrality.  
6.4.1.3  Betweenness Centrality 
Betweenness centrality provides information to assess an organization’s positional advantage 
based upon whether it falls on the shortest pathway between other pairs of organizations.  
According to betweenness centrality data in Table 31, the Prime Ministry Crisis 
Management Center (actor #1) is the most central organization which falls on the shortest 
pathway between other pairs of actors while it was the fourth most central organization in terms 
of degree centrality. Kocaeli Crisis Management Center (actor #13), Kizilay (actor #7), Military 
(actor # 5), Bolu Crisis Management Center (actor # 9), Yalova Crisis Management Center (actor 
#14), and Sakarya Crisis Management Center (actor # 11) are the other central organizations 
with the highest degree of betweenness centrality(see Appendix E, Table 3 for betweenness 
centrality of all organizations).  
Table 32 shows betweenness centrality data for the Duzce response system. Military 
(actor #16) is the most central actor in the network. Bolu Crisis Management Center (actor #2), 
and the Prime Ministry Crisis Management Center (actor #1) are the second and the third most 
central organizations, respectively, followed by Istanbul Greater City Municipality (actor #37) 
and Istanbul Province (actor #38) (see Appendix F, Table 3 for betweenness centrality of all 
organizations).  
The betweenness centrality statistics show that there is more variation in the Marmara 
response network (from 0 to 2552.16) than the Duzce response network (from 0 to 255.17). The 
overall network centralization is higher (9.24%) in the Marmara response network than in the 
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Duzce response network (1.90%). Although these data indicate that the Marmara response 
system had more intermediary actors (e.g. PMCMC, KOCMC), the response systems needed 
more agents that provide connections among disaster organizations 
Table 31 Betweenness Centrality for the Marmara Response System 
Actor#                 Betweenness nBetweenness 
  1           PMCMC      2552.156        9.431 
 13           KOCMC      1922.243        7.104 
  7         Kizilay       804.001        2.971 
  5         Military      762.387        2.817 
  9           BOCMC       762.234        2.817 
 14           YACMC       730.218        2.699 
 11           SACMC       610.451        2.256 
 50   Environment M.      447.167        1.653 
  2            PWSM       317.500        1.173 
  3      Interior M.      285.000        1.053 
 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR EACH MEASURE 
               Betweenness nBetweenness 
              ------------ ------------ 
  1     Mean        68.108        0.252 
  2  Std Dev       278.363        1.029 
  3      Sum     11306.000       41.781 
  4 Variance     77485.914        1.058 
  5      SSQ  13632696.000      186.177 
  6    MCSSQ  12862662.000      175.661 
  7 Euc Norm      3692.248       13.645 
  8  Minimum         0.000        0.000 
  9  Maximum      2552.156        9.431 
 
Network Centralization Index = 9.24% 
SSQ  : Sum of Squares  
MCSSQ: Mean Centered Sum of Squares 
Euc Norm: Euclidian Norm 
KOCMC: Kocaeli Crisis Management Center 
SACMC: Sakarya Crisis Management Center 
YACMC: Yalova Crisis Management Center 
PMCM :  Prime Ministry Crisis Management Center 
BOCMC: Bolu Crisis Management Center 
ISCMC: Istanbul Crisis Management Center 
National Education M.: National Education Ministry 
Regional CMC: Regional Crisis Management Center 
Health M. : Health Ministry 
Environment M. : Environment Ministry 
        Sources: Cumhuriyet news reports, August 17 - September 7, 1999 (Corbacioglu, 2004) 
 
 
 
 123 
 Table 32 Betweenness Centrality for the Duzce Response System 
Actor#                       Betweenness   nBetweenness 
 16              Military       225.167      1.948 
  2              Bolu CMC       171.833      1.487 
  1                 PMCMC       157.167      1.360 
 37      Istanbul G.C. Mu.      88.833       0.769 
 38            Istanbul P.      82.000       0.710 
 60         Prime Ministry      33.000       0.286 
 23            D. Highways      18.000       0.156 
 54               Kizilay       15.000       0.130 
 74                   TNA       3.000        0.026 
 58      President Demirel      3.000        0.026 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR EACH MEASURE 
               Betweenness nBetweenness 
  1     Mean         7.376        0.064 
  2  Std Dev        32.521        0.281 
  3      Sum       804.000        6.957 
  4 Variance      1057.615        0.079 
  5      SSQ    121210.445        9.077 
  6    MCSSQ    115280.023        8.633 
  7 Euc Norm       348.153        3.013 
  8  Minimum         0.000        0.000 
  9  Maximum       225.167        1.948 
 
Network Centralization Index = 1.90% 
SSQ  : Sum of Squares  
MCSSQ: Mean Centered Sum of Squares 
Euc Norm: Euclidian Norm 
Bolu CMC    : Bolu Crisis Management Center 
PMCMC       : Prime Ministry Crisis Management Center 
D.Highways  : General Directorate of Highways 
Kizilay     : Red Crescent  
Istanbul G.C.Mu: Istanbul Greater City Municipality 
Istanbul P. Istanbul Province Government 
TNA: Turkish National Assembly 
           Source: Cumhuriyet news reports, November 12 - December 1, 1999 (Corbacioglu, 2004) 
  
6.4.1.4 Flow Betweenness Centrality 
Flow Betweenness centrality measures not only the shortest pathways between two pairs of 
organizations but also all other alternative pathways by which an organization can use to reach 
the others.  
The flow betweenness centrality data produce similar results to the betweenness 
centrality data. As revealed in Table 33, the crisis management centers are the most influential 
actors in the Marmara response operations. According to the table, the Prime Ministry Crisis 
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Management Center (PMCMC), (actor #1) is the most central actor followed by Kocaeli Crisis 
Management Center (CMC), (actor#13), Yalova Crisis Management Center (CMC), (actor #14), 
and Bolu Crisis Management Center (CMC), (actor #9). Interior Ministry (actor r#3), Kizilay 
(actor #7), Environment Ministry (actor #50), and Military (actor #7) are the other organizations 
that exhibit high degree of flow betweenness centrality (see Appendix E, Table 4 for flow 
betweenness centrality of all organizations).    
The outcomes of flow betweenness centrality for the Duzce response system are 
parallel to the outcomes of Duzce betweenness centrality. Although the Prime Ministry Crisis 
Management Center (PMCMC), (actor #1) and Military (actor #16) reversed their positions, the 
five most influential organizations remained the same.  Following the PMCMC and Military, the 
first and the second respectively, Bolu Crisis Management Center (actor #2), Istanbul Greater 
City Municipality (actor # 37), and Istanbul Province Government (actor # 38) are the most 
central organizations in the network in terms of flow betweenness centrality. Duzce Crisis 
Management Center is the most central actor according to the degree and closessness centrality; 
however, it does not display a high degree of betweenness and flow betweenness centrality (see 
Appendix F, Table 4 for flow betweenness centrality of all organizations).  
The descriptive statistics of both response networks reveal similar findings that flow 
betweenness centrality data explored. The variation in the Marmara response network is 
substantially higher (4303.36) than in the Duzce response network (258). Likewise, network 
centralization is higher (15.69%) in the Marmara response network than in the Duzce network 
(2.19%). The network centralization data of flow betweenness centrality are higher than 
betweenness centrality that was based on shortest pathway. The findings strengthen the central 
positions of Prime Ministry Crisis Management Center, Kocaeli, Bolu, and Yalova Crisis 
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Management Centers. Coordination of response operations would be significantly worse if these 
organizations did not create connections among disaster organizations.   
Table 33 Flow Betweenness Centrality for the Marmara Response System 
Actor#                  FlowBet         nFlowBet 
 1       PMCMC         4303.363         15.903 
13       KOCMC         1440.825          5.325 
14       YACMC         1275.794          4.715 
 9      BOCMC          1192.773          4.408 
 3   Interior M.        663.691          2.453 
 7    Kizilay           660.041          2.439 
50 Environment M.       517.727          1.913 
 5      Military        507.704          1.876 
71        KOCI          377.136          1.394 
11        SACMC         301.230          1.113 
Network Centralization Index = 15.691% 
Descriptive Statistics for Each Meausre 
  1     Mean        82.857        0.306 
  2  Std Dev       384.770        1.422 
  3      Sum     13754.238       50.829 
  4 Variance    148048.328        2.022 
  5      SSQ  25715656.000      351.190 
  6    MCSSQ  24576022.000      335.626 
  7 Euc Norm      5071.061       18.740 
  8  Minimum         0.000        0.000 
  9  Maximum      4303.363       15.903 
SSQ  : Sum of Squares  
MCSSQ: Mean Centered Sum of Squares 
Euc Norm: Euclidian Norm 
KoCMC        : Kocaeli Crisis Management Center 
SaCMC        : Sakarya Crisis Management Center 
YACMC        : Yalova Crisis Management Center 
PMCM         :Prime Ministry Crisis Management 
Center 
BOCMC        : Bolu Crisis Management Center 
Kizilay      : Red Crescent 
Environment M. Environment Ministry  
Interior M. : Interior Ministry 
KOCI: Kocaeli Chamber of Industry 
        Sources: Cumhuriyet news reports, August 17 - September 7, 1999 (Corbacioglu, 2004) 
In both cases, the Marmara and Duzce, provincial and local crisis management center 
acted as primary actors for coordinating the response and recovery operations. The Prime 
Ministry Crisis Management Center, officially responsible for overall coordination of response 
operations, is identified as the most central organization in both response systems. According to 
the centrality analyses’ results, Kizilay and Military were also very active organizations during 
the response operations. The centrality measures indicate the practical circumstances which 
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would be beneficial for restructuring organizational and technical aspects of the Turkish disaster 
system.  
Table 34 Flow Betweenness Centrality for the Duzce Response System 
Actor#                        FlowBet     nFlowBet 
  1                 PMCMC     258.000        2.233 
 16              Military     251.000        2.172 
  2               Bolu CMC    172.833        1.496 
 37      Istanbul G.C. Mu.     66.667        0.577 
 38            Istanbul P.     56.000        0.485 
 60         Prime Ministry     26.000        0.225 
 23            D. Highways     13.000        0.112 
Network Centralization Index = 2.186% 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR EACH MEASURE 
                   FlowBet     nFlowBet 
  1     Mean         7.739        0.067 
  2  Std Dev        38.472        0.333 
  3      Sum       843.500        7.299 
  4 Variance      1480.132        0.111 
  5      SSQ    167861.797       12.570 
  6    MCSSQ    161334.359       12.081 
  7 Euc Norm       409.709        3.545 
  8  Minimum         0.000        0.000 
  9  Maximum          258.000         2.233 
SSQ  : Sum of Squares  
MCSSQ: Mean Centered Sum of Squares 
Euc Norm: Euclidian Norm 
PMCMC      : Prime Ministry Crisis Management Center 
Bolu CMC    : Bolu Crisis Management Center 
Istanbul P. : Istanbul Province 
D.Highways  : General Directorate of Highways 
Istanbul G.C.Mu: Istanbul Greater City Municipality 
BOCMC        : Bolu Crisis Management Center 
 Source: Cumhuriyet news reports, November 12 - December 1, 1999 (Corbacioglu, 2004) 
6.4.2 Cliques 
Table 5 (see Appendix E) provides information about the cliques (subgroups) identified in the 
1999 Marmara and Duzce response operations. There are 80 cliques for the Marmara response 
operations (see Appendix E, Table 5). The largest clique is composed of four actors. According 
to the data, crisis management centers are the most active actors that interact with others in 
subgroups.  Sakarya CMC (actor #11) has the highest participation in cliques as a member of 40 
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existing cliques. The total number of clique membership is 27 for Kocaeli (CMC) (actor #13), 24 
for (PMCMC) (actor #1), 21 for Bolu (CMC) (actor #9), and 9 for Yalova (CMC) (actor #14).  
Consistent with centrality data, Military, Kizilay and Interior Ministry are the other actors that 
are the members of several cliques.  
Based upon the data, there are 18 cliques for the Duzce response operations (Appendix F, 
Table 5).  The largest clique consists of 4 actors. Duzce (CMC) is the most active actor with 12 
clique memberships. The highest number following Duzce (CMC) is Military (actor #16) with 6 
clique memberships. Bolu (CMC) (actor # 2) and Istanbul Province (actor # 38) have 5 clique 
memberships apiece, and Kizilay (actor # 54), 4 such memberships.  
6.5 COMMUNICATION CREATES DIFFERENCES 
The analyses revealed the strengths and weaknesses of the Turkish disaster response system. 
Statistical analysis of Emergency Support Function in conjunction with the UCINET analysis 
(Borgatti, Everett, Freeman 2002) showed that the 1999 Marmara and Duzce disaster response 
systems were mainly operated by public-central organizations with considerable assistance from 
public-international and public provincial organizations. The inadequate involvement of public-
district and public-municipal organizations hindered the performance of the response systems in 
terms of coordinated response operations, especially during the Marmara earthquake. Statistical 
analysis of ESFs proved that inadequate communication and information capacity of the system 
restrained coordination of response operations thus restrained coordinated search and rescue 
operations. This situation created a public disapproval of Turkish public administration’s 
performance in the Marmara earthquake.  
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After this disappointing performance, the system was more prepared and performed 
better during the Duzce response operations. The ESFs and transaction analyses indicated that 
increasing communication functions improved coordination of response operations, thus 
enhanced the performance of the system in search and rescue operations. Increases in 
information flow among organizations facilitated more involvement of local organizations which 
was very decisive for the effective response system during the Duzce earthquake.   
According to centrality measures, crisis management centers were very active and central 
actors during the 1999 earthquake response operations. The Prime Ministry Crisis Management 
Center was the most central agency in both response systems. Provincial crisis management 
centers were very active during the Duzce earthquake. These centers coordinated response 
activities. Due to the success of these centers, every city in the region established a permanent 
crisis management center after the earthquakes. Each center was equipped with necessary tools 
to manage and coordinate disaster affairs.   
6.6 SUMMARY 
This chapter reviewed the performance of the 1999 response systems that evolved following the 
Marmara and Duzce earthquakes. The types of organizations involved in response operations and 
the form of transactions made by these organizations were analyzed. I also reviewed the types of 
transactions among disaster organizations from different jurisdictions.  
 The analysis showed that public national and international organizations played very 
significant roles in the response operations. The public-central organizations are more central in 
both response systems. However, the Duzce response system involved relatively more local 
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disaster agencies than the Marmara response system. The disaster response operations were more 
coordinated in the Duzce response system. The data showed that increased communication 
activities improved coordinated response operations during the Duzce earthquake.   
Inferences from the analyses exposed some gaps in the Turkish disaster system. The 
system remains very centralized and bureaucratic in which district governments and 
municipalities do not play significant roles in the system. Moreover, nonprofit and private 
organizations do not appear to be important components of the system.  
Seismic risk affects every aspect of community life. It requires a combination of efforts 
and expertise from various sources to address the challenges it poses. The disaster management 
system needs to unite these different sources for better performance, and in particular, to 
encourage more involvement of disaster organizations at the local level.   
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7.0  REFORMING THE TURKISH DISASTER MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
Data collected from primary sources were analyzed to identify the organizations and the 
interactions involved in the projects initiated after the 1999 earthquakes in order to improve 
organizational and informational capacity of the Turkish disaster system. The analysis also 
includes the projects that were initiated prior to, but continued after, the 1999 Earthquakes. The 
data were collected from official websites of disaster organizations, interviews, content analyses 
of Cumhuriyet Scientific and Technical Section (May 1998-May 2005), and situation and 
professional reports. The research identifies transactions and interaction patterns among the 
organizations involved in investing the information and organizational infrastructure after the 
earthquakes. These data reveal characteristics of inter-organizational network in the projects. 
After the complex problems of disaster operations during the 1999 earthquakes, the 
Turkish disaster system recognized the necessity of improving organizational and informational 
capacity to cope with future catastrophic disasters. Funded by national and international sources, 
many projects were initiated after the 1999 earthquakes. Individual disaster organizations, 
especially provincial governments, implemented various projects to improve the response 
capacity of their own organizations. However, this chapter only analyzes joint projects that are 
carried out by two or more organizations and does not include individual organizational attempts. 
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These projects are relatively small activities and have been initiated by an individual 
organization without cooperation with others. These activities are mainly focused on improving 
the response capacity of the system, increasing personnel capacity of rescue teams, training 
activities, and reorganizing and developing technical equipment (e.g. buying a new fire truck). 
The next chapter will analyze these developments. 
In the first part of the chapter, I present the frequency distribution of the organizations 
that were involved in the projects. Then, I classify and analyze the projects based on their 
primary purposes. Finally, I use social network analysis to identify the role of organizations 
participating in the projects, and the interactions among them. The UCINET 6.0 software 
program (Borgatti, Everett, Freeman, 2002) was used to analyze centrality measurements to 
identify the most dynamic organizations and interaction patterns in the network. In this chapter, I 
explore to what extent the efforts undertaken after the earthquakes are sufficient to close the gaps 
in the Turkish disaster system. 
7.2 TYPES OF ORGANIZATIONS CONTRIBUTING TO DISASTER 
MANAGEMENT PROJECTS 
The research identified the primary organizations involved in the projects. As shown in Table 35, 
there are 154 organizations involved in the projects (see Appendix H for the list of 
organizations). Eighty-five of 154 (55.19%) organizations are national public, nonprofit and 
private while 69 of 154 (44.81%) organizations involved in the project are international. Most of 
the organizations involved in the projects are public. From Table 23, we can observe that 34 of 
the 69 (48.57%) international organizations and 71 of 85 (83.53%) national organizations are 
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public. Also significant is the role of domestic public-central organizations (26.32%). 
International public (22.08%), international nonprofit (16.23%), and domestic public-province 
organizations (12.99%) have had notable roles in the projects as well.  
Domestic and international research institutions understandably play significant roles in 
redesigning the Turkish disaster system. Sixty-one of 154 (39.61%) organizations are research 
institutions of which 20, or 32.78%, are domestic central organizations. Although most national 
research institutions (e.g. universities) operate at the province level, and mainly cooperate with 
province administrations, they are legally considered to be public-central organizations.    
Table 35 Types of Organizations Contributed in Disaster Management Projects Reported 
by Primary Funding Source Jurisdictions 
National Organizations N % N of Research Institutions  
Public-Central 40 26.32 20 of 40 are research institutions, 50% 
Public-Province 20 12.99  
Public-District 2 1.30  
Public-Municipal 9 5.84  
Nonprofit 7 4.55  
Private 7 4.55  
Total National 85 55.19  
International Organizations N % N % of Research Institutions 
International-Public 34 22.08 25 of 34 are research institutions, 73.52% 
International-Nonprofit 25 16.23 16 of 25 are research institutions,64.0% 
International-Private 10 6.49  
Total International 69 44.81  
Total Organizations 154 100.00  
N=Number of Organizations; %=Percentage of Organizations 
Source: Appendix C 
 
International organizations consist of more research institutions than do national 
organizations. Forty one of 61 (67.21%) research institutions are international. All national 
research institutions and most international ones are public. Twenty of 71 (28.17%) domestic 
public organizations, 25 of 34 (73.52%) international public organizations, and 16 of 25 (64%) 
international nonprofit, are research institutions.  
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Table 36 National Organizations Contributed in Disaster Management Projects Reported 
by Primary Funding Source & Jurisdictions 
National Organizations N % 
Public-central 40 47.06 
Public-province 20 23.53 
Public-district 2 2.35 
Public-municipal 9 10.59 
Nonprofit 7 8.24 
Private 7 8.24 
Total 85 100.00 
  N=Number of Organizations; %=Percentage of Organizations 
  Source: Appendix C 
 
According to Table 36, most national organizations are public-central organizations. 
Thirty nine of 85 (47.06%) are public-central organizations, whereas 20 of 85 (23.53%) are 
public-province organizations. There are nine (10.59%) municipalities, including 3 district 
municipalities that participated in the projects. Only two of 85 (2.35%) national organizations are 
public-district. Equal numbers of national nonprofit and private organizations (7; 8.24%) are 
involved in the projects.  
Table 37 International Organizations Contributed in Disaster Management Projects 
Reported by Primary Funding Source & Jurisdictions 
International N % 
International Public 34 49.28 
International Nonprofit 25 36.23 
International Private 10 14.49 
Total 69 100.00 
    N=Number of Organizations; %=Percentage of Organizations 
    Source: Appendix C 
 
As depicted in Table 37, most international organizations contributing to the projects are 
public organizations. Thirty-four of 69 (49.28%) international organizations are public whereas 
25 of 69 (36.23%) are nonprofit. In addition, ten international private organizations (14.49%) are 
involved in the projects.   
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More international nonprofit and private organizations are involved in the projects than 
national nonprofit and private organizations.  Only 14 of the 85 (16.48%) national organizations 
are private and nonprofit whereas slightly more than half of the international organizations, 35 of 
69 (50.72%) are private and nonprofit.  
7.3 THE GOAL OF THE PROJECTS 
The research identified 93 primary shared projects that are aimed at establishing and developing 
organizational and informational infrastructure of the system (see Appendix I for a detailed list 
of joint projects). Some, but not all, of these projects are completed. I categorize the projects 
based on type of actions (e.g. the subject/purpose of the project) to determine the main goal of 
Turkish disaster management.  
The main goal of these projects is to increase the capacity of disaster system for different 
cycles of the disaster management: mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. Mitigation 
and preparedness are the stages in which responsible disaster managers design and develop 
policies and structures to diminish the catastrophic effects of disasters before they occur. At 
these phases, organizations also prepare strategic plans to clarify the tasks that have to be 
executed by different organizations during the four phases of disasters. The performance of a 
disaster management system in responding to a disaster depends on actions that are taken during 
the mitigation and preparedness stages. 
Response and recovery phases come after a disaster occurs and test the capacity and 
awareness of the system to a disaster. Responsible managers of disaster systems may invest more 
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in mitigation and preparedness activities in order to be successful in response and recovery 
stages. 
7.3.1 Earthquake Monitoring and Recording 
After the 1999 disasters, the Turkish disaster management system developed considerably its 
capacity to monitor and record seismic activity across the country. The primary organizations 
that initiated projects for continuous earthquake monitoring and recording activities include the 
Turkish Scientific and Technical Council and Marmara Research Center (TUBITAK-MAM), 
Earthquake Research Department under the General Directorate of Disaster Affairs, Bogazici 
University Kandilli Observatory and Earthquake Engineering (Bogazici-KOERI), Istanbul 
Metropolitan Municipality, General Command of Mapping.  
Thirty-eight digital accelerometers were added to Strong Ground Motion Network, and 
14 earthquake monitoring and recording stations were established by Bogazici University and 
Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality to monitor seismic event occurring along the North 
Anatolian Fault Line. TUBITAK initiated several projects for the same purposes. Twenty-two 
earthquake recording stations were built to monitor changes and movements in the West, Central 
and Southern Anatolian fault lines and several more stations are planned. TUBITAK Marmara 
Research Center, a leader in conducting seismological, geodetic and geological studies, erected 
one soil gas radon observation station on the East Anatolian fault line to monitor radon gas 
activities for future earthquake risk. General Command of Mapping joined a project to establish 
16 earthquake stations throughout Turkey for monitoring purposes. The ultimate goal is to 
complete 50 stations. Finally, the Earthquake Research Department initiated two main projects 
between 2002 and 2003: 20 modern acceleration recording instruments around two arrays 
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(Yalova-Bursa and Aydin-Denizli) and 18 modern acceleration recording instruments around the 
array (Antakya-Maras) were positioned for monitoring and recording underground movements. 
These studies improved the monitoring and recording capacity of the Turkish disaster 
system compared to the pre-earthquake period.31  Disaster organizations such as Earthquake 
Research Department and Kandilli Observatory continuously analyze and record seismic 
activities twenty-four hours across the country. 
7.3.2 Geodesic and Geophysics  
After the 1999 earthquakes, research institutions conducted many joint and individual projects to 
investigate geodesic and geophysical characteristics of fault lines, especially the North Anatolian 
Fault Line. Bogazici-KOERI, Istanbul Technical University, and TUBITAK-MAM initiated 
important projects to investigate deformation and movements in the fault line after the 
earthquakes. They include Monitoring Crustal Deformation by Different Geodetic Measurement 
Techniques, Determining Current Tectonic Features of Central Part of NAF by GPS 
Measurements, Crustal Deformation and Block Kinematics the Eastern Sector of the NAF by 
GPS Measurements, and Investigations on the Fault Line in the North Shore of Marmara Sea by 
using Electric and Electromagnetic instruments. TUBITAK-MAM and Yildiz technical 
University began researches to determine the deformation in the region after the Marmara 
earthquake. These investigations are very vital to assess the changes in seismic risk prone areas 
and provide information for responsible policy makers to minimize the impact of a major 
earthquake on a community’s life.   
                                                 
31 Interview with General Directorate of Disaster Affairs, Earthquake Research Center, June 10, 
2004 
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Seismological investigations are also conducted in the Marmara Sea. Scientists from 
France and Turkey conducted a project, “French-Turk SEISMARMARA Joint Project in the 
Marmara Sea” to collect seismological data in order to assess seismic risk in the Marmara Sea. 
The data were also analyzed to evaluate the risk of a Tsunami during a possible future 
earthquake in the Marmara Sea.  
One important project is the “Marmara Earthquake Recovery Land Identification System 
(MERLIS)”. The project has developed as part of the Marmara Earthquake Emergency Recovery 
(MEER) that the Prime Ministry Implementation Unit initiated in 1999. The MERLIS project has 
been carried out by the General Directorate of Land Registry and Cadastre (GDLRC). The 
GDLRC has been renewing cadastral information and creating a land registry and cadastral 
database system which will be based for construction activities for the Marmara region.  
The MERLIS and MEER are considered two important projects for urban development 
policies. After the completion of these projects, local organizations (e.g. municipalities) will 
have an updated cadastral database that is prepared based on seismic codes, and will utilize to 
regulate construction activities in the Marmara region. However, experiences showed that a 
strong political and legal will should be behind these regulations for them to be effective.32  
“…Governments should enforce this rule. Otherwise these changes do not make 
any differences. For instance, we did a pilot study in Zeytinburnu33 and completed 
geodesic and geophysical analyses. We decided that we have to renew the entire 
neighborhood and move people to somewhere else. We can find financial 
assistance to do this. But, it becomes a purely political and legal decision because 
it is hard to persuade people to move…” 
                                                 
32 Interview with Directorate of Earthquake Department, Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, 
June 22, 2004    
33 Zeytinburnu is a neighborhood under a high seismic risk in European part of Istanbul.   
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7.3.3 Earthquake Prediction and Early Warning 
Bogazici University Kandilli Observatory and Earthquake Engineering (Bogazici-KOERI), 
Turkish Scientific and Technical Council and Marmara Research Center (TUBITAK-MAM), 
Istanbul Technical University, and Turkish Red Crescent Society Emergency Coordination 
Center (Kizilay-AFOM) are the primary organizations that initiated projects for the purpose of 
earthquake prediction.  
The most comprehensive earthquake prediction project developed under the supervision 
of Bogazici-KOERI with financial and technical assistances from Istanbul Province Government, 
The First Army Headquarter, Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, and GeoSig & Electrowatt 
Ekono Consortium is the “Istanbul Earthquake Rapid Response and Early Warning Project”. For 
this early warning system, 110 stations were established to monitor seismic activities. Istanbul 
Technical University also ran a similar project between 2000 and 2004. Thirty stations were built 
to observe geological rock stress and thus predict earthquakes.  
TUBITAK-MAM led two research projects in 2003 and 2004 to investigate the 
relationship between soil, radon gas, spring water, and earthquake predict future damaging 
earthquakes. Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality supported a study, “Testing New Methods for 
the Prediction of Earthquakes in the Marmara Region” to investigate anomalies in spring water, 
soil, and radon gas and compare the results with GPS studies and seismological data to determine 
the relations between such anomalies and seismic activity. Finally, Kizilay-AFOM planned to 
establish a satellite early warning system for rapid response. 
Earthquake prediction and early warning studies aim to improve the capacity of the 
system for later stages of disaster management. These studies aim to prevent possible post-
earthquake disaster such as fire and chemical explosions. Although these projects are important 
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to diminish the destructive consequences of an earthquake, they do not increase sustainability of 
local communities to seismic risk. 
7.3.4 Emergency Response and Recovery 
Istanbul Province Government, Prime Ministry Project Implementation Unit, Bogazici 
University Center for Disaster Management, TUBITAK-MAM, Yildiz Technical University, and 
General Directorate of Civil Defense are the primary organizations that initiated essential 
projects for emergency response and recovery purposes. 
The most important development discussed in this chapter to strengthen the emergency 
response capacity of the system was the formation of 11 regional professional rescue teams by 
the General Directorate of Civil Defense. Istanbul Province Government established disaster 
stations with necessary equipment in 32 district centers for immediate need for rescue operations.  
Prime Ministry Project Implementation Unit (PIU) supported several important projects 
that aimed to increase response capacity of the system as well as recovery and rehabilitation 
from the 1999 earthquakes. PIU initiated two projects between 2000 and 2004, Marmara 
Earthquake Rehabilitation Program and Turkey Earthquake Rehabilitation and Reconstruction 
Assistant Project (TERRA), which provided different reconstruction and psycho-social 
rehabilitation activities, and assistance to municipalities for implementation of their disaster 
recovery and reconstruction plans. Another project that PIU supported is Turkey Earthquake and 
Flood Emergency Recovery Project (TEFER) which focuses on recovering from the damages of 
future destructive disasters and developing hazard mitigation strategies. Prime Ministry Project 
Implementation Unit also supported Marmara Earthquake and Recovery Project (MEER) from 
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1999 to 2005, which established the Establishing Turkish Emergency Management Agency and 
institutionalized the Mandatory Insurance Program.  
The elites in The Turkish disaster management acknowledged that the capacity of the 
disaster system increased significantly for rescue and recovery phases34. Official rescue groups 
in combination with volunteer rescue teams created a better responsive disaster system. 
Responsible managers believe that Turkey has one of the finest response systems in terms of 
search and rescue operations35.  
“…After difficulties in search and rescue operations in the 1999  earthquakes, 
we focused on this issue. We established very professional  rescue groups. For 
instance, they performed effectively in Iran  earthquake. Now we send them to 
many earthquakes in different countries  and we get very good  appraisal from 
their governments…”  
7.3.5 Information Management 
During the 1999 disaster response operations, lack of valid geographic information for disaster 
prone areas significantly hampered the ability of disaster organizations to assist needy 
communities. After the earthquakes, municipalities and provincial governments in the region 
initiated projects to create a Geographic Information Systems (GIS) for disaster management 
purposes. Istanbul Province Government, Bursa Municipality, Bolu Government, Sakarya 
Government, Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality and Duzce Municipality established a GIS 
urban knowledge base for public affairs that included disaster affairs and land development 
                                                 
34 Interview with Duzce Province Government, June 14, 2004 
    Interview with Yalova Crisis Management Center, June 17, 2004 
    Interview with Sakarya Civil Defense Rescue Group, June 15, 2004 
35 Interview with General Directorate of Civil Defense, June 8, 2004                                    
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affairs. Also, TUBITAK-MAM conducted a project to create a GIS database for Yalova for the 
purposes of land development management and disaster affairs.  
Istanbul Technical University Disaster Management Center undertook a project called 
“The Development of National Database Using GIS & Remote Sensing Systems and the 
Standards for a Disaster Management System” to form a GIS base for a nationwide disaster 
information management system. TUBITAK also conducted a joint project, Seismological 
Network Calibration between Israel and Turkey, with organizations from Israel to establish a 
database about micro-earthquake activities, and seismio-tectonic data of the East Mediterranean 
Sea. Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality initiated a comprehensive project in 2001 to collect 
borehole data about the Istanbul Metropolitan area in order to establish a digital database. This 
database will be used for land development policies that will regulate construction activities in 
the metropolitan area of Istanbul.  
Bogazici University Disaster Management Center (BU-CENDIM) conducted several 
joint projects for both preparedness and recovery purposes. One of them, “Istanbul Disaster 
Preparedness Education Project”, was carried out between 2001 and 2003. Increasing emergency 
awareness, developing a GIS project to integrate disaster capability with USGS, and creating a 
web-site for information sharing were the main goals in this project. BU-CENDIM also carried 
out projects that aimed to establish a disaster management decision support system. “Authority 
and Communication Systems for Disaster Management: An Integrated Model” was initiated to 
develop an authority and communication structure for policy formulation, decision making and 
coordination for disaster preparation and response operations for Istanbul. “Integrated Decision 
Support System for Disaster Management in Turkey” was conducted by BU-Cendim to enhance 
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the emergency recovery and humanitarian relief capability of the disaster system by focusing on 
preparedness and response strategies for potential major earthquakes in Istanbul.  
Inadequacies in information process capacity of the disaster system awakened the 
Turkish disaster organizations and they invested more in information systems compared to 
before the 1999 earthquakes. These developments are in the early stages of adopting information 
systems in most organizations. Especially, local disaster organizations lack financial, technical 
and personnel capacity to adopt these systems and they rely primarily on outside assistance.36 
The analysis also shows that the lack of well-developed knowledge base among disaster 
organizations remains an important challenge.  
7.3.6 Communication and Coordination 
Disaster organizations completed many individual projects to establish communication channels 
among themselves. Obtaining satellite phones, wireless communication systems, and creating 
websites are some of the activities that individual disaster organizations executed by using their 
own sources. Moreover, several joint projects were carried out to establish secure 
communication channels among disaster organizations. TUBITAK initiated an important project, 
“BILSAT” which is the first Turkish observation satellite launched in 2003. The main function 
of the satellite is disaster monitoring and communication. BILSAT is considered to take part in 
“The Disaster Monitoring Constellation (DMC) Consortium”, which consists of the satellites of 
Algeria, China, Nigeria, Thailand, and the United Kingdom.    
                                                 
36Interview with Golcuk Crisis Management Center, June 16, 2004    
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One key development was the formation of a wireless communication network among 
provincial disaster management centers in the Marmara region. Turkish Amateur Radio Club 
(TRAC) opened permanent stations in disaster management centers in Sakarya, Bursa, Yalova, 
Kocaeli, and Istanbul. TRAC also signed an agreement in 2000 with the General Directorate of 
Turkey Emergency Management, General Directorate of Civil Defense, and International 
Federation of the Red Cross for emergency communication. TRAC and participating 
organizations agreed on logistic and technical support, information sharing and increasing human 
resources in order to supply better communication for disaster affairs.  
Istanbul Provincial Government initiated an information network project to create a 
communication network among district disaster management centers in Istanbul and Istanbul 
Province Crisis Management Center. This communication network is assumed to increase 
information exchange among district crisis management centers. Therefore, responsible 
managers are able to share sources to perform necessary technical and organizational changes 
and implement appropriate policies to improve the capacity of the emergency management 
system.  
After the establishment of the General Directorate of Turkey Emergency Management 
Agency (see chapter 4 for detailed explanation), the most important development in coordination 
of disaster affairs was the establishment of permanent crisis management centers under province 
and district governments. Before the 1999 earthquakes, these centers were only active during the 
emergency response and recovery phases. However, after the earthquakes, every province and 
district government placed emphasis upon the creation of permanent crisis management centers 
so that disaster affairs can be managed and coordinated from preparedness to recovery phases.   
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The Turkish Red Crescent Society (Kizilay) established a sub-organization (Kizilay-
AFOM) in Ankara to coordinate and manage outside assistance during response operations. This 
center is also responsible for managing inventories in order to avoid any shortage during a major 
disaster.   
There are several points to be mentioned about communication and coordination 
activities. First, despite of these developments, coordination of disaster affairs is still an 
important issue that is to be addressed. The General Directorate of Turkey Emergency 
Management is not able to practically serve its duty.37The legal and technical foundation of the 
agency should be improved so that the agency could perform the tasks for coordination purposes.  
Second, nonprofit organizations, TRAC, Kizilay-AFOM, played important roles in these 
attempts. However, improvements in communication channels do not provide a well-connection 
between central and local, especially district, organizations38.  
7.3.7 Risk Assessment and Earthquake Scenario and Planning 
Bogazici KOERI, Istanbul Technical University, Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, General 
Directorate of Disaster Affairs, Kizilay AFOM, Kocaeli University, Izmir Municipality carried 
out joint projects to assess seismic risk and develop earthquake scenarios and plans.  
Seismic microzonation studies have been conducted in the Marmara region to assess 
seismic risk and develop appropriate policies for disaster mitigation. Istanbul Metropolitan 
Municipality started a project in 2000, “The Study on Disaster Prevention, Mitigation Basic Plan 
in Istanbul Including Seismic Microzonation in the Republic of Turkey” to create seismic 
                                                 
37 Interview with General Directorate of Turkey Emergency Management, June 7, 2004    
38 Interview with Turkish Amateur Radio Club, June  23, 2004 
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microzonation maps and collect microzonation data to evaluate seismic risk in every 
neighborhood within the metropolitan area. Preparation of this database is very crucial for land 
development strategies.  
Kocaeli University conducted the study, “Seismic Microzonation of Izmit and its 
Surroundings by GIS” in order to examine the impact of the Kocaeli earthquake and evaluate 
future seismic risks. The General Directorate of Disaster Affairs started a project in March 2002 
and completed it in February 2004. With this, “Seismic Microzonation for Municipalities 
(microzonation for Earthquake Risk Mitigation, MERM),” GDDA aimed to create microzonation 
maps as applicable databases for administration of land development activities.  
Two metropolitan municipalities that are exposed to significant seismic risk, Izmir and 
Istanbul, prepared a comprehensive earthquake master plan for their cities. Izmir metropolitan 
municipality completed its master plan, “An Earthquake Damage Scenario and Earthquake 
Master Plan for Izmir” at the end of 1999. This plan includes various damage assessment 
scenarios, alternative plans and strategies to cope with damage that a possible earthquake creates.  
The master plan that Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality initiated and supported is the 
most comprehensive plan and includes every aspect of disaster affairs for Istanbul to prevent 
future losses from an expected Istanbul Earthquake. Disaster experts from Bogazici University, 
Istanbul Technical University, Yildiz Technical University, and Middle East Technical 
University worked two years (2002-2003) to prepare this master plan. It includes explanations of 
the legal, technical, and organizational bases of Turkish disaster management and proposes 
solutions to avoid possible destructive consequences of a future Istanbul earthquake.   
In contrast to the limited capability of the disaster system before the 1999 earthquakes 
(Comfort, 2000), disaster organizations developed a considerable number of risk assessment 
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models and prepared strategic plans. The Istanbul Master Plan is considered the best 
investigation and plan that could be conducted.39 President of Bogazici Kandilli Observatory 
stated this fact as: 
“…The knowledgeable researchers from four universities worked two years to 
prepare this plan. We received financial and technical support from the Istanbul 
Metropolitan Municipality. From information management to legal process, we 
have studied every aspects of seismic risk in Istanbul and proposed policies to 
manage this risk. Now, we have to implement these policies before it is late…” 
7.3.8 Education and Training Projects 
Istanbul Technical University Center of Excellence for Disaster Management (ITU-CEDM) 
initiated studies for educating and training purposes. The center implemented a project between 
2001 and 2003 in cooperation with Federal Emergency Management (FEMA-USA) and Turkish 
Interior Ministry. The National Emergency Management, Education and Exercise 
Implementation Program aimed to provide sustainability to the emergency management system 
of Turkey via the training. The center also run the project, A Cooperative Hazard Impact 
reduction Effort via Education (ACHIEVE) to train and educate responsible managers. 
The ITU-CEDM carried out “Red Cross Education Project” with Kizilay and FEMA. The 
project had several purposes such as first aid training, community emergency response team 
training and GIS education for disaster management. In addition, the municipalities and crisis 
management centers in the region carried out many individual programs to train rescue teams 
and educate responsible managers for disaster response and recovery purposes. The disaster 
organizations implemented training and education programs not only for public professional 
                                                 
39 Interview with Bogazici University Kandilli Observatory, June 24, 2004 
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rescue teams, but also volunteer groups to build rescue capacity in local communities. A program 
first implemented in Kocaeli to establish Neighborhood Volunteer Rescue Groups served as the 
model for other cities. These training and education programs significantly enhanced the quality 
and quantity of rescue capacity of the Turkish disaster system.  
As summarized above, these education and training activities were mainly focused on 
rescue, recovery, and relief stages of disaster management cycles. The responsible  managers 
point out this fact40: 
“…We have to teach the citizens and personnel that they have to face seismic risk 
and they have to learn how to live with that. What we are doing is to teach them 
how to survive after an earthquake happens. Of course this is important as well. 
This is a very complex issue. But the first thing that we have to teach and train 
ourselves is that this seismic risk was here, is here and will be here. So, we have 
to learn to change our attitudes to cope with this risk…” 
 
7.4 INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL NETWORK IN EFFORTS UNDERTAKEN AFTER 
1999 EARTHQUAKES 
In this section of the study, I utilize the UCINET 6.0 (Borgatti, Everett, Freeman, 2002) to 
perform network analysis for joint projects. The network diagram, produced by using the 
UCINET software for social network analysis (Borgatti, Everett, Freeman, 2002), demonstrates 
inter-organizational collaboration and partnership in the projects initiated after the 1999 
Earthquakes. Data gathered from official documents, professional reports, news analyses of 
Cumhuriyet, and the related web sites were used for this analysis.   
                                                 
40 Interview with Bogazici University Earthquake Engineering, June 24, 2004 
Interview with Turkish Amateur Radio Club, June  23, 2004 
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Sources: Official Websites of Turkish Disaster Organizations, Semi-Structured Interviews with 
Turkish Experts in Disaster Management (June 1-July 27, 2004), Cumhuriyet News Reports 
Academic and Professional Reports (see the full list in Appendix C) 
 
Figure 8 Project Inter-organizational Network 
Legend: 
Acronym Organizations Acronym Organizations 
Bu-KOERI Bogazici University, Kandilli 
Observatory and Earthquake Research 
Institute  
Turk Pirelli Turk Pirelli 
ITU Istanbul Technical University  Erickson Erickson 
METU Middle East Technical University Tuncmatik Tuncmatik 
Tubitak-MAM TUBITAK Marmara Research Center  YBT Yapisal Tasarim Hizmetleri  
ITU-Cendm ITU Center of Excellence for Disaster 
Management  
TRAC Turkish Ameteur Radio Club 
ERD GDDA Earthquake Research Center  AKUT Search and Rescue Association 
Tubitak The Scientific and Technical research 
and Council Turkey  
TFA Turkish Firebrigade Association  
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Acronym Organizations Acronym Organizations 
Bu-Cendim Bogazici University-Center for 
Disaster Management  
KIZILAY Turkish Red Crescent Society  
GDDA General Directorate of Turkish 
Disaster Affairs  
Kizilay-
AFOM 
Kizilay-Emergency Coordination Center 
GDTEM General Directorate of Turkey 
Emergency Management  
TNGGA Turkish National Geophysics and Geodesy 
Association  
BU Bogazici University BITA Bolu Industrial and Trade Association 
Ytu Yildiz Technical University  SDC Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation  
Ist. Uni. Istanbul University  FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency, USA  
GDCD General Directorate of Civil Defense  NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization  
PIU Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry 
Project Implementation Unit  
GMG Gumulcine Municipality of Greece  
Interior Ministry of 
Turkey 
Interior Ministry of Turkey SLF Swiss Federal Institute of Snow and Avalanche 
Research  
KOU Kocaeli University  ETHZ-IGT Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich - 
Institute for Geotechnical Engineering  
SAU Sakarya University EPFL-IS Swiss Federal Institute Technology Lausanne  
Firat Uni. Firat University ETHZ-IG Swiss Federal Institute Technology Zurich  
GCM General Command of Mapping, 
Turkey  
USGS United Centrals Geological Survey  
SHOD Turkish Navy- Department of 
Navigation, Hydrography and 
Oceanography 
USID-OFDA United Centrals International Development Agency 
“Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance”  
DMI Central Meteorological Affairs  PSU Penn Central University\ 
DSI General Directorates of Central 
Hydraulic Works  
CNR National Research Council of Italy  
MTA General Directorate of Mineral 
Research and Exploration  
NSSP National Survey for Seismic Protection, Yerevan, 
Armenia  
DPT Central Planning Institution DUTech Darmstadt University of Tech.-Institute of Physics 
and Geodesy  
TEDAS Turkish Central Electricity 
Distribution Corp 
JIPE Joint Institute of Physics of the Earth, Moscow, 
Russia  
Turk Telecom Turk Telecom FJG Julich Research Center 
EIE General Directorate of Electrical 
Power Resources, Turkey 
 IRRS Istituto di Ricerca sul Rischio Sismico, Milano, Italy  
GDLRC General Directorate of Land Registry 
and Cadastre 
ING Istituto Nazionale di Geofisica, Roma, Italy  
GDI General Directorate of Insurance  GII Geophysical Institute of Israel  
MPWS Ministry of Public Works and 
Settlements  
GI Geophysics Institute, National Academy of Sciences, 
Kiev, Ukraine  
GDSL General Directorate of Central Land  GPG Grevena Province Government, Greece  
DEU Dokuz Eylul University IG-Tiblisi Institute of Geophysics, Academy of Sciences, 
Tbilisi, Georgia  
AIBU Abant Izzet Baysal University IG-Zurich Institute of Geophysics, ETH Zurich, Switzerland  
ZKU Zonguldak Karaelmas Uni. IMG Institute of Marine Geology, Italy  
Dicle Uni Dicle Uni IRM Institute of Rock Mechanics, Academy of Sciences, 
Prague, Czech Republic 
Selcuk Uni. Selcuk Uni. IIEES International Institute of Earthquake Engineering and 
Seismology, Teheran, Iran  
Karadeniz Uni.  Karadeniz Uni.  IIEPTMG International Institute of Earthquake Prediction 
Theory and Mathematical Geophysics, Moscow, 
Russia  
First Army Hd First Army Headquarters IS Institute of Seismology, Academy of Sciences, 
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Acronym Organizations Acronym Organizations 
Ashkhabad, Turkmenistan  
IPG Istanbul Province Government EMGE Experimental Methodical Geophysical Expedition, 
Academy of Sciences, Baku, Azerbaijan  
KG Kocaeli Government ERR Emilia Romagna Region, Italy  
SG Sakarya Government GFZ GeoForschungsZentrum, Potsdam, Germany  
BG Bursa Government CSIC-Spain Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas-
Spain 
YG Yalova Government ETHZ-Zurich Swiss Seismological Service 
Bolu Gov Bolu Government BKG Bundesamt Kartographie und Geodasie  
DG Duzce Province Government JICA Japan International Cooperation Agency  
Ankara CD Ankara Civil Defense  US Red 
Cross 
US Red Cross 
Afyon CD Afyon Civil Defense MIT Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
Adana CD Adana Civil Defense UN United Nations 
Bursa CD Bursa Civil Defense WB World Bank 
Diyarbakir CD Diyarbakir Civil Defense French Team French Team 
Erzurum CD Erzurum Civil Defense EUREF European Reference Frame  
Istanbul CD Istanbul Civil Defense ESC European Seismological Commission  
Izmir CD Izmir Civil Defense DRM The world Institute for Disaster management  
Sakarya CD Sakarya Civil Defense TITech Tokyo Institute of Technology 
Samsun CD Samsun Civil Defense UNR University of Nevada at Reno  
Van CD Van Civil Defense UP University of PA  
SAR Search and Rescue  IFRC International Federation of Red Cross 
Izmit KK Izmit Kent Kurultayi VT Virginia Institute of Technology  
Izmit CD Izmit Civil Defense WRMDC Wharton Risk Management and Decision Center 
IBB Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality  Kyoto Uni Kyoto University 
Yalova Mun Yalova Municipality LDEO Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory, Colombia 
University  
Izmir Mun Izmir Municipality ISSMGE International Society of Soil Mechanics and 
Geotechnical Engineering  
Bursa Mun Bursa Municipality EAEE European Association of Earthquake Engineering  
Kocaeli Mun Kocaeli Municipality EIB European Investment Bank  
Sakarya Mun Sakarya Municipality ESA European Space Agency  
Bolu Mun Bolu Municipality EUF European Union Fund  
Duzce Mun Duzce Municipality Negro of 
JRC-Ispra 
Environmental Institute for Health and Consumer 
Protection  
Avcilar Mun Avcilar Municipality  CHRR Center for Hazard and Risk Research- Colombia 
University 
District M Diztrict Municipalities UNAVCO University NAVSTAR Consortium  
DCMC District Crisis Management Center SSTL Surrey Satellite Technology Limited 
Siemens Siemens GS&EEC GeoSig&Electrowatt Ekono Cons 
Sika Sika ECC Exandas Consultant Comp 
Unilever Unilever Munich 
Regroup 
Munich Regroup 
CW Corliss Willis Studer Eng. Studer Engineering 
CAR Cambridge Architectural Research 
Limited  
LEL&OC-
UK 
London Economics Limited and Oracle 
Corporation UK Ltd 
CSFB Credit Suisse First Boston  Sumitomo 
Co. 
Sumitomo Corporation 
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Figure 8 depicts interactions among the national and international organizations for 
preparation and implementation of the projects. The figure provides a quick snapshot of the 
network. Organizations have different positions depending on their degree of involvement in the 
projects. Before analyzing the centrality data, one can easily observe from the figure that some 
organizations are key actors in the network: Bogazici University Kandilli Observatory and 
Earthquake Engineering (BU-KOERI), Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality (IBB), Istanbul 
Province Government (IPG), Istanbul Technical University (ITU), Middle East Technical 
University (METU), ITU- Disaster Management Center (ITU-Cendim). The Scientific and 
Technical Research and Council of Turkey (TUBITAK), the TUBITAK-Marmara Research 
Center (TUBITAK-MAM), the General Directorate of Disaster Affairs (GDDA), the Prime 
Ministry of Project Implementation Unit (PIU), and the General Directorate of Civil Defense are 
the other most central organizations. European Seismological Commission (ESC) appears to be 
the most central international organizations. Kizilay and Turkish Amateur Radio Association 
(TRAC) are the most active national nonprofit organizations in the network. It is understandable 
that research institutions (e.g. BU-KOERI, Metu, Itu, TUBITAK) are key actors in the project 
network.  
7.4.1 Centrality 
7.4.1.1 Degree Centrality 
The measurement of Freeman’s degree centrality shows which organization has the most central 
role in the joint projects. Out-Degree and In-Degree data document the position of an 
organization in the network. If an organization is the main organization which develops the 
project, and unites with others for this purpose, its Out-Degree value grows higher. If an 
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organization participates in a project developed by others and joins with other organizations for 
this purpose, its In-Degree value becomes higher. Table 38 shows the 10 most central 
organizations in terms of degree centrality in the project network (see Appendix G, Table 1 for 
Freeman’s degree centrality data for all organizations). 
Table 38 indicates that Bogazici University Kandilli Observatory and Earthquake 
Engineering (actor #1) is the most central organization with more ties (38) to others than any 
other organization. The BU-KOERI has the second highest Out-Degree centrality score, 29, (the 
same as TUBITAK-MAM) and in-degree centrality value of 9, (the same as TUBITAK and 
METU). BU-KOERI is the most active organization in the network that initiates projects and 
cooperates in other projects that are developed by other organizations (see Figure 9).  
Table 38 also present descriptive analyses and network centralization of the project 
network. According to these statistics, on the average, organizations have a degree of 1.81, and 
Freeman’s graph centralization measure indicates that the project network has 2.03% in-degree, 
and 4.69% out-degree centrality. These statistics show there is not a substantial centralization, or 
concentration in the network. The power of centrality is distributed among organization such as 
BU-KOERI, TUBITAK, ITU, IBB, GDDA, ESC, PIU.  
According to Table 38, the European Seismological Commission (actor #76), has the 
highest out-degree centrality (30) and the third highest total degree centrality; however, it does 
not have any in-degree centrality.41 Therefore, the ESC is in the central position in its local 
neighborhood, and can be treated as an outlier. Figure 10 shows that the BU-KOERI is the key 
organization that connects the ESC to the whole network. 
                                                 
41 There are only two projects that ESC coordinates. These projects are located in large regions of   
Europe, Africa, and Near-Asia. 
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Table 38 Freeman’s Degree Centrality for the Project Network 
Actor#         OutDegree     InDegree    NrmOutDeg     NrmInDeg 
 
76     ESC      30.000         0.000        4.902        0.000 
1   BU-KOERI    29.000        9.000         4.739        1.471 
5   TUBITAK-MAM 29.000        8.000         4.739        1.307 
2      IBB      21.000        7.000         3.431        1.144 
20     PIU      21.000        0.000         3.431        0.000 
12    GDDA      17.000        2.000         2.778        0.327 
6  ITU-Cendm    15.000        0.000         2.451        0.000 
3      ITU      13.000       14.000         2.124        2.288 
35     GCM      13.000        3.000         2.124        0.490 
19    GDCD      11.000        2.000         1.797        0.327 
 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
                        OutDegree      InDegree        NrmOutDeg  NrmInDeg 
  1     Mean             1.831           1.831          0.299         0.299 
  2  Std Dev             5.393           1.937          0.881         0.316 
  3      Su            282.000         282.000         46.078        46.078 
  4 Variance            29.088           3.751          0.777         0.100 
  5     SSQ           4996.000        1094.000        133.389        29.209 
  6    MCSS           4479.610         577.610        119.602        15.422 
  7 Euc Norm            70.682          33.076         11.549         5.405 
Network Centralization (Outdegree) = 4.695% 
Network Centralization (Indegree) = 2.028% 
SSQ  : Sum of Squares  
MCSSQ: Mean Centered Sum of Squares 
Euc Norm: Euclidian Norm 
ESC: European Seismological Commission 
BU-KOERI: Bogazici University Kandilli Observatory and Earthquake 
Engineering 
TUBITAK-MAM: The Scientific and Technical Research and Council of Turkey 
Marmara Research Center  
PIU: Prime Ministry of Project Implementation Unit 
IBB: Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality 
GDDA: General Directorate of Disaster Affairs 
GDCD: General Directorate of Civil Defense 
ITU: Istanbul Technical University 
ITU-Cendim: ITU- Disaster Management Center  
GCM: General Command of Mapping 
Sources: Official Websites of Turkish Disaster Organizations, Semi-Structured Interviews with 
Turkish Experts in Disaster Management (June 1-July 27, 2004), Cumhuriyet News Reports 
Academic and Professional Reports (see the full list in Appendix C) 
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Sources: Official Websites of Turkish Disaster Organizations, Semi-Structured Interviews with 
Turkish Experts in Disaster Management (June 1-July 27, 2004), Cumhuriyet News Reports 
Academic and Professional Reports (see the full list in Appendix C) 
Figure 9 Ego Network for BU-KOERI 
Legend: 
Acronym Organizations 
Bu-KOERI Bogazici University, Kandilli Observatory and Earthquake Research Institute  
ITU Istanbul Technical University  
METU Middle East Technical University 
Tubitak-MAM TUBITAK Marmara Research Center  
ERD GDDA Earthquake Research Center  
Tubitak The Scientific and Technical research and Council Turkey  
Bu-Cendim Bogazici University-Center for Disaster Management  
BU Bogazici University 
GCM General Command of Mapping 
MIT Massachusetts Institute of Technology  
IPG Istanbul Province Government 
Bu-Cendim Bogazici University-Center for Disaster Management  
GDDA General Directorate of Turkish Disaster Affairs  
IBB Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality 
First Army Headquarters First Army Headquarters 
Turk Telecom Turk Telecom 
Turk Treasury Turk Treasury 
KIZILAY Turkish Red Crescent Society  
SAR Search and Rescue  
Izmir Mun Izmir Municipality 
TEDAS Turkish Central Electricity Distribution Corp 
US Red Cross US Red Cross 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization  
Negro of JRC-Ispra Environmental Institute for Health and Consumer Protection  
ISSMGE International Society of Soil Mechanics and Geotechnical Engineering  
EAEE European Association of Earthquake Engineering  
 155 
Acronym Organizations 
Negro of JRC-Ispra Environmental Institute for Health and Consumer Protection  
GS&EEC GeoSig&Electrowatt Ekono Cons 
ESC European Seismological Commission  
USGS United Centrals Geological Survey  
CSFB Credit Suisse First Boston  
Munich Regroup Munich Regroup 
Sources: Official Websites of Turkish Disaster Organizations, Semi-Structured Interviews with 
Turkish Experts in Disaster Management (June 1-July 27, 2004), Cumhuriyet News Reports 
Academic and Professional Reports (see the full list in Appendix C) 
Figure 10 EGO Network for ESC 
Legend: 
Acronym Organizations  
ESC European Seismological Commission  
Bu-KOERI Bogazici University, Kandilli Observatory and Earthquake Research Institute  
NSSP National Survey for Seismic Protection, Yerevan, Armenia  
JIPE Joint Institute of Physics of the Earth, Moscow, Russia  
 IRRS Istituto di Ricerca sul Rischio Sismico, Milano, Italy  
ING Istituto Nazionale di Geofisica, Roma, Italy  
GI Geophysics Institute, National Academy of Sciences, Kiev, Ukraine  
IG-Tiblisi Institute of Geophysics, Academy of Sciences, Tbilisi, Georgia  
IG-Zurich Institute of Geophysics, ETH Zurich, Switzerland  
IRM Institute of Rock Mechanics, Academy of Sciences, Prague, Czech Republic 
IIEES International Institute of Earthquake Engineering and Seismology, Teheran, Iran  
IIEPTMG International Institute of Earthquake Prediction Theory and Mathematical Geophysics, Moscow, Russia  
IS Institute of Seismology, Academy of Sciences, Ashkhabad, Turkmenistan  
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Acronym Organizations  
EMGE Experimental Methodical Geophysical Expedition, Academy of Sciences, Baku, Azerbaijan  
GFZ GeoForschungsZentrum, Potsdam, Germany  
CSIC-Spain Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas-Spain 
ETHZ-Zurich Swiss Seismological Service 
 
Sources: Official Websites of Turkish Disaster Organizations, Semi-Structured Interviews with 
Turkish Experts in Disaster Management (June 1-July 27, 2004), Cumhuriyet News Reports 
Academic and Professional Reports (see the full list in Appendix C) 
Figure 11 Ego Network for TUBITAK-MAM 
Legend: 
Acronym Organizations  
Bu-KOERI Bogazici University, Kandilli Observatory and Earthquake Research Institute  
ITU Istanbul Technical University  
METU Middle East Technical University 
Tubitak-MAM TUBITAK Marmara Research Center  
Tubitak The Scientific and Technical research and Council Turkey  
Ytu Yildiz Technical University  
Ist Uni. Istanbul University 
KOU Kocaeli University  
Firat Uni. Firat University 
GCM General Command of Mapping, Turkey  
MTA General Directorate of Mineral Research and Exploration  
SHOD Turkish Navy- Department of Navigation, Hydrography and Oceanography 
TNGGA Turkish National Geophysics and Geodesy Association  
Bolu Gov Bole Government 
Avcilar Mun. Avcilar Municipality  
Yalova Mun. Yalova Municipality 
French Team French Team 
MIT Massachusetts Institute of Technology  
UNAVCO University NAVSTAR Consortium  
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Acronym Organizations  
EUREF European Reference Frame  
TITech Tokyo Institute of Technology 
GMG Gumulcine Municipality of Greece  
EUF European Union Fund  
 
Excluding ESC, the TUBITAK-MAM (37) and Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality (28) 
follow BU-KOERI. The TUBITAK-MAM has 29 out-degree and 8 in-degree centrality (Figure 
11), whereas IBB has 21 out-degree and 7 in-degree centrality (Figure 12).  
Sources: Official Websites of Turkish Disaster Organizations, Semi-Structured Interviews with 
Turkish Experts in Disaster Management (June 1-July 27, 2004), Cumhuriyet News Reports 
Academic and Professional Reports (see the full list in Appendix C) 
Figure 12 Network for Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality  
Legend: 
Acronym Organizations  
IBB Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality  
Bu-KOERI Bogazici University, Kandilli Observatory and Earthquake Research Institute  
ITU Istanbul Technical University  
METU Middle East Technical University 
Tubitak-MAM TUBITAK Marmara Research Center  
Tubitak The Scientific and Technical research and Council Turkey  
BU Bogazici University 
District Mun District Municipalities  
MIT Massachusetts Institute of Technology  
IPG Istanbul Province Government 
Ytu Yildiz Technical University  
MTA General Directorate of Mineral Research and Exploration  
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Acronym Organizations  
FJG Julich Research Center 
LDEO Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory, Colombia University  
JICA Japan International Cooperation Agency  
CNR National Research Council of Italy  
IMG Institute of Marine Geology, Italy  
 
Istanbul Technical University (27), the Project Implementation Unit of Turkish Prime 
Ministry (21) and the General Directorate of Disaster Affairs (19) are other public-province and 
public central organizations that have the most central position in the network after the first four 
organizations. Those organizations are the most central organizations that develop and contribute 
to the projects.  
ITU has the biggest in-degree centrality (14) (Figure 13), followed by BU-KOERI (actor 
#1), the TUBITAK (actor #7), and the Middle East Technical University (actor #4), each with in-
degree centrality value of 9. Therefore, those organizations are the main organizations that join 
projects developed by other organizations in the network. 
According to Table 1 (see Appendix G), ESC (actor#76), the Prime Ministry Project 
Implementation Unit (PIU, actor#20), ITU-Disaster Management Center (ITU-Cendim, actor#6), 
the Turkish Treasury (actor#26), and Bolu Government (actor#56) do not have any in-degree 
centrality whereas the METU, and the Bogazici University (BU, actor#11) do not have  any out-
degree centrality. Interestingly, the General Directorate of Turkey Emergency Management 
(GDTEM, actor #13) mandated with coordination of disaster affairs is not among the most 
central organizations in the network. 
 
 
 
 
 159 
 
Sources: Official Websites of Turkish Disaster Organizations, Semi-Structured Interviews with 
Turkish Experts in Disaster Management (June 1-July 27, 2004), Cumhuriyet News Reports 
Academic and Professional Reports (see the full list in Appendix C) 
Figure 13 Ego Network for ITU Sources 
 
Legend: 
Acronym Organizations  
Bu-KOERI Bogazici University, Kandilli Observatory and Earthquake Research Institute  
ITU Istanbul Technical University  
METU Middle East Technical University 
Tubitak-MAM TUBITAK Marmara Research Center  
ERD GDDA Earthquake Research Center  
Tubitak The Scientific and Technical research and Council Turkey  
GCM General Command of Mapping 
IPG Istanbul Province Government 
GDDA General Directorate of Turkish Disaster Affairs  
IBB Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality 
Ist Uni.  Istanbul University 
SAU Sakarya University 
Turkish Treasury Turkish Treasury 
Izmir Mun.  Izmir Municipality 
Siemens Siemens 
Sika Sika 
Unilever Unilever 
Turk Pirelli Turk Pirelli 
Erickson Erickson 
Tuncmatik Tuncmatik 
YBT Yapisal Tasarim Hizmetleri  
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Acronym Organizations  
Turk Pirelli Turk Pirelli 
ESA European Space Agency  
 
The European Seismological Commission is the only international agency among the 
most central organizations. TRAC, Kizilay and Kizilay-AFOM are the most central national 
nonprofit organizations. In terms of jurisdictions, public-central organizations have significantly 
higher centrality degree than public-province ones. Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality is the 
only municipality that has a notable centrality degree.   
7.4.1.2 Closeness Centrality 
Closeness centrality not only measures the distance of an organization to all other organizations, 
but also measures the shortest distance from each organization to all others in the project 
network. Table 39 presents data on the degree of closeness centrality for the ten most central 
organizations in the project network (see Appendix G, Table 2 for closeness centrality data for 
all organizations).  
As shown in Table 39, BU-KOERI is the most central organization with the highest 
degree of closeness centrality (44.868), and the sum of its farness score from other organizations 
is the least (341). The General Directorate of Disaster Affairs (GDDA) follows BU-KOERI with 
a total farness degree of 361. Istanbul Technical University (ITU) with a farness degree of 367, 
the TUBITAK-Marmara Research Center with a farness degree of 385 and the Istanbul 
Metropolitan Municipality with a farness degree of 394 come after the first two organizations, 
respectively.   
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Table 39 Closeness Centrality for the Project Network 
Actor#                      Farness       nCloseness 
 1            BU-KOERI       341.000       44.868 
12               GDDA        361.000       42.382 
 3                ITU        367.000       41.689 
 5       TUBITAK-MAM         385.000       39.740 
 2               IBB         394.000       38.832 
 8               IPG         415.000       36.867 
20               PIU         417.000       36.691 
 7           TUBITAK         426.000       35.915 
40           Kizilay         434.000       35.253 
 4              METU         436.000       35.092 
Statistics 
                   Farness   nCloseness 
  1     Mean       549.779       28.448 
  2  Std Dev        80.690        4.337 
  3      Sum     84666.000     4380.983 
  4 Variance      6510.847       18.811 
  5      SSQ  47550280.000   127526.906 
  6    MCSSQ   1002670.500     2896.943 
  7 Euc Norm      6895.671      357.109 
  8  Minimum       341.000       17.019 
  9  Maximum       899.000       44.868 
Network Centralization = 33.44% 
SSQ  : Sum of Squares  
MCSSQ: Mean Centered Sum of Squares 
Euc Norm: Euclidian Norm 
IPG: Istanbul Province Government 
BU-KOERI: Bogazici University Kandilli Observatory and 
Earthquake Engineering 
TUBITAK-MAM: The Scientific and Technical Research and 
Council of Turkey Marmara Research Center  
PIU: Prime Ministry of Project Implementation Unit 
IBB: Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality 
GDDA: General Directorate of Disaster Affairs 
TUBITAK: The Scientific and Technical Research and 
Council of Turkey 
ITU: Istanbul Technical University 
Kizilay: Turkish Red Crescent  
METU: Middle East Technical University 
   Sources: Official Websites of Turkish Disaster Organizations, Semi-Structured 
 Interviews with Turkish Experts in Disaster Management (June 1-July 27, 2004), 
 Cumhuriyet News Reports Academic and Professional Reports (see the full list in 
 Appendix C) 
 
In terms of jurisdictions, the public-central organizations are more central in the network 
than the public-province organizations. Eight of ten organizations that have the least farness 
degrees are the public-central organizations, whereas only one of ten (Istanbul Province 
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Government) is a public-province organization. Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality is the only 
municipality among the ten most central organizations. Two national nonprofit organizations, 
Turkish Amateur Radio Club and the Turkish Red Crescent Society, are among the twenty most 
central organizations. 
The data reveal that the European Seismological Commission is a local central 
organization in the network. The ESC is the nineteenth most central organization in terms of 
closeness centrality, while it is the only international and third most central organization in terms 
of degree centrality. The table shows that international organizations are more central when all 
ties rather than only immediate ties are considered (see Appendix G, Table 2). There are three 
international organizations, the ESC, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Japan International 
Coordination Agency, among the most central organizations.  
The network centralization index shows a considerably large (33.44%) degree of 
concentration in the whole network. This indicates organizations such as Bu-KOERI, GDDA, 
ITU, and TUBITAK-MAM were involved in considerable numbers of projects in the network. 
7.4.1.3 Betweenness Centrality 
Table 40 cites data on betweenness centrality for the project network.  The table lists 18 
organizations that have at least (1.000) score of betweenness centrality degree. All other 
organizations in the network have (0) score of betweenness centrality (see Appendix G, Table 3 
for betweenness centrality data for all organizations). 
According to Table 40, Bogazici University Kandilli Observatory and Earthquake 
Engineering (actor #1), Istanbul Technical University (actor #3), and TUBITAK-Marmara 
Research Center (actor # 5) have the highest degree of betweenness centrality, suggesting that 
more organizations depend on them to connect with other organizations in the network. 
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TUBITAK (actor #7), Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality (actor #2), General Directorate of 
Disaster Affairs (actor #12), General Command of Mapping (actor #35), Kocaeli University 
(actor #27), and Istanbul Province Government (actor #8) follow the first three organizations. 
 Although the Project Implementation Unit of Turkish Prime Ministry (actor #20) is the 
sixth most central organization according to the Freeman’s degree centrality, it is not among the 
main organizations according to the betweenness centrality data. The General Directorate of 
Turkey Emergency Management (GDTEM, actor #13) is again not among the most central 
organizations in the network in terms of betweenness centrality. 
Moreover, like the Freeman’s degree centrality data, there is one international 
organization, Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (actor #21) among the first 18 
organizations that fall on the shortest pathway between other pairs of organizations in the 
network.  
In terms of jurisdictions, 11 of 18 organizations that have the highest betweenness 
centrality score are the public-central organizations. There are two public-province governments, 
Istanbul Province Government and Sakarya Government, and two province municipalities, 
Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality and Duzce Municipality, and two national nonprofit 
organizations, TRAC and Kizilay among the most central organizations as measured by 
betweenness centrality. 
The graph centralization present a 2.24% index degree that shows the network is not 
centralized. It indicates that organizations interact with other without assistance of intermediary 
actors. 
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Table 40 Betweenness Centrality for the Project Network 
Actor#               Betweenness     nBetweenness 
 1   BU-KOERI            538.767        2.317 
 3        ITU            417.700        1.796 
 5    TUBITAK-MAM        413.700        1.779 
 7        TUBITAK        323.283        1.390 
 2        IBB            180.583        0.777 
12       GDDA            156.500        0.673 
35        GCM            141.117        0.607 
27        KOU            105.000        0.451 
 8        IPG             98.333        0.423 
14        Ytu             42.067        0.181 
19       GDCD             33.000        0.142 
 9        ERD             31.450        0.135 
40   Kizilay              20.000        0.086 
21        SDC             18.000        0.077 
33       TRAC             18.000        0.077 
38  Sakarya Gov.           5.000        0.021 
138     GDLRC              2.500        0.011 
34   Duzce Mun.            1.000        0.004 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR EACH MEASURE 
               Betweenness nBetweenness 
  1     Mean        16.532        0.071 
  2  Std Dev        72.118        0.310 
  3      Sum      2546.000       10.948 
  4 Variance      5200.973        0.096 
  5      SSQ    843041.500       15.588 
  6    MCSSQ    800949.875       14.809 
  7 Euc Norm       918.173        3.948 
  8  Minimum         0.000        0.000 
  9  Maximum       538.767        2.317 
Network Centralization Index = 2.24% 
SSQ  : Sum of Squares  
MCSSQ: Mean Centered Sum of Squares 
Euc Norm: Euclidian Norm 
BU-KOERI: Bogazici University Kandilli Observatory and Earthquake 
Engineering 
TUBITAK: The Scientific and Technical Research and Council of Turkey 
TUBITAK-MAM: Marmara Research Center of Tubitak 
IBB: Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality 
GDDA: General Directorate of Disaster Affairs 
GDCD: General Directorate of Civil Defense 
ITU: Istanbul Technical University 
YTU: Yildiz Technical University  
GCM: General Command of Mapping 
IPG: Istanbul Province Government 
Kizilay: Turkish Red Crescent  
KOU: Kocaeli University 
ERD: Earthquake Research Department 
TRAC: Turkish Radio Amateur Club 
Sakarya Gov.: Sakarya Province Government 
GDLRC: General Directorate of Land Registry and Cadastre 
Duzce Mun. : Duzce Municipality 
SDC: Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation 
Sources: Official Websites of Turkish Disaster Organizations, Semi-Structured 
Interviews with Turkish Experts in Disaster Management (June 1-July 27, 2004), 
Cumhuriyet News Reports Academic and Professional Reports (see the full list in 
Appendix C) 
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7.4.1.4 Flow Betweenness Centrality 
Table 41 cites data on flow betweenness centrality for the project network.  The table presents 
data on 17 organizations that have scores of at least 1.000 on flow betweenness centrality. All 
other organizations in the network have a score of 0.000 on flow betweenness centrality (see 
Appendix G, Table 4 for flow betweenness centrality data for all organizations). 
According to the flow betweenness centrality table, Bogazici University Kandilli 
Observatory and Earthquake Engineering (actor #1) has the highest centrality degree, indicating 
that BU-KOERI is the most important mediator in the network. Similar to the betweenness 
centrality data, Istanbul Technical University (actor #3) and the TUBITAK-MAM (actor # 5) 
follow BU-KOERI. TUBITAK (actor #7), Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality (actor #2), 
Istanbul Province Government (actor #8), Kocaeli University (actor #27), General Command of 
Mapping (actor #35), and General Directorate of Disaster Affairs (actor #12) fall below the first 
three organizations. 
With respect to jurisdictions, 10 of 17 organizations that have the highest betweenness 
centrality score are public-central organizations. According to Tables 28 and 29, betweenness 
centrality and flow betweenness centrality data reveal similar results about province 
governments, province municipalities and the national nonprofit organizations as they include 
the same provincial, local and nonprofit organizations. Swiss Agency for Development and 
Cooperation (actor #21) is once more the only international organization among the first 17 
organizations with a high score of flow betweenness centrality. 
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Table 41 Flow Betweenness Centrality for the Project Network 
     Actor#                       FlowBet     nFlowBet 
1         BU-KOERI         916.077          3.939 
3              ITU         363.852          1.565 
5      TUBITAK-MAM         331.182          1.424 
7          TUBITAK         219.336          0.943 
2              IBB         135.064          0.581 
8              IPG         117.292          0.504 
27             KOU         107.976          0.464 
35             GCM         101.755          0.438 
12            GDDA          77.333          0.333 
9              ERD          69.743          0.300 
14             Ytu          42.142          0.181 
33            TRAC          11.333          0.049 
21             SDC           4.833          0.021 
138          GDLRC           1.333          0.006 
34      Duzce Mun.           1.000          0.004 
38     Sakarya Gov.          1.000          0.004 
40         Kizilay          1.000           0.004 
Network Centralization Index = 3.895% 
                   FlowBet     nFlowBet 
  1     Mean        16.248        0.070 
  2  Std Dev        86.622        0.372 
  3      Sum      2502.252       10.760 
  4 Variance      7503.299        0.139 
  5      SSQ   1196165.750       22.117 
  6    MCSSQ   1155508.125       21.365 
  7 Euc Norm      1093.694        4.703 
SSQ  : Sum of Squares  
MCSSQ: Mean Centered Sum of Squares 
Euc Norm: Euclidian Norm 
BU-KOERI: Bogazici University Kandilli Observatory and Earthquake 
Engineering 
TUBITAK-MAM: The Scientific and Technical Research and Council of 
Turkey Marmara Research Center  
IBB: Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality 
GDDA: General Directorate of Disaster Affairs 
ITU: Istanbul Technical University 
YTU: Yildiz Technical University  
GCM: General Command of Mapping 
IPG: Istanbul Province Government 
TUBITAK: The Scientific and Technical Research and Council of 
Turkey 
Kizilay: Turkish Red Crescent, KOU: Kocaeli University 
ERD: Earthquake Research Department, TRAC: Turkish Radio Amateur 
Club 
Sakarya Gov.: Sakarya Province Government 
GDLRC: General Directorate of Land Registry and Cadastre 
Duzce Mun. : Duzce Municipality 
SDC: Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation 
Sources: Official Websites of Turkish Disaster Organizations, Semi-Structured Interviews with 
Turkish Experts in Disaster Management (June 1-July 27, 2004), Cumhuriyet News Reports 
Academic and Professional Reports (see the full list in Appendix C) 
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The final centrality measurement indicates that the General Directorate of Turkey 
Emergency Management (GDTEM, actor #13) is not among the most central organizations in the 
network. Although there are only seven national nonprofit organizations in the whole network, it 
is certain that two national nonprofit organizations, TRAC and Kizilay, are the most central 
organizations among all 154 organizations in the network based upon four different centrality 
measurements. 
The betweenness centrality and flow betweenness statistics show a relatively low index 
of graph centralizations. Network centralization for betweenness centrality is 2.24%, whereas for 
flow betweenness centrality is 3.89%. These data show that many organizations interact with 
others without using intermediary actors.  
7.4.2 Cliques 
Table 42 lists the cliques (subgroups) identified in the project network. The data exhibit sub-
network structures within the larger network. Since we assume that the larger network supports 
the emergence of subgroups, this table gives us applicable data to understand the features of the 
whole network.  According to the table, there are 33 cliques that contain at least three or more 
members.  
The three largest cliques are composed of five organizations. Seven of the 33 cliques 
have four members. The remainder of the cliques (23) in the table is composed of three 
organizations. Of 154 national and international organizations, only 38 have a clique 
membership. The remaining 116 organizations are isolated. 
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Table 42 Cliques for the Project Network 
   1:  BU-KOERI IBB ITU TUBITAK-MAM TUBITAK 
   2:  BU-KOERI ITU TUBITAK-MAM TUBITAK GCM 
   3:  BU-KOERI ITU TUBITAK ERD 
   4:  BU-KOERI IBB ITU IPG 
   5:  BU-KOERI ITU GDDA 
   6:  BU-KOERI ITU Turkish Treasury 
   7:  BU-KOERI ITU Izmir Municipality 
   8:  BU-KOERI IPG Bu-Cendim BU 
   9:  BU-KOERI Bu-Cendim NATO 
  10:  BU-KOERI Bu-Cendim USGS 
  11:  BU-KOERI IBB IPG BU 
  12:  BU-KOERI ERD NATO 
  13:  BU-KOERI TUBITAK-MAM TUBITAK MIT GCM 
  14:  BU-KOERI ERD USGS 
  15:  METU TUBITAK ERD Kizilay-AFOM 
  16:  IBB METU TUBITAK 
  17:  METU TUBITAK GCM 
  18:  ITU-Cendm GDTEM TRAC 
  19:  ITU-Cendm TRAC Kizilay 
  20:  ITU-Cendm GDDA JICA 
  21:  IBB IPG YTU 
  22:  IBB TUBITAK-MAM YTU 
  23:  TUBITAK-MAM YTU GCM 
  24:  ITU TUBITAK-MAM Ist. Uni. 
  25:  PIU WB GDLRC 
  26:  GDDA SDC Kocaeli Gov. 
  27:  TUBITAK-MAM TUBITAK KOU 
  28:  ITU GDDA SAU 
  29:  Kizilay Kizilay-AFOM UN 
  30:  IBB TUBITAK-MAM MTA 
  31:  TUBITAK-MAM TUBITAK Avcilar Mun. 
  32:  TUBITAK-MAM GCM TNGGA 
  33:  TUBITAK-MAM GCM UNAVCO 
Sources: Official Websites of Turkish Disaster Organizations, Semi-  
Structured Interviews with Turkish Experts in Disaster Management (June 
1-July 27, 2004), Cumhuriyet News Reports Academic and Professional 
Reports (see the full list in Appendix C) 
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Legend: 
Acronym Organizations Acronym Organizations 
Bu-KOERI Bogazici University, Kandilli Observatory 
and Earthquake Research Institute  
USGS United Centrals Geological Survey  
ITU Istanbul Technical University  KG Kocaeli Government 
METU Middle East Technical University TNGGA Turkish National Geophysics and Geodesy 
Association  
Tubitak-MAM TUBITAK Marmara Research Center  TRAC Turkish Ameteur Radio Club 
ITU-Cendm ITU Center of Excellence for Disaster 
Management  
AKUT Search and Rescue Association 
ERD GDDA Earthquake Research Center  KIZILAY Turkish Red Crescent Society  
Tubitak The Scientific and Technical research and 
Council Turkey  
Kizilay-
AFOM 
Kizilay-Emergency Coordination Center 
Bu-Cendim Bogazici University-Center for Disaster 
Management  
SDC Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation  
GDDA General Directorate of Turkish Disaster 
Affairs  
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization  
GDTEM General Directorate of Turkey Emergency 
Management  
MIT Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
BU Bogazici University UN United Nations 
Ytu Yildiz Technical University  WB World Bank 
Ist. Uni. Istabul University  JICA Japan International Cooperation Agency  
GDCD General Directorate of Civil Defense  UNAVCO University NAVSTAR Consortium  
PIU Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry Project 
Implementation Unit  
GCM General Command of Mapping, Turkey  
KOU Kocaeli University  GDLRC General Directorate of Land Registry and Cadastre 
SAU Sakarya University IPG Istanbul Province Government 
IBB Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality  Avcilar Mun Avcilar Municipality  
 
According to Table 42, BU-KOERI (actor #1) is the main organization with the highest 
number of clique memberships (14). The second key organization, TUBITAK-MAM (actor #5), 
is a member of 11 cliques. The total number of clique memberships is 9 for ITU (actor #3) and 
TUBITAK , 7 for IBB (actor #2), 6 for GCM (actor #35), 4 for IPG (actor #8), 4 for ERD (actor 
#9), and 3 for METU (actor #4), ITU-Cendim (actor #6), BU-Cendim (actor #10), GDDA (actor 
#12), and YTU (actor #14).  
In terms of jurisdictions, the public-central organizations play remarkably more important 
roles in the cliques than any other type of organizations. Thirty-two of 33 cliques have at least 
one public-central organization. According to Table 30, municipalities are the second most 
important actors in subgroups. Eight of 33 cliques have municipalities whereas five of 33 cliques 
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have a public-province government organization.  Avcilar municipality (actor #49) is the only 
district organization in the cliques.  
Six international organizations (MIT, USGS, NATO, JICA, UNAVCO, SDC) are 
members of 8 cliques. Three national nonprofit organizations (Kizilay, Kizilay-AFOM, and 
TRAC) identified as three most central nonprofit organizations in terms of degree, closeness, 
betweenness and flow betweenness centrality are the member of at least one clique.  
Interestingly, the General Directorate of Civil Defense (actor #17), the main organization 
responsible for rescue operations after a disaster occurs, is isolated from the cliques. The other 
key organization, General Directorate of Turkey Emergency Management (GDTEM, actor #13), 
shares only one clique membership with ITU-Cendim (actor #6) and TRAC (actor #33). This 
shows that organizations with coordination responsibilities do not effectively perform their 
duties regarding coordination. 
 
7.5 ASSESSMENT OF JOINT PROJECTS AND PROJECT NETWORK ANALYSIS 
Although there have been significant efforts after the 1999 earthquakes, Turkey is still at the 
beginning of the process in managing seismic risk. The respondent organizations acknowledge 
that there have been considerable improvements in realizing the great danger of seismic risk.  
However, they assert that the Turkish disaster administration is not ready for a possible Istanbul 
earthquake. Most of the efforts have focused on the later stage of disasters, and there are many 
tasks that have to be completed to prepare the administration and public for future disasters. 
Public-central (e.g. research institutions) are at the center of these developments with 
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considerable technical and financial assistance from international. While some provincial 
organizations (e.g. Istanbul, Sakarya, Kocaeli Province Government) and Istanbul Metropolitan 
Municipalities highly engaged in these projects, district organizations were not able to join these 
attempts due to financial, technical, personnel constraints.   
In light of all data gathered, the respondents were asked to evaluate the present capacity 
of the Turkish disaster system should a major earthquake occur. Table 43 presents data regarding 
the preparedness of the Turkish disaster system, from the perspective of respondent 
organizations. 
Table 43 The Level of Readiness for Future Disasters 
To what extent is the Turkish disaster system ready for future 
catastrophic earthquakes  
 N % 
Great extent 0 0 
Good extent 3 7.7 
Neither good or bad 14 35.9 
Less than good 16 41 
Not at all good 6 15.4 
Total responses 39 100 
    N=Number of Responses; %=Percentage of Responses                                               
    Sources: Semi-Structured Interviews with Turkish Experts in Disaster   
                     Management (June 1-July 27, 2004) 
 
None of the respondents believe that the Turkish disaster system is, to the highest degree, 
ready for a major future earthquake. Only three of the respondents (7.7%) said that the Turkish 
disaster system is well prepared for a major earthquake. These respondents emphasized in their 
assessment that the disaster system is ready for response and recovery/relief operations. One of 
the respondents claimed that the Turkish disaster management is more prepared for a future 
earthquake than any other nation that has similar seismic risk and economic conditions.42 
                                                 
42 Interview with Duzce Province Government, June 14, 2004 
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“…We are ready for rescue operations. Next time, the coordination and rescue 
efforts will be definitely much better. We are also very prepared for recovery and 
relief stages. We can do our best.”  
 
However, 41% of the interviewees claimed that the Turkish disaster system is at a less 
than good position to cope with destructive consequences of a major earthquake whereas 15.4% 
of them claimed that the system is not ready at all. If the Turkish public administration does not 
implement the required tasks, some claim that a future earthquake in Istanbul will be deadlier 
than the Marmara earthquake.43  
“…Yes, we can save more people now if an earthquake occurs. But how many 
people you would rescue: three hundred or maximum five hundreds. Of course, 
saving one more life is very important. But if an earthquake happens in Istanbul, 
we will probably lose many more people. The number of illegal buildings is still 
increasing very fast. We should stop this, and rebuild, or fix many old buildings. 
Regulations should allow us to force people to obey earthquake resistant 
codes…We have to change a lot. It is becoming late”.   
7.6 SUMMARY 
This chapter reviewed the joint projects initiated after the 1999 earthquakes. The analysis 
showed that the Turkish public administration began to understand the problem of seismic risk. 
National and international organizations invested in technical and organizational aspects of the 
disaster system. Attempts to improve the informational infrastructure are considerable. Public-
central organizations, especially research institutions, played significant roles in this regard. 
In the second part, I analyzed the joint projects that are developed after the 1999 
Marmara and Duzce earthquakes. The research identified 93 projects that aimed to increase the 
                                                 
43 Interview with Emergency Coordination Center, Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, June 22,   
2004    
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capacity of the disaster system from earthquake monitoring to emergency response and recovery 
phases. 
Then, I analyzed the network characteristics of organizations involved in projects. 
Inferences from analyses expose some gaps in the Turkish disaster system. The system remains 
very centralized. District governments and municipalities play very insignificant roles in the 
system. Moreover, nonprofit and private organizations are not considered as parts of the system.  
Seismic risk has an effect on every aspect and sector of social and economic life. It 
requires a combination of efforts and proficiencies from diverse sources. Therefore, an 
appropriate system design should unite these sources. In particular, more involvement from local 
disaster organizations is required to improve the performance of the disaster system. 
In the next chapter, I will examine to what extent did the changes in informational 
infrastructure, and organizational structure improve the capacity of the Turkish disaster system in 
terms of component of socio-technical systems? The chapter will focus on changes to determine 
to what extent did the changes affect informational infrastructure, organizational flexibility, 
organizational culture, and local sustainability?  
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8.0  ADVANCEMENTS IN INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATIONAL 
CAPACITY AFTER THE 1999 EARTHQUAKES 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter analyzes the improvements in organizational capacity and information processes 
capacity of the Turkish disaster system after the 1999 earthquakes. Data collected from the 
interviews were used to determine the level of improvement in informational infrastructure after 
the earthquakes, the current stage of local sustainability of the disaster system, and the degree of 
organizational changes to support organizational flexibility for disaster mitigation purposes. The 
analysis indicates to what extent the 1999 disasters had an impact on the understanding of 
Turkish public administration toward natural disasters, and shows improvements and gaps in the 
system.   
The analysis in this chapter reveals the key insights in reference to the questions of the 
study: 
What factors restrain or facilitate information processes among emergency organizations 
from different organizational and jurisdictional levels? 
a. What internal and external factors create opportunities or deficiencies for better 
information exchange among organizations in the disaster management system? 
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b. To what extent do these initial conditions of the information infrastructure need to 
support the organizational structure in order to coordinate response to the 
disaster? 
c. To what extent is it necessary for the organizational culture to support openness to 
new information? 
How could advanced information systems be used to improve the performance of the 
disaster management system?  
a. To what extent has the Turkish disaster management system become a socio-
technical system? 
b. What changes in the organizational structure of the Turkish disaster management 
system, if any, have been made after the earthquakes?  
c. What changes in the technical information structure, if any, have been made at 
what governmental levels since the 1999 earthquakes? 
d. To what extent are the developments in the information infrastructure after the 
earthquakes compliant with changes in the organizational structure? 
e. What changes, if any, can help to create a better fit between Turkey’s socio-
technical infrastructure and the unpredictable and dynamic problem of seismic 
risk to which it is exposed? 
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8.2 CHANGES IN INFORMATIONAL CAPACITY OF THE DISASTER SYSTEM 
AFTER 1999 EARTHQUAKES  
In this section of the study, I investigate the current stage of information infrastructure, 
investments in information technology, factors that facilitate or constrain the ability of agencies 
to utilize these tools, and willingness to engage in information sharing among organizations.  
8.2.1 Advancement in Information Infrastructure 
After the 1999 earthquakes, disaster organizations in Turkey realized the importance of 
information gathering and exchange for coordinated response during a catastrophic event. Table 
44 presents data about the advancements in information and communication means after the 
disasters.  
As shown in Table 44, the availability of information and communication technologies 
after the earthquakes has grown. It appears that most of the organizations, 19 of 36 respondents, 
or 16.1%, value cell/mobile phones for obtaining and exchanging the information. However, it is 
clear that there has been a greater focus on satellite phones (from 5 to 10) and wireless 
communication (from 8 to 18), since the 1999 earthquakes. The 1999 response operations 
proveindicated that satellite phones are more usable than cell and regular phones during a 
devastating earthquake. 
The disaster organizations understand the importance of advanced information 
technology following the problems of the 1999 response operations. They began to invest in 
technologies by using local resources or obtaining financial and technical assistance from other 
agencies to establish a sufficient information capacity for their organization and the disaster 
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system as whole. Nineteen of the 36 respondents, or 16.9%, said that they have been 
implementing GIS technology since the earthquakes while only seven of them had said they had 
GIS during the earthquakes. Most of the organizations attempting to implement GIS are the 
organizations with primary responsibility for response actions when a disaster occurs. Fifteen of 
the 39 respondents said that they are able to use GPS technology (e.g. only seven of them had 
GPS in the Marmara earthquake), and 5 of them said that their organizations have intelligent 
reasoning systems (e.g. only one of them had intelligent reasoning in the Marmara earthquake) 
for the purpose of disaster mitigation. Interestingly, eight organizations established a risk 
assessment model after the earthquakes, whereas none of the respondents said that they were 
able to use any sort of risk or damage assessment models during the 1999 earthquakes.  
Table 44 Investments in Means of Information and Communication Technologies 
 “What kinds of advanced information and communication technologies has your 
organization adopted after the 1999 earthquakes?” 
Means of Communication Responses % 
GIS 2044 16.9
GPS 15 12.7
Computer/Computer Networks 7 5.9
Satellite Phones 10 8.5
Radio/ Amateur radio 6 5.1
Internet 9 7.6
TV 0 0.0
Intelligent Reasoning 5 4.2
Advanced Wireless Communication 18 15.3
Cell / mobile Phones 19 16.1
Risk Assessment models 9 7.6
Other (n/a) 3 0.0
Total responses 118 100.0
 N= Number of Responses; %= Percentage of Responses                      
 Multiple responses were accepted. 
 Sources: Semi-Structured Interviews with Turkish Experts in Disaster Management       
(June 1-July 27, 2004) 
                                                 
44 Nine of the projects were under development at the time of interviews. 
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However, the respondents pointed out that the system remains ill-prepared at the local 
level. Although the lack of information and communication technologies was one of the main 
causes of failure of coordinated inter-organizational disaster operations during the 1999 disasters, 
particularly during the Marmara earthquake, there are still many organizations, especially local 
organizations that do not have the capacity to adopt these technologies for disaster mitigation 
purposes.45  
“…We were at the center of the Marmara earthquake. The central government has 
done many things to improve technical capacity of the disaster organizations, but 
they did nothing here, in Golcuk. They made improvements in Ankara, or in 
Istanbul, or in other metropolitan cities. However, if an earthquake hit, we are the 
ones who have the responsibility to respond first. They gave me a brand new 
walky-talky and that is it. We still do not know that the local agencies come first.” 
 
As the Marmara response operations proved, insufficient information capacity of local 
organizations diminishes their participation in disaster affairs. Without involvement from the 
local disaster organizations, the system cannot perform successfully during a destructive disaster.  
Twelve of 37 respondents, or 32.4%, continue to believe that their organizations are 
neither good nor bad in using information and communication technologies to improve 
coordinated actions for future disaster operations (Appendix D, Table 7). Seven, or 18.9%, 
claimed that their organizations are at a “less than good level” in terms of having sufficient 
information capacity to respond successfully to a destructive disaster. It is understandable that 
none of the respondents thinks that her organization has the ability to use information and 
communication systems at a great level, since they think that there is always more room to 
increase the information capacity of the system to a better level. Eighteen of the 37 respondents, 
or 48.6%, said that their organizations currently use these systems at a good level. When one 
                                                 
45 Interview with Golcuk Crisis Management Center, June 16, 2004 
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considers that the research institutions tend to have a relatively good information infrastructure, 
it is clear that fewer disaster agencies that cope with the problems of disaster environments in 
practice possess sufficient information infrastructure capacity  
The respondents listed some factors that influence their organizations’ ability to utilize 
the information and communication means. Table 45 represents the factors that are important to 
organizations in the implementation and use of communication and information systems.  
Table 45 Factors Affect the Utilization of Information Systems 
 “What are the most important factors in your organization’s ability to utilize these tools? Please 
list them in accordance with significance?” 
  1  %  2 % 3 % 4 % 5 % 6 % 
Total 
Response % 
Trained Personnel 12  8.1  8  5.4 6  4.0 4  2.7 3  2.0 2  1.3  35 23.5 
Financial Assistance 7  4.7  9  6.0 4  2.7 0 0 2  1.3 2  1.3  24 16.1 
New Disaster 
Organizational Design 4  2.7  3  2.0 8  5.4 4  2.7 3  2.0 0 0 22 14.8 
Constant Updated Data 
from Disaster Location 1  0.7  4  2.7 5  3.4 6  4.0 2  1.3 1  0.7  19 12.8 
Changes in 
Laws/Regulations/Policy 8  5.4  4  2.7 10  6.7 7  4.7 1  0.7 0 0 30 20.1 
Authority Deregulation 4  2.7  5  3.4 1  0.7 7  4.7 1  0.7 1  0.7  19 12.8 
Other (n/a) 2                       2  - 
Total Response 36 24.2 33 22.1 34 22.8 28 18.8 12 8.1 6 4.0 149 100.0 
N=Number of Respondents; %=Percentage of Respondents 
Multiple responses were accepted. 
Sources: Semi-Structured Interviews with Turkish Experts in Disaster Management   
    (June 1-July 27, 2004) 
 
According to the respondents, “trained personnel” (23.5%) and “changes in 
laws/regulation/policies” (20.1%) affect most directly their ability to utilize information and 
communication means adopted after the earthquakes. “Financial assistance” (16.1%), “new 
disaster organizational design” (14.8%), “constantly updated data from disaster location” 
(12.8%) and “authority deregulation” (12.8%) are other important factors, cited by them.  
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Twelve of the 36 respondents claimed that the lack of trained personnel is the greater 
constraint on their ability to use these tools more effectively.46  
“…We really need personnel even to do basic tasks. Central government does not 
really consider what we need. They assigned personnel without checking our 
needs. Some organizations have more personnel than they need. Some do not 
have even enough personnel to do paper work. We bought some technical 
equipment, but are waiting for personnel so that we could use them.”    
 
Eight of 36 respondents said that the disaster laws/regulation and policies need to be 
changed to permit more effective use of these tools.47 
“…The most important thing is disaster regulations. We can find the money. But 
the regulations do not give us authority to do things without permission from 
central government. The tasks of organizations are not clear. Ankara does not get 
our consultation.  Some people in Ankara think they know everything, but they do 
not. They waste money.” 
 
Seven respondents rated financial assistance as the most important factor that affects their 
ability to use adopted information systems effectively.48  
“…We started to create a GIS database right after the Marmara earthquake. GIS 
could be useful if you update the data continuously. So, we needed a sort of 
department for this task. We had to hire technical personnel, new equipment, and 
so on. So, we needed extra financial sources. But, we had more important tasks to 
do after the earthquakes. We needed money for reconstruction of the city. 
Because of that we could not continue to keep GIS work.” 
8.2.2 Inter-organizational Knowledge Base after the 1999 Earthquakes 
The analysis in chapter 5 has shown that the lack of inter-organizational knowledge base had a 
critical impact on the performance of coordinated operations. Therefore, it is necessary to 
                                                 
46 Interview with Yalova Crisis Management Center, June 17, 2004 
47 Interview with Sakarya Civil Defense Rescue Group, June 15, 2004 
48 Interview with Kocaeli Province Government, June 16, 2004 
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establish a shared knowledge base that allows disaster organizations to share disaster relevant 
information continuously.  
Table 46 Investments in Inter-organizational Knowledge base after the Earthquakes 
 “Do you currently share any databases with other organizations?” 
 Response % 
Yes 7 17.9
No 32 82.1
Other (n/a) 0 0
Total Response 39 100.0
        N=Number of Respondents; %=Percentage of Respondents         
Sources: Semi-Structured Interviews with Turkish Experts in Disaster                           
Management (June 1-July 27, 2004) 
 
Table 46 shows the availability of shared knowledge base. Although the lack of inter-
organizational knowledge base created problems in exchanging necessary information among the 
disaster organizations during the earthquakes, the disaster organizations have not yet paid 
enough attention to this deficit. Only 7 of the 39 (17.9%) respondents said that their 
organizations currently have a knowledge base that they share with other organizations for the 
purposes of disaster affairs. According to the data presented, more than 80% of the disaster 
organizations are not able to use an inter-organizational knowledge base.  
The existing knowledge base systems are mostly among provincial organizations. There 
is only one central organization that has a shared knowledge base with other organizations.49 
Two of the provincial organizations are metropolitan municipalities, Istanbul and Bursa 
Metropolitan Municipalities, whereas two of them are province governments, Istanbul and Bursa 
Government. Bogazici University and TUBITAK are the research institutions that share 
                                                 
49 Interview with General Directorate of Disaster Affairs, Earthquake Research Center, June 10,        
2004 
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knowledge bases with other organizations. Kizilay is the only nonprofit organization that has 
been working on a project to create a knowledge base to share with its local branches.50   
These organizations essentially work together on major projects. Therefore it is 
reasonable for them to utilize a shared knowledge base. Organizations at the local level engage in 
disaster operations and institutions at the central level that have the authority (e.g. General 
Directorate of Turkey Emergency Management) and resources for disaster management have not 
yet participated in these information sharing activities. 
8.2.3 Information Sharing for Disaster Mitigation  
Information exchange during response operations in a destructive disaster depends on constant 
information sharing during normal times. This requires establishing various communication 
channels among the organizations and also promoting an organizational culture in which 
agencies are willing to share information. Table 47 presents the data regarding the exchange of 
disaster relevant information. 
All of the respondents said that they currently have relationships with other organizations 
and exchange disaster relevant information. However, out of 37, only 9, or 24.3% of the 
respondents, who were mainly from search and rescue groups, said that they exchange disaster 
relevant information on a daily basis51. More than half of the respondents (21, or 56.8%) said 
that they sometimes exchange disaster relevant information. From the table, we can conclude 
that responsible disaster organizations need to exchange information more frequently.  
                                                 
50 Interview with Kizilay Emergency Coordination Center, June 9, 2004 
5111 civil defense rescue groups were established in different regions of the country. These rescue   
groups are required to communicate two times everyday.  
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Table 47 Information Exchange Frequency 
 “How often do you exchange disaster relevant information with other 
disaster organizations (public, nonprofit, private)?” 
  Responses % 
Daily 9 24.3  
Weekly 5 13.5  
Monthly 2 5.4  
Yearly 0 0 
Sometimes 21 56.8  
Not at all 0 0 
Other (n/a) 2 0.0 
Total responses 37 100.0  
  N=Number of Respondents; %=Percentage of Respondents              
  Sources: Semi-Structured Interviews with Turkish Experts in Disaster   
                    Management (June 1-July 27, 2004) 
 
The lower level of information sharing results not only from insufficient information 
infrastructure capacity but also a lower degree of openness to new information in the 
organizational culture. Creating an organizational culture that promotes openness to new 
information is a huge task for disaster administration in Turkey. The experts from the Turkish 
disaster system acknowledge the fact that organizational culture in disaster organizations does 
not promote openness to new information to a high degree. Table 48 provides the data for the 
public, nonprofit and private disaster organizations in terms of their willingness to share 
information.   
Out of 113 responses from 38 respondents, only 19.5% indicates that disaster 
organizations are willing to share the disaster relevant information to a high degree. The 
respondents that rated the willingness of information sharing among public, private and nonprofit 
organizations as high mainly consider information sharing to occur only during the disaster 
response and recovery phases.52  
                                                 
52 Interview with , Istanbul Province Crisis Management Center, June 21,  2004 
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“…When we ask information from any organizations, they tell us. We did not 
have any problems of getting information during the earthquakes. Everybody is 
very helpful. In fact, they legally have to share whatever they have.” 
 
Table 48 Willingness of Information Sharing 
 “How do you scale the organizations, public, private, non-profit, in terms of their 
willingness to share information?” 
 High % Medium % Low % Total Response % 
Public 9 8.0 11 9.7 18 15.9 38 33.6
Private 6 5.3 17 15.0 15 13.3 38 33.6
Nonprofit 7 6.2 21 18.6 9 8.0 37 32.8
Total 
Response 22 19.5 49 43.3 42 37.1 113 100.0
 N=Number of Responses; %=Percentage of Responses             
 Multiple responses were accepted 
Sources: Semi-Structured Interviews with Turkish Experts in Disaster                        
Management (June 1-July 27, 2004) 
 
When I rephrase my questions as “how about before an earthquake, during the normal 
time,” they changed their response as follows:53  
“…We have very bureaucratic difficulties in contacting especially public 
organizations. There is no organizational culture in Turkish public administration 
that supports information exchange. There is institutional patriotism among 
organizations. They are jealous of each other. They do not want others to be more 
successful than themselves. That is why they do not inform other organizations 
when they need specific information.” 
 
Table 36 shows that public organizations have both the highest (9, or 8%), and the lowest 
(18, or 15.9%) of responses regarding willingness to share information. This finding shows that 
there is no standard guideline or an organizational culture that promotes the sharing of 
                                                 
53 Interview with , Middle East Technical University, Disaster Management Center, June 8,   
2004 
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information among public organizations. The degree of willingness to share information depends 
mainly on the personnel who administer the organization.  
As shown in Table 48, approximately 80% (medium + low) of the respondents asserted 
that disaster organizations are not willing to share disaster relevant information at a high level.  
Twenty one respondents claimed that it is relatively easier to get information from nonprofit 
organizations, whereas 17 of them made that claim for private organizations. Nonprofit and 
private organizations appear very similar to public organizations in their attitudes towards 
information sharing.  
8.3 LOCAL SUSTAINABILITY  
The success of any disaster system primarily relies on the sustainability of local communities 
where a disaster creates chaotic circumstances. The system should technically and institutionally 
establish sufficient capacity at the local level to quickly and effectively respond to a destructive 
event.  
8.3.1 Primary Financial Sources 
One of the primary requirements for building local disaster resilience communities is that local 
disaster organizations should have sufficient financial capacity to act more independently to 
adapt to dynamic disaster environments. Table 49 presents the data about the primary and 
secondary financial sources of interviewee organizations. 
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Table 49 Primary Sources of Funding 
 “What is your organization’ primary source of funding?” 
 1 % 2 % 3 % Total Response % 
Government (Central) 34 65.4 0 0.0 0 0.0 34 65.4
Donations 3 5.8 1 1.9 0 0.0 4 7.7
Private Sources 1 1.9 1 1.9 0 0.0 2 3.8
International Sources 0 0.0 2 3.8 2 3.8 4 7.7
Individual 0 0.0 5 9.6 3 5.8 8 15.4
Total Response 38 73.1 9 17.3 5 9.6 52 100.0
  N=Number of Responses; %=Percentage of Responses  
  Multiple responses were accepted 
Sources: Semi-Structured Interviews with Turkish Experts in Disaster                   
Management (June 1-July 27, 2004) 
 
As seen from Table 37, the Turkish disaster system relies financially on central 
government resources. According to Table 37, 34 of 38 respondents said that the main source of 
funding for their organizations is the central government. There are only three organizations that 
report their primary sources to be donations. Only one organization relies on primarily private 
financial sources. This analysis indicates that there is a significant financial dependency on 
central government. This situation tends to reinforce the centralized disaster system.      
8.3.2  Information Gathering   
Local disaster organizations should maintain open communication channels with other agencies 
at different organizational and jurisdictional levels to gather accurate disaster relevant 
information upon which to base their decisions. Close connections with central and provincial 
organizations to enable the collection of disaster relevant information is very important for 
establishing a local sustainable community. Table 50 presents responses regarding the ability of 
disaster organizations to gather disaster relevant information. 
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Table 50 Information Gathering 
 “To what extent do you feel that you have all necessary 
information for emergency management purposes?” 
 Response % 
Great extent 0 0 
Good extent 17 44.7 
Neither good or bad 15 39.5 
Less than good 6 15.8 
Not at all good 0 0.0 
Other: (n/a) 1 0.0 
Total response 38 100.0 
  N=Number of Responses; %=Percentage of Responses                
  Sources: Semi-Structured Interviews with Turkish Experts in Disaster   
             Management (June 1-July 27, 2004) 
             
According to Table 50, 17 of the 37 interviewees, or 44.7%, have all necessary 
information for emergency management purposes to a good extent. However, they claimed that 
others were not as fortunate.54 
“…I know what to do because I have been in disaster management for many 
years. I have joined the response operations since the 60’s. I have been working in 
emergency management more than three decades. So, I know where and what 
kind of information I need to gather. But not everybody is as lucky as I am to 
know all necessary information.”   
 
More than half of the respondents (55.3%) do not think that they have all necessary 
information to a good extent. The respondents claimed that obtaining disaster relevant 
information, especially from central organizations, is very difficult (see Table 51). None of the 
respondents claimed that information acquisition from disaster organizations is very easy. 
Eighteen of the 38 respondents, or 47.4%, think information gathering is difficult. Fourteen or 
36.8% of the respondents said that information acquisition from disaster organizations is neither 
good nor bad. As shown in Table 51, only 6 out of 38 respondents, or 15.8%, claim that it is easy 
for them to obtain and disseminate disaster relevant information. These respondents state that 
                                                 
54 Interview with Turkish Red Crescent Society, June 9, 2004    
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they are able to obtain disaster relevant information by using their personal friendships and good 
connections with responsible managers in other disaster organizations.55 
“…Personally, I have no difficulties in getting information from other public 
organizations. I have been working for 20 years in disaster affairs. I know most of 
the responsible managers in other public organizations. If I need anything, I 
directly call them. I do not go through standard procedure. If I do not use my 
connections, it is so difficult to obtain information from them.” 
 
Table 51 Difficulties in Information Gathering 
“To what extent do you have difficulties in obtaining information 
from other local, provincial, central disaster organizations –public, 
private and nonprofit-?” 
 Response % 
Very difficult 2 5.3 
Difficult 16 42.1 
Neither good nor bad 14 36.8 
Easy 6 15.8 
Very easy 0 0.0 
Other: (n/a) 1 0.0 
Total response 38 100.0 
  N=Number of Responses; %=Percentage of Responses                                               
  Sources: Semi-Structured Interviews with Turkish Experts in Disaster   
              Management (June 1-July 27, 2004) 
 
Bureaucratic organizational structure and organizational culture are impediments to the 
capacity of disaster agencies to obtain, and share disaster relevant information with other 
organizations. Disaster organizations tend to keep important information for themselves and in 
most cases they are not willing to share it.56  
“…You have to do lots of procedures to get basic information. For instance, the 
law says that land registry and cadastral information should be open to public. If 
anybody even a common citizen asks to get this information, the public 
organization is required to provide this information. However, in practice, it is 
almost impossible to get this information not just for a citizen but also for an 
organization like us.”     
 
                                                 
55 Interview with Communication and Logistic Department, GDDA, July 10, 2004 
56 Interview with Sakarya Civil Defense Rescue Group, June 15, 2004 
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8.3.3 Capacity for Independent Actions 
The self-governing capacity of disaster organizations to take independent action is an important 
indication of local sustainability. Self-governing disaster organizations should have flexibility to 
act based on accurate and timely information for disaster mitigation. In order to have this 
flexibility, disaster organizations should possess sufficient financial and technical capacity, 
skilled personnel, appropriate disaster regulations and political environment that permit 
independent action. These factors also affect the ability of organizations to build appropriate 
information infrastructure for information gathering and exchange. As seen in Table 52 the 
respondents categorized these primary factors in terms of importance to their organizations. 
Table 52  Factors Constrain Independency 
 “What do you believe are the most important factors that constrain your ability to take 
independent actions? Please list them in terms of importance to you?” 
 Factors 1 % 2 % 3 % 4 % 5 % 
Total 
Response % 
Financial 4 2.8 11 7.6 7 4.9 3 2.1 3 2.1 28 19.4
Insufficient 
equipment 0 - 2 1.4 10 6.9 9 6.25 7 4.9 28 19.4
Trained 
personnel 6 4.2 6 4.2 11 7.6 6 4.2 1 0.7 30 20.8
Laws/regulations 22 15.3 6 4.2 1 0.7 2 1.4 2 1.4 33 22.9
Political 
environment 4 2.8 7 4.9 4 2.8 4 2.8 6 4.2 25 17.4
Other (n/a) 2    
Total Responses 37 25.0 32 22.2 33 22.9 24 16.7 19 13.2 144 100.0
N=Number of Responses; %=Percentage of Percentages        
Multiple responses were accepted 
Sources: Semi-Structured Interviews with Turkish Experts in Disaster                            
                Management (June 1-July 27, 2004) 
 
According to the respondents, current “laws and regulations” (33 of 144 responses, or 
22.9%) are the main factors that constrain the ability of disaster organizations to take 
independent actions. The lack of “trained personnel” (20.8%); (3) insufficient “financial 
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capacity” (19.4%); (4) “insufficient equipment” (19.4%); and (5) “political environment” 
(17.4%) fall below “laws and regulations”.   
Twenty-two of 33 respondents asserted that current laws and regulations are the most 
crucial issue constraining the ability of their organizations to take independent actions, whereas 
six of them believed that current laws and regulations are secondary issues.  
Six out of 30 respondents who underline the importance of trained personnel claimed that 
the lack of “trained personnel” is the main factor, whereas 11 of them stated that “trained 
personnel” has a third degree of importance in terms of affecting their self-governing ability. 
Four of 28 respondents who stated that insufficient financial capacity is important claimed that 
insufficient “financial capacity” is the most important, whereas 11 of them said that it is the 
second important factor that hinders their ability for independent actions.  
Although 19.4% of respondents cited the lack of “sufficient equipment”, none of the 
respondents claimed that this factor had a first degree of importance. Among 25 respondents who 
stated that political environment is important, four of them claimed that “political environment” 
is the most important issue that constrains their organizations in performing as flexibly as they 
need.  
When we consider the centralized and bureaucratic characteristics of the Turkish disaster 
system, it was not surprising that the primary factor that restrains the ability of organizations to 
take independent actions is “laws and regulations”. The data show that the organizations request 
appropriate disaster regulations, qualified personnel, and more financial sources to develop more 
self-operating disaster organizations.  
Based on these criteria, the question “To what extent do you have the capacity to 
implement and change disaster policies or reallocate resources?” was asked. According to the 
 191 
data presented in Table 8 (see Appendix D), only one of 35 respondents, or 2.9%, claimed that 
her organization has a great capacity to change and implement the disaster policies and reallocate 
resources.57 When we add the number of respondents who claimed that their organizations have 
a “good capacity” to change and implement the disaster policies and reallocate resources, the 
total number grows to 5, which represents only 14.3% of the respondents. Fourteen of 35 
respondents, or 42.9%, claimed that their organizations have “less than good” or “not at all 
good” capacity to change and implement the disaster policies and reallocate resources.  
8.4 ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE AND DISASTER MITIGATION 
This part of chapter analyzes the data that indicate the form and purposes of changes that have 
been initiated since the earthquakes. Following the 1999 earthquakes, disaster organizations 
instituted changes to better cope with disasters. The purpose of changes in organizational and 
technical aspects of the agencies should normally be consistent with the practical problems that 
were observed during the 1999 disaster response operations. Therefore, the analysis in this 
section inspect to what extent did the changes improve organizational flexibility? 
8.4.1 Organizational and Technical Change 
There are six major issues that the Turkish disaster system considers essential to address in order 
to create a better disaster system. They are: (1) “Changes in laws and regulations”; (2) “changes 
                                                 
57 Only General Command of Mapping claimed they have sufficient sources and  authority to 
act independently.  
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in organizational structure”; (3) “changes in financial conditions”; (4) “changes in personnel”; 
(5) “changes in technical capacity”; and (6) “changes in information infrastructure”. Table 53 
presents the data that categorize the changes accomplished by disaster organizations after the 
1999 earthquakes. 
Table 53 Organizational and Technical Changes 
 “What sorts of significant changes have there been in your organization for the purposes of 
disaster management? Please list them in terms of importance to your daily operations?” 
Changes 1 % 2 % 3 % 4 % 5 % 6  Total Response % 
Changes in 
laws/regulations 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 0.7 2 1.5 1 0.7 1 0.7 5 3.7
Changes in 
organizational 
structure 11 8.1 6 4.4 2 1.5 6 4.4 0 0.0 0 0.0 25 18.5
Changes in 
financial 
conditions 2 1.5 0 0.0 1 0.7 3 2.2 4 3.0 1 0.7 11 8.1
Changes in 
personnel 3 2.2 7 5.2 9 6.7 10 7.4 0 0.0 0 0.0 29 21.5
Changes in 
technical 
capacity 13 9.6 12 8.9 7 5.2 1 0.7 0 0.0 0 0.0 33 24.4
Investments in 
information 
infrastructure 7 5.2 10 7.4 14 10.4 1 0.7 0 0.0 0 0.0 32 23.7
Other (n/a) 3    
Total Response 36 26.7 35 25.9 34 25.2 23 17.0 5 3.7 2 1.5 135 100.0
N=Number of Responses; %=Percentage of Responses 
Multiple responses were accepted 
Sources: Semi-Structured Interviews with Turkish Experts in Disaster Management    
    (June 1-July 27, 2004) 
 
The responsible managers were somewhat able to improve the organizational and 
technical capacity of their organizations. Investment in technical capacity and information 
infrastructure became top priorities after the 1999 disasters. According to the table, public 
managers paid more attention to increasing the technical capacity of organizations (24.4%) and 
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invested in information infrastructure (23.7%). Among all 135 responses, 13, or 9.6%, of them 
stated that the organizations put more emphasis on increasing technical capacity than any other 
issue. Seven, or 5.2%, of responses claimed that “investment in information infrastructure” was 
the first priority of their organizations after the 1999 earthquakes.  
Changes in personnel capacity (21.5%), changes in organizational structure (18.7%), and 
changes in financial conditions (8.1%) follow respectively. Although “changes in organizational 
structure” overall falls below “investment in information infrastructure” and “changes in 
personnel capacity,” more respondents claimed that their organizations put more effort on 
“changing organizational structure” (11, or 8.1%) as a first priority. Only three, or 2.2% and two, 
or 1.5% of respondents claimed that “increasing personnel capacity” and “improving financial 
conditions,” respectively, are the most important issues that their organizations attempted to 
develop. Only 11 of 36 respondents believed that changes in financial conditions are significant 
to their organizations. 
Although the respondents asserted that current Turkish disaster policies are the most 
important factors that constrain their ability to take independent actions (see Table 40), the 
disaster system was unable to put more emphasis on changing laws and regulations. Only five 
out of 36 respondents believed that there have been some important changes in “disaster laws 
and regulations”. According to these respondents, these changes were at most the third degree of 
significance to their organizations.58  
“…Laws and regulations need to be changed. There are a lot of authority 
confusions. The people in Ankara do not want to lose their power. Local 
institutions can not do much, as long as the bureaucratic, centralized system 
prevails. Everybody says something. Municipalities, provincial and district 
governments, and central government have different ideas and authority for 
                                                 
58 Interview with Bole Province Government, June 14, 2004    
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disaster affairs. We need to make tasks clear. Everybody should clearly know 
what to do. I am not saying more rules. I am saying clear and straight rules. In fact 
we need a new public administration, not just new disaster administration.” 
Even though the respondents acclaimed the importance of reforms after the earthquakes, 
the analysis indicates that the responsible managers have been struggling to change the 
conditions that are most problematic to their organizations. As one respondent points out, the 
disaster organizations need more improvements to significantly increase the organizational and 
technical capacity of the system.59 
“…Do not get me wrong. We have done many things, especially right after the 
earthquakes. First 2-3 years. But we need a lot. We compare ourselves before 
earthquakes. Yes, we improved. But this is just the beginning. We bought devices, 
vehicles, established new institutions and we started some projects and 
everything. But, we have lots of things to do. Unfortunately, I feel that we are 
slowing down.”   
8.4.2 The Purposes of Changes   
The changes in technical and organizational aspects of the disaster system implemented after the 
1999 earthquakes cover three main phases of disaster mitigation. The success of these changes 
and eventually the success of the disaster system depend on the degree of improvement in the 
phases of preparedness.  
From Table 54, we can see that the primary purpose of the changes is for the stage of 
immediate response after an earthquake hits. Twenty of 37 respondents, or 54.1%, said that the 
main purpose of the changes is to improve the disaster system’s response capacity. 
Correspondingly, 20, or 54.1% of the respondents stated that the secondary aim of these changes 
is intended to develop the capacity of the disaster system for recovery and relief operations. If we 
                                                 
59 Interview with Turkish Red Crescent Society, June 10, 2004    
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sum the first two columns of the sections “response” (54.1%+32.4%) and “recovery and relief” 
(8.1%+54.1%), we can clearly observe that the first and second purposes of the changes in 
technical and organizational capacity focus on the tasks that have to be performed after a disaster 
occurs. Most of the respondents acknowledged that the rescue capacity of the Turkish disaster 
system has developed significantly since the 1999 earthquakes.60 
“...We really have professional rescue groups, now. We significantly improved 
that. I can easily say that Turkey, now, is one of the best countries in terms of 
skilled rescue and response teams. Most of the organizations bought advanced 
technical equipment, advanced communication devices and hired and trained new 
personnel. Many volunteer organizations were also established.”  
 
Table 54 The purposes of changes 
 “For what purposes have these changes been primarily carried out? Please order by 
priority given by your organization?” 
 1 % 2 % 3 % Total Response % 
Preparedness 14 37.8 5 13.5 18 48.6 37 100.0
Response 20 54.1 12 32.4 5 13.5 37 100.0
Recovery/Relief 3 8.1 20 54.1 14 37.8 37 100.0
Other (n/a) 2  
Total Response 37 100.0 37 100.0 37 100.0 111 100.0
N=Number of Responses; %=Percentage of Responses 
Multiple responses were accepted 
Sources: Semi-Structured Interviews with Turkish Experts in Disaster                              
    Management (June 1-July 27, 2004) 
 
 
In contrast, 14 of 37 respondents, or 37.8%, claimed that their efforts mainly focused on 
the first stage of the disaster mitigation cycle, preparedness before a disaster. Approximately half 
of the respondents (48.6%) said that “the preparation before an earthquake” is the last purpose of 
                                                 
60 Interview with Avcilar Crisis Management Center, June 22, 2004  
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the changes. Accordingly, there remains a large gap in the stage of disaster preparedness 
especially for metropolitan cities. One interviewee emphasized:61  
“…We are still very fragile to any earthquake in metropolitan cities. We have 
focused on rescue and recovery stages so far. We are so slow to do things that will 
minimize seismic risk. We pay more attention to emergency management than 
risk management.” 
8.4.3 Organizational Flexibility 
It is necessary to determine to what extent these changes in technical capacity and organizational 
design affect the organizational flexibility of the disaster management system. Organizational 
flexibility is a vital issue for a self-governing disaster system. Disaster organizations should be 
flexible to act quickly and adapt to new complex conditions that a disaster creates. Appropriate 
policies and regulations as well as technical and organizational structure are necessary for 
increasing organizational flexibility. Table 55 provides information which indicates the 
effectiveness of the changes to organizational flexibility.  
Experts in the Turkish disaster system believe that increases in organizational flexibility 
after the reforms are not significant. According to Table 55, only 10.8% of respondents 
acknowledged that the changes have significantly increased the organizational flexibility. 
Approximately half of the respondents (48.6%) acknowledged that the changes in technical 
capacity and organizational design after the earthquakes somewhat increased the organizational 
flexibility.  
 
                                                 
61 Interview with Kocaeli Fire Department, June 16, 2004    
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However, 15 out of 37 respondents, or 40.6%, claimed that there is no significant 
increase in the organizational flexibility of the disaster system. The changes in technical and 
organizational aspects of the Turkish disaster system will be beneficial only if they create a 
flexible disaster system. One expert noted this fact.62 
“…If information is the first important thing in disaster administration, flexible 
organizational structure is the second. Unfortunately, we still have very strict 
disaster system. In fact this is the problem of Turkish public administration. The 
disaster system is a part of whole system. Without changing the whole public 
administration structure, how should we change the disaster system? The system 
is still very inflexible, and very bureaucratic. It usually depends on individuals. If 
the person understands the issue, you can be more flexible to do things. 
Otherwise, you should be careful. You could have many problems with central 
government.” 
 
Table 55 Changes in Organizational Flexibility 
 “To what extent have those changes in technical capacity and organizational 
design since the earthquakes increased/decreased the organizational flexibility 
of the disaster management system?” 
 Responses % 
Increased significantly 4 10.8 
Increased somewhat 18 48.6 
No change 15 40.5 
Decreased somewhat 0 0.0 
Decreased significantly 0 0.0 
Other (n/a) 2 - 
Total Responses 37 100.0 
 N=Number of Responses; %=Percentage of Responses                                        
Sources: Semi-Structured Interviews with Turkish Experts in Disaster                   
Management (June 1-July 27, 2004) 
 
                                                 
62  Interview with Sakarya Civil Defense Group, June 15, 2004    
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8.5 TOWARD A MORE EFFECTIVE TURKISH DISASTER SYSTEM 
The tasks must be implemented by the Turkish public administration are quite wide ranging, 
from educating Turkish citizens to training the emergency personnel. The respondent 
organizations highlighted important responsibilities of the administration from their point of 
view. I categorized these recommendations and Table 56 presents this analysis.    
 Of 39 interviewees, 38 of them provided 215 multiple responses to the question “What do 
you recommend to significantly increase the effectiveness of Turkish disaster management 
system?” According to Table 56, “increasing enforcement for construction facilities” is seen as 
the most important factor to decrease the vulnerability of the Turkish disaster management to 
destructive earthquakes (36; 16.7%). Considering the challenge of illegal construction activities 
in seismic risk prone areas, it is very reasonable that the experts consider this issue as the main 
concern of the system.  
An interesting point is that the experts consider information infrastructure as the second 
most critical issue to which Turkish public administration should pay more attention and develop 
for a more effective disaster system. Thirty one respondents believe that more investment in 
information and communication systems will assist coordination of efforts in every phases of 
disaster mitigation. “Investments in information infrastructure” (31, or 14.4%) are seen as 
important as “educating citizens” about disaster affairs (31, or 14.4%).  
“Increasing power of local public organizations” (29, or 13.5%) and “increasing trained 
personnel” (29, or 13.5%) follow the first three factors. “Changing laws and regulations” (21, or 
9.8%), “establishing new organizational design” (13, or 6.0%), “changing building codes” (11, or 
5.1%) are other essential reforms that the respondents recommended for a better disaster system. 
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Table 56 Recommendations for more Effective Turkish Disaster System 
“What would you recommend to significantly increase the effectiveness of Turkish disaster management system? 
Please list them in accordance with importance to yo?” 
 
Recommendations 1 % 2 % 3 % 4 % 5 % 6 % 7 % Tot Response % 
More investments 
in information 
infrastructure 3 1.4 3 1.4 2 0.9 7 3.2 4 1.9 7 3.2 5 2.3 31 14.4
Increasing power 
of local public 
organizations 2 0.9 1 0.5 6 2.8 5 2.3 8 3.7 6 2.8 1 0.5 29 13.5
Increasing number 
of trained 
personnel 1 0.5 3 1.4 3 1.4 5 2.3 11 5.1 3 1.4 3 1.4 29 13.5
Establishing new 
emergency 
organizational 
design 1 0.5 3 1.4 1 0.5 1 0.5 3 1.4 2 0.9 2 0.9 13 6.0
Educating citizens 3 1.4 9 4.2 11 5.1 5 2.3 2 0.9 1 0.5 0 0.0 31 14.4
Changing building 
codes 0 0.0 1 0.5 1 0.5 4 1.9 3 1.4 1 0.5 1 0.5 11 5.1
Increasing 
enforcement for 
construction 
facilities 8 3.7 5 2.3 12 5.6 8 3.7 1 0.5 2 0.9 0 0.0 36 16.7
Changing laws/ 
regulations (more 
clear about the 
tasks of EO) 13 6.0 7 3.2 0 0.0 1 0.5 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 21 9.8
The conception of 
emergency 
management 
should change 3 1.4 4 1.9 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 7 3.3
Coordination of 
efforts of EO 2 0.9 1 0.5 1 0.5 1 0.5 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 5 2.3
Developing 
economic 
conditions 2 0.9 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 2 0.9
Other (n/a) 1 1 0.0
Total Responses 38 17.6 37 17.1 37 17.1 37 17.1 32 14.8 22 10.2 12 5.6 215 100
N=Number of responses; %=Percentage of Responses 
Multiple responses were accepted 
Sources: Semi-Structured Interviews with Turkish Experts in Disaster                              
    Management (June 1-July 27, 2004) 
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“Changing disaster laws and regulations” has a total number of 21 responses, and overall, 
it is the fifth most important factor. However, thirteen of the 21 respondents claimed that 
changing current disaster laws and regulations should be the first priority of Turkish public 
administration. The majority of respondents do not consider the current disaster laws and 
regulations sufficient to manage the seismic risk that Turkey faces.  The respondents repeatedly 
insisted that the disaster laws and regulations are the most important factors that constrain their 
ability to take independent actions and create a flexible and sustainable disaster system.  
Eight of 36 respondents think that “increasing enforcement for construction facilities” is 
the most important issue for the administration although there are only 11 respondents who claim 
that building codes need to be changed. None of these respondents claim that changing building 
codes is the most important priority for Turkish public administration. The respondents mainly 
assert that building codes are only meaningful if the officials strongly enforce their 
implementation.  
Another fundamental requirement reported by the respondents is “more investment on 
information infrastructure”. It is notable that the respondents consider this issue to be one of the 
most important to the operation of the disaster system. Of 38 respondents, 31 of them believe 
that the system should invest more in information and communication systems for a better 
disaster management. Seven of 31 respondents see this issue as being of fourth importance. 
Three of 31 respondents believe it is the most important issue. The difficulties generated by 
uncoordinated operations during the 1999 earthquakes proved how vital timely and accurate 
information is for coordination of response operations. Therefore, the responsible managers call 
attention to this fact and recommend allocating more resources to it.  
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8.6 SUMMARY 
In this chapter, I analyzed the data gathered from interviews of experienced personnel in the 
Turkish disaster management system to assess the improvements in the system after the 1999 
earthquakes. Based on my theoretical model, I analyzed the data from three points of view: (1) 
improvements in information infrastructure, (2) improvements in local sustainability, and (3) 
improvements in organizational flexibility and disaster mitigation.  
The analyses indicated that disaster organizations attempted to establish basic 
information and communication means to improve information capacity of the system. However, 
deficiencies remain despite the efforts. First, information infrastructure in local agencies is very 
weak. Second, the lack of necessary inter-organizational knowledge base among the disaster 
agencies has yet to be adequately addressed. Third, organizational culture, particularly in public 
disaster agencies, does not support information sharing among disaster organizations.  
In the last part of the chapter, I categorized experts’ recommendations for creating a 
better disaster system. The respondents believe that regardless of the efforts initiated after the 
1999 earthquakes, Turkey does not have sufficient organizational and technical capacity to 
manage a destructive future earthquake. The most important tasks that the system has to carry 
out are listed as “changing disaster laws and regulations,” “increasing enforcement for 
construction facilities,” “educating citizens,” and “more investment on information 
infrastructure”.  
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9.0  IMPLICATIONS AND CHALLENGES FOR A SOCIO-TECHNICAL TURKISH 
DISASTER SYSTEM 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter summarizes and reviews the findings from the research to explore implications and 
challenges for Turkish disaster administration. The findings point to the course of actions 
required to create a socio-technical Turkish disaster system better able to cope with seismic risk 
in Turkey. In the first part of this chapter, I discuss the initial conditions of the existing 
information infrastructure to determine the questions of how effectively the information 
infrastructure capacity of the Turkish Disaster Management System supported the organizational 
response operations in the 1999 Marmara and Duzce Earthquakes. Then, I assess the findings to 
define factors that restrain or facilitate information processes among emergency agencies from 
different organizational and jurisdictional levels. Finally, I evaluate the changes made after the 
earthquakes to determine how advanced information systems can be utilized to improve the 
performance of the disaster management system. In the last part of the chapter, I address the 
challenges from management, policy and organizational perspectives, and propose policy 
suggestions for the Turkish public administration to establish a socio-technical Turkish disaster 
system. I evaluate the findings from practical and theoretical perspectives. 
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9.2  INITIAL CONDITIONS OF INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE   
The initial conditions of the information infrastructure during the 1999 Marmara and Duzce 
response operations determined the performance of disaster organizations. The research found 
that utilization of information and communication means, availability of a shared knowledge 
base, and the information exchange capacity of the disaster system hindered or facilitated 
information search, acquisition and exchange to support coordinated operations. 
 Research Question 1: 
• How effectively did the existing information infrastructure capacity of the Turkish 
Disaster Management System support the organizational response operations in the 1999 
Marmara and Duzce Earthquakes? 
 
Difficulties in obtaining and exchanging timely and accurate disaster relevant information 
inhibited successful performance of disaster organizations during the Marmara response 
operations. The lack of necessary information and communication infrastructure constrained a 
coordinated response to the earthquakes. However, the Turkish disaster management system was 
more adaptive and relatively more successful in responding to the Duzce earthquake. The 
individual and organizational experiences from the Marmara earthquake taught responsible 
managers that information search, acquisition and exchange are vital for effective coordinated 
response operations. Therefore, a better understanding of the importance of disaster relevant 
information generated faster and more coordinated response operations. 
Research Proposition: 
• The socio-technical characteristics of a disaster management system need to match the 
dynamic and uncertain characteristics of disaster environments. The initial conditions of 
the organizational and informational capacity of a disaster system determine the 
performance of response and recovery operations. 
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Although means of communication and information, and the existence of an inter-
organizational knowledge base did not significantly differ from the Marmara to the Duzce 
earthquake, utilization of information and communication systems was improved. Information 
exchange was faster and more effective in providing timely and accurate disaster relevant 
information, which resulted in better coordinated response operations during the Duzce 
earthquake and more involvement from local organizations. The inclusion of local organizations 
in the improved disaster response permitted faster, more appropriate assistance to needy 
communities.  
9.3 FACTORS THAT RESTRAIN OR FACILITATE INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
COORDINATION  
In addition to a sufficient information infrastructure, organizational flexibility and organizational 
culture are other important factors that hinder or facilitate information processing among disaster 
organizations during both regular and emergency periods. The informational capacity of a 
disaster system is effective if the system is flexible to adapt to changes in the disaster 
environment and promotes an organizational culture that allows openness to new information.  
Research Question 2: 
• What factors restrain or facilitate information processes among emergency organizations 
from different organizational and jurisdictional levels? 
 
Research Proposition: 
• A disaster response system possesses dynamic, unpredictable, and complex 
characteristics. The complexity arises from numerous interactions among components 
within the organizational system and their environment. The success of the system 
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depends on the level of connectedness of the parts and the adaptability of the whole 
system to changing conditions in the environment in which the system operates. 
 
Organizational flexibility is vital in increasing or decreasing performance of a socio-
technical disaster system. According to the data gathered from respondent disaster organizations, 
the Turkish disaster system is not flexible enough to adapt rapidly to the changes in disaster 
environments. The analysis showed that changes in technical, organizational structure, and 
disaster policies after the 1999 earthquakes somewhat increased organizational flexibility. 
However responsible managers from disaster organizations argue that the disaster system does 
not yet have sufficient flexibility to overcome dynamic, complex problems of seismic risk. 
Disaster laws and policies, trained personnel, financial sources, insufficient equipment, and 
political environment are key factors affecting the self-governing ability of disaster 
organizations. A flexible disaster system with sustainable local disaster sub-systems is more 
effective to deal with destructive earthquakes. 
Organizational culture is an important aspect of self-governing and flexible socio-
technical systems. The analyses indicated that the organizational culture of Turkish disaster 
agencies does not promote an environment in which people are open to sharing disaster relevant 
information. The respondents interviewed claimed that public organizations in particular, are 
least engaged in information sharing. Nonprofit and private organizations are also not much 
different. The responsible managers use their personal relationships to obtain and transmit 
information. More than half of the disaster organizations interviewed believe that they do not 
posses necessary disaster relevant information because organizations tend to withhold and are 
not willing to share it.  
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 Research Proposition: 
• Disasters create turbulent and complex conditions that require valid and timely 
information. Therefore, a disaster management system needs to have sufficient flexibility 
through decentralization and lateral coordination for information search, exchange and 
organizational learning. 
 
The analyses showed that the Turkish disaster policy and structure are based upon linear 
assumptions that produce a centralized and bureaucratic disaster system. The findings present a 
disaster system that functions mainly at the central level.  
According to the UCINET network analyses (Borgatti, Everett, Freeman, 2002) and N-K 
analysis, the response systems were mainly operated by central, international and provincial 
organizations and there was insufficient involvement of local organizations, especially in the 
Marmara response operations. Public-district organizations played a very small role in the 
response operations. There was also insufficient involvement of municipalities in both response 
systems. The local actors were unable to communicate with other actors from different 
jurisdictions due to the problems in obtaining accurate and timely information. The analysis 
proved that increasing communication and coordination activities increased involvement of local 
organizations during the Duzce response operations.  
The findings demonstrate that the Turkish disaster response system is also very weak in 
terms of participation from nonprofit organizations. The Turkish Red Crescent Society, the only 
nonprofit organization in the formal Turkish disaster system that functioned as the major 
nonprofit agency in both response systems. The Turkish Amateur Radio Club and AKUT were 
other nonprofit organizations that played very significant roles in rescue operations and in 
establishing communication channels among responsible managers from different organizations. 
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Lastly, international assistance appears to be very valuable component for an effective 
Turkish disaster management system. International organizations were significantly involved in 
both response systems. Although the formal Turkish disaster structure does not take international 
involvement into consideration, in practice it is a very critical part of the system since national 
and local resources are not sufficient to overcome the problems generated by a destructive 
earthquake.  
9.4 INCREASING INFORMATIONAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY OF 
THE DISASTER SYSTEM  
The consequences of uncoordinated response operations during the 1999 earthquakes, especially 
in the Marmara earthquake awakened the Turkish public administration. After the disasters, the 
Turkish public administration began to reform the organizational and informational infrastructure 
to strengthen the response capacity of disaster agencies. Disaster organizations from different 
jurisdictions and sectors, individually and jointly, initiated significant projects. The goals and 
characteristics of these attempts provide valuable insight about improvements and the gaps in the 
disaster system.  
Research Question 3: 
• How could advanced information systems be used to improve the performance of the 
disaster management system? 
 
Research Proposition: 
• Sufficient and timely information processing requires using necessary information 
infrastructure.  Increasing information capacity through information infrastructure 
increases information search, exchange, and feedback within a system, and between the 
system and its environment.  
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Based upon the analyses, it is clear that the Turkish disaster system recognizes the 
importance of information and communication for effective disaster management. There have 
been notable efforts to advance information capacity of the system.  Many organizations 
established basic communication tools and made considerable investment in advanced 
information systems. Disaster organizations joined in many projects to develop a system that 
continuously monitors and records seismic activity. National and international research 
institutions, notably Bogazici University, Kandilli Observatory, Istanbul Metropolitan 
University, the Scientific and Technical Council of Turkey, General Directorate of Disaster 
Affairs Earthquake Research Department, Istanbul Technical University, and Middle East 
Technical University participated in important projects to predict future earthquakes and prepare 
strategic plans for disaster operations.  
The research indicated that public-central organizations have been the primary source 
behind attempts to the adoption of information systems. Local disaster agencies rely upon central 
government sources and lack the resources to develop their own capacity. While central disaster 
organizations and some province governments (i.e. Bursa Province Government) and 
municipalities (e.g. Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality) participate significantly in projects to 
improve their information management capacity, many local disaster organizations (e.g. Golcuk 
District Government) lack basic communication tools.  
A considerable number of disaster organizations adopted advanced information and 
communication systems such as Geographic Information Systems and Wireless Communication 
Networks to obtain, assess and exchange disaster relevant information. However, simply 
investing in these systems is not enough to establish an information structure among disaster 
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organizations. The research found that there are several factors that significantly affect 
organizations’ ability to utilize these tools. According to the respondents included in the sample, 
one of the most critical problems is the “lack of trained personnel”. “Strict disaster laws and 
regulations”, “inadequate financial sources”, “authority deregulation”, and “lack of constantly 
updated data” from disaster locations are other factors that hinder the effective utilization of 
existing information infrastructure. 
Finally, the research discloses that establishing an inter-organizational knowledge base is 
a key factor to exchanging timely and accurate information for coordination of disaster activities. 
However, the lack of a necessary inter-organizational knowledge base among the disaster 
agencies remains an insufficiency yet to be addressed.  
Research Proposition: 
• Improving organizational capacity and information processes for local disaster 
organizations increases information flow and enables responsible decision makers from 
different jurisdictions to make timely and effective decisions. Timely and effective 
decisions based on continual organizational interactions increase coordination between 
organizations. Thus, well-coordinated operations will save more lives and reduce the cost 
of disasters to communities. 
 
Although the attempts after the 1999 earthquakes are considered a positive step, 
deficiencies remain in terms of strengthening the information infrastructure of local disaster 
organizations. The local agencies are not sufficiently integrated into the process of improving the 
disaster management system. For instance, public-district organizations play a very small role in 
this progress. The local disaster agencies lack sufficient financial, technical, and personnel 
capacity to undertake necessary tasks and independent actions. The analyses revealed that the 
most fundamental impediment that constrains the ability of local agencies to deal with disaster 
issues is the restrictive nature of disaster laws and regulations.  
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Further, there is not sufficient involvement from municipalities in the projects. 
Municipalities are not very active in disaster affairs, although they have more authority over land 
development policies. The only exception is the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality. Because of 
its immense financial resources, Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality is highly involved and 
supportive of initiations that seek to strengthen the organizational and technical capacity of the 
Turkish disaster system.  
Finally, the research found that improvements in the disaster management system after 
the earthquakes focused mainly on later phases of disaster management. The system is improved 
for response and recovery operations; however, it has not yet adequately prepared for disaster 
mitigation.  
9.5 CHALLENGES AND RECOMMENDATIONS   
9.5.1 Challenges from Management Perspectives 
The analyses of the response system showed that the centralized and bureaucratic Turkish 
disaster system failed to meet the needs of uncertain and dynamic disaster environments. 
Although the responsible managers recognized this, and complained about restrictive disaster 
laws and regulations, the post-earthquake reforms have not altered the centralized characteristics 
of the Turkish disaster system. Since authority and resources are accumulated by central 
organizations, local organizations are unable to take independent action to transform their 
performance based on the changing parameters in disaster environments. Turkish public 
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administration must create a management structure that diminishes the centralized effect of the 
disaster management system.   
According to disaster laws and regulations, province and district disaster organizations 
are initially responsible for response to an earthquake. However, in practice, local organizations 
do not possess the operational and technical capacity to manage the consequences of a moderate 
or destructive earthquake. Central level organizations usually command and control disaster 
operations. This system creates confusion and constrains the ability of disaster agencies to 
respond quickly when timely action is crucial. In this respect, establishing a sustainable local 
disaster system should be the first priority of the Turkish disaster management. Local 
organizations should be supported by financial resources, trained personnel and advanced 
information and communication means to establish a sustainable local disaster system.  
The 1999 response operations and joint projects initiated after the earthquakes proved 
that outside assistance from different jurisdictional levels and sectors is very vital. International 
organizations played very instrumental roles in both response systems and supported the attempts 
to establish a new disaster system in Turkey. The Turkish disaster management system should 
consider these efforts and develop appropriate policies to coordinate this type of assistance in 
advance of the next disaster. 
The findings also indicated that involvement of nonprofit organizations in disaster affairs 
is vital. For example, AKUT and TRAC played major roles during the response operations and 
participated in efforts to increase the communication and rescue capacity of the system. After the 
earthquakes, many communities created local rescue groups. However, the formal Turkish 
disaster management structure includes only one nonprofit organization, Turkish Red Crescent 
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Society. Thus, the system should create an appropriate structure that connects nonprofit 
organizations to it.  
Multi-jurisdictional disaster organizations have caused coordination difficulties before, 
during and after disasters. The Turkish public administration observed this problem and 
established an agency, the General Directorate of Turkey Emergency Management. GDTEM that 
is responsible for coordination of disaster affairs during both emergency and non-emergency 
periods. However, organizations such as the General Directorate of Civil Defense or the General 
Directorate of Disaster Affairs have similar responsibilities. After a disaster occurs other 
organizations such as the Prime Ministry Crisis Management Center and the Natural Disaster 
Coordination Committee are fully or partially responsible for coordination of disaster operations 
as well. The confusion brought about by conflicting authorities among the coordination agency 
makes coordination of disaster operations more problematic. The establishment of GDTEM is 
not able to address this issue since the organizations are at the same hierarchical level, and 
GDTEM does not have any authority over other coordination agencies. Many of the Turkish 
disaster experts interviewed suggested that the establishment of GDTEM eliminated the need for 
PMCMC. Instead, the administration should reform GDTEM as the Prime Ministry Emergency 
Management Undersecretariat, with authority over other coordination agencies.    
9.5.2 Challenges from Policy Perspectives 
The research findings suggest that changes should be made in Turkish disaster policies. First, the 
two primary disaster policies, Disaster Law 7269 and Regulation 12777 should be amended to 
reflect the new conditions of seismic risk in Turkey. Disaster policies were prepared decades ago 
and based on linear and bureaucratic assumptions of public administration. However, changes in 
 213 
the demographic, social, and economic characteristics of the nation made seismic risk more 
hazardous for Turkish people. Turkish public administration should reform disaster policies 
based on the new circumstances of risk prone areas.  
Second, the disaster management system should place greater emphasis on mitigation 
efforts rather than simply improving the rescue and response capacity of the system. In this 
respect, development laws and regulations should be connected to disaster laws. Development 
Law 3194 does not consider seismic risk as a factor in the settlement of areas. The law should be 
updated and used as a tool for diminishing the vulnerabilities of communities to seismic risk 
especially in metropolitan regions. Earthquake building codes should be implemented and 
strictly enforced to prevent illegal construction activities in metropolitan cities, especially in 
Istanbul.  
Third, according to development laws, municipalities possess authority for settlement 
activities within cities. Controlling settlement activities is crucial for disaster mitigation. 
Municipalities do not have a direct responsibility for post-disaster operations. Province and 
district governments are primarily responsible for these activities. Disaster preparedness, 
response, recovery, and relief are four inseparable phases of disaster mitigation. Therefore, either 
municipalities should also be responsible for latter phases of disaster mitigation or province and 
district governments should have authority over settlement issues. The role of each organization 
within the system needs to be clearly defined in advance to avoid confusion during emergency.   
Fourth, the General Directorate of Civil Defense established highly trained rescue groups 
in 11 cities and assigned these teams to particular cities. These rescue teams continually interact 
with each other. Through these groups, cities are connected for rescue operations after an 
earthquake occurs. However, this same connection cannot be claimed for disaster mitigation 
 214 
efforts. Responsible managers must prepare their organizations to conform to the requirements of 
disaster law and regulations. Most of the interviewees argued that disaster organizations, even 
within the same city, implement their plans and programs without interacting with other 
organizations. In fact, these organizations should connect their plans not only with organizations 
within the same city but also with organizations in neighbor cities. 
9.5.3 Challenges from Organizational Perspectives 
The evolution and changes in the response system from the Marmara to the Duzce earthquake 
are an indication of the complexity in disaster environments. Frequent interactions among 
disaster organizations from different jurisdictions and sectors create very intricate circumstances 
that make coordination of these interactions very difficult. Establishing the necessary 
information infrastructure is very important to supporting the interaction among disaster 
organizations during regular and emergency times. Without increasing the information search, 
acquisition, and exchange capacity of disaster organizations, it will be very difficult to establish 
connections among disaster organizations from different organizational and jurisdictional levels.  
Increasing information capacity is important for continuous organizational learning and 
transformation to adapt to changing conditions in disaster environments. It is imperative for the 
Turkish disaster system to create an organizational structure that facilitates a culture that 
promotes openness to new information. In that sense, training and education are very important 
for responsible managers. Responsible managers from different organizations should learn to 
work together and to share disaster relevant information to better respond to the needs of 
communities under seismic risk.  
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Organizational flexibility is also an important challenge for Turkish pubic administration. 
It must create a more adaptive, self-governing disaster management system. Disaster laws and 
regulations should be more flexible to support deregulation of power and resources to local 
disaster organizations. Local disaster organizations should be supported by financial sources, 
trained personnel and technical equipment in order to act independently when an earthquake 
happens.  
9.6 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
This research examined two response systems, the Marmara and Duzce. While the research 
comprehensively examined two cases, it is hard to construct robust principles for such a social 
phenomenon involving complexity. It is important to be cautious in generalizing the results to 
different response systems occurring in different contexts. Multiple case studies, including more 
than two cases in different contexts (e.g. different countries), might produce stronger results that 
can help to generate benchmark principles. Therefore, it is important to conduct a future study 
that allows comparison of multiple cases from different contexts.  
 Hundreds of organizations were involved in the response operations and projects 
following the Marmara and Duzce earthquakes, however, experienced managers from only 39 
organizations were interviewed due to budgetary and time constraints. Although I interviewed 
the elites in the Turkish disaster system, I acknowledge that interviewing all organizations from 
stricken communities would produce stronger outcomes. I also acknowledge that each 
interviewee had personal biases about the performance of his/her own organization and the entire 
disaster management system. 
 216 
In this research, I sought to compare two response systems to evaluate the performance of 
the Turkish disaster system in terms of utilizing and exchanging disaster relevant information to 
support coordinated response operations. I used paired-t test based on two samples. Due to the 
small number of cases (19 for Duzce, and 39 for Marmara) and differences between the two 
earthquakes in terms of magnitude, and demographic conditions of areas that they struck, I 
acknowledge that the comparison results should be used carefully as indicators to show the 
difference between two response systems.   
Lastly, the research is heavily reliant on data gathered from content analysis of 
newspapers, web sites of disaster organizations, and interviews. Network analyses and N-K 
methodology analysis are also based on this data. I analyzed inter-organizational coordination 
based on interactions among disaster organizations during the response operations, and 
advancement in organizational and informational structure after the earthquakes. One should 
accept that the data set could not cover all interactions and developments in the disaster system. 
Immense difficulties in obtaining data from public organizations in Turkey can be considered a 
limitation of the study as well.  
9.7 FUTURE RESEARCH 
This study examines the initial conditions of existing information infrastructure during the 1999 
Marmara and Duzce response operations, compares two response systems, uncovers the gaps and 
evaluates the reforming activities that aim to close these gaps. The study mainly focuses on the 
Marmara region. Since 96% of the land in Turkey is exposed to seismic risk, a future study 
might cover all of the country in order to analyze to what extent Turkish public administration 
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builds a disaster system that seeks to reduce the vulnerabilities of communities across the 
country to destructive disasters. 
The study discovered that the Turkish disaster system learned from the Marmara 
earthquake and began to reform the system to better cope with future earthquakes. Large 
earthquakes do not occur frequently enough to keep communities alert. People tend to forget the 
outcomes of a destructive earthquake and eventually lose the sense of urgency to take necessary 
actions. A future study should examine to what extent the initiated projects to create a socio-
technical Turkish disaster system continue in right direction. 
Future research with multiple cases would be valuable to test the outcomes that this 
research produced. Multiple cases from different countries could be used to confirm whether the 
results are valid for other cases in different circumstances. A future study with more content 
analysis and more representative organizations from stricken communities could also strengthen 
the objectivity of the research findings.  
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APPENDIX A 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
This investigation examines the potential of utilizing information systems to in disaster 
mitigation efforts. The purpose of the investigation is to discover, define, and evaluate the 
important issues regarding the uses of information and communication tools in creating 
coordinated response actions in emergencies. 
 
a. Initial Conditions of Information Infrastructure 
 
1. What is your organization’s primary function?  
 
 __Crisis Management  
 __Research  
 __Health/Rehabilitation  
 __Public Safety  
 __Mass Care  
 __Communication 
 __Rescue 
 __Other ___ 
 
2. To what extent did information exchange exist between your organization and 
other disaster organizations during response operations? 
 
_Great extent   _Good extent  _Neither good nor bad   
_Less than good _Not at all good _Other ____ 
 
4. What kind of information and communication technologies did you use to transmit 
information to other organizations involved in the disaster operations process? 
 
 __GIS 
 __GPS 
 __Computer/Computer Networks 
 __Phone 
 __Satellite Phone 
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 __Radio/Shortwave Radio 
 __TV 
 __Internet 
 __Megaphone 
 __Intelligent Reasoning 
 __Risk Assessment Models 
 __Other____ 
 
5. To what extent did your organizations utilize information and communication means in 
disaster operations? 
 
_Great extent   _Good extent  _Neither good nor bad   
_Less than good _Not at all good _Other ____ 
 
6a. Were you able to utilize any inter-organizational knowledge base during the disaster 
operations? 
 
_yes _no _Other___ 
 
b. If, yes, which knowledge bases did you use? 
 
c. If yes, how useful they were for decision-making?  
 
_Great extent   _Good extent  _Neither good nor bad   
_Less than good _Not at all good _Other ____ 
  
 
7. To what extent did the existing information systems provide timely and accurate 
information to support disaster organizations during the disaster operations?   
 
_Great extent   _Good extent  _Neither good nor bad   
_Less than good _Not at all good _Other ____ 
 
8. How do you rate performance of the information infrastructure in terms of exchanging 
necessary disaster relevant information and resources with local/provincial/central government? 
 
_Great extent   _Good extent  _Neither good nor bad   
_Less than good _Not at all good _Other ____ 
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b. Current state of information infrastructure 
 
9. To what extent is your organization currently able to use information and 
communication technologies to improve coordinated actions for disaster operations? 
 
_Great extent   _Good extent  _Neither good nor bad   
_Less than good _Not at all good _Other ____ 
 
10. What kinds of advanced information and communication technologies has your 
organization adopted after the 1999 earthquakes? 
 
 __GIS (or underdevelopment) 
 __GPS (or underdevelopment) 
 __Computer Networks (or underdevelopment) 
 __Intelligent Reasoning (or underdevelopment) 
 __Risk Assessment Models (or underdevelopment) 
 __Satellite based communication systems (or underdevelopment) 
 __Other __ 
 
If new technologies have been adopted;  
 
11a. What are the financial sources of these investments? 
 
 __Central Government 
 __Local/provincial Government 
 __Private 
 __Nonprofit 
 __International 
 __Individual 
 __Other __ 
 
 b. What are the most important factors in your organization’s ability to utilize these 
 tools? Please list them in accordance with significance.  
  
 _Trained Personnel 
 _Financial Assistance 
 _New Disaster Organizational Design 
 _Constant Updated Data from Disaster Locations 
 _Changes in Laws/Regulations/Policy 
 _Authority Deregulation 
 _Other__ 
 
12a. Do you currently share any databases with other organizations?  
 
__No 
__Yes 
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b. If yes, with which of following organizations? 
 
 
 
 
 
Please 
name______________ 
 
13. How often do you exchange disaster relevant information with other disaster 
organizations (public, nonprofit, private)?  
 
 _Daily 
 _Weekly 
 _Monthly 
 _Yearly 
 _Not at all 
 _Other 
 
14. How do you scale the organizations, public, private, non-profit, in terms of their 
willingness to share information?  
 
 
 
 
c. Local sustainability   
 
15. What is your organization’ primary source of funding? 
 
__Government 
__Donations 
__Private Sources 
__International Sources 
__Individual 
__Other  
 
16. How often do you inform your personnel/citizens about important subjects related to 
disaster circumstances/policy?  
 
_Always   
_Very often   
_Sometimes   
_Rarely   
_Never  
Local 
level public nonprofit private 
Provincial 
level  public nonprofit private 
Central 
level public nonprofit private 
Public high medium low 
Private high medium low 
Nonprofit high medium low 
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_ Other 
 
17. To what extent do you feel that you have all necessary information for emergency 
management purposes? 
 
_Great extent   _Good extent  _Neither good nor bad   
_Less than good _Not at all good _Other ____ 
 
18. To what extent do you have difficulties in obtaining information from other local, 
provincial, central disaster organizations –public, private and nonprofit-? 
 
_Great extent   _Good extent  _Neither good nor bad   
_Less than good _Not at all good _Other ____ 
 
19.  To what extent do you have the capacity to implement and change disaster policies 
or reallocate resources? 
 
_Great extent   _Good extent  _Neither good nor bad   
_Less than good _Not at all good _Other ____ 
 
20. What do you believe are the most important factors that constrain your ability to take 
independent actions? Please list them in terms of importance to you. 
 
_Financial 
_Insufficient equipment 
_Trained personnel 
_Laws/regulations  
_Political environment 
_Other 
 
d. Organizational changes and disaster mitigation 
 
21. What sorts of significant changes have there been in your organization for the 
purposes of disaster management? Please list them in terms of importance to your daily 
operations? 
 
__Changes in laws/regulations 
__Changes in organizational structure 
__Changes in financial conditions 
__Changes in personnel 
__Changes in technical capacity 
__Investments in information infrastructure 
__Other__ 
 
22. For what purposes have these changes been primarily carried out? Please order by 
priority given by your organization.  
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__Preparedness before an earthquake 
__Response immediate after and earthquake 
__Recover/Relief   
__All above 
 
23. To what extent have those changes in technical capacity and organizational design 
since the earthquakes increased/decreased the organizational flexibility of the disaster 
management system? 
 
__Increased significantly 
__Increased somewhat  
__No change   
__Decreased somewhat 
__Decreased significantly    
__Other 
 24. Does your organization currently have a regular training program for the purpose of disaster 
mitigation? 
  
 __yes  __no  __Other (please specify) 
 
25. To what extent is the Turkish disaster system ready for future catastrophic 
earthquakes? 
 
_Great extent   _Good extent  _Neither good nor bad   
_Less than good _Not at all good _Other ____ 
 
26. What would you recommend to significantly increase the effectiveness of Turkish 
disaster management system? Please list them in accordance with importance to you. 
 
__More investments in information infrastructure 
__Increasing power of local public organizations 
__Increasing number of trained personnel 
__Establishing new emergency organizations 
__Educating citizens 
__Changing building codes 
__Increasing enforcement for construction facilities  
__Other (Comment) ___ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
e. Personal Information 
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27. How many years of service do you have with your organizations for the purposes of 
emergency management? 
 
__1 year or less 
__2-4 
__5-7 
__8-10 
__more than 10 years 
 
28. How many personnel does your organization have for emergency operations? 
 
_1-5 
_6-15 
_16-25 
_26-50 
_over 50 
 
29. Approximately, what is the total budget of your organization for recent fiscal 
year? 
 
_0-25,000,000,000 TL 
_25,000,000,001-75,000,000,000  TL  
_75,000,000, 001-150,000,000,000 TL 
_150,000,000, 001- 500, 000,000,000 TL 
_More than 500, 000,000,000 TL 
 
30. What is your last educational degree that you have completed? 
 
__High school diploma 
__Bachelor’s Degree 
__Master’s 
__PhD  
__Other___ 
  
31. How old are you? 
 
__20-30 
__31-40 
__41-50 
__51-60 
__61-over 
 
32. Gender? 
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__Male 
__Female 
 
 
 
Are there any other issues that you want to mention? 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
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APPENDIX B 
DESTRUCTIVE EARTHQUAKES IN TURKEY, 1902-2005 
Destructive Earthquakes in Turkey, 1902-2005 
Destructive earthquakes in Turkey 
Region 
  
Date 
(DD/MM/YYYY) 
Magnitude 
(Ms) 
Number of 
deaths 
Number of 
injured 
Number of 
Heavily damaged 
residencies 
Çankiri 09.03.1902 5.6 4 - 3000 
Malazgirt 28.04.1903 6.7 2626 - 4500 
Zara 10.02.1903 5.8 - - 1500 
Çemisgezek 04.12.1905 6.8 - - 15 
Mürefte 09.08.1912 7.3 216 466 5540 
Afyon-Bolvadin 04.10.1914 5.1 400 - 1700 
Çaykara 13.05.1924 5.3 50 - 700 
Pasinler 13.09.1924 6.9 310 - 4300 
Afyon-Dinar 07.08.1925 5.9 3 - 2043 
Milas 08.02.1926 4.7 2 - 598 
Finike 18.03.1926 6.9 27 - 190 
Kars 22.10.1926 5.7 355 - 1100 
Izmir-Torbali 31.03.1928 7 50 - 2100 
Sivas-Susehri 18.05.1929 6.1 64 - 1357 
Hakkari Siniri 06.05.1930 7.2 2514 - 3000 
Denizli-Çivril 19.07.1933 5.7 20 - 200 
Bingöl 15.12.1934 4.9 12 - 200 
Erdek 04.01.1935 6.7 5 30 600 
Digor 01.05.1935 6.2 200 - 1300 
Kars-Kötek 23.03.1936 4.5 - - 100 
Kirsehir 19.04.1938 6.6 149 - 3860 
Kirsehir 16.12.1938 4.8 - - 300 
Izmir-Dikili 22.09.1939 7.1 60 - 1235 
Tercan 21.11.1939 5.9 43 - 500 
Erzincan 26.12.1939 7.9 32968 - 116720 
Nigde 10.01.1940 5 58 - 586 
Kayseri-Develi 20.02.1940 6.7 37 20 530 
Yozgat 13.04.1940 5.6 20 - 1250 
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Destructive Earthquakes in Turkey, 1902-2005 
Destructive earthquakes in Turkey 
Region 
  
Date 
(DD/MM/YYYY) 
Magnitude 
(Ms) 
Number of 
deaths 
Number of 
injured 
Number of 
Heavily damaged 
residencies 
Mugla 23.05.1941 6 2 - 500 
Van-Ercis 10.09.1941 5.9 194 - 600 
Erzincan 12.11.1941 5.9 15 - 500 
Mugla 13.12.1941 5.7 - - 400 
Bigadiç-Sindirgi 15.11.1942 6.1 7 - 1262 
Osmancik 21.11.1942 5.5 7 - 448 
Çorum 11.12.1942 5.9 25 - 816 
Niksar-Erbaa 20.12.1942 7 3000 6300 32000 
Adapazari-Hendek 20.06.1943 6.6 336 - 2240 
Tosya-Ladik 26.11.1943 7.2 2824 - 25000 
Bolu-Gerede 01.02.1944 7.2 3959 - 20865 
Düzce 10.02.1944 5.4 - - 900 
Mudurnu 05.04.1944 5.6 30 - 900 
Gediz-Usak 25.06.1944 6.2 21 - 3476 
Ayvalik-Edremit 06.10.1944 7 27 - 1158 
Adana-Ceyhan 20.03.1945 6 10 - 650 
Van 20.11.1945 5.8 - - 1000 
Kadinhan-Ilgin 21.02.1946 5.6 2 - 509 
Varto-Hinis 31.05.1946 5.7 839 349 1986 
Izmir-Karaburun 23.07.1949 7 1 7 824 
Karliova 17.08.1949 7 450 - 3000 
Harmancik 05.02.1949 5.2 - - 150 
Kigi 04.02.1950 4.6 20 - 100 
Iskenderun 08.04.1951 5.7 6 10 13 
Kursunlu 13.08.1951 6.9 52 208 3354 
Hasankale 03.01.1952 5.8 133 - 701 
Misis 22.10.1952 5.5 10 - 511 
Yenice-Gönen 18.03.1953 7.4 265 336 9670 
Karaburun 02.05.1953 5.1 - - 73 
Kursunlu 07.09.1953 6.4 2 - 230 
Edirne 18.06.1953 5.1 - - 323 
Aydin-Söke 16.07.1955 7 23 - 470 
Eskisehir 20.02.1956 6.4 2 - 1219 
Fethiye 25.04.1957 7.1 67 - 3100 
Bolu-Abant 26.05.1957 7.1 52 100 4201 
Basköy 07.07.1957 5.1 - - 300 
Köycegiz 25.04.1959 5.7 - - 59 
Hinis 25.10.1959 5 18 - 300 
Bitlis 26.02.1960 4 - - 80 
Germencik 10.04.1960 4.4 - - 100 
Tokat 26.07.1960 4.6 - - 22 
Marmaris 23.05.1961 6.5 - 9 61 
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Destructive Earthquakes in Turkey, 1902-2005 
Destructive earthquakes in Turkey 
Region 
  
Date 
(DD/MM/YYYY) 
Magnitude 
(Ms) 
Number of 
deaths 
Number of 
injured 
Number of 
Heavily damaged 
residencies 
Mus 10.02.1962 4 - - 97 
Igdir 04.09.1962 5.3 1 22 - 
Denizli 11.03.1963 5.5 - - 54 
Çinarcik-Yalova 18.09.1963 6.3 1 26 230 
Denizli 22.11.1963 5.1 - - 298 
Siirt 24.03.1964 4 1 - 100 
Malatya 14.06.1964 6 8 36 678 
Manyas 06.10.1964 7 23 130 5398 
Denizli-Honaz 13.06.1965 5.7 14 217 488 
Karliova 31.08.1965 5.6 - - 1500 
Varto 07.03.1966 5.6 14 75 1100 
Varto 12.07.1966 4 12 - 90 
Varto 19.08.1966 6.9 2394 1489 20007 
Adana-Bahçe 07.04.1966 4.8 - - 100 
Adapazari 22.07.1967 7.2 89 235 5569 
Pülümür 26.07.1967 6.2 97 268 1282 
Akyazi 30.07.1967 6 2 40 - 
Adana-Bahçe 07.04.1967 5.3 - - 91 
Bingöl-Elazig 24.09.1968 5.1 2 40 - 
Amasya-Bartin 03.09.1968 6.5 29 231 2073 
Fethiye 14.01.1969 6.2 - - 42 
Gönen 03.03.1969 5.7 1 - 20 
Demirci 23.03.1969 6.1 - - 1100 
Demirci 25.03.1969 6 - - 1826 
Alasehir 28.03.1969 6.6 41 186 4372 
Karaburun 06.04.1969 5.6 - 3 443 
Gediz 28.03.1970 7.2 1086 1260 9452 
Çavdarhisar-Kütahya 19.04.1970 5.9 - 2 41 
Demirci 23.04.1970 5.7 - 43 150 
Gürün 02.07.1970 4.8 1 - 150 
Burdur 12.05.1971 6.2 57 57 3227 
Bingöl 22.05.1971 6.7 878 878 9111 
Ezine 26.04.1972 5 - - 400 
Sarikamis 22.03.1972 4.7 - 4 100 
Van 16.07.1972 5.2 1 - 400 
Izmir 01.02.1974 5.2 2 20 47 
Kars-Susuz 25.03.1975 5.1 2 26 762 
Lice 06.09.1975 6.9 2385 3339 8149 
Dogu Beyazit 02.04.1976 4.8 5 13 236 
Denizli 19.08.1976 4.9 4 28 887 
Ardahan 30.04.1976 5 4 - 300 
Çaldiran-Muradiye 24.11.1976 7.2 3840 497 9552 
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Destructive Earthquakes in Turkey, 1902-2005 
Destructive earthquakes in Turkey 
Region 
  
Date 
(DD/MM/YYYY) 
Magnitude 
(Ms) 
Number of 
deaths 
Number of 
injured 
Number of 
Heavily damaged 
residencies 
Lice 25.03.1977 4.8 8 17 210 
Palu 26.03.1977 5.2 8 26 842 
Izmir 09.12.1977 4.8 - - 11 
Izmir 16.12.1977 5.3 - - 40 
Foça 14.06.1979 5.9 - - 22 
Antakya 30.06.1981 4.4 - - 2 
Mus-Bulanik 27.03.1982 5.2 - - 424 
Biga 05.07.1983 4.9 3 - 85 
Erzurum-Kars 30.10.1983 6.8 1155 1142 3241 
Erzurum-Balkaya 18.09.1984 5.9 3 35 187 
Malatya-Sürgü 05.05.1986 5.8 8 24 824 
Sürgü-Malatya 06.06.1986 5.6 1 20 1174 
Kars-Akyaka 07.12.1988 6.9 4 11 546 
Erzincan-Tunceli 13.03.1992 6.8 653 3850 8057 
Dinar 01.10.1995 5.9 94 240 14156 
Çorum-Amasya 14.08.1996 5.4 - 6 707 
Antakya 22.01.1997 5.4 1 - 1841 
Bingol-Karliova 13.04.1998 5 - - 148 
Adana-Ceyhan 27.06.1998 5.9 146 1041 4000 
17 Agustos Kocaeli 17.08.1999 7.4 17480 43953 244,383 
Bolu-Duzce 12.11.1999 7.2 763 4948 133,496 
Cankiri-Orta 06.06.2000 6.1 2 - 1766 
Sakarya-Hendek 23.08.2000 5.8 - 9 - 
Afyon-Sultandagi 15.12.2000 5.8 6 - 547 
Osmaniye 25.06.2001 5.5 - - 66 
Afyon-Cay-Sultandagi 03.02.2002 6.4 44 - 622 
Tunceli-Pulumur 27.01.2003 6.2 1 7 - 
Bingol 01.05.2003 6.4 176 520 6000 
Erzurum-Cat 25.03.2004 5.1 9 20 1280 
Agri Dogubeyazit 02.07.2004 5.1 18 32 1000 
Elazig-Sivrice 11.08.2004 5.5 - 12 - 
Hakkari  25.01.2004 5.5 2 5 159 
Bingol-Karliova 12.03.2005 5.7 - 16 758 
Sources: Adapted from Boazici Universtiy Kandilli Observatory (www.koeri.boun.edu.tr/sismo), Earthquake 
Research Instittution National Earthquake Monitoring Center (www.angora.deprem.gov.tr), Primime Ministry Crisis 
Management Center (2001), Belgenet webpage (www.belgenet.deprem),  
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APPENDIX C 
DATA SOURCES FOR PROJECTS 
Content Analysis of Newspapers 
Cumhuriyet, Science & Technology Section, May 1998-May 2005 
Interviewees 
Interviewee # Ahmet Bumin  
Interviewee # Aziz Sasa 
Interviewee # Dilek Kocak 
Interviewee # Ismail Eroglu 
Interviewee # Oktay Ergunay 
Interviewee # Ramazan Tuncer 
Reports 
Report by Mustafa Erdik "Strong Data Acquisition, Processing and Utilization in 
Turkey”  
Web Sites 
http://www.cedm.itu.edu.tr    (Istanbul Technical University, Center of Excellence for 
Disaster Management) 
http://www.cendim.boun.edu.tr/ (Bogazici University Center for Disaster Management) 
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http://www.deprem.cs.itu.edu.tr (Istanbul Technical University, Earthquake Prediction 
Project) 
http://www.deprem.gov.tr (Earthquake research Department, General Directorate of 
Disaster Affairs) 
http://www.duzce-bld.gov.tr (Duzce Municipality) 
http://www.ibb.gov.tr (Istanbul Greater (Metropolitan) Municipality) 
http://www.ins.itu.edu.tr (Istanbul Technical University, Civil Engineering Department) 
http://www.istanbul.gov.tr (Istanbul Province Government)  
http://www.jica.go.jp/turkey   (Japan International Cooperation Agency/Turkey) 
http://www.kizilay.org.tr (Turkish Red Crescent) 
http://www.koeri.boun.edu.tr/depremmuh/ (Bogazici University and Kandilli 
Observatory) 
http://www.koeri.boun.edu.tr/jeodezi (Bogazici University Geodesy Engineering 
Department)  
http://www.pub.gov.tr/projects.html (Prime Ministry Project Implementation Unit) 
http://www.sakarya.gov.tr  (Sakarya Province Government)  
http://www.tkgm.gov.tr (General Directorate of Land Registry and Cadastre)  
http://www.tubitak.gov.tr (The Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey)  
http://www.yildiz.edu.tr (Yildiz Technical University) 
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APPENDIX D 
COMPARISON OF THE MARMARA AND DUZCE RESPONSE SYSTEM 
Table D-1 Utilizing Information and Communication Systems 
“To what extent did your organizations utilize these tools in disaster operations?” 
Paired T test for Duzce and Marmara 
 
                         N      Mean     StDev   SE Mean 
Duzce              35   2.88571   1.79495   0.30340 
Marmara          35   2.22857   1.21476   0.20533 
Differences      35  0.657143  1.908847  0.322654 
 
95% lower bound for mean difference: 0.111559 
T-Test of mean difference = 0 (vs > 0): T-Value = 2.04  P-Value = 0.025 
Sources: Semi-Structured Interviews with Turkish Experts in Disaster                                
     Management (June 1-July 27, 2004) 
 
Table  D-2 Information Exchange among Disaster Organizations 
“To what extent did the information exchange exist between your organization and other 
organizations during response operations?” 
Paired T test for Duzce and Marmara     
        
                      N      Mean     StDev   SE Mean 
Duzce           35   2.80000   1.71155   0.28931 
Marmara       35   2.08571   0.88688   0.14991 
Differences   35  0.714286  1.887598  0.319062 
 
95% lower bound for mean difference: 0.174776 
T-Test of mean difference = 0 (vs > 0): T-Value = 2.24  P-Value = 0.016 
P-Value =0.000 
Sources: Semi-Structured Interviews with Turkish Experts in Disaster                                
    Management (June 1-July 27, 2004) 
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Table D-3  Effectiveness of Information Systems 
 “To what extent did the existing information systems provide timely and accurate 
information to support disaster organizations during the disaster operations?” 
Paired T test for Duzce and Marmara     
        
                       N      Mean     StDev    SE Mean 
Duzce            35   2.91429   1.82098   0.30780 
Marmara        35   2.05714   1.05560   0.17843 
Differences    35  0.857143  1.880908  0.317931 
 
 
95% lower bound for mean difference: 0.319545 
T-Test of mean difference = 0 (vs > 0): T-Value = 2.70  P-Value = 0.005 
 
Sources: Semi-Structured Interviews with Turkish Experts in Disaster                                
    Management (June 1-July 27, 2004) 
 
 
 
Table D-4 The performance of Turkish Disaster System in terms of Information 
Infrastructure 
 “How do you rate performance of the information infrastructure in terms of exchanging 
necessary disaster relevant information and resources with local/provincial/central 
government?” 
Paired T test for Duzce and Marmara     
        
                       N     Mean    StDev  SE Mean 
Duzce            38  2.76316  1.82230  0.29562 
Marmara        38  1.76316  0.78617  0.12753 
Differences    38  1.00000  1.98644  0.32224 
 
95% lower bound for mean difference: 0.45635 
T-Test of mean difference = 0 (vs > 0): T-Value = 3.10  P-Value = 0.002 
 
Sources: Semi-Structured Interviews with Turkish Experts in Disaster                                
    Management (June 1-July 27, 2004) 
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Table D-5 Availability of Inter-organizational Knowledge base Systems 
 “Were you able to utilize any inter-organizational knowledge base during the disaster 
operations?” 
Marmara Duzce All Earthquakes  Responses % Responses % Responses % 
Yes 3 7.7 2 10.5 5 8.6
No 36 92.3 17 89.5 53 91.4
Total responses 39 100 19 100 58 100.0
  Sources: Semi-Structured Interviews with Turkish Experts in Disaster   
                Management (June 1-July 27, 2004) 
 
 
Table D-6 Effectiveness of Inter-organizational Knowledge base 
 “If yes, how useful were they for decision-making?” 
Marmara Duzce All Earthquakes  
Responses % Responses % Responses % 
Great extent 1 33.3 1 50 2 40.0
Good extent 1 33.3 1 50 2 40.0
Neither good or bad 1 33.3 0 0.0 1 20.0
Less than good 0 0.0 0 0.0 0  0.0
Not at all good 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
Total responses 3 100 2 100 5 100.0
        Sources: Semi-Structured Interviews with Turkish Experts in Disaster   
            Management (June 1-July 27, 2004) 
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Table D-7 Utilization of Information Systems after the Earthquakes 
“To what extent is your organization currently able to use information and 
communication technologies to improve coordinated actions for disaster 
operations?” 
  Responses % 
Great extent 0 0.0 
Good extent 18 48.6 
Neither good or bad 12 32.4 
Less than good 6 16.2 
Not at all good 1 2.7 
Total responses 37 100 
 
 
 
Table D-8 Independent actions 
“To what extent do you have the capacity to implement and change disaster 
policies or reallocate resources?” 
 Number % 
Great extent 1 2.9 
Good extent 4 11.4 
Neither good or bad 15 42.9 
Less than good 14 40.0 
Not at all good 1 2.9 
Other: 4 0.0 
Total responses 35 100.0 
 
 236 
APPENDIX E 
CENTRALITY MEASUREMENTS: THE MARMARA RESPONSE OPERATIONS 
Table E- 1 Freeman’s Degree Centrality Measures 
                                                 1            2            3            4 
                                         OutDegree     InDegree    NrmOutDeg     NrmInDeg 
                                      ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ 
  7                          Kizilay        26.000        6.000        3.916        0.904 
  3                      Interior M.        22.000        1.000        3.313        0.151 
  1                            PMCMC        21.000       25.000        3.163        3.765 
  5                         Military        18.000       12.000        2.711        1.807 
 13                            KOCMC        17.000       49.000        2.560        7.380 
 83            National Education M.        13.000        2.000        1.958        0.301 
  4                         Health M        11.000        2.000        1.657        0.301 
 98                             TEAS        10.000        0.000        1.506        0.000 
  9                            BOCMC        10.000       31.000        1.506        4.669 
110                              TBF         9.000        0.000        1.355        0.000 
  2                             PWSM         8.000        3.000        1.205        0.452 
 99                            TEDAS         7.000        0.000        1.054        0.000 
 36                            BOTAS         7.000        0.000        1.054        0.000 
 94                      Central M. HG         6.000        0.000        0.904        0.000 
 49           E.Natural Resources M.         6.000        0.000        0.904        0.000 
 12                            ISCMC         6.000       27.000        0.904        4.066 
114                             TRAC         6.000        0.000        0.904        0.000 
107                             TPAO         5.000        0.000        0.753        0.000 
 10                            BUCMC         5.000        4.000        0.753        0.602 
103                              TKI         5.000        0.000        0.753        0.000 
 90                   Religious A.A.         5.000        0.000        0.753        0.000 
 67                   Izmir Province         5.000        0.000        0.753        0.000 
 66                             ISKI         5.000        0.000        0.753        0.000 
 52                     Esenyurt Mu.         5.000        0.000        0.753        0.000 
 46                    Dokuzeylul U.         5.000        1.000        0.753        0.151 
 27                            ANCMC         4.000        0.000        0.602        0.000 
 14                            YACMC         4.000       42.000        0.602        6.325 
 71                             KOCI         4.000        1.000        0.602        0.151 
 93                              SSK         4.000        1.000        0.602        0.151 
 50                   Environment M.         4.000        4.000        0.602        0.602 
 34                        Bartin P.         4.000        0.000        0.602        0.000 
 75                   L. Social S M.         4.000        1.000        0.602        0.151 
 64                  Istanbul T. Un.         3.000        1.000        0.452        0.151 
100                            TEKEL         3.000        0.000        0.452        0.000 
 43                    D.Public Sec.         3.000        2.000        0.452        0.301 
105                             TOKI         3.000        1.000        0.452        0.151 
 57                              HEA         3.000        1.000        0.452        0.151 
 82              National Defense M.         3.000        1.000        0.452        0.151 
11                            SACMC          3.000       42.000        0.452        6.325 
 53                     Eskisehir P.         3.000        3.000        0.452        0.452 
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 24                     Ankara GCMu.         3.000        1.000        0.452        0.151 
 22                              ACC         3.000        0.000        0.452        0.000 
 45                    Diyarbakir P.         3.000        0.000        0.452        0.000 
 56                              GPO         3.000        0.000        0.452        0.000 
 79                             MLSA         2.000        0.000        0.301        0.000 
 80                          Mugla P         2.000        1.000        0.301        0.151 
 47                        Duzce Mu.         2.000        0.000        0.301        0.000 
 15                             AIBU         2.000        1.000        0.301        0.151 
 69                     Kirsehir Mu.         2.000        0.000        0.301        0.000 
118            Turkish Petrolum A.S.         2.000        0.000        0.301        0.000 
 21                             AKUT         2.000        1.000        0.301        0.151 
 32                 Bahcelievler Mu.         2.000        0.000        0.301        0.000 
 48                        Edirne P.         2.000        0.000        0.301        0.000 
 44                      D.Rural Af.         2.000        0.000        0.301        0.000 
106                       Tourism M.         2.000        2.000        0.301        0.301 
  6                             SSCP         2.000        1.000        0.301        0.151 
 78                Ministers Cabinet         2.000        4.000        0.301        0.602 
 42                   D.Disaster Af.         2.000        4.000        0.301        0.602 
 54                   F.Rural Af. M.         2.000        1.000        0.301        0.151 
 20                       Aksaray P.         2.000        0.000        0.301        0.000 
108                          TRT CYA         2.000        0.000        0.301        0.000 
 84        National Security Council         2.000        0.000        0.301        0.000 
 97                            TAECA         2.000        3.000        0.301        0.452 
41                      D.Civil Def.         2.000        3.000        0.301        0.452 
 51                        Eregli SH         1.000        0.000        0.151        0.000 
 40                        Dinar Mu.         1.000        0.000        0.151        0.000 
 18                              ALC         1.000        0.000        0.151        0.000 
 61                          ISDEMIR         1.000        0.000        0.151        0.000 
 60                    I.Commerce M.         1.000        0.000        0.151        0.000 
 68                       Justice M.         1.000        0.000        0.151        0.000 
 19                              ASH         1.000        0.000        0.151        0.000 
 70                      Kirsehir P.         1.000        0.000        0.151        0.000 
 30                              ACA         1.000        0.000        0.151        0.000 
 59                             IEIS         1.000        0.000        0.151        0.000 
 33                          BSNI H.         1.000        0.000        0.151        0.000 
 76                        Manisa P.         1.000        0.000        0.151        0.000 
 55                       Giresun P.         1.000        0.000        0.151        0.000 
 58                             HRDF         1.000        0.000        0.151        0.000 
 29                       Antalya P.         1.000        0.000        0.151        0.000 
 39                      Bursa YI H.         1.000        0.000        0.151        0.000 
 81                    Narlidere Mu.         1.000        0.000        0.151        0.000 
113                  Turkey Sea Aut.         1.000        0.000        0.151        0.000 
 63                              IDH         1.000        0.000        0.151        0.000 
 38                     Bursa St. H.         1.000        0.000        0.151        0.000 
 65                     Istanbul Un.         1.000        0.000        0.151        0.000 
 86 Office of Agricultural Produces          1.000        0.000        0.151        0.000 
 26                        Ankara NH         1.000        0.000        0.151        0.000 
 25                             AIEA         1.000        0.000        0.151        0.000 
 89         Public Education Centers         1.000        2.000        0.151        0.301 
 91                        Samsun P.         1.000        0.000        0.151        0.000 
111                              TDA         1.000        0.000        0.151        0.000 
 92                              SHF         1.000        0.000        0.151        0.000 
 73                      Kocaeli Un.         1.000        2.000        0.151        0.301 
115                              TDA         1.000        0.000        0.151        0.000 
 95                       Central M.SS         1.000        0.000        0.151        0.000 
 96                      Central M. SU         1.000        0.000        0.151        0.000 
 77                         ME Union         1.000        0.000        0.151        0.000 
 37                        Bursa SSK         1.000        0.000        0.151        0.000 
 16                             ADRC         1.000        0.000        0.151        0.000 
 17                           ARA M.         1.000        3.000        0.151        0.452 
101                    D.Mining T.R.         1.000        0.000        0.151        0.000 
102                            T?GEM         1.000        0.000        0.151        0.000 
 62                              ICC         1.000        1.000        0.151        0.151 
104                             TOBB         1.000        1.000        0.151        0.151 
 85                         Nigde P.         1.000        0.000        0.151        0.000 
 23                           AFAFAC         1.000        0.000        0.151        0.000 
 87                President Demirel         1.000        0.000        0.151        0.000 
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 35                              BCA         1.000        0.000        0.151        0.000 
119                            TUROB         1.000        1.000        0.151        0.151 
 28                            AESOB         1.000        0.000        0.151        0.000 
121                    Yildiz T. Un.         1.000        0.000        0.151        0.000 
112                        THW Union         1.000        0.000        0.151        0.000 
120                       Uludag Un.         1.000        0.000        0.151        0.000 
 31                             AYEA         1.000        0.000        0.151        0.000 
117                    T.National A.         1.000        1.000        0.151        0.151 
116                              THF         1.000        0.000        0.151        0.000 
122                  Zeytinburnu Mu.         1.000        0.000        0.151        0.000 
 72                      Kocaeli Mu.         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.151 
109                           TUPRAS         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.151 
 88                         Prime M.         0.000        2.000        0.000        0.301 
  8                     Regional CMC         0.000       14.000        0.000        2.108 
74                         KorfezCMC         0.000        2.000        0.000        0.301 
123                    Balikesir Un.         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.151 
124                   Bandirma Dist.         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.151 
125                         Bolu Mu.         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.151 
126                    Bakirkoy S.H.         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.151 
127                       CilimliCMC         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.151 
128                      D.B.Land R.         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.151 
129                       D.Highways         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.151 
130                           DEGCMC         0.000        6.000        0.000        0.904 
131                           DUZCMC         0.000        6.000        0.000        0.904 
132                             DISK         0.000        0.000        0.000        0.000 
133                         GebzeCMC         0.000        2.000        0.000        0.301 
135                     Golcuk Muni.         0.000        5.000        0.000        0.753 
136                      Golyaka CMC         0.000        3.000        0.000        0.452 
137                      Golcuk S.H.         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.151 
138            Gebze H. T. Institute         0.000        2.000        0.000        0.301 
139                  Foreign Aff. M.         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.151 
140                       Finance M.         0.000        2.000        0.000        0.301 
141                              HRA         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.151 
142                        Izmir Mu.         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.151 
143                     Istanbul Mu.         0.000        2.000        0.000        0.301 
144                            IGSAS         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.151 
145                          IZAYDAS         0.000        2.000        0.000        0.301 
146                       Izmit S.H.         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.151 
147                             ISBA         0.000        0.000        0.000        0.000 
148                    KaramurselCMC         0.000        7.000        0.000        1.054 
149                       KandiraCMC         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.151 
150                   Kocaeli SSK H.         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.151 
151                               MF         0.000        0.000        0.000        0.000 
152                             METU         0.000        2.000        0.000        0.301 
153                           PETKIM         0.000        0.000        0.000        0.000 
154                    Avcilar Dist.         0.000        2.000        0.000        0.301 
155                     Sakarya Uni.         0.000        2.000        0.000        0.301 
156                     Provinces B.         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.151 
157                     Sakarya S.H.         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.151 
158                            SSCPD         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.151 
159                    Central M. RKY          0.000        1.000        0.000        0.151 
160                         Treasury         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.151 
161                            TUROB         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.151 
162                              TEC         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.151 
163                     D.S.Railways         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.151 
164                    Yalova SSK HC         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.151 
165                               ZB         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.151 
166                           ZONCMC         0.000        3.000        0.000        0.452 
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DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
                         1            2            3            4 
                  
                      OutDegree     InDegree    NrmOutDeg     NrmInDeg 
              ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ 
  1     Mean         2.410        2.410        0.363        0.363 
  2  Std Dev         4.018        7.032        0.605        1.059 
  3      Sum       400.000      400.000       60.241       60.241 
  4 Variance        16.145       49.447        0.366        1.122 
  5      SSQ      3644.000     9172.000       82.650      208.031 
  6    MCSSQ      2680.145     8208.145       60.789      186.170 
  7 Euc Norm        60.366       95.771        9.091       14.423 
  8  Minimum         0.000        0.000        0.000        0.000 
  9  Maximum        26.000       49.000        3.916        7.380 
 
Network Centralization (Outdegree) = 3.596% 
Network Centralization (Indegree) = 7.102% 
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Table E- 2 Closeness Centrality Measures 
                                                 1            2 
                                           Farness   nCloseness 
                                      ------------ ------------ 
  1                            PMCMC      1982.000        8.325 
 13                            KOCMC      1988.000        8.300 
  7                          Kizilay      2002.000        8.242 
 11                            SACMC      2006.000        8.225 
  5                         Military      2016.000        8.185 
 14                            YACMC      2020.000        8.168 
  9                            BOCMC      2023.000        8.156 
  2                             PWSM      2032.000        8.120 
 36                            BOTAS      2042.000        8.080 
  3                      Interior M.      2051.000        8.045 
 83            National Education M.      2055.000        8.029 
 12                            ISCMC      2059.000        8.014 
110                              TBF      2060.000        8.010 
 93                              SSK      2063.000        7.998 
  4                         Health M      2063.000        7.998 
 49           E.Natural Resources M.      2071.000        7.967 
114                             TRAC      2074.000        7.956 
 98                             TEAS      2076.000        7.948 
 90                   Religious A.A.      2076.000        7.948 
103                              TKI      2076.000        7.948 
 99                            TEDAS      2076.000        7.948 
107                             TPAO      2076.000        7.948 
 66                             ISKI      2076.000        7.948 
 94                      Central M. HG      2077.000        7.944 
 50                   Environment M.      2077.000        7.944 
  8                     Regional CMC      2082.000        7.925 
 78                Ministers Cabinet      2083.000        7.921 
 42                   D.Disaster Af.      2086.000        7.910 
134                           GOLCMC      2088.000        7.902 
 41                     D.Civil Def.      2090.000        7.895 
 53                     Eskisehir P.      2091.000        7.891 
 52                     Esenyurt Mu.      2092.000        7.887 
131                           DUZCMC      2095.000        7.876 
 34                        Bartin P.      2095.000        7.876 
 79                             MLSA      2097.000        7.868 
148                    KaramurselCMC      2097.000        7.868 
 82              National Defense M.      2098.000        7.865 
 89         Public Education Centers      2101.000        7.853 
 10                            BUCMC      2107.000        7.831 
 75                   L. Social S M.      2111.000        7.816 
100                            TEKEL      2112.000        7.813 
 88                         Prime M.      2114.000        7.805 
 54                   F.Rural Af. M.      2117.000        7.794 
136                      Golyaka CMC      2118.000        7.790 
135                     Golcuk Muni.      2119.000        7.787 
 24                     Ankara GCMu.      2121.000        7.779 
 27                            ANCMC      2121.000        7.779 
 22                              ACC      2122.000        7.776 
 45                    Diyarbakir P.      2122.000        7.776 
 21                             AKUT      2124.000        7.768 
  6                             SSCP      2125.000        7.765 
 44                      D.Rural Af.      2127.000        7.757 
 48                        Edirne P.      2130.000        7.746 
130                           DEGCMC      2130.000        7.746 
140                       Finance M.      2130.000        7.746 
 20                       Aksaray P.      2130.000        7.746 
106                       Tourism M.      2132.000        7.739 
104                             TOBB      2133.000        7.736 
 73                      Kocaeli Un.      2134.000        7.732 
 80                          Mugla P      2136.000        7.725 
165                               ZB      2136.000        7.725 
 23                           AFAFAC      2136.000        7.725 
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 61                          ISDEMIR      2136.000        7.725 
159                    Central M. RKY       2136.000        7.725 
156                     Provinces B.      2136.000        7.725 
 77                         ME Union      2136.000        7.725 
113                  Turkey Sea Aut.      2136.000        7.725 
 74                        KorfezCMC      2140.000        7.710 
 60                    I.Commerce M.      2142.000        7.703 
149                       KandiraCMC      2142.000        7.703 
 87                President Demirel      2142.000        7.703 
 29                       Antalya P.      2142.000        7.703 
138            Gebze H. T. Institute      2142.000        7.703 
 33                          BSNI H.      2142.000        7.703 
 72                      Kocaeli Mu.      2142.000        7.703 
146                       Izmit S.H.      2142.000        7.703 
 28                            AESOB      2142.000        7.703 
 15                             AIBU      2143.000        7.699 
155                     Sakarya Uni.      2154.000        7.660 
 56                              GPO      2154.000        7.660 
154                    Avcilar Dist.      2156.000        7.653 
126                    Bakirkoy S.H.      2156.000        7.653 
164                    Yalova SSK HC      2156.000        7.653 
150                   Kocaeli SSK H.      2156.000        7.653 
112                        THW Union      2156.000        7.653 
127                       CilimliCMC      2156.000        7.653 
139                  Foreign Aff. M.      2156.000        7.653 
111                              TDA      2156.000        7.653 
118            Turkish Petrolum A.S.      2157.000        7.650 
 71                             KOCI      2158.000        7.646 
 32                 Bahcelievler Mu.      2159.000        7.642 
133                         GebzeCMC      2160.000        7.639 
122                  Zeytinburnu Mu.      2160.000        7.639 
 43                    D.Public Sec.      2160.000        7.639 
 85                         Nigde P.      2160.000        7.639 
 46                    Dokuzeylul U.      2162.000        7.632 
152                             METU      2166.000        7.618 
 16                             ADRC      2170.000        7.604 
 68                       Justice M.      2170.000        7.604 
124                   Bandirma Dist.      2170.000        7.604 
 38                     Bursa St. H.      2174.000        7.590 
 37                        Bursa SSK      2174.000        7.590 
 39                      Bursa YI H.      2174.000        7.590 
 69                     Kirsehir Mu.      2174.000        7.590 
120                       Uludag Un.      2174.000        7.590 
 70                      Kirsehir P.      2174.000        7.590 
 67                   Izmir Province      2176.000        7.583 
 51                        Eregli SH      2177.000        7.579 
 19                              ASH      2177.000        7.579 
105                             TOKI      2180.000        7.569 
166                           ZONCMC      2194.000        7.521 
143                     Istanbul Mu.      2211.000        7.463 
 47                        Duzce Mu.      2211.000        7.463 
117                    T.National A.      2212.000        7.459 
 26                        Ankara NH      2213.000        7.456 
 65                     Istanbul Un.      2213.000        7.456 
 59                             IEIS      2217.000        7.442 
145                          IZAYDAS      2217.000        7.442 
 17                           ARA M.      2230.000        7.399 
158                            SSCPD      2231.000        7.396 
116                              THF      2236.000        7.379 
 55                       Giresun P.      2236.000        7.379 
 81                    Narlidere Mu.      2236.000        7.379 
 76                        Manisa P.      2236.000        7.379 
 92                              SHF      2236.000        7.379 
 31                             AYEA      2236.000        7.379 
 30                              ACA      2237.000        7.376 
 84        National Security Council      2237.000        7.376 
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 58                             HRDF      2242.000        7.360 
 62                              ICC      2243.000        7.356 
142                        Izmir Mu.      2246.000        7.346 
 57                              HEA      2264.000        7.288 
108                          TRT CYA      2269.000        7.272 
 97                            TAECA      2272.000        7.262 
 25                             AIEA      2279.000        7.240 
119                            TUROB      2286.000        7.218 
161                            TUROB      2286.000        7.218 
123                    Balikesir Un.      2288.000        7.212 
 40                        Dinar Mu.      2294.000        7.193 
 64                  Istanbul T. Un.      2314.000        7.131 
137                      Golcuk S.H.      2316.000        7.124 
129                       D.Highways      2330.000        7.082 
 95                       Central M.SS      2334.000        7.069 
160                         Treasury      2334.000        7.069 
 63                              IDH      2365.000        6.977 
 86 Office of Agricultural Produces       2384.000        6.921 
102                            T?GEM      2384.000        6.921 
 18                              ALC      2384.000        6.921 
121                    Yildiz T. Un.      2418.000        6.824 
163                     D.S.Railways      2423.000        6.810 
162                              TEC      2426.000        6.801 
141                              HRA      2426.000        6.801 
115                              TDA      2426.000        6.801 
101                    D.Mining T.R.      2468.000        6.686 
144                            IGSAS      2468.000        6.686 
109                           TUPRAS      2468.000        6.686 
157                     Sakarya S.H.     27225.000        0.606 
 91                        Samsun P.     27225.000        0.606 
 96                      Central M. SU     27225.000        0.606 
128                      D.B.Land R.     27225.000        0.606 
125                         Bolu Mu.     27225.000        0.606 
 35                              BCA     27225.000        0.606 
147                             ISBA                            
132                             DISK                            
153                           PETKIM                            
151                               MF                            
 
Statistics 
                         1            2 
                   Farness   nCloseness 
              ------------ ------------ 
  1     Mean      3098.321        7.359 
  2  Std Dev      4732.671        1.366 
  3      Sum    501928.000     1192.078 
  4 Variance  22398176.000        1.865 
  5      SSQ 5183638528.000     9074.090 
  6    MCSSQ 3628504576.000      302.179 
  7 Euc Norm     71997.492       95.258 
  8  Minimum      1982.000        0.606 
  9  Maximum     27225.000        8.325 
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Table E- 3 Betweenness Centrality Measures 
                                                1            2 
                                       Betweenness nBetweenness 
                                      ------------ ------------ 
  1                            PMCMC      2552.156        9.431 
 13                            KOCMC      1922.243        7.104 
  7                          Kizilay       804.001        2.971 
  5                         Military       762.387        2.817 
  9                            BOCMC       762.234        2.817 
 14                            YACMC       730.218        2.699 
 11                            SACMC       610.451        2.256 
 50                   Environment M.       447.167        1.653 
  2                             PWSM       317.500        1.173 
  3                      Interior M.       285.000        1.053 
 12                            ISCMC       260.467        0.963 
 75                   L. Social S M.       206.533        0.763 
 83            National Education M.       196.867        0.728 
 71                             KOCI       190.917        0.706 
106                       Tourism M.       179.000        0.661 
 89         Public Education Centers       170.867        0.631 
 78                Ministers Cabinet       146.333        0.541 
  4                         Health M       115.000        0.425 
 15                             AIBU       112.000        0.414 
 73                      Kocaeli Un.        89.000        0.329 
 62                              ICC        87.000        0.322 
105                             TOKI        60.000        0.222 
 57                              HEA        60.000        0.222 
  6                             SSCP        59.000        0.218 
 54                   F.Rural Af. M.        59.000        0.218 
104                             TOBB        57.000        0.211 
 42                   D.Disaster Af.        18.708        0.069 
 10                            BUCMC         9.250        0.034 
 21                             AKUT         8.933        0.033 
 93                              SSK         6.667        0.025 
 97                            TAECA         6.000        0.022 
 46                    Dokuzeylul U.         4.000        0.015 
 82              National Defense M.         3.601        0.013 
 64                  Istanbul T. Un.         3.000        0.011 
 17                           ARA M.         3.000        0.011 
117                    T.National A.         0.500        0.002 
 18                              ALC         0.000        0.000 
 19                              ASH         0.000        0.000 
 25                             AIEA         0.000        0.000 
  8                     Regional CMC         0.000        0.000 
 29                       Antalya P.         0.000        0.000 
 20                       Aksaray P.         0.000        0.000 
 31                             AYEA         0.000        0.000 
 39                      Bursa YI H.         0.000        0.000 
 38                     Bursa St. H.         0.000        0.000 
 26                        Ankara NH         0.000        0.000 
 45                    Diyarbakir P.         0.000        0.000 
 28                            AESOB         0.000        0.000 
 49           E.Natural Resources M.         0.000        0.000 
 40                        Dinar Mu.         0.000        0.000 
 51                        Eregli SH         0.000        0.000 
 27                            ANCMC         0.000        0.000 
 33                          BSNI H.         0.000        0.000 
 24                     Ankara GCMu.         0.000        0.000 
 35                              BCA         0.000        0.000 
 36                            BOTAS         0.000        0.000 
 47                        Duzce Mu.         0.000        0.000 
 58                             HRDF         0.000        0.000 
 59                             IEIS         0.000        0.000 
 60                    I.Commerce M.         0.000        0.000 
 61                          ISDEMIR         0.000        0.000 
 16                             ADRC         0.000        0.000 
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 53                     Eskisehir P.         0.000        0.000 
 44                      D.Rural Af.         0.000        0.000 
 65                     Istanbul Un.         0.000        0.000 
 66                             ISKI         0.000        0.000 
 67                   Izmir Province         0.000        0.000 
 68                       Justice M.         0.000        0.000 
 69                     Kirsehir Mu.         0.000        0.000 
 70                      Kirsehir P.         0.000        0.000 
 30                              ACA         0.000        0.000 
 72                      Kocaeli Mu.         0.000        0.000 
 32                 Bahcelievler Mu.         0.000        0.000 
 74                        KorfezCMC         0.000        0.000 
 55                       Giresun P.         0.000        0.000 
 76                        Manisa P.         0.000        0.000 
 77                         ME Union         0.000        0.000 
 37                        Bursa SSK         0.000        0.000 
 79                             MLSA         0.000        0.000 
 80                          Mugla P         0.000        0.000 
 81                    Narlidere Mu.         0.000        0.000 
 41                     D.Civil Def.         0.000        0.000 
 43                    D.Public Sec.         0.000        0.000 
 84        National Security Council         0.000        0.000 
 85                         Nigde P.         0.000        0.000 
 86 Office of Agricultural Produces          0.000        0.000 
 87                President Demirel         0.000        0.000 
 88                         Prime M.         0.000        0.000 
 48                        Edirne P.         0.000        0.000 
 90                   Religious A.A.         0.000        0.000 
 91                        Samsun P.         0.000        0.000 
 92                              SHF         0.000        0.000 
 52                     Esenyurt Mu.         0.000        0.000 
 94                      Central M. HG         0.000        0.000 
 95                       Central M.SS         0.000        0.000 
 96                      Central M. SU         0.000        0.000 
 56                              GPO         0.000        0.000 
 98                             TEAS         0.000        0.000 
 99                            TEDAS         0.000        0.000 
100                            TEKEL         0.000        0.000 
101                    D.Mining T.R.         0.000        0.000 
102                            T?GEM         0.000        0.000 
103                              TKI         0.000        0.000 
 63                              IDH         0.000        0.000 
 22                              ACC         0.000        0.000 
 23                           AFAFAC         0.000        0.000 
107                             TPAO         0.000        0.000 
108                          TRT CYA         0.000        0.000 
109                           TUPRAS         0.000        0.000 
110                              TBF         0.000        0.000 
111                              TDA         0.000        0.000 
112                        THW Union         0.000        0.000 
113                  Turkey Sea Aut.         0.000        0.000 
114                             TRAC         0.000        0.000 
115                              TDA         0.000        0.000 
116                              THF         0.000        0.000 
 34                        Bartin P.         0.000        0.000 
118            Turkish Petrolum A.S.         0.000        0.000 
119                            TUROB         0.000        0.000 
120                       Uludag Un.         0.000        0.000 
121                    Yildiz T. Un.         0.000        0.000 
122                  Zeytinburnu Mu.         0.000        0.000 
123                    Balikesir Un.         0.000        0.000 
124                   Bandirma Dist.         0.000        0.000 
125                         Bolu Mu.         0.000        0.000 
126                    Bakirkoy S.H.         0.000        0.000 
127                       CilimliCMC         0.000        0.000 
128                      D.B.Land R.         0.000        0.000 
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129                       D.Highways         0.000        0.000 
130                           DEGCMC         0.000        0.000 
131                           DUZCMC         0.000        0.000 
132                             DISK         0.000        0.000 
133                         GebzeCMC         0.000        0.000 
134                           GOLCMC         0.000        0.000 
135                     Golcuk Muni.         0.000        0.000 
136                      Golyaka CMC         0.000        0.000 
137                      Golcuk S.H.         0.000        0.000 
138            Gebze H. T. Institute         0.000        0.000 
139                  Foreign Aff. M.         0.000        0.000 
140                       Finance M.         0.000        0.000 
141                              HRA         0.000        0.000 
142                        Izmir Mu.         0.000        0.000 
143                     Istanbul Mu.         0.000        0.000 
144                            IGSAS         0.000        0.000 
145                          IZAYDAS         0.000        0.000 
146                       Izmit S.H.         0.000        0.000 
147                             ISBA         0.000        0.000 
148                    KaramurselCMC         0.000        0.000 
149                       KandiraCMC         0.000        0.000 
150                   Kocaeli SSK H.         0.000        0.000 
151                               MF         0.000        0.000 
152                             METU         0.000        0.000 
153                           PETKIM         0.000        0.000 
154                    Avcilar Dist.         0.000        0.000 
155                     Sakarya Uni.         0.000        0.000 
156                     Provinces B.         0.000        0.000 
157                     Sakarya S.H.         0.000        0.000 
158                            SSCPD         0.000        0.000 
159                    Central M. RKY 
         0.000        0.000 
160                         Treasury         0.000        0.000 
161                            TUROB         0.000        0.000 
162                              TEC         0.000        0.000 
163                     D.S.Railways         0.000        0.000 
164                    Yalova SSK HC         0.000        0.000 
165                               ZB         0.000        0.000 
166                           ZONCMC         0.000        0.000 
 
 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR EACH MEASURE 
 
                         1            2 
               Betweenness nBetweenness 
              ------------ ------------ 
  1     Mean        68.108        0.252 
  2  Std Dev       278.363        1.029 
  3      Sum     11306.000       41.781 
  4 Variance     77485.914        1.058 
  5      SSQ  13632696.000      186.177 
  6    MCSSQ  12862662.000      175.661 
  7 Euc Norm      3692.248       13.645 
  8  Minimum         0.000        0.000 
  9  Maximum      2552.156        9.431 
 
Network Centralization Index = 9.24% 
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Table E- 4 Flow Betweenness Centrality Measures 
                                                1            2 
                                           FlowBet     nFlowBet 
                                      ------------ ------------ 
  1                            PMCMC      4303.363       15.903 
  2                             PWSM       138.376        0.511 
  3                      Interior M.       663.691        2.453 
  4                         Health M       121.500        0.449 
  5                         Military       507.704        1.876 
  6                             SSCP        58.000        0.214 
  7                          Kizilay       660.041        2.439 
  8                     Regional CMC         0.000        0.000 
  9                            BOCMC      1192.773        4.408 
 10                            BUCMC       229.450        0.848 
 11                            SACMC       301.230        1.113 
 12                            ISCMC       177.000        0.654 
 13                            KOCMC      1440.825        5.325 
 14                            YACMC      1275.794        4.715 
 15                             AIBU       116.000        0.429 
 16                             ADRC         0.000        0.000 
 17                           ARA M.         0.000        0.000 
 18                              ALC         0.000        0.000 
 19                              ASH         0.000        0.000 
 20                       Aksaray P.         0.000        0.000 
 21                             AKUT         1.667        0.006 
 22                              ACC         0.000        0.000 
 23                           AFAFAC         0.000        0.000 
 24                     Ankara GCMu.         0.750        0.003 
 25                             AIEA         0.000        0.000 
 26                        Ankara NH         0.000        0.000 
 27                            ANCMC         0.000        0.000 
 28                            AESOB         0.000        0.000 
 29                       Antalya P.         0.000        0.000 
 30                              ACA         0.000        0.000 
 31                             AYEA         0.000        0.000 
 32                 Bahcelievler Mu.         0.000        0.000 
 33                          BSNI H.         0.000        0.000 
 34                        Bartin P.         0.000        0.000 
 35                              BCA         0.000        0.000 
 36                            BOTAS         0.000        0.000 
 37                        Bursa SSK         0.000        0.000 
 38                     Bursa St. H.         0.000        0.000 
 39                      Bursa YI H.         0.000        0.000 
 40                        Dinar Mu.         0.000        0.000 
 41                     D.Civil Def.         0.377        0.001 
 42                   D.Disaster Af.         6.250        0.023 
 43                    D.Public Sec.         0.000        0.000 
 44                      D.Rural Af.         0.000        0.000 
 45                    Diyarbakir P.         0.000        0.000 
 46                    Dokuzeylul U.         5.500        0.020 
 47                        Duzce Mu.         0.000        0.000 
 48                        Edirne P.         0.000        0.000 
 49           E.Natural Resources M.         0.000        0.000 
 50                   Environment M.       517.727        1.913 
 51                        Eregli SH         0.000        0.000 
 52                     Esenyurt Mu.         0.000        0.000 
 53                     Eskisehir P.         0.402        0.001 
 54                   F.Rural Af. M.        58.000        0.214 
 55                       Giresun P.         0.000        0.000 
 56                              GPO         0.000        0.000 
 57                              HEA        58.000        0.214 
 58                             HRDF         0.000        0.000 
 59                             IEIS         0.000        0.000 
 60                    I.Commerce M.         0.000        0.000 
 61                          ISDEMIR         0.000        0.000 
 62                              ICC       294.936        1.090 
 247 
                                                1            2 
                                           FlowBet     nFlowBet 
 63                              IDH         0.000        0.000 
 64                  Istanbul T. Un.         0.000        0.000 
 65                     Istanbul Un.         0.000        0.000 
 66                             ISKI         0.000        0.000 
 67                   Izmir Province         0.000        0.000 
 68                       Justice M.         0.000        0.000 
 69                     Kirsehir Mu.         0.000        0.000 
 70                      Kirsehir P.         0.000        0.000 
 71                             KOCI       377.136        1.394 
 72                      Kocaeli Mu.         0.000        0.000 
 73                      Kocaeli Un.        89.000        0.329 
 74                        KorfezCMC         0.000        0.000 
 75                   L. Social S M.       177.067        0.654 
 76                        Manisa P.         0.000        0.000 
 77                         ME Union         0.000        0.000 
 78                Ministers Cabinet       121.500        0.449 
 79                             MLSA         0.000        0.000 
 80                          Mugla P         0.000        0.000 
 81                    Narlidere Mu.         0.000        0.000 
 82              National Defense M.       178.519        0.660 
 83            National Education M.        75.730        0.280 
 84        National Security Council         0.000        0.000 
 85                         Nigde P.         0.000        0.000 
 86 Office of Agricultural Produces          0.000        0.000 
 87                President Demirel         0.000        0.000 
 88                         Prime M.         0.000        0.000 
 89         Public Education Centers       101.330        0.374 
 90                   Religious A.A.         0.000        0.000 
 91                        Samsun P.         0.000        0.000 
 92                              SHF         0.000        0.000 
 93                              SSK         1.667        0.006 
 94                      Central M. HG         0.000        0.000 
 95                       Central M.SS         0.000        0.000 
 96                      Central M. SU         0.000        0.000 
 97                            TAECA         2.000        0.007 
 98                             TEAS         0.000        0.000 
 99                            TEDAS         0.000        0.000 
100                            TEKEL         0.000        0.000 
101                    D.Mining T.R.         0.000        0.000 
102                            T?GEM         0.000        0.000 
103                              TKI         0.000        0.000 
104                             TOBB       263.936        0.975 
105                             TOKI        58.000        0.214 
106                       Tourism M.       179.000        0.661 
107                             TPAO         0.000        0.000 
108                          TRT CYA         0.000        0.000 
109                           TUPRAS         0.000        0.000 
110                              TBF         0.000        0.000 
111                              TDA         0.000        0.000 
112                        THW Union         0.000        0.000 
113                  Turkey Sea Aut.         0.000        0.000 
114                             TRAC         0.000        0.000 
115                              TDA         0.000        0.000 
116                              THF         0.000        0.000 
117                    T.National A.         0.000        0.000 
118            Turkish Petrolum A.S.         0.000        0.000 
119                            TUROB         0.000        0.000 
120                       Uludag Un.         0.000        0.000 
121                    Yildiz T. Un.         0.000        0.000 
122                  Zeytinburnu Mu.         0.000        0.000 
123                    Balikesir Un.         0.000        0.000 
124                   Bandirma Dist.         0.000        0.000 
125                         Bolu Mu.         0.000        0.000 
126                    Bakirkoy S.H.         0.000        0.000 
127                       CilimliCMC         0.000        0.000 
128                      D.B.Land R.         0.000        0.000 
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129                       D.Highways         0.000        0.000 
130                           DEGCMC         0.000        0.000 
131                           DUZCMC         0.000        0.000 
132                             DISK         0.000        0.000 
133                         GebzeCMC         0.000        0.000 
134                           GOLCMC         0.000        0.000 
135                     Golcuk Muni.         0.000        0.000 
136                      Golyaka CMC         0.000        0.000 
137                      Golcuk S.H.         0.000        0.000 
138            Gebze H. T. Institute         0.000        0.000 
139                  Foreign Aff. M.         0.000        0.000 
140                       Finance M.         0.000        0.000 
141                              HRA         0.000        0.000 
142                        Izmir Mu.         0.000        0.000 
143                     Istanbul Mu.         0.000        0.000 
144                            IGSAS         0.000        0.000 
145                          IZAYDAS         0.000        0.000 
146                       Izmit S.H.         0.000        0.000 
147                             ISBA         0.000        0.000 
148                    KaramurselCMC         0.000        0.000 
149                       KandiraCMC         0.000        0.000 
150                   Kocaeli SSK H.         0.000        0.000 
151                               MF         0.000        0.000 
152                             METU         0.000        0.000 
153                           PETKIM         0.000        0.000 
154                    Avcilar Dist.         0.000        0.000 
155                     Sakarya Uni.         0.000        0.000 
156                     Provinces B.         0.000        0.000 
157                     Sakarya S.H.         0.000        0.000 
158                            SSCPD         0.000        0.000 
159                    Central M. RKY 
         0.000        0.000 
160                         Treasury         0.000        0.000 
161                            TUROB         0.000        0.000 
162                              TEC         0.000        0.000 
163                     D.S.Railways         0.000        0.000 
164                    Yalova SSK HC         0.000        0.000 
165                               ZB         0.000        0.000 
166                           ZONCMC         0.000        0.000 
 
 
Network Centralization Index = 15.691% 
 
 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR EACH MEASURE 
 
                         1            2 
                   FlowBet     nFlowBet 
              ------------ ------------ 
  1     Mean        82.857        0.306 
  2  Std Dev       384.770        1.422 
  3      Sum     13754.238       50.829 
  4 Variance    148048.328        2.022 
  5      SSQ  25715656.000      351.190 
  6    MCSSQ  24576022.000      335.626 
  7 Euc Norm      5071.061       18.740 
  8  Minimum         0.000        0.000 
  9  Maximum      4303.363       15.903 
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Table E- 5 Cliques for the Marmara response system 
   1:  PMCMC Kizilay SACMC KOCMC 
   2:  PMCMC PWSM SACMC KOCMC 
   3:  PMCMC SACMC KOCMC BOTAS 
   4:  PMCMC SACMC KOCMC SSK 
   5:  Health M SACMC KOCMC 
   6:  Interior M. SACMC KOCMC Eskisehir P. 
   7:  SACMC KOCMC Aksaray P. 
   8:  SACMC KOCMC ACC 
   9:  SACMC KOCMC Ankara GCMu. ANCMC 
  10:  SACMC KOCMC Bartin P. 
  11:  SACMC KOCMC Edirne P. 
  12:  SACMC KOCMC E.Natural Resources M. 
  13:  SACMC KOCMC Eskisehir P. National Education M. 
  14:  SACMC KOCMC ISKI 
  15:  SACMC KOCMC Religious A.A. 
  16:  SACMC KOCMC Central M. HG 
  17:  SACMC KOCMC TEAS 
  18:  SACMC KOCMC TEDAS 
  19:  SACMC KOCMC TKI 
  20:  SACMC KOCMC TPAO 
  21:  SACMC KOCMC TBF 
  22:  Kizilay SACMC KOCMC TRAC 
  23:  Interior M. Military KOCMC D.Civil Def. 
  24:  PMCMC Military Kizilay KOCMC 
  25:  PWSM KOCMC D.Disaster Af. 
  26:  PMCMC KOCMC Environment M. 
  27:  PMCMC KOCMC Ministers Cabinet 
  28:  PMCMC Kizilay Regional CMC 
  29:  PMCMC Regional CMC F.Rural Af. M. 
  30:  PMCMC Regional CMC National Defense M. 
  31:  PMCMC PWSM BOCMC SACMC 
  32:  PMCMC Kizilay BOCMC SACMC 
  33:  PMCMC BOCMC SACMC BOTAS 
  34:  Interior M. BOCMC SACMC Eskisehir P. 
  35:  Health M BOCMC SACMC 
  36:  BOCMC SACMC AIBU 
  37:  BOCMC SACMC ACC 
  38:  BOCMC SACMC Ankara GCMu. ANCMC 
  39:  BOCMC SACMC Bartin P. 
  40:  BOCMC SACMC E.Natural Resources M. 
  41:  BOCMC SACMC Eskisehir P. National Education M. 
  42:  BOCMC SACMC ISKI 
  43:  BOCMC SACMC Religious A.A. 
  44:  BOCMC SACMC TEAS 
  45:  BOCMC SACMC TEDAS 
  46:  BOCMC SACMC TKI 
  47:  BOCMC SACMC TPAO 
  48:  BOCMC SACMC TBF 
  49:  Kizilay BOCMC DUZCMC 
  50:  Interior M. BOCMC Golcuk Muni. 
  51:  BOCMC TBF KaramurselCMC 
  52:  Interior M. BUCMC YACMC 
  53:  BUCMC YACMC National Education M. 
  54:  BUCMC YACMC Central M. HG 
  55:  Interior M. BUCMC GOLCMC 
  56:  ISCMC TBF GebzeCMC 
  57:  ISCMC TBF GOLCMC 
  58:  ISCMC TBF KaramurselCMC 
  59:  Interior M. ISCMC GOLCMC 
  60:  Interior M. ISCMC Golcuk Muni. 
  61:  ISCMC E.Natural Resources M. GOLCMC 
  62:  Kizilay ISCMC TRAC 
  63:  PMCMC Military Kizilay YACMC 
  64:  PMCMC PWSM YACMC 
  65:  PMCMC YACMC BOTAS 
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  66:  PMCMC YACMC SSK 
  67:  Interior M. Military YACMC 
  68:  PWSM YACMC Esenyurt Mu. 
  69:  Dokuzeylul U. Izmir Province DEGCMC 
  70:  Military GPO DUZCMC 
  71:  Environment M. KOCI IZAYDAS 
  72:  PMCMC Military L. Social S M. 
  73:  PMCMC L. Social S M. SSK 
  74:  PMCMC Military National Defense M. 
  75:  PMCMC National Defense M. Golyaka CMC 
  76:  PMCMC Military Prime M. 
  77:  PMCMC Military Public Education Centers 
  78:  Military Kizilay DUZCMC 
  79:  Interior M. Military D.Civil Def. GOLCMC 
  80:  PMCMC Kizilay Golyaka CMC 
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APPENDIX F 
CENTRALITY MEASUREMENTS FOR THE DUZCE RESPONSE OPERATIONS 
Table F-1 Freeman’s Degree Centrality Measures 
                                      1            2            3            4 
                               OutDegree     InDegree    NrmOutDeg     NrmInDeg 
                            ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ 
 33            Health M.          13.000        0.000        2.006        0.000 
 16               Military        10.000        7.000        1.543        1.080 
 54                Kizilay         9.000        1.000        1.389        0.154 
  1                  PMCMC         6.000        2.000        0.926        0.309 
 24                    MTS         6.000        0.000        0.926        0.000 
 25             D.P.Safety         6.000        0.000        0.926        0.000 
 60         Prime Ministry         5.000        1.000        0.772        0.154 
 38            Istanbul P.         5.000        2.000        0.772        0.309 
 37      Istanbul G.C. Mu.         4.000        1.000        0.617        0.154 
 53             Kayseri P.         4.000        0.000        0.617        0.000 
 49               Izmir P.         4.000        0.000        0.617        0.000 
 21               Corum P.         3.000        0.000        0.463        0.000 
 18         Balikesir S.R.         3.000        0.000        0.463        0.000 
 30         Etibank Mining         3.000        0.000        0.463        0.000 
 47       Izmir Heath D.P.         3.000        1.000        0.463        0.154 
 13   Balikesir Civil D.D.         3.000        0.000        0.463        0.000 
 31             Finance M.         2.000        0.000        0.309        0.000 
 55                  KOERI         2.000        0.000        0.309        0.000 
 19             Cankiri P.         2.000        0.000        0.309        0.000 
 17                    BOP         2.000        0.000        0.309        0.000 
  8         Ankara G.C. Mu         2.000        0.000        0.309        0.000 
  9              Ankara P.         2.000        0.000        0.309        0.000 
 23            D. Highways         2.000        1.000        0.309        0.154 
 32                   GMWU         2.000        0.000        0.309        0.000 
 65                   SUBA         2.000        0.000        0.309        0.000 
  2               Bolu CMC         2.000       19.000        0.309        2.932 
 14           Balikesir HD         2.000        0.000        0.309        0.000 
 67                  TAECA         2.000        1.000        0.309        0.154 
 62             Sakarya P.         2.000        0.000        0.309        0.000 
 70      Transportation M.         2.000        0.000        0.309        0.000 
 64         Central Ministry         2.000        0.000        0.309        0.000 
 50             Karabuk P.         2.000        0.000        0.309        0.000 
  7      Ankara Civil D.D.         2.000        0.000        0.309        0.000 
 22            D. Civil D.         2.000        0.000        0.309        0.000 
 76           Zonguldak P.         2.000        0.000        0.309        0.000 
 75                TELECOM         2.000        0.000        0.309        0.000 
 15              Bartin P.         1.000        0.000        0.154        0.000 
 29             Erzurum P.         1.000        0.000        0.154        0.000 
 58      President Demirel         1.000        1.000        0.154        0.154 
  5              Afyon Mu.         1.000        0.000        0.154        0.000 
 34                Icel P.         1.000        0.000        0.154        0.000 
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                                      1            2            3            4 
                               OutDegree     InDegree    NrmOutDeg     NrmInDeg 
 41          Istanbul H.D.         1.000        1.000        0.154        0.154 
 57          Labor S.S. M.         1.000        1.000        0.154        0.154 
 66                    SOC         1.000        0.000        0.154        0.000 
 39    Istanbul Civil D.D.         1.000        1.000        0.154        0.154 
 46         Izmir G.C. Mu.         1.000        1.000        0.154        0.154 
 20             Civil C.C.         1.000        0.000        0.154        0.000 
 42            Maltepe Mu.         1.000        0.000        0.154        0.000 
 36                   IGEC         1.000        0.000        0.154        0.000 
 44           Bagcilar Mu.         1.000        0.000        0.154        0.000 
 45             Kartal Mu.         1.000        0.000        0.154        0.000 
 52                   KNED         1.000        0.000        0.154        0.000 
 59                   PWSM         1.000        3.000        0.154        0.463 
 27            Edirne P.D.         1.000        0.000        0.154        0.000 
 28            Erzincan P.         1.000        0.000        0.154        0.000 
 56               Konya P.         1.000        0.000        0.154        0.000 
 51         Kayseri GC Mu.         1.000        0.000        0.154        0.000 
 71                TUBITAK         1.000        0.000        0.154        0.000 
 11             Ardagan P.         1.000        0.000        0.154        0.000 
  6                   AKUT         1.000        0.000        0.154        0.000 
 61                    RPP         1.000        0.000        0.154        0.000 
 35            Interior M.         1.000        0.000        0.154        0.000 
 43           Bakirkoy Mu.         1.000        0.000        0.154        0.000 
 10             Antalya P.         1.000        0.000        0.154        0.000 
 68            Tekirdag P.         1.000        0.000        0.154        0.000 
 72                    TRF         1.000        0.000        0.154        0.000 
 40           Istanbul P.D         1.000        3.000        0.154        0.463 
 74                    TNA         1.000        1.000        0.154        0.154 
 69         Trabzon GC.Mu.         1.000        0.000        0.154        0.000 
 63              Samsun P.         1.000        0.000        0.154        0.000 
 48                    IPC         1.000        0.000        0.154        0.000 
 73                    TCA         1.000        2.000        0.154        0.309 
 26        D.Religious Af.         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.154 
  4           Kaynasli CMC         0.000        9.000        0.000        1.389 
 12           Balikesir P.         0.000        3.000        0.000        0.463 
  3              Duzce CMC         0.000       59.000        0.000        9.105 
 77          Zonguldak Mun         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.154 
 78          Ankara P. HD.         0.000        2.000        0.000        0.309 
 79             Ankara Un.         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.154 
 80             Aydin H.D.         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.154 
 81          Balikesir Mu.         0.000        3.000        0.000        0.463 
 82            Bartin H.D.         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.154 
 83              Bolu P.D.         0.000        2.000        0.000        0.309 
 84          Bosphorus Un.         0.000        2.000        0.000        0.309 
 85            Bolu R. Af.         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.154 
 86           Cankiri H.D          0.000        1.000        0.000        0.154 
 87             Corum H.D.         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.154 
 88            Duzce R. Af         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.154 
 89 Diyarbakir Civil D. D.         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.154 
 90                  DSHW.         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.154 
 91             Duzce S.H.         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.154 
 92         Eskisehir H.D.         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.154 
 93         Golyaka R. Af.         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.154 
 94         Gulhane M.M.S.         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.154 
 95               Icel ED.         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.154 
 96             Justice M.         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.154 
 97 Istanbul T. University         0.000        3.000        0.000        0.463 
 98             Izmir P.D.         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.154 
 99                Kizilay         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.154 
100             Konya H.D.         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.154 
101          Kutahya H.D,          0.000        1.000        0.000        0.154 
102           Karabuk H.D.         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.154 
103     Kayseri Civil D.D.         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.154 
104           Kayseri P.D.         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.154 
105      Kaynasli Rel. Af.         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.154 
106            Manisa H.D.         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.154 
107                    NSC         0.000        2.000        0.000        0.309 
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                                      1            2            3            4 
                               OutDegree     InDegree    NrmOutDeg     NrmInDeg 
108            Yalova P.D.         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.154 
109          Zonguldak HD.         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.154 
 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
                         1            2            3            4 
                 OutDegree     InDegree    NrmOutDeg     NrmInDeg 
              ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ 
  1     Mean         1.495        1.495        0.231        0.231 
  2  Std Dev         2.084        5.936        0.322        0.916 
  3      Sum       163.000      163.000       25.154       25.154 
  4 Variance         4.342       35.241        0.103        0.839 
  5      SSQ       717.000     4085.000       17.075       97.284 
  6    MCSSQ       473.248     3841.248       11.270       91.479 
  7 Euc Norm        26.777       63.914        4.132        9.863 
  8  Minimum         0.000        0.000        0.000        0.000 
  9  Maximum        13.000       59.000        2.006        9.105 
 
Network Centralization (Outdegree) = 1.792% 
Network Centralization (Indegree) = 8.956% 
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Table F- 2 Closeness Centrality Measures 
                                     1            2 
                                 Farness   nCloseness 
                            ------------ ------------ 
  3              Duzce CMC      1584.000        6.818 
 16               Military      1630.000        6.626 
 33            Health M.        1635.000        6.606 
 54                Kizilay      1636.000        6.601 
 38            Istanbul P.      1649.000        6.549 
 37      Istanbul G.C. Mu.      1650.000        6.545 
 60         Prime Ministry      1651.000        6.541 
  8         Ankara G.C. Mu      1655.000        6.526 
 22            D. Civil D.      1655.000        6.526 
 65                   SUBA      1655.000        6.526 
 70      Transportation M.      1655.000        6.526 
 75                TELECOM      1655.000        6.526 
 19             Cankiri P.      1657.000        6.518 
 59                   PWSM      1658.000        6.514 
  2               Bolu CMC      1659.000        6.510 
 40           Istanbul P.D      1662.000        6.498 
 41          Istanbul H.D.      1666.000        6.483 
 39    Istanbul Civil D.D.      1666.000        6.483 
 25             D.P.Safety      1671.000        6.463 
 14           Balikesir HD      1672.000        6.459 
 57          Labor S.S. M.      1672.000        6.459 
 73                    TCA      1672.000        6.459 
 49               Izmir P.      1672.000        6.459 
 47       Izmir Heath D.P.      1672.000        6.459 
 21               Corum P.      1673.000        6.455 
 18         Balikesir S.R.      1674.000        6.452 
 13   Balikesir Civil D.D.      1674.000        6.452 
 30         Etibank Mining      1674.000        6.452 
 53             Kayseri P.      1674.000        6.452 
 46         Izmir G.C. Mu.      1676.000        6.444 
 51         Kayseri GC Mu.      1678.000        6.436 
 29             Erzurum P.      1678.000        6.436 
 44           Bagcilar Mu.      1678.000        6.436 
 69         Trabzon GC.Mu.      1678.000        6.436 
 63              Samsun P.      1678.000        6.436 
 62             Sakarya P.      1678.000        6.436 
 10             Antalya P.      1678.000        6.436 
  5              Afyon Mu.      1678.000        6.436 
 52                   KNED      1678.000        6.436 
 28            Erzincan P.      1678.000        6.436 
 43           Bakirkoy Mu.      1678.000        6.436 
 42            Maltepe Mu.      1678.000        6.436 
 56               Konya P.      1678.000        6.436 
 45             Kartal Mu.      1678.000        6.436 
 72                    TRF      1678.000        6.436 
 35            Interior M.      1678.000        6.436 
 48                    IPC      1678.000        6.436 
 11             Ardagan P.      1678.000        6.436 
  1                  PMCMC      1689.000        6.394 
  4           Kaynasli CMC      1707.000        6.327 
  7      Ankara Civil D.D.      1722.000        6.272 
 94         Gulhane M.M.S.      1724.000        6.265 
 78          Ankara P. HD.      1725.000        6.261 
 74                    TNA      1726.000        6.257 
109          Zonguldak HD.      1729.000        6.246 
100             Konya H.D.      1729.000        6.246 
 82            Bartin H.D.      1729.000        6.246 
 91             Duzce S.H.      1729.000        6.246 
 92         Eskisehir H.D.      1729.000        6.246 
 86           Cankiri H.D       1729.000        6.246 
101          Kutahya H.D,       1729.000        6.246 
 23            D. Highways      1730.000        6.243 
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                                     1            2 
                                 Farness   nCloseness 
 32                   GMWU      1733.000        6.232 
 64         Central Ministry      1735.000        6.225 
 58      President Demirel      1740.000        6.207 
 66                    SOC      1743.000        6.196 
 31             Finance M.      1750.000        6.171 
 17                    BOP      1751.000        6.168 
 50             Karabuk P.      1751.000        6.168 
 61                    RPP      1753.000        6.161 
  6                   AKUT      1753.000        6.161 
 99                Kizilay      1753.000        6.161 
 15              Bartin P.      1753.000        6.161 
 83              Bolu P.D.      1763.000        6.126 
 76           Zonguldak P.      1764.000        6.122 
 81          Balikesir Mu.      1764.000        6.122 
 12           Balikesir P.      1764.000        6.122 
108            Yalova P.D.      1765.000        6.119 
 80             Aydin H.D.      1766.000        6.116 
 98             Izmir P.D.      1766.000        6.116 
106            Manisa H.D.      1766.000        6.116 
 87             Corum H.D.      1767.000        6.112 
103     Kayseri Civil D.D.      1768.000        6.109 
104           Kayseri P.D.      1768.000        6.109 
 90                  DSHW.      1783.000        6.057 
107                    NSC      1783.000        6.057 
 67                  TAECA      1799.000        6.003 
 68            Tekirdag P.      1801.000        5.997 
 89 Diyarbakir Civil D. D.      1816.000        5.947 
  9              Ankara P.      1817.000        5.944 
 96             Justice M.      1845.000        5.854 
102           Karabuk H.D.      1845.000        5.854 
 27            Edirne P.D.      1857.000        5.816 
 77          Zonguldak Mun      1858.000        5.813 
 20             Civil C.C.      1893.000        5.705 
 26        D.Religious Af.      1911.000        5.651 
 24                    MTS     10910.000        0.990 
 97 Istanbul T. University     10913.000        0.990 
 85            Bolu R. Af.     10917.000        0.989 
 88            Duzce R. Af     10917.000        0.989 
 79             Ankara Un.     10917.000        0.989 
 93         Golyaka R. Af.     10917.000        0.989 
105      Kaynasli Rel. Af.     10917.000        0.989 
 36                   IGEC     10920.000        0.989 
 71                TUBITAK     10920.000        0.989 
 84          Bosphorus Un.     11664.000        0.926 
 34                Icel P.     11664.000        0.926 
 95               Icel ED.     11664.000        0.926 
 55                  KOERI     11664.000        0.926 
 
 
Statistics 
 
                         1            2 
                   Farness   nCloseness 
              ------------ ------------ 
  1     Mean      2840.661        5.666 
  2  Std Dev      3059.317        1.740 
  3      Sum    309632.000      617.586 
  4 Variance   9359420.000        3.029 
  5      SSQ 1899736192.000     3829.345 
  6    MCSSQ 1020176768.000      330.149 
  7 Euc Norm     43585.965       61.882 
  8  Minimum      1584.000        0.926 
  9  Maximum     11664.000        6.818 
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Table F-3 Betweenness Centrality Measures 
                                      1            2 
                             Betweenness nBetweenness 
                            ------------ ------------ 
 16               Military       225.167        1.948 
  2               Bolu CMC       171.833        1.487 
  1                  PMCMC       157.167        1.360 
 37      Istanbul G.C. Mu.        88.833        0.769 
 38            Istanbul P.        82.000        0.710 
 60         Prime Ministry        33.000        0.286 
 23            D. Highways        18.000        0.156 
 54                Kizilay        15.000        0.130 
 74                    TNA         3.000        0.026 
 58      President Demirel         3.000        0.026 
 47       Izmir Heath D.P.         2.000        0.017 
 59                   PWSM         2.000        0.017 
 67                  TAECA         1.000        0.009 
 57          Labor S.S. M.         1.000        0.009 
 73                    TCA         1.000        0.009 
  9              Ankara P.         0.000        0.000 
 12           Balikesir P.         0.000        0.000 
 15              Bartin P.         0.000        0.000 
 18         Balikesir S.R.         0.000        0.000 
  7      Ankara Civil D.D.         0.000        0.000 
  8         Ankara G.C. Mu         0.000        0.000 
 22            D. Civil D.         0.000        0.000 
 17                    BOP         0.000        0.000 
 24                    MTS         0.000        0.000 
 25             D.P.Safety         0.000        0.000 
 26        D.Religious Af.         0.000        0.000 
 14           Balikesir HD         0.000        0.000 
 28            Erzincan P.         0.000        0.000 
 29             Erzurum P.         0.000        0.000 
 30         Etibank Mining         0.000        0.000 
 31             Finance M.         0.000        0.000 
 32                   GMWU         0.000        0.000 
 33            Health M.           0.000        0.000 
 21               Corum P.         0.000        0.000 
 35            Interior M.         0.000        0.000 
 36                   IGEC         0.000        0.000 
 10             Antalya P.         0.000        0.000 
 11             Ardagan P.         0.000        0.000 
 39    Istanbul Civil D.D.         0.000        0.000 
 40           Istanbul P.D         0.000        0.000 
 41          Istanbul H.D.         0.000        0.000 
 42            Maltepe Mu.         0.000        0.000 
 43           Bakirkoy Mu.         0.000        0.000 
 44           Bagcilar Mu.         0.000        0.000 
 45             Kartal Mu.         0.000        0.000 
 46         Izmir G.C. Mu.         0.000        0.000 
 34                Icel P.         0.000        0.000 
 48                    IPC         0.000        0.000 
 49               Izmir P.         0.000        0.000 
 50             Karabuk P.         0.000        0.000 
 51         Kayseri GC Mu.         0.000        0.000 
 52                   KNED         0.000        0.000 
 53             Kayseri P.         0.000        0.000 
 27            Edirne P.D.         0.000        0.000 
 55                  KOERI         0.000        0.000 
 56               Konya P.         0.000        0.000 
  3              Duzce CMC         0.000        0.000 
  4           Kaynasli CMC         0.000        0.000 
  5              Afyon Mu.         0.000        0.000 
  6                   AKUT         0.000        0.000 
 61                    RPP         0.000        0.000 
 62             Sakarya P.         0.000        0.000 
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                             Betweenness nBetweenness 
 63              Samsun P.         0.000        0.000 
 64         Central Ministry         0.000        0.000 
 65                   SUBA         0.000        0.000 
 66                    SOC         0.000        0.000 
 13   Balikesir Civil D.D.         0.000        0.000 
 68            Tekirdag P.         0.000        0.000 
 69         Trabzon GC.Mu.         0.000        0.000 
 70      Transportation M.         0.000        0.000 
 71                TUBITAK         0.000        0.000 
 72                    TRF         0.000        0.000 
 19             Cankiri P.         0.000        0.000 
 20             Civil C.C.         0.000        0.000 
 75                TELECOM         0.000        0.000 
 76           Zonguldak P.         0.000        0.000 
 77          Zonguldak Mun         0.000        0.000 
 78          Ankara P. HD.         0.000        0.000 
 79             Ankara Un.         0.000        0.000 
 80             Aydin H.D.         0.000        0.000 
 81          Balikesir Mu.         0.000        0.000 
 82            Bartin H.D.         0.000        0.000 
 83              Bolu P.D.         0.000        0.000 
 84          Bosphorus Un.         0.000        0.000 
 85            Bolu R. Af.         0.000        0.000 
 86           Cankiri H.D          0.000        0.000 
 87             Corum H.D.         0.000        0.000 
 88            Duzce R. Af         0.000        0.000 
 89 Diyarbakir Civil D. D.         0.000        0.000 
 90                  DSHW.         0.000        0.000 
 91             Duzce S.H.         0.000        0.000 
 92         Eskisehir H.D.         0.000        0.000 
 93         Golyaka R. Af.         0.000        0.000 
 94         Gulhane M.M.S.         0.000        0.000 
 95               Icel ED.         0.000        0.000 
 96             Justice M.         0.000        0.000 
 97 Istanbul T. University         0.000        0.000 
 98             Izmir P.D.         0.000        0.000 
 99                Kizilay         0.000        0.000 
100             Konya H.D.         0.000        0.000 
101          Kutahya H.D,          0.000        0.000 
102           Karabuk H.D.         0.000        0.000 
103     Kayseri Civil D.D.         0.000        0.000 
104           Kayseri P.D.         0.000        0.000 
105      Kaynasli Rel. Af.         0.000        0.000 
106            Manisa H.D.         0.000        0.000 
107                    NSC         0.000        0.000 
108            Yalova P.D.         0.000        0.000 
109          Zonguldak HD.         0.000        0.000 
 
 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR EACH MEASURE 
 
                         1            2 
               Betweenness nBetweenness 
              ------------ ------------ 
  1     Mean         7.376        0.064 
  2  Std Dev        32.521        0.281 
  3      Sum       804.000        6.957 
  4 Variance      1057.615        0.079 
  5      SSQ    121210.445        9.077 
  6    MCSSQ    115280.023        8.633 
  7 Euc Norm       348.153        3.013 
  8  Minimum         0.000        0.000 
  9  Maximum       225.167        1.948 
 
Network Centralization Index = 1.90% 
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Table F-4 Flow Betweenness Centrality 
                                    1            2 
                                 FlowBet     nFlowBet 
                            ------------ ------------ 
  1                  PMCMC       258.000        2.233 
  2               Bolu CMC       172.833        1.496 
  3              Duzce CMC         0.000        0.000 
  4           Kaynasli CMC         0.000        0.000 
  5              Afyon Mu.         0.000        0.000 
  6                   AKUT         0.000        0.000 
  7      Ankara Civil D.D.         0.000        0.000 
  8         Ankara G.C. Mu         0.000        0.000 
  9              Ankara P.         0.000        0.000 
 10             Antalya P.         0.000        0.000 
 11             Ardagan P.         0.000        0.000 
 12           Balikesir P.         0.000        0.000 
 13   Balikesir Civil D.D.         0.000        0.000 
 14           Balikesir HD         0.000        0.000 
 15              Bartin P.         0.000        0.000 
 16               Military       251.000        2.172 
 17                    BOP         0.000        0.000 
 18         Balikesir S.R.         0.000        0.000 
 19             Cankiri P.         0.000        0.000 
 20             Civil C.C.         0.000        0.000 
 21               Corum P.         0.000        0.000 
 22            D. Civil D.         0.000        0.000 
 23            D. Highways        13.000        0.112 
 24                    MTS         0.000        0.000 
 25             D.P.Safety         0.000        0.000 
 26        D.Religious Af.         0.000        0.000 
 27            Edirne P.D.         0.000        0.000 
 28            Erzincan P.         0.000        0.000 
 29             Erzurum P.         0.000        0.000 
 30         Etibank Mining         0.000        0.000 
 31             Finance M.         0.000        0.000 
 32                   GMWU         0.000        0.000 
 33            Health M.           0.000        0.000 
 34                Icel P.         0.000        0.000 
 35            Interior M.         0.000        0.000 
 36                   IGEC         0.000        0.000 
 37      Istanbul G.C. Mu.        66.667        0.577 
 38            Istanbul P.        56.000        0.485 
 39    Istanbul Civil D.D.         0.000        0.000 
 40           Istanbul P.D         0.000        0.000 
 41          Istanbul H.D.         0.000        0.000 
 42            Maltepe Mu.         0.000        0.000 
 43           Bakirkoy Mu.         0.000        0.000 
 44           Bagcilar Mu.         0.000        0.000 
 45             Kartal Mu.         0.000        0.000 
 46         Izmir G.C. Mu.         0.000        0.000 
 47       Izmir Heath D.P.         0.000        0.000 
 48                    IPC         0.000        0.000 
 49               Izmir P.         0.000        0.000 
 50             Karabuk P.         0.000        0.000 
 51         Kayseri GC Mu.         0.000        0.000 
 52                   KNED         0.000        0.000 
 53             Kayseri P.         0.000        0.000 
 54                Kizilay         0.000        0.000 
 55                  KOERI         0.000        0.000 
 56               Konya P.         0.000        0.000 
 57          Labor S.S. M.         0.000        0.000 
 58      President Demirel         0.000        0.000 
 59                   PWSM         0.000        0.000 
 60         Prime Ministry        26.000        0.225 
 61                    RPP         0.000        0.000 
 62             Sakarya P.         0.000        0.000 
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 63              Samsun P.         0.000        0.000 
 64         Central Ministry         0.000        0.000 
 65                   SUBA         0.000        0.000 
 66                    SOC         0.000        0.000 
 67                  TAECA         0.000        0.000 
 68            Tekirdag P.         0.000        0.000 
 69         Trabzon GC.Mu.         0.000        0.000 
 70      Transportation M.         0.000        0.000 
 71                TUBITAK         0.000        0.000 
 72                    TRF         0.000        0.000 
 73                    TCA         0.000        0.000 
 74                    TNA         0.000        0.000 
 75                TELECOM         0.000        0.000 
 76           Zonguldak P.         0.000        0.000 
 77          Zonguldak Mun         0.000        0.000 
 78          Ankara P. HD.         0.000        0.000 
 79             Ankara Un.         0.000        0.000 
 80             Aydin H.D.         0.000        0.000 
 81          Balikesir Mu.         0.000        0.000 
 82            Bartin H.D.         0.000        0.000 
 83              Bolu P.D.         0.000        0.000 
 84          Bosphorus Un.         0.000        0.000 
 85            Bolu R. Af.         0.000        0.000 
 86           Cankiri H.D          0.000        0.000 
 87             Corum H.D.         0.000        0.000 
 88            Duzce R. Af         0.000        0.000 
 89 Diyarbakir Civil D. D.         0.000        0.000 
 90                  DSHW.         0.000        0.000 
 91             Duzce S.H.         0.000        0.000 
 92         Eskisehir H.D.         0.000        0.000 
 93         Golyaka R. Af.         0.000        0.000 
 94         Gulhane M.M.S.         0.000        0.000 
 95               Icel ED.         0.000        0.000 
 96             Justice M.         0.000        0.000 
 97 Istanbul T. University         0.000        0.000 
 98             Izmir P.D.         0.000        0.000 
 99                Kizilay         0.000        0.000 
100             Konya H.D.         0.000        0.000 
101          Kutahya H.D,          0.000        0.000 
102           Karabuk H.D.         0.000        0.000 
103     Kayseri Civil D.D.         0.000        0.000 
104           Kayseri P.D.         0.000        0.000 
105      Kaynasli Rel. Af.         0.000        0.000 
106            Manisa H.D.         0.000        0.000 
107                    NSC         0.000        0.000 
108            Yalova P.D.         0.000        0.000 
109          Zonguldak HD.         0.000        0.000 
 
 
Network Centralization Index = 2.186% 
 
 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR EACH MEASURE 
 
                         1            2 
                   FlowBet     nFlowBet 
              ------------ ------------ 
  1     Mean         7.739        0.067 
  2  Std Dev        38.472        0.333 
  3      Sum       843.500        7.299 
  4 Variance      1480.132        0.111 
  5      SSQ    167861.797       12.570 
  6    MCSSQ    161334.359       12.081 
  7 Euc Norm       409.709        3.545 
  8  Minimum         0.000        0.000 
  9  Maximum       258.000        2.233 
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Table F- 5 Cliques for the Duzce response system 
   1:  Duzce CMC Istanbul G.C. Mu. Istanbul P. 
   2:  Duzce CMC Istanbul P. Istanbul Civil D.D. 
   3:  Duzce CMC Istanbul P. Istanbul P.D 
   4:  Duzce CMC Istanbul P. Istanbul H.D. 
   5:  Duzce CMC Military Cankiri P. 
   6:  Duzce CMC Military Kizilay 
   7:  Duzce CMC Military Prime Ministry 
   8:  Duzce CMC Corum P. TCA 
   9:  Duzce CMC D.P.Safety Istanbul P.D 
  10:  Duzce CMC Izmir G.C. Mu. Izmir P. 
  11:  Duzce CMC Izmir Heath D.P. Izmir P. 
  12:  Duzce CMC Kizilay PWSM 
  13:  PMCMC Bolu CMC Military 
  14:  PMCMC Bolu CMC Finance M. 
  15:  PMCMC Bolu CMC Istanbul G.C. Mu. 
  16:  Bolu CMC Istanbul G.C. Mu. Istanbul P. 
  17:  Bolu CMC Military Kizilay 
  18:  Kaynasli CMC Military Kizilay 
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APPENDIX G 
CENTRALITY MEASUREMENTS FOR THE PROJECT NETWORK 
Table G-1  Freeman’s Degree Centrality Measurements 
                                           1            2            3            4 
                                           OutDegree     InDegree    NrmOutDeg     NrmInDeg 
                                        ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ 
1.  76                               ESC        30.000        0.000        4.902        0.000 
2.   1                          BU-KOERI        29.000        9.000        4.739        1.471 
3.   5                       TUBITAK-MAM        29.000        8.000        4.739        1.307 
4.   2                               IBB        21.000        7.000        3.431        1.144 
5.  20                               PIU        21.000        0.000        3.431        0.000 
6.  12                              GDDA        17.000        2.000        2.778        0.327 
7.   6                         ITU-Cendm        15.000        0.000        2.451        0.000 
8.   3                               ITU        13.000       14.000        2.124        2.288 
9.  35                               GCM        13.000        3.000        2.124        0.490 
10.  19                              GDCD        11.000        2.000        1.797        0.327 
11.   9                               ERD        11.000        2.000        1.797        0.327 
12.   7                           TUBITAK         9.000        9.000        1.471        1.471 
13.  10                         Bu-Cendim         9.000        0.000        1.471        0.000 
14.  33                              TRAC         8.000        1.000        1.307        0.163 
15.  26                  Turkish Treasury         7.000        0.000        1.144        0.000 
16.  56                          Bolu Gov         6.000        0.000        0.980        0.000 
17.   8                               IPG         5.000        7.000        0.817        1.144 
18.  21                               SDC         5.000        1.000        0.817        0.163 
19.  41                      Kizilay-AFOM         5.000        0.000        0.817        0.000 
20.  14                               Ytu         4.000        4.000        0.654        0.654 
21. 138                             GDLRC         4.000        1.000        0.654        0.163 
22.  27                               KOU         3.000        3.000        0.490        0.490 
23.  51                Izmir Municipality         2.000        0.000        0.327        0.000 
24.  52                Bursa Municipality         2.000        0.000        0.327        0.000 
25.  34                        Duzce Mun.         1.000        1.000        0.163        0.163 
26.  38                      Sakarya Gov.         1.000        3.000        0.163        0.490 
27.  40                           Kizilay         1.000        4.000        0.163        0.654 
28.  28                               SAU         0.000        2.000        0.000        0.327 
29.  11                                BU         0.000        8.000        0.000        1.307 
30.  17           District Municipalities         0.000        2.000        0.000        0.327 
31.   4                              METU         0.000        9.000        0.000        1.471 
32.  32                              AKUT         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.163 
33.  24                              FEMA         0.000        3.000        0.000        0.490 
34.  25           Int. Ministry of Turkey         0.000        4.000        0.000        0.654 
35.  16                              JICA         0.000        4.000        0.000        0.654 
36.  36                               TFA         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.163 
37.  37                      Kocaeli Gov.         0.000        4.000        0.000        0.654 
38.  29                              NATO         0.000        3.000        0.000        0.490 
39.  30                        Firat Uni.         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.163 
40.  31                               MIT         0.000        4.000        0.000        0.654 
41.  22                      US Red Cross         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.163 
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42.  42                                UN         0.000        2.000        0.000        0.327 
43.  15                         Ist. Uni.         0.000        3.000        0.000        0.490 
44.  44                              SHOD         0.000        2.000        0.000        0.327 
45.  45                               DMI         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.163 
46.  46                               DSI         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.163 
47.  47                               MTA         0.000        4.000        0.000        0.654 
48.  39                       Yalova Gov.         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.163 
49.  49                      Avcilar Mun.         0.000        2.000        0.000        0.327 
50.  50               Yalova Municipality         0.000        2.000        0.000        0.327 
51.  13                             GDTEM         0.000        3.000        0.000        0.490 
52.  43                                WB         0.000        4.000        0.000        0.654 
53.  53                      Kocaeli Mun.         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.163 
54.  54                       Sakarya Mun         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.163 
55.  55                          Bolu Mun         0.000        2.000        0.000        0.327 
56.  18                      District CMC         0.000        3.000        0.000        0.490 
57.  48                               DPT         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.163 
58.  58                          Afyon CD         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.163 
59.  59                          Adana CD         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.163 
60.  60                          Bursa CD         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.163 
61.  23                         Bursa Gov         0.000        2.000        0.000        0.327 
62.  62                        Erzurum CD         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.163 
63.  63                       Istanbul CD         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.163 
64.  64                          Izmir CD         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.163 
65.  65                        Sakarya CD         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.163 
66.  66                         Samsun CD         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.163 
67.  67                            Van CD         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.163 
68.  68                               GMG         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.163 
69.  69                       French Team         0.000        2.000        0.000        0.327 
70.  70                             TNGGA         0.000        2.000        0.000        0.327 
71.  71                             EUREF         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.163 
72.  72                             TEDAS         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.163 
73.  73                      Turk Telecom         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.163 
74.  74           First Army Headquarters         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.163 
75.  75                               SAR         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.163 
76.  57                         Ankara CD         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.163 
77.  77                               SLF         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.163 
78.  78                          ETHZ-IGT         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.163 
79.  79                           EPFL-IS         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.163 
80.  80                           ETHZ-IG         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.163 
81.  81                               DRM         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.163 
82.  82                            TITech         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.163 
83.  83                              USGS         0.000        4.000        0.000        0.654 
84.  84                         USID-OFDA         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.163 
85.  85                               UNR         0.000        2.000        0.000        0.327 
86.  86                                UP         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.163 
87.  87                              IFRC         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.163 
88.  88                Studer Engineering         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.163 
89.  89                                VT         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.163 
90.  90                               PSU         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.163 
91.  91                             WRMDC         0.000        2.000        0.000        0.327 
92.  92                               CNR         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.163 
93.  93                              NSSP         0.000        2.000        0.000        0.327 
94.  94                         Kyoto Uni         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.163 
95.  95                            DUTech         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.163 
96.  96                              LDEO         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.163 
97.  97                         LEL&OC-UK         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.163 
98.  98                              JIPE         0.000        2.000        0.000        0.327 
99.  99                               FJG         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.163 
100. 100                      Sumitomo Co.         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.163 
101. 101                              SSTL         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.163 
102. 102                              IRRS         0.000        2.000        0.000        0.327 
103. 103                               ING         0.000        2.000        0.000        0.327 
104. 104                               GII         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.163 
105. 105                                GI         0.000        2.000        0.000        0.327 
106. 106                               GPG         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.163 
107. 107                        IG-Tiblisi         0.000        2.000        0.000        0.327 
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108. 108                         IG-Zurich         0.000        2.000        0.000        0.327 
109. 109                               IMG         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.163 
110. 110                               IRM         0.000        2.000        0.000        0.327 
111. 111                             IIEES         0.000        2.000        0.000        0.327 
112. 112                           IIEPTMG         0.000        2.000        0.000        0.327 
113. 113                            ISSMGE         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.163 
114. 114                              EAEE         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.163 
115. 115                               EIB         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.163 
116. 116                            GS&EEC         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.163 
117. 117                               ESA         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.163 
118. 118                                IS         0.000        2.000        0.000        0.327 
119. 119                               EUF         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.163 
120. 120                              EMGE         0.000        2.000        0.000        0.327 
121. 121                               ECC         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.163 
122. 122                               EIE         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.163 
123. 123                    Munich Regroup         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.163 
124. 124                               ERR         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.163 
125. 125                Negro of JRC-Ispra         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.163 
126. 126                     CorlissWillis         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.163 
127. 127                               CAR         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.163 
128. 128                              CHRR         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.163 
129. 129                              CSFB         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.163 
130. 130                           Siemens         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.163 
131. 131                              Sika         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.163 
132. 132                          Unilever         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.163 
133. 133                      Turk Pirelli         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.163 
134. 134                          Erickson         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.163 
135. 135                         Tuncmatik         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.163 
136. 136                               YBT         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.163 
137. 137                               GFZ         0.000        2.000        0.000        0.327 
138.  61                     Diyarbakir CD         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.163 
139. 139                        CSIC-Spain         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.163 
140. 140                       ETHZ-Zurich         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.163 
141. 141                               GDI         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.163 
142. 142                              MPWS         0.000        2.000        0.000        0.327 
143. 143                              GDSL         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.163 
144. 144                             BS&TA         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.163 
145. 145                               DEU         0.000        2.000        0.000        0.327 
146. 146                              AIBU         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.163 
147. 147          Zonguldak Karaelmas Uni.         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.163 
148. 148                         Dicle Uni         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.163 
149. 149                       Selcuk Uni.         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.163 
150. 150                   Karadeniz Uni.          0.000        1.000        0.000        0.163 
151. 151                            UNAVCO         0.000        2.000        0.000        0.327 
152. 152                               BKG         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.163 
153. 153                          Izmit KK         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.163 
154. 154                          Izmit CD         0.000        1.000        0.000        0.163 
  
  
 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
  
                                                  1            2            3            4 
                                            OutDegree     InDegree    NrmOutDeg     NrmInDeg 
                                         ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ 
   1     Mean                                   1.831        1.831        0.299        0.299 
   2  Std Dev                                   5.393        1.937        0.881        0.316 
   3      Sum                               282.000      282.000       46.078       46.078 
   4 Variance                                29.088        3.751        0.777        0.100 
   5      SSQ                              4996.000     1094.000      133.389       29.209 
   6    MCSSQ                              4479.610      577.610      119.602       15.422 
   7 Euc Norm                                70.682       33.076       11.549        5.405 
  
 Network Centralization (Outdegree) = 4.695% 
 Network Centralization (Indegree) = 2.028% 
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Table G- 2 Closeness Centrality Measures 
                                                 1            2 
                                             Farness   nCloseness 
                                        ------------ ------------ 
1.   1                          BU-KOERI       341.000       44.868 
2.  12                              GDDA       361.000       42.382 
3.   3                               ITU       367.000       41.689 
4.   5                       TUBITAK-MAM       385.000       39.740 
5.   2                               IBB       394.000       38.832 
6.   8                               IPG       415.000       36.867 
7.  20                               PIU       417.000       36.691 
8.   7                           TUBITAK       426.000       35.915 
9.  40                           Kizilay       434.000       35.253 
10.   4                              METU       436.000       35.092 
11.  35                               GCM       438.000       34.932 
12.  26                  Turkish Treasury       440.000       34.773 
13.  47                               MTA       444.000       34.459 
14.  33                              TRAC       449.000       34.076 
15.  50               Yalova Municipality       455.000       33.626 
16.  11                                BU       458.000       33.406 
17.  31                               MIT       458.000       33.406 
18.   6                         ITU-Cendm       461.000       33.189 
19.  10                         Bu-Cendim       462.000       33.117 
20.  16                              JICA       462.000       33.117 
21.  76                               ESC       463.000       33.045 
22.  28                               SAU       464.000       32.974 
23.   9                               ERD       466.000       32.833 
24.  38                      Sakarya Gov.       471.000       32.484 
25.  37                      Kocaeli Gov.       472.000       32.415 
26.  21                               SDC       474.000       32.278 
27.  14                               Ytu       475.000       32.211 
28.  51                Izmir Municipality       482.000       31.743 
29.  83                              USGS       485.000       31.546 
30.  29                              NATO       485.000       31.546 
31.  41                      Kizilay-AFOM       489.000       31.288 
32.  27                               KOU       491.000       31.161 
33. 129                              CSFB       493.000       31.034 
34. 116                            GS&EEC       493.000       31.034 
35.  56                          Bolu Gov       493.000       31.034 
36.  72                             TEDAS       493.000       31.034 
37.  74           First Army Headquarters       493.000       31.034 
38. 123                    Munich Regroup       493.000       31.034 
39. 113                            ISSMGE       493.000       31.034 
40.  22                      US Red Cross       493.000       31.034 
41. 125                Negro of JRC-Ispra       493.000       31.034 
42.  73                      Turk Telecom       493.000       31.034 
43. 114                              EAEE       493.000       31.034 
44.  75                               SAR       493.000       31.034 
45.  43                                WB       494.000       30.972 
46.  15                         Ist. Uni.       494.000       30.972 
47.  91                             WRMDC       500.000       30.600 
48.  19                              GDCD       511.000       29.941 
49.  81                               DRM       513.000       29.825 
50.  80                           ETHZ-IG       513.000       29.825 
51.  88                Studer Engineering       513.000       29.825 
52.  79                           EPFL-IS       513.000       29.825 
53.  78                          ETHZ-IGT       513.000       29.825 
54.  89                                VT       513.000       29.825 
55.  86                                UP       513.000       29.825 
56.  77                               SLF       513.000       29.825 
57. 133                      Turk Pirelli       519.000       29.480 
58. 117                               ESA       519.000       29.480 
59. 134                          Erickson       519.000       29.480 
60. 136                               YBT       519.000       29.480 
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61. 132                          Unilever       519.000       29.480 
62. 131                              Sika       519.000       29.480 
63. 130                           Siemens       519.000       29.480 
64. 135                         Tuncmatik       519.000       29.480 
65.  13                             GDTEM       527.000       29.032 
66.  49                      Avcilar Mun.       529.000       28.922 
67.  70                             TNGGA       531.000       28.814 
68. 151                            UNAVCO       531.000       28.814 
69.  55                          Bolu Mun       535.000       28.598 
70.  82                            TITech       537.000       28.492 
71.  69                       French Team       537.000       28.492 
72.  71                             EUREF       537.000       28.492 
73.  30                        Firat Uni.       537.000       28.492 
74.  44                              SHOD       537.000       28.492 
75. 119                               EUF       537.000       28.492 
76.  68                               GMG       537.000       28.492 
77. 138                             GDLRC       539.000       28.386 
78.  17           District Municipalities       546.000       28.022 
79.  99                               FJG       546.000       28.022 
80. 109                               IMG       546.000       28.022 
81.  92                               CNR       546.000       28.022 
82.  96                              LDEO       546.000       28.022 
83.  34                        Duzce Mun.       567.000       26.984 
84.  18 District Crisis Management Center       567.000       26.984 
85.  54                       Sakarya Mun       569.000       26.889 
86. 141                               GDI       569.000       26.889 
87. 143                              GDSL       569.000       26.889 
88. 122                               EIE       569.000       26.889 
89. 115                               EIB       569.000       26.889 
90.  46                               DSI       569.000       26.889 
91. 142                              MPWS       569.000       26.889 
92.  45                               DMI       569.000       26.889 
93. 106                               GPG       569.000       26.889 
94. 121                               ECC       569.000       26.889 
95. 124                               ERR       569.000       26.889 
96. 145                               DEU       570.000       26.842 
97.  42                                UN       575.000       26.609 
98. 104                               GII       578.000       26.471 
99. 101                              SSTL       578.000       26.471 
100. 150                   Karadeniz Uni.        590.000       25.932 
101. 149                       Selcuk Uni.       590.000       25.932 
102. 152                               BKG       590.000       25.932 
103. 148                         Dicle Uni       590.000       25.932 
104. 126                     CorlissWillis       592.000       25.845 
105.  97                         LEL&OC-UK       592.000       25.845 
106. 127                               CAR       592.000       25.845 
107.  23                         Bursa Gov       597.000       25.628 
108.  87                              IFRC       601.000       25.458 
109. 100                      Sumitomo Co.       613.000       24.959 
110.  36                               TFA       613.000       24.959 
111.  24                              FEMA       613.000       24.959 
112.  25       Interior Ministry of Turkey       613.000       24.959 
113.  32                              AKUT       613.000       24.959 
114.  84                         USID-OFDA       614.000       24.919 
115. 128                              CHRR       614.000       24.919 
116. 140                       ETHZ-Zurich       615.000       24.878 
117. 137                               GFZ       615.000       24.878 
118. 118                                IS       615.000       24.878 
119. 139                        CSIC-Spain       615.000       24.878 
120. 120                              EMGE       615.000       24.878 
121. 102                              IRRS       615.000       24.878 
122. 103                               ING       615.000       24.878 
123. 105                                GI       615.000       24.878 
124. 112                           IIEPTMG       615.000       24.878 
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                                             Farness   nCloseness 
125. 110                               IRM       615.000       24.878 
126.  98                              JIPE       615.000       24.878 
127. 108                         IG-Zurich       615.000       24.878 
128. 107                        IG-Tiblisi       615.000       24.878 
129.  93                              NSSP       615.000       24.878 
130. 111                             IIEES       615.000       24.878 
131.  85                               UNR       618.000       24.757 
132. 154                          Izmit CD       626.000       24.441 
133. 153                          Izmit KK       626.000       24.441 
134.  53                      Kocaeli Mun.       626.000       24.441 
135.  95                            DUTech       627.000       24.402 
136.  48                               DPT       643.000       23.795 
137.  90                               PSU       643.000       23.795 
138. 144                             BS&TA       645.000       23.721 
139. 146                              AIBU       645.000       23.721 
140.  61                     Diyarbakir CD       663.000       23.077 
141.  58                          Afyon CD       663.000       23.077 
142.  65                        Sakarya CD       663.000       23.077 
143.  62                        Erzurum CD       663.000       23.077 
144.  67                            Van CD       663.000       23.077 
145.  59                          Adana CD       663.000       23.077 
146.  60                          Bursa CD       663.000       23.077 
147.  63                       Istanbul CD       663.000       23.077 
148.  66                         Samsun CD       663.000       23.077 
149.  57                         Ankara CD       663.000       23.077 
150.  64                          Izmir CD       663.000       23.077 
151.  39                       Yalova Gov.       691.000       22.142 
152.  94                         Kyoto Uni       719.000       21.280 
153.  52                Bursa Municipality       747.000       20.482 
154. 147          Zonguldak Karaelmas Uni.       899.000       17.019 
  
  
 Statistics 
  
                          1            2 
                    Farness   nCloseness 
               ------------ ------------ 
   1     Mean       549.779       28.448 
   2  Std Dev        80.690        4.337 
   3      Sum     84666.000     4380.983 
   4 Variance      6510.847       18.811 
   5      SSQ  47550280.000   127526.906 
   6    MCSSQ   1002670.500     2896.943 
   7 Euc Norm      6895.671      357.109 
   8  Minimum       341.000       17.019 
   9  Maximum       899.000       44.868 
  
 Network Centralization = 33.44% 
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Table G- 3 Betweenness Centrality Measures 
                                                   1            2 
                                          Betweenness nBetweenness 
                                        ------------ ------------ 
1.   1                          BU-KOERI       538.767        2.317 
2.   3                               ITU       417.700        1.796 
3.   5                       TUBITAK-MAM       413.700        1.779 
4.   7                           TUBITAK       323.283        1.390 
5.   2                               IBB       180.583        0.777 
6.  12                              GDDA       156.500        0.673 
7.  35                               GCM       141.117        0.607 
8.  27                               KOU       105.000        0.451 
9.   8                               IPG        98.333        0.423 
10.  14                               Ytu        42.067        0.181 
11.  19                              GDCD        33.000        0.142 
12.   9                               ERD        31.450        0.135 
13.  40                           Kizilay        20.000        0.086 
14.  21                               SDC        18.000        0.077 
15.  33                              TRAC        18.000        0.077 
16.  38                      Sakarya Gov.         5.000        0.021 
17. 138                             GDLRC         2.500        0.011 
18.  34                        Duzce Mun.         1.000        0.004 
19.  10                         Bu-Cendim         0.000        0.000 
20.  11                                BU         0.000        0.000 
21.  17           District Municipalities         0.000        0.000 
22.  13                             GDTEM         0.000        0.000 
23.   4                              METU         0.000        0.000 
24.   6                         ITU-Cendm         0.000        0.000 
25.  25       Interior Ministry of Turkey         0.000        0.000 
26.  26                  Turkish Treasury         0.000        0.000 
27.  18 District Crisis Management Center         0.000        0.000 
28.  28                               SAU         0.000        0.000 
29.  20                               PIU         0.000        0.000 
30.  30                        Firat Uni.         0.000        0.000 
31.  22                      US Red Cross         0.000        0.000 
32.  32                              AKUT         0.000        0.000 
33.  24                              FEMA         0.000        0.000 
34.  15                         Ist. Uni.         0.000        0.000 
35.  16                              JICA         0.000        0.000 
36.  36                               TFA         0.000        0.000 
37.  37                      Kocaeli Gov.         0.000        0.000 
38.  29                              NATO         0.000        0.000 
39.  39                       Yalova Gov.         0.000        0.000 
40.  31                               MIT         0.000        0.000 
41.  41                      Kizilay-AFOM         0.000        0.000 
42.  42                                UN         0.000        0.000 
43.  43                                WB         0.000        0.000 
44.  44                              SHOD         0.000        0.000 
45.  45                               DMI         0.000        0.000 
46.  46                               DSI         0.000        0.000 
47.  47                               MTA         0.000        0.000 
48.  48                               DPT         0.000        0.000 
49.  49                      Avcilar Mun.         0.000        0.000 
50.  50               Yalova Municipality         0.000        0.000 
51.  51                Izmir Municipality         0.000        0.000 
52.  52                Bursa Municipality         0.000        0.000 
53.  53                      Kocaeli Mun.         0.000        0.000 
54.  54                       Sakarya Mun         0.000        0.000 
55.  55                          Bolu Mun         0.000        0.000 
56.  56                          Bolu Gov         0.000        0.000 
57.  57                         Ankara CD         0.000        0.000 
58.  58                          Afyon CD         0.000        0.000 
59.  59                          Adana CD         0.000        0.000 
60.  60                          Bursa CD         0.000        0.000 
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                                          Betweenness nBetweenness 
61.  23                         Bursa Gov         0.000        0.000 
62.  62                        Erzurum CD         0.000        0.000 
63.  63                       Istanbul CD         0.000        0.000 
64.  64                          Izmir CD         0.000        0.000 
65.  65                        Sakarya CD         0.000        0.000 
66.  66                         Samsun CD         0.000        0.000 
67.  67                            Van CD         0.000        0.000 
68.  68                               GMG         0.000        0.000 
69.  69                       French Team         0.000        0.000 
70.  70                             TNGGA         0.000        0.000 
71.  71                             EUREF         0.000        0.000 
72.  72                             TEDAS         0.000        0.000 
73.  73                      Turk Telecom         0.000        0.000 
74.  74           First Army Headquarters         0.000        0.000 
75.  75                               SAR         0.000        0.000 
76.  76                               ESC         0.000        0.000 
77.  77                               SLF         0.000        0.000 
78.  78                          ETHZ-IGT         0.000        0.000 
79.  79                           EPFL-IS         0.000        0.000 
80.  80                           ETHZ-IG         0.000        0.000 
81.  81                               DRM         0.000        0.000 
82.  82                            TITech         0.000        0.000 
83.  83                              USGS         0.000        0.000 
84.  84                         USID-OFDA         0.000        0.000 
85.  85                               UNR         0.000        0.000 
86.  86                                UP         0.000        0.000 
87.  87                              IFRC         0.000        0.000 
88.  88                Studer Engineering         0.000        0.000 
89.  89                                VT         0.000        0.000 
90.  90                               PSU         0.000        0.000 
91.  91                             WRMDC         0.000        0.000 
92.  92                               CNR         0.000        0.000 
93.  93                              NSSP         0.000        0.000 
94.  94                         Kyoto Uni         0.000        0.000 
95.  95                            DUTech         0.000        0.000 
96.  96                              LDEO         0.000        0.000 
97.  97                         LEL&OC-UK         0.000        0.000 
98.  98                              JIPE         0.000        0.000 
99.  99                               FJG         0.000        0.000 
100. 100                      Sumitomo Co.         0.000        0.000 
101. 101                              SSTL         0.000        0.000 
102. 102                              IRRS         0.000        0.000 
103. 103                               ING         0.000        0.000 
104. 104                               GII         0.000        0.000 
105. 105                                GI         0.000        0.000 
106. 106                               GPG         0.000        0.000 
107. 107                        IG-Tiblisi         0.000        0.000 
108. 108                         IG-Zurich         0.000        0.000 
109. 109                               IMG         0.000        0.000 
110. 110                               IRM         0.000        0.000 
111. 111                             IIEES         0.000        0.000 
112. 112                           IIEPTMG         0.000        0.000 
113. 113                            ISSMGE         0.000        0.000 
114. 114                              EAEE         0.000        0.000 
115. 115                               EIB         0.000        0.000 
116. 116                            GS&EEC         0.000        0.000 
117. 117                               ESA         0.000        0.000 
118. 118                                IS         0.000        0.000 
119. 119                               EUF         0.000        0.000 
120. 120                              EMGE         0.000        0.000 
121. 121                               ECC         0.000        0.000 
122. 122                               EIE         0.000        0.000 
123. 123                    Munich Regroup         0.000        0.000 
124. 124                               ERR         0.000        0.000 
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125. 125                Negro of JRC-Ispra         0.000        0.000 
126. 126                     CorlissWillis         0.000        0.000 
127. 127                               CAR         0.000        0.000 
128. 128                              CHRR         0.000        0.000 
129. 129                              CSFB         0.000        0.000 
130. 130                           Siemens         0.000        0.000 
131. 131                              Sika         0.000        0.000 
132. 132                          Unilever         0.000        0.000 
133. 133                      Turk Pirelli         0.000        0.000 
134. 134                          Erickson         0.000        0.000 
135. 135                         Tuncmatik         0.000        0.000 
136. 136                               YBT         0.000        0.000 
137. 137                               GFZ         0.000        0.000 
138.  61                     Diyarbakir CD         0.000        0.000 
139. 139                        CSIC-Spain         0.000        0.000 
140. 140                       ETHZ-Zurich         0.000        0.000 
141. 141                               GDI         0.000        0.000 
142. 142                              MPWS         0.000        0.000 
143. 143                              GDSL         0.000        0.000 
144. 144                             BS&TA         0.000        0.000 
145. 145                               DEU         0.000        0.000 
146. 146                              AIBU         0.000        0.000 
147. 147          Zonguldak Karaelmas Uni.         0.000        0.000 
148. 148                         Dicle Uni         0.000        0.000 
149. 149                       Selcuk Uni.         0.000        0.000 
150. 150                   Karadeniz Uni.          0.000        0.000 
151. 151                            UNAVCO         0.000        0.000 
152. 152                               BKG         0.000        0.000 
153. 153                          Izmit KK         0.000        0.000 
154. 154                          Izmit CD         0.000        0.000 
  
  
 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR EACH MEASURE 
  
                          1            2 
                Betweenness nBetweenness 
               ------------ ------------ 
   1     Mean        16.532        0.071 
   2  Std Dev        72.118        0.310 
   3      Sum      2546.000       10.948 
   4 Variance      5200.973        0.096 
   5      SSQ    843041.500       15.588 
   6    MCSSQ    800949.875       14.809 
   7 Euc Norm       918.173        3.948 
   8  Minimum         0.000        0.000 
   9  Maximum       538.767        2.317 
  
 Network Centralization Index = 2.24% 
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Table G- 4  Flow Betweenness Centrality Measures 
      1 2 
      FlowBet nFlowBet 
      ------------ ------------ 
1.                 1 BU-KOERI 916.077 3.939 
2.                 3 ITU 363.852 1.565 
3.                 5 TUBITAK-MAM 331.182 1.424 
4.                 7 TUBITAK 219.336 0.943 
5.                 2 IBB 135.064 0.581 
6.                 8 IPG 117.292 0.504 
7.                 27 KOU 107.976 0.464 
8.                 35 GCM 101.755 0.438 
9.                 12 GDDA 77.333 0.333 
10.             9 ERD 69.743 0.3 
11.             14 Ytu 42.142 0.181 
12.             33 TRAC 11.333 0.049 
13.             21 SDC 4.833 0.021 
14.             138 GDLRC 1.333 0.006 
15.             34 Duzce Mun. 1 0.004 
16.             38 Sakarya Gov. 1 0.004 
17.             40 Kizilay 1 0.004 
18.             11 BU 0 0 
19.             4 METU 0 0 
20.             6 ITU-Cendm 0 0 
21.             10 Bu-Cendim 0 0 
22.             13 GDTEM 0 0 
23.             15 Ist. Uni. 0 0 
24.             16 JICA 0 0 
25.             17 District Municipalities 0 0 
26.             18 District Crisis Management Center 0 0 
27.             19 GDCD 0 0 
28.             20 PIU 0 0 
29.             22 US Red Cross 0 0 
30.             23 Bursa Gov 0 0 
31.             24 FEMA 0 0 
32.             25 Interior Ministry of Turkey 0 0 
33.             26 Turkish Treasury 0 0 
34.             28 SAU 0 0 
35.             29 NATO 0 0 
36.             30 Firat Uni. 0 0 
37.             31 MIT 0 0 
38.             32 AKUT 0 0 
39.             36 TFA 0 0 
40.             37 Kocaeli Gov. 0 0 
41.             39 Yalova Gov. 0 0 
42.             41 Kizilay-AFOM 0 0 
43.             42 UN 0 0 
44.             43 WB 0 0 
45.             44 SHOD 0 0 
46.             45 DMI 0 0 
47.             46 DSI 0 0 
48.             47 MTA 0 0 
49.             48 DPT 0 0 
50.             49 Avcilar Mun. 0 0 
51.             50 Yalova Municipality 0 0 
52.             51 Izmir Municipality 0 0 
53.             52 Bursa Municipality 0 0 
54.             53 Kocaeli Mun. 0 0 
55.             54 Sakarya Mun 0 0 
56.             55 Bolu Mun 0 0 
57.             56 Bolu Gov 0 0 
58.             57 Ankara CD 0 0 
59.             58 Afyon CD 0 0 
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60.             59 Adana CD 0 0 
61.             60 Bursa CD 0 0 
62.             61 Diyarbakir CD 0 0 
63.             62 Erzurum CD 0 0 
64.             63 Istanbul CD 0 0 
65.             64 Izmir CD 0 0 
66.             65 Sakarya CD 0 0 
67.             66 Samsun CD 0 0 
68.             67 Van CD 0 0 
69.             68 GMG 0 0 
70.             69 French Team 0 0 
71.             70 TNGGA 0 0 
72.             71 EUREF 0 0 
73.             72 TEDAS 0 0 
74.             73 Turk Telecom 0 0 
75.             74 First Army Headquarters 0 0 
76.             75 SAR 0 0 
77.             76 ESC 0 0 
78.             77 SLF 0 0 
79.             78 ETHZ-IGT 0 0 
80.             79 EPFL-IS 0 0 
81.             80 ETHZ-IG 0 0 
82.             81 DRM 0 0 
83.             82 TITech 0 0 
84.             83 USGS 0 0 
85.             84 USID-OFDA 0 0 
86.             85 UNR 0 0 
87.             86 UP 0 0 
88.             87 IFRC 0 0 
89.             88 Studer Engineering 0 0 
90.             89 VT 0 0 
91.             90 PSU 0 0 
92.             91 WRMDC 0 0 
93.             92 CNR 0 0 
94.             93 NSSP 0 0 
95.             94 Kyoto Uni 0 0 
96.             95 DUTech 0 0 
97.             96 LDEO 0 0 
98.             97 LEL&OC-UK 0 0 
99.             98 JIPE 0 0 
100.          99 FJG 0 0 
101.          100 Sumitomo Co. 0 0 
102.          101 SSTL 0 0 
103.          102 IRRS 0 0 
104.          103 ING 0 0 
105.          104 GII 0 0 
106.          105 GI 0 0 
107.          106 GPG 0 0 
108.          107 IG-Tiblisi 0 0 
109.          108 IG-Zurich 0 0 
110.          109 IMG 0 0 
111.          110 IRM 0 0 
112.          111 IIEES 0 0 
113.          112 IIEPTMG 0 0 
114.          113 ISSMGE 0 0 
115.          114 EAEE 0 0 
116.          115 EIB 0 0 
117.          116 GS&EEC 0 0 
118.          117 ESA 0 0 
119.          118 IS 0 0 
120.          119 EUF 0 0 
121.          120 EMGE 0 0 
122.          121 ECC 0 0 
123.          122 EIE 0 0 
124.          123 Munich Regroup 0 0 
125.          124 ERR 0 0 
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126.          125 Negro of JRC-Ispra 0 0 
127.          126 CorlissWillis 0 0 
128.          127 CAR 0 0 
129.          128 CHRR 0 0 
130.          129 CSFB 0 0 
131.          130 Siemens 0 0 
132.          131 Sika 0 0 
133.          132 Unilever 0 0 
134.          133 Turk Pirelli 0 0 
135.          134 Erickson 0 0 
136.          135 Tuncmatik 0 0 
137.          136 YBT 0 0 
138.          137 GFZ 0 0 
139.          139 CSIC-Spain 0 0 
140.          140 ETHZ-Zurich 0 0 
141.          141 GDI 0 0 
142.          142 MPWS 0 0 
143.          143 GDSL 0 0 
144.          144 BS&TA 0 0 
145.          145 DEU 0 0 
146.          146 AIBU 0 0 
147.          147 Zonguldak Karaelmas Uni. 0 0 
148.          148 Dicle Uni 0 0 
149.          149 Selcuk Uni. 0 0 
150.          150 Karadeniz Uni. 0 0 
151.          151 UNAVCO 0 0 
152.          152 BKG 0 0 
153.          153 Izmit KK 0 0 
154.          154 Izmit CD 0 0 
    
    
  Network Centralization Index = 3.895% 
    
    
  DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR EACH MEASURE 
    
                           1            2 
                     FlowBet     nFlowBet 
                ------------ ------------ 
    1     Mean        16.248        0.070 
    2  Std Dev        86.622        0.372 
    3      Sum      2502.252       10.760 
    4 Variance      7503.299        0.139 
    5      SSQ   1196165.750       22.117 
    6    MCSSQ   1155508.125       21.365 
    7 Euc Norm      1093.694        4.703 
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APPENDIX H 
LIST OF ORGANIZATION INVOLVED IN PROJECTS 
No: Name of Organizations Source of Funding & Jurisdictions 
1. Bogazici University, Kandilli Observatory and Earthquake 
Research Institute (BU-KOERI) 
Public-central 
2. Istanbul Technical University (ITU) Public-central 
3. Middle East Technical University (METU) Public-central 
4. TUBITAK Marmara Research Center (TUBITAK-MAM) Public-central 
5. ITU Center of Excellence for Disaster Management (ITU-
CEDM) 
Public-central 
6. GDDA Earthquake Research Center (ERD) Public-central 
7. The Scientific and Technical research and Council Turkey 
(TUBITAK) 
Public-central 
8. Bogazici University-Center for Disaster Management (BU-
CENDIM) 
Public-central 
9. General Directorate of Turkish Disaster Affairs (GDDA) Public-central 
10. General Directorate of Turkey Emergency Management 
(GDTEM) 
Public-central 
11. Bogazici University Public-central 
12. Yildiz Technical University (YTU) Public-central 
13. Istabul University (IU) Public-central 
14. General Directorate of Civil Defense (GDCD) Public-central 
15. Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry Project Implementation 
Unit (PIU) 
Public-central 
16. Ege University (EU) Public-central 
17. Interior Ministry of Turkey Public-central 
18. Kocaeli University (KOU) Public-central 
19. Sakarya University (SAU) Public-central 
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No: Name of Organizations Source of Funding & Jurisdictions 
20. Firat University, (FU) Public-central 
21. General Command of Mapping, Turkey (GCM) Public-central 
22. Turkish Navy- Department of Navigation, Hydrography and 
Oceanography, (SHOD) 
Public-central 
23. Central Meteorological Affairs (DMI) Public-central 
24. General Directorates of Central Hydraulic Works (DSI) Public-central 
25. General Directorate of Mineral Research and Exploration 
(MTA) 
Public-central 
26. Central Planning Institution Public-central 
27. Turkish Central Electricity Distribution Corp Public-central 
28. Turk Telecom Public-central 
29. General Directorate of Electrical Power Resources, Turkey Public-central 
30. General Directorate of Land Registry and Cadastre 
(GDLRC) 
Public-central 
31. General Directorate of Insurance (GDI) Public-central 
32. Ministry of Public Works and Settlements (MPWS) Public-central 
33. General Directorate of Central Land (GDSL) Public-central 
34. Dokuz Eylul University Public-central 
35. Abant Izzet Baysal University Public-central 
36. Zonguldak Karaelmas Uni. Public-central 
37. Dicle Uni Public-central 
38. Selcuk Uni. Public-central 
39. Karadeniz Uni.  Public-central 
40. First Army Headquarters Public-central 
41. Istanbul Province Government, (IPG) Public-province 
42. Kocaeli Government Public-province 
43. Sakarya Government Public-province 
44. Yalova Government Public-province 
45. Bolu Gov Public-province 
46. Duzce Province Government, (DG) Public-province 
47. Ankara Civil Defense (CD) Public-province 
48. Afyon CD Public-province 
49. Adana CD Public-province 
50. Bursa CD Public-province 
51. Diyarbakir CD Public-province 
52. Erzurum CD Public-province 
53. Istanbul CD Public-province 
54. Izmir CD Public-province 
55. Sakarya CD Public-province 
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56. Samsun CD Public-province 
57. Van CD Public-province 
58. Search and Rescue (SAR) Public-province 
59. Izmit Kent Kurultayi Public-Province 
60. Izmit Civil Defense Public-Province 
61. Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality (IBB) Municipality 
62. Yalova Municipality Municipality 
63. Izmir Municipality Municipality 
64. Bursa Municipality Municipality 
65. Kocaeli Mun. Municipality 
66. Sakarya Mun Municipality 
67. Bolu Mun Municipality 
68. Duzce Municipality Municipality 
69. Avcilar Municipality  Municipality 
70. Diztrict Municipalities Public-district (Municipality) 
71. District Crisis Management Center Public Disctrict 
72. Siemens Private 
73. Sika Private 
74. Unilever Private 
75. Turk Pirelli Private 
76. Erickson Private 
77. Tuncmatik Private 
78. Yapisal Tasarim Hizmetleri (YBT) Private 
79. Turkish Ameteur Radio Club National Nonprofit 
80. Search and Rescue Association (AKUT) National Nonprofit 
81. Turkish Firebrigade Association (TFA) National Nonprofit 
82. Turkish Red Crescent Society (KIZILAY) National Nonprofit 
83. Kizilay-Emergency Coordination Center National Nonprofit 
84. Turkish National Geophysics and Geodesy Association  National Nonprofit 
85. Bolu Industrial and Trade Association National Nonprofit 
86. Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) International Public 
87. Federal Emergency Management Agency, USA (FEMA) International Public 
88. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) International Public 
89. Gumulcine Municipality of Greece (GMG) International Public 
90. Swiss Federal Institute of Snow and Avalanche Research 
(SLF) 
International Public 
91. Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich - Institute for 
Geotechnical Engineering (ETHZ-IGT) 
International Public 
92. Swiss Federal Institute Technology Lausanne (EPFL-IS) International Public 
93. Swiss Federal Institute Technology Zurich (ETHZ_IG) International Public 
94. United Centrals Geological Survey (USGS) International Public 
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95. United Centrals International Development Agency “Office 
of Foreign Disaster Assistance”  (USID-OFDA) 
International Public 
96. Penn Central University International Public 
97. National Research Council of Italy (CNR) International Public 
98. National Survey for Seismic Protection, Yerevan, Armenia 
(NSSP) 
International Public 
99. Darmstadt University of Tech.-Institute of Physics and 
Geodesy  
International Public 
100. Joint Institute of Physics of the Earth, Moscow, Russia 
(JIPE) 
International Public 
101. Julich Research Center International Public 
102. Istituto di Ricerca sul Rischio Sismico, Milano, Italy IRRS) International Public 
103. Istituto Nazionale di Geofisica, Roma, Italy (ING) International Public 
104. Geophysical Institute of Israel (GII) International Public 
105. Geophysics Institute, National Academy of Sciences, Kiev, 
Ukraine (GI) 
International Public 
106. Grevena Province Government, Greece (GPG) International Public 
107. Institute of Geophysics, Academy of Sciences, Tbilisi, 
Georgia (IG,Tblisi) 
International Public 
108. Institute of Geophysics, ETH Zurich, Switzerland 
(IG,Zurich) 
International Public 
109. Institute of Marine Geology, Italy (IMG) International Public 
110. Institute of Rock Mechanics, Academy of Sciences, Prague, 
Czech Republic (IRM) 
International Public 
111. International Institute of Earthquake Engineering and 
Seismology, Teheran, Iran (IIEES) 
International Public 
112. International Institute of Earthquake Prediction Theory and 
Mathematical Geophysics, Moscow, Russia (IIEPTMG) 
International Public 
113. Institute of Seismology, Academy of Sciences, Ashkhabad, 
Turkmenistan (IS) 
International Public 
114. Experimental Methodical Geophysical Expedition, 
Academy of Sciences, Baku, Azerbaijan (EMGE) 
International Public 
115. Emilia Romagna Region, Italy (ERR) International Public 
116. GeoForschungsZentrum, Potsdam, Germany (GFZ) International Public 
117. Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas-Spain International Public 
118. Swiss Seismological Service, ETHZ-Zurich International Public 
119. Bundesamt Kartographie und Geodasie (BKG) International Public 
120. Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) International Nonprofit 
121. US Red Cross International Nonprofit 
122. Massachusetts Institute of Technology International Nonprofit 
123. United Nations International Nonprofit 
124. World Bank International Nonprofit 
125. French Team International Nonprofit 
126. European Reference Frame  International Nonprofit 
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127. European Seismological Commission  International Nonprofit 
128. The world Institue for Disaster management (DRM) International Nonprofit 
129. Tokyo Institute of Technology, (TITech) International Nonprofit 
130. University of Nevada at Reno (UNR) International Nonprofit 
131. University of PA (UP) International Nonprofit 
132. International Federation of Red Cross International Nonprofit 
133. Virginia Institute of Technology (VT) International Nonprofit 
134. Wharton Risk Management and Decision Center 
(WRMDC) 
International Nonprofit 
135. Kyoto University International Nonprofit 
136. Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory, Colombia University 
(LDEO) 
International Nonprofit 
137. International Society of Soil Mechanics and Geotechnical 
Engineering (ISSMGE) 
International Nonprofit 
138. European Association of Earthquake Engineering (EAEE) International Nonprofit 
139. European Investment Bank (EIB) International Nonprofit 
140. European Space Agency (ESA) International Nonprofit 
141. European Union Fund (EUF) International Nonprofit 
142. Environmental Institute for Health and Consumer 
Protection (Negro of JRC-Ispra) 
International Nonprofit 
143. Center for Hazard and Risk Research- Colombia University 
(CHRR) 
International Nonprofit 
144. University NAVSTAR Consortium (UNAVCO) International Nonprofit 
145. Surrey Satellite Technology Limited International Private 
146. GeoSig&Electrowatt Ekono Cons International Private 
147. Exandas Consultant Comp.(ECC) International Private 
148. Munich Regroup International Private 
149. Corliss Willis International Private 
150. Cambridge Architectural Research Limited (CAR) International Private 
151. Credit Suisse First Boston (CSFB) International Private 
152. Studer Engineering International Private 
153. London Economics Limited and Oracle Corporation UK 
Ltd (LEL&OC-UK) 
International Private 
154. Sumitomo Co. International Private 
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APPENDIX I 
JOINT PROJECTS 
Project Date N K Organization Project Name Type, T Transaction 
Source 
of 
Fundin
g 
Interactions Data Sources 
2001 1 1.1 BU-KOERI Strong Ground Motion 
Earthquake 
Monitoring 
and 
Recording 
38 digital accelerometers are added to 
Strong Ground Motion Network 
Public-
Central ERD 
http://www.koeri.boun.edu.tr/
depremmuh/ 
2002 1 1.2 BU-KOERI 
Istanbul Earthquake Rapid 
Response and Early Warning 
Project 
Earthquake 
Prediction 110 station were installed 
Public-
Central 
IPG, First Army Headquarters, 
IBB, (CSFB), 
GeoSig&Electrowatt Ekono 
Cons 
http://www.koeri.boun.edu.tr/
depremmuh/  & Report by 
Mustafa Erdik "Strong Data 
Acquisition, Processing and 
Utilization in Turkey 
1999-2000 1 1.3 BU-KOERI NATO Science for Peace project 
Earthquake-
loss 
Assessment 
A comprehensive investigation of 
earthquake loss in Istanbul 
Public-
Central NATO 
http://www.koeri.boun.edu.tr/
depremmuh/ 
2000-2001 1 1.4 BU-KOERI KOERI-Loss software 
Earthquake-
loss 
Assessment 
a GIS program is developed Public-Central SAR agencies, IBB, IPG The Same 
 1 1.5 BU-KOERI Seismic Microzonation 
Risk 
Assessment 
served on the technical committee and 
in the preparation of manual for 
zonation on seismic geotechnical 
hazard 
Public-
Central ISSMGE The Same 
2004-2006 1 1.6 BU-KOERI 
Performance Based Seismic 
Evaluation and Design 
Civil 
Engineering 
testing a nonlinear analysis techniques 
"being developed for the performance 
evaluation of existing structures and 
the design of new structures under the 
action of seismic ground motion" 
Public-
Central (EAEE),  Negro of JRC-Ispra The Same 
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of 
Fundin
g 
Interactions Data Sources 
2002 1 1.7 BU-KOERI 
Earthquake Risk Assessments 
for Istanbul Metropolitan Area 
Earthquake 
Scenario and 
Plan 
earthquake risk is investigated and 
loss-estimation models are developed 
for the metropolitan area of Istanbul 
Public-
Central 
The US Red Cross, KIZILAY, 
IBB, IPG,TEDAS, Turk 
Telekom, USGS, Munich-Re 
Group 
The Same 
2002 1 1.8 BU-KOERI 
Earthquake Risk Assessments 
for industrial facilities in 
Istanbul 
Earthquake 
Scenario and 
Plan 
earthquake risk is investigated for the 
industrial facilities in Istanbul 
Public-
Central Munich Re Group The Same 
2003- 1 1.9 BU-KOERI 
Investigation of Total 
Displacement in the Western 
Part of North Anatolian Fault 
Zone Using GPS Technology 
Mitigation 
Geodesy 
a new geodetic network with 10 
stations in Iznik is measured using 
GPS technology 
Public-
Central GCM The Same 
2003- 1 1.10 
BU-
KOERI 
Monitoring Tectonic 
Deformations by Geodetic 
Measurements Techniques 
Mitigation 
Geodesy 
Terrestrial techniques and GPS are 
performed on the networks on the 
North Anatolian Fault Zone and the 
results are compared. 
Public-
Central Bogaziçi University The Same 
2001-2003 1 1.11 
BU-
KOERI 
Post seismic Deformation 
Following the 1999 Izmit-Duzce 
Earthquake GPS studies 
Mitigation 
Geodesy 
Seismic deformation after 1999 
Earthquakes are investigated by GPS 
Public-
Central MIT, GCM, ITU, TUBITAK The Same 
2002-2003 1 1.12 
BU-
KOERI 
Monitoring Crustal Deformation 
by Different Geodetic 
Measurement Techniques 
Mitigation 
Geodesy 
Crustal Deformation are monitored 
after the 1999 Earthquakes by using 
geodetic techniques 
Public-
Central Bogaziçi University The Same 
2000-2001 1 1.13 
BU-
KOERI 
Investigation of Pre/Co/Post 
Seismic Displacement in Iznik, 
Sapanca, Akyazi Using GPS 
Technology 
Mitigation 
Geodesy 
Pre and post seismic movement are 
being investigated by GPS 
Public-
Central Bogaziçi University The Same 
January 2001-
Spring 2005 10 
10.
1 
BU-
CENDIM 
Automated Decision-Support for 
Logistics Operations in Disaster 
Relief Operations  using 
Helicopters 
Emergency 
Response 
the development of an automated 
decision support framework for 
planning the deployment of 
helicopters in disaster relief operations 
Public-
Central NATO 
http://www.cendim.boun.edu.
tr/ 
June 2001- 
January 2003 10 
10.
2 
BU-
CENDIM 
Authority and Communication 
Systems for Disaster 
Management: An Integrated 
Model 
Information 
Management 
developing an authority and 
communications structure for policy 
formulation, decision making and 
coordination for disaster preparation 
and response for the Istanbul area 
Public-
Central Bogaziçi University The same 
July 2002-
April 2003 10 
10.
3 
BU-
CENDIM 
Disaster Management Database 
Design and Implementation 
Project for Istanbul 
Information 
Management 
creating a database to use during 
disaster relief operations 
Public-
Central IPG The same 
February 
2002-June 
2002 
10 10.4 
BU-
CENDIM 
Benefit Cost Analysis of 
Mitigation Strategies for 
Apartment Buildings in Turkey 
Civil 
engineering 
developing different modules and set 
different measurements for 
constructing the buildings for different 
earthquake scenarios 
Public-
Central 
CHRR, BU-KOERI,  
(WRMDC) The Same 
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of 
Fundin
g 
Interactions Data Sources 
December 
2000-
December 
2003 
10 10.5 
BU-
CENDIM 
Integrated Decision Support 
System for Disaster 
Management in Turkey 
Information 
Management 
enhancing the EM and humanitarian 
relief capability of disaster by 
focusing on preparedness and 
response strategies for potential major 
earthquakes in the Metropolitan City 
Istanbul 
Public-
Central Bogaziçi University The Same 
October 2001- 
September 
2003 
10 10.6 
BU-
CENDIM 
Istanbul Disaster Preparedness  
Education Project 
Information 
Management 
increase emergency awareness, 
developing GIS project to integrate 
disaster capability with USGS, crating 
web-site for information sharing 
Public-
Central (USID-OFDA), USGS The Same 
2000- 2 2.1 IBB 
The Study on Disaster 
Prevention, Mitigation Basic 
Plan in Istanbul including 
Seismic Microzonation in the 
Republic of Turkey 
Risk 
Assessment 
creating seismic Microzonation maps, 
collecting Microzonation data studies, 
and creating a database for land use 
management 
Public-
provinc
ial 
JICA, IPG 
http://www.jica.go.jp/turkey 
http://www.ibb.gov.tr/ibbtr/14
4/14405/2001/01/220101.htm 
2002-2003 2 2.2 IBB Earthquake Master plan for Istanbul 
Risk 
Assessment 
A comprehensive analysis/outline for 
Istanbul to prevent future losses of 
expected devastating Istanbul 
Earthquake is done 
Public-
provinc
ial 
BU, METU,YTU, ITU http://www.koeri.boun.edu.tr/depremmuh/ 
1998- 2 2.3 IBB Seismic Analysis (8 Earthquake Recording Station Network) 
Earthquake 
Monitoring 
and 
Recording 
8 Earthquake Monitoring and 
Recording Stations are established 
Public-
provinc
ial 
BU-KOERI, TUBITAK-MAM www.ibb.gov.tr/deprem/calismalarimiz.htm 
2003- 2 2.4 IBB Seismic Analysis (6 Earthquake Recording Station Network) 
Earthquake 
Monitoring 
and 
Recording 
6 Earthquake Monitoring Stations are 
established 
Public-
provinc
ial 
JICA The Same 
1999- 2 2.5 IBB Analyzing Soil Exploration Reports 
Mitigation 
Geophysics 
Soil exploration reports from district 
municipalities are being analyzed 
every year 
Public-
provinc
ial 
District Municipalities The Same 
34.04.2001 - 
31.04.2003 2 2.6 IBB 
Testing New Methods for the 
Prediction of Earthquakes in the 
Marmara Region 
Earthquake 
Scenario and 
Plan 
Researching anomalies in spring water 
and soil radon gas and compare the 
results with GPS studies and 
seismological data to determine the 
relations between such anomalies and 
seismic activity 
Public-
provinc
ial 
(TUBITAK-MAM), (ITU), 
(FJG), (MTA), (LDEO), (CNR), 
(IMG) 
The Same 
2001- 2 2.7 IBB Soil Databank Information Management 
Borehole data about Istanbul 
Metropolitan area have been 
collecting and establishing a digital 
databank 
Public-
provinc
ial 
YTU www.ibb.gov.tr/deprem/calismalarimiz.htm 
2000- 2 2.8 IBB GIS Information Management 
IBB has been completed 90% of  a 
GIS database for metropolitan 
municipality services' areas including 
disaster management 
Public-
provinc
ial 
ITU,Bogazici University, 
District municipalities The Same 
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Source 
of 
Fundin
g 
Interactions Data Sources 
2001-2003 6 6.1 ITU-CEDM 
National Emergency 
Management, Education and 
Exercise Implementation 
Program 
Education 
and Training 
educational project to provide 
sustainability to the emergency 
management system of Turkey via the 
training 
Public-
Central 
FEMA, Ministry of Interior of 
Turkey http://www.aym.itu.edu.tr/ 
2001-2004 6 6.2 ITU-CEDM 
A Cooperative Hazard Impact 
reduction Effort Via Education 
(ACHIEVE) 
Education 
and Training 
Educating and training responsible 
disaster managers 
Public-
Central PMCMC, FEMA, GDDA The Same 
2001-2003 6 6.3 ITU-CEDM 
Development of National 
Emergency Management Model 
Earthquake 
Scenario and 
Plan 
Conducted research to provide data to 
create an appropriate disaster 
management structure for Turkey 
Public-
Central Ministry of Interior of Turkey The Same 
2001-2003 6 6.4 ITU-CEDM 
The development of National 
Database using GIS & Remote 
Sensing Systems and the 
Standards for a Disaster 
Management System 
Information 
Management 
creating a nationwide GIS-based for 
disaster information management 
system 
Public-
Central 
(SPC) of Ministry of Interior of 
Turkey The Same 
2001 6 6.5 ITU-CEDM Red Cross Education Project 
Education 
and Training 
First Aid Training, Community 
Emergency Response Team Training, 
GIS education, Resistance 
Community Training 
Public-
Central KIZILAY, FEMA The Same 
2001-2003 6 6.6 ITU-CEDM 
The Restructuring of the Turkish 
Fire Brigades 
Emergency 
Response 
Conducted research to establish a 
proper structure to increase efficiency 
and coordination of fire services in 
Turkey 
Public-
Central 
Ministry of Interior of Turkey, 
Turkish Firebrigade Assoc. 
http://www.ins.itu.edu.tr/insa
at/anabil/betonerm/ai14.htm 
2003-2004 6 6.7 ITU-CEDM 
Disaster Prevention Education 
Program 
Education 
and Training 
Education and training activities  for 
disaster responsible public managers 
in Japan and In Turkey 
Public-
Central JICA, Sumitomo Co. http://www.aym.itu.edu.tr/ 
2002 6 6.8 ITU-CEDM Protocol with AKUT&TRAC 
Communicat
ion 
Volunteer training program, 
developing communication 
infrastructure 
Public-
Central AKUT, TRAC The Same 
2000-2004 3 3.1 ITU 
Earthquake Prediction System 
Based on Observing the Stress 
of Rocks by the Method of ULF 
Electric Field Measurement 
Earthquake 
Prediction 
At the first stage 30 stations were 
established for monitoring. At the 
second stage the data from these 
stations will utilized for early warning 
purposes 
Public-
Central 
SAU, IU, Sponsored by  
Siemens, Turk Pirelli, Unilever, 
Sika, Ericsson, YBT, Tuncmatit 
http://www.deprem.cs.itu.edu.
tr/ 
1993-2000 3 3.2 ITU Earthquake Disaster Prevention Project 
Earthquake 
Scenario and 
Plan 
a project aiming to collect 
seismological data, estimate the 
damage, and give the results to the 
responsible disaster managers 
immediately 
Public-
Central JICA, ERD The Same 
 3 3.3 ITU 
Use of Space Technologies for 
Earthquake Hazard Assessment 
and Monitoring 
Earthquake-
loss 
Assessment 
remote sensing, GPS , GIS are used to 
estimate future earthquake risk and 
damage assessment 
Public-
Central ESA 
http://www.ins.itu.edu.tr/jeod
ezi/jeodezi_e.htm 
2001-2002 3 3.4 ITU 
Determining Current Tectonic 
Features of Central part of NAF 
by GPS measurements 
Mitigation 
Geodesy 
16 GPS network are installed in the 
summer of 2001. The project aims to 
determine the parts of NAF between 
Ladik&Ilgaz by GPS 
Public-
Central TUBITAK-MAM 
http://www.deprem.cs.itu.edu.
tr/ 
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October 1999-
October 2000 3 3.5 ITU 
Investigation of the Connection 
between Fault Line system  and 
Geothermal Water 
Earthquake 
Prediction 
the connection between geothermal 
water and fault line system was 
researched after the Marmara 
earthquake in order to predict next 
earthquakes 
Public-
Central TUBITAK 
http://www.geop.itu.edu.tr/pr
ojeler.html 
May 2001-
November 
2002 
3 3.6 ITU 
Investigations on the fault line in 
the North shore of Marmara Sea 
by using Electric and 
Electromagnetic Methods 
Mitigation 
Geophysics 
researches was done in the fault line 
of north part of the Marmara sea 
Public-
Central TUBITAK 
http://www.deprem.cs.itu.edu.
tr/ 
11.01.2002 – 
12.31.2003 7 7.1 
TUBITA
K 
Upper Mantle Wave Propagation 
in the Southern Anatolian 
Region 
Earthquake 
Monitoring 
and 
Recording 
22 Earthquake recording station is 
established 
Public-
Central MIT TUBITAK.gov.tr 
02.01.2001 – 
31.12.2004 7 7.2 
TUBITA
K 
Dynamic Characteristic of West 
and Middle Part of North 
Anatolian Fault Line: Marmara 
Continues GPS Network  
(MAGNET) 
Earthquake 
Monitoring 
and 
Recording 
Establishing new stations to monitor 
changes/movements in the West and 
Central Anatolian fault line to 
determine earthquake risk 
Public-
Central BU-KOERI, GCM, ITU The Same 
20.03.2000 – 
31.08.2000 7 7.3 
TUBITA
K 
Investigation of Seismic Ground 
Amplification In the Avcilar 
Region 
Emergency 
Recovery 
Seismologic researches are conducted 
after the Marmara Earthquake 
Public-
Central Avcilar Municipality The Same 
18.07.2001 – 
14.07.2004 7 7.4 
TUBITA
K 
Seismological Network 
Calibration between Israel and 
Turkey 
Information 
Management 
This project aims to establish a 
database about micro-earthquake 
activities, seismo-tectonic data of East 
Mediterranean Sea 
Public-
Central (GII) The Same 
20.06.2003 – 
15.12.2003 7 7.5 
TUBITA
K 
Spring Water And Soil Radon 
Gas Monitoring: A Search For 
Possible Precursors Of 
Earthquake Activity In The 
Marmara Region 
Earthquake 
Prediction 
researching the relationship between 
soil radon gas and spring water, and 
earthquake risk to predict future 
damaging earthquakes 
Public-
Central IBB The Same 
01.07.2001 – 
01.07.2002 5 5.1 
TUBITA
K-MAM 
French-Turk SEISMARMARA 
Joint Project in the Marmara 
Sea. Seismologic Observation 
and Cinarcik-Pendik Seismic 
profile 
Mitigation 
Geophysics 
Seismologic research are conducted in 
the Marmara Sea 
Public-
Central 
IU, ITU,KOU, MTA, SHOD, 
French Team 
The Same, Cumhuriyet 
Science and Technical 
content analysis 
16.04.2002 – 
29.11.2002 5  
TUBITA
K-MAM 
A Wide Angle Seismic 
Refraction/Reflection profile in 
the Province of Adapazari 
Mitigation 
Geophysics 
The data of seismic risk for Adapazari 
is collected 
Public-
Central (TITech) The Same 
16.04.2002 – 
13.12.2002 5 5.2 
TUBITA
K-MAM 
Seismologic Data Quality and 
Continuity Studies 
Information 
Management 
Technical support for continuous data 
quality of earthquake recording 
stations is performed 
Public-
Central IBB The Same 
30.10.2001 – 
31.10.2002 5 5.3 
TUBITA
K-MAM 
Tsunami Risk in the Marmara 
Sea 
Tsunami 
Studies 
The risk of tsunami in the Marmara 
Sea is researched 
Public-
Central TUBITAK The Same 
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01.03.2004 – 
30.06.2004 5 5.4 
TUBITA
K-MAM 
Establishing a Soil Radon Gas 
Measurement System in Elazig 
region in the East Anatolian 
Fault Line 
Earthquake 
Monitoring 
and 
Recording 
One soil radon gas observation station 
is established in the East Anatolian 
Fault Line 
Public-
Central FU The Same 
01.06.2002 – 
01.06.2004 5 5.5 
TUBITA
K-MAM 
Investigation of Crustal Velocity 
Structure of Marmara Sea from 
the Analysis of Seismarmara 
2001 
Mitigation 
Geodesy 
the project is aim to analyze the data 
collected from the first Seismologic 
research  in the Marmara Sea and 
establish a knowledge base 
Public-
Central 
IU, ITU,KOU, MTA, SHOD, 
French Team 
The Same, Cumhuriyet 
Science and Technical 
content analysis 
2003- 5 5.6 TUBITAK-MAM 
Investigation of Crustal 
Deformation and Block 
Kinematics along the Eastern 
Sector of the NAF by GPS 
Measurements 
Mitigation 
Geodesy 
investigating crustal deformation and 
block kinematics by (GPS) 
measurements in and around the 
eastern sector of the  (NAF) Zone 
Public-
Central 
BU-KOERI,  YTU, Turkey 
National Geodesy and 
Geophysics Association 
http://www.koeri.boun.edu.tr/
/jeodezi/default.htm 
25.03.2004 – 
24.12.2004 5 5.7 
TUBITA
K-MAM 
Studies of the Earthquake 
Prediction in the Marmara 
Region 
Earthquake 
Prediction 
supplementary researches to  the 
project of Spring Water And Soil 
Radon Gas Monitoring: A Search For 
Possible Precursors Of Earthquake 
Activity In The Marmara Region 
Public-
Central IBB TUBITAK.gov.tr 
02.01.2001 - 
31.12.2004 5 5.8 
TÜBİTA
K-MAM 
High Resolution Long term 
Earthquake Monitoring Project; 
Marmara Region Continuous 
Seismology Observation 
Network (MARSIS) 
Earthquake 
Monitoring 
and 
Recording 
Seismologic, geodetic and geologic 
studies are conducted to establish a 
database for determining future 
earthquake risk 
Public-
Central Avcilar Municipality, IBB The Same 
25.11.2003 - 
16.05.2005 5 5.9 
TUBITA
K-MAM 
TUBITAK’s GIS Studies for the 
Yalova Municipality within the 
Framework of MERP 
Information 
Management 
it aims to create a GIS database for 
Yalova city for land use management 
and disaster management purposes 
Public-
Central 
Gumulcine Municipality-Greece, 
Yalova Municipality, EUF The Same 
15.07.2003 - 
14.07.2005 5 
5.1
0 
TUBITA
K-MAM 
Monitoring Deformation Cycle 
of 1999 Izmit-Duzce 
Earthquakes 
Earthquake 
Recovery 
researches to determine the 
deformation after the Marmara 
earthquake 
Public-
Central MIT,UNAVCO, EUREF The Same 
01.08.2003 - 
31.05.2005 5 
5.1
1 
TUBITA
K-MAM 
Gebze-Kartal Seismic Zone: 
Earthquake Risk and Evaluation 
of Seismic Threat 
Earthquake 
Monitoring 
and 
Recording 
Seismological studies will be 
conducted 
Public-
Central TUBITAK The Same 
1999-2001 35 35.1 GCM 
Turkish National Fundamental 
GPS Network (TUTGA) 
Earthquake 
Monitoring 
and 
Recording 
16 stations are established throughout 
Turkey. The ultimate goal is to 
establish 50 stations. 
Public-
Central 
TUBITAK-MAM, METU, 
UNAVCO, MIT, KTU, DU, SU, 
BKG,ITU 
Onur Lenk 
2002- 35 35.2 GCM 
Turkish Sea Level Monitoring 
System 
Earthquake 
Monitoring 
and 
Recording 
to monitor the sea level and shoreline 
variations along our coasts and to test 
the existing geoids 
Public-
Central 
TUBITAK-MAM, METU, 
YTU, Turkish National Geodesy 
and Geophysics Association 
The Same 
2000- 40 40.1 Kizilay Disaster Coordination Center Coordination 
A disaster coordination center was 
established in Ankara to coordinate 
recovery and relief efforts by Kizilay 
after earthquakes 
Nonpro
fit-
Nation
al 
UN Dilek Kocak&Oktay Ergunay 
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2005- 41 41.1 
Kizilay-
AFOM Alarm Satellite Systems 
Erthquake 
Prediction 
A satellite early warning system is 
planned to be established 
Nonpro
fit-
Nation
al 
ERD, METU www.kizilay.org.tr 
2000- 41 41.2 
Kizilay-
AFOM Logistic Management Coordination 
Coordination and management of 
outside assistances and inventories 
before and during earthquakes 
Nonpro
fit-
Nation
al 
TUBITAK www.kizilay.org.tr 
2001-2004 41 41.3 
Kizilay-
AFOM 
Risk Assessment Systems by 
GIS 
Risk 
Assessment 
Risk assessment models are created 
for every region of Turkey by using 
GIS 
Nonpro
fit-
Nation
al 
Kizilay and UN sponsored www.kizilay.org.tr 
01.08.2003 - 
01.12.2005 14 
14.
1 YTU 
Micro-Deformations aspects of 
Local Region Between Gebze 
and Tuzla 
Earthquake 
Recovery 
researches to determine the 
deformation between Tuzla-Gebze, 
after the Marmara earthquake 
Public-
Central 
TUBITAK-MAM, Darmstadt 
University of Technology-
Institute of Physical Geodesy 
ytu.edu.tr 
2003- 14 14.2 YTU 
Disaster Management 
Information System (AFAYBIS) 
Information 
Management 
For a chosen pilot area of (Istanbul), 
GIS database is aimed to be created 
for the purpose of disaster 
communicational and coordination 
Public-
Central Prime Ministry Office, IPG The Same 
1992-1999 76 76.1 ESC 
The Global Seismic Hazard 
Assessment Program 
Damage 
Assessment 
The first seismic hazard map is 
created for European-Mediterranean 
region 
Nonpro
fit-
Internat
ional 
BU-KOERI, NSSP,IS, IGTiblisi, 
EMGE, JIPE, IIEPTMG, GI, 
ING, IGZurich, IIEES, GFZ, 
IRM, IRRS 
http://www.koeri.boun.edu.tr/
depremmuh/ 
1992-2002 76 76.2 ESC 
The ESC-SESAME project 
(European Seismological 
Commission -IUGS Program 
Project no. 382) 
Damage 
Assessment 
The first unified model for 
Probabilistic Seismic Hazard 
Assessment for European 
Mediterranean is created 
Nonpro
fit-
Internat
ional 
BU-KOERI, GFZ, ETHZ-
Zurich, CSIC, NSSP,IS, 
IGTiblisi, EMGE, JIPE, 
IIEPTMG, GI, ING, IGZurich, 
IIEES, IRM, IRRS 
http://www.koeri.boun.edu.tr/
depremmuh/ 
2001 27 27.1 KOU 
Seismic Microzonation of Izmit 
and its surroundings using by 
GIS 
Risk 
Assessment 
Seismic microzonation studies are 
conducted in the city of Izmit and her 
environment in order to examine the 
impact of Kocaeli earthquake and 
analysis for future risks 
Public-
Central Penn Central, DPT, TUBITAK 
http://www.kou.edu.tr/rektorl
uk/yayin/DPT.htm 
Completed in 
1999 51 
51.
1 
Izmir 
Municipal
ity 
An Earthquake Damage 
Scenario and Earthquake Master 
Plan for the city of Izmir 
Earthquake 
Scenario and 
Plan 
created damage assessment scenarios 
and a master plan for the city of Izmir 
Public-
provinc
ial 
BU-KOERI, ITU koeri.boun.edu.tr 
1996-2000 52 52.1 
Bursa 
Municipal
ity 
GIS Information Management 
A GIS disaster database has been 
established 
Public-
provinc
ial 
Zonguldak Karaelmas 
University 
Ramazan Tuncer, Head of fire 
department 
2003- 52 52.2 
Bursa 
Municipal
ity 
Provinces Crisis Center 
Department Project Coordination 
this project aims to establish a fire 
department building inside the center 
of province crisis management to 
coordinate rescue efforts and various 
assistance during a disaster (a 911 
prototype project) 
Public-
provinc
ial 
Bursa Province Government Ramazan Tuncer 
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Project Date N K Organization Project Name Type, T Transaction 
Source 
of 
Fundin
g 
Interactions Data Sources 
December 
1999-2001 34 
34.
1 
Duzce 
Municipal
ity 
DIMSIS-GIS. Development of 
Disaster-Management Spatial 
Information System 
Information 
Management 
creating a GIS database of for the 
disaster management purposes 
Public-
provinc
ial 
Kyoto University http://www.duzce-bld.gov.tr/2.html 
04.04.2001-
13.06.2002 56 
56.
1 
Bolu 
Governme
nt 
Establishing Fundamental GIS 
Layers for City of Bolu 
Information 
Management 
Bolu Government and TUBITAK 
jointly created basic layers for 
establishing GIS database for Bolu 
Public-
provinc
ial 
TUBITAK-MAM http://www.nemrut.MAM.gov.tr/ 
2001 56 56.2 
Bolu 
Governme
nt 
GIS urban knowledge base Information Management 
A GIS urban knowledge base has been 
establishing for the purposes of land 
use management and as well as 
disaster management 
Public-
provinc
ial 
Bolu Municipality, Abant Izzet 
Baysal University, Bolu Ticaret 
ve Sanayi Odasi, TUBITAK-
MAM, DEU 
Ismail Eroglu, Deputy 
Governer of Bolu 
2001-2004 38 38.1 
Sakarya 
Governme
nt 
GIS urban knowledge base Information Management 
A GIS urban knowledge base has been 
established for the purposes of land 
use management and as well as 
disaster management 
Public-
provinc
ial 
DEU www.sakarya.org.tr 
2000- 8 8.1 IPG GIS urban knowledge base Information Management 
A GIS database created for city of 
Istanbul for many purposes including 
disaster management 
Public-
provinc
ial 
Bogazici University, ITU, 
District Disaster Management 
Centers 
www.istanbul.org.tr 
2000-2003 8 8.2 IPG Information Network Project Coordination 
A communication network is 
established among district crisis 
management centers and Istanbul 
Crisis Management center 
Public-
provinc
ial 
District Disaster Management 
centers The Same 
2003- 8 8.3 IPG Disaster Station for each Neighborhood 
Emergency 
Response 
Disaster stations including some 
necessary equipments are aimed to 
establish in 32 district center for 
immediate need for rescue operations 
in future earthquakes 
Public-
provinc
ial 
District Disaster Management 
centers The Same 
2001-2004 20 20.1 PIU 
Marmara Earthquake 
Rehabilitation Program 
Emergency 
Recovery 
reconstruction facilities, psycho-social 
rehabilitation activities and assisting 
municipalities for implementation of 
their disaster plans 
Public-
Central 
Duzce, Yalova, Izmit, Sakarya, 
Bolu Municipality, (GPG), 
(ERR), .(ECC) supported by EU 
and GPG 
The Same 
2000-2003 20 20.2 PIU 
Turkey Earthquake 
Rehabilitation and 
Reconstruction Assistant 
(TERRA) Project 
Emergency 
Recovery 
different rehabilitation and 
reconstruction efforts were undertaken 
Public-
Central Financed  by (EIB) 
http://www.pub.gov.tr/project
s.html 
1998-2002 20 20.3 PIU 
Turkey Earthquake and Flood 
Emergency Recovery (TEFER) 
Project 
Emergency 
Recovery 
recovering damage and developing 
hazard mitigation strategies 
Public-
Central 
MPWS,HAD,DSI, DMI, EIE, 
MTA, Financed  by WB The Same 
December 
1999- May 
2005 
20 20.4 PIU 
Marmara Earthquake Emergency 
Recovery (MEER) Project 
Emergency 
Recovery 
establishing EMAT, establishing 
TCIP, public awareness, coordination 
of emergency agency 
Public-
Central 
GDDA, GDCD, MPWS, GDI, 
GDLRC, GDSL, Financed  by 
WB 
The Same 
1998-2002 26 26.1 
Turkish 
Treasury 
Turkish Improvement of Natural 
Hazard Insurance and Disaster 
Funding Strategy (part of 
TEFER 
Emergency 
Recovery established a disaster insurance policy 
Public-
Central 
WB, Cordiss Willis, CAR, BU-
KOERI, ITU, METU, 
(LEL&OC-UK) 
The Same 
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Project Date N K Organization Project Name Type, T Transaction 
Source 
of 
Fundin
g 
Interactions Data Sources 
2000 19 19.1 GDCD Professional Rescue Groups 
Emergency 
Response 
11 Professional rescue groups (120 
individuals) are established 
Public-
Central 
Adana, Afyon, Ankara, Bursa, 
Diyarbakir, Erzurum, Istanbul, 
Izmir, Sakarya, Samsun, Van 
(CMC) 
Ahmet Bumin, Department 
Head, GDCD 
2000- 137 137.1 GDLRC 
Marmara Earthquake Recovery 
Land Identification System 
(MERLIS) –part of MEER- 
Mitigation 
Geodesy 
crating a land registry and cadastre 
information system  which will be 
based for reconstruction for the 
earthquake region 
Public-
Central YG, SG, KG, Financed by WB http://www.tkgm.gov.tr/ 
March 2002-
February 2004 12 
12.
1 GDDA 
Seismic Microzonation for 
Municipalities (microzonation 
for Earthquake Risk Mitigation, 
MERM) 
Risk 
Assessment 
The application of microzonation 
maps for better land use management 
and administration 
Public-
Central 
DRM,  SDC, BU-KOERI, 
METU, GDDA, SAU, (ETHZ-
IG), (EPFL-IS), (ETHZ-IGT), 
(SLF), (VT), (UP),  Studer 
Engineering, Wharton School, 
KG, SG, 
The Same 
200-2003 9 9.1 ERD 
Enhancement of the National 
Strong Motion and Establishing 
Seismic Arrays in Turkey 
Earthquake 
Monitoring 
and 
Recording 
20 modern acceleration recording 
instruments around two arrays (e.g. 
Yalova-Bursa and Aydin-Denizli) are 
positioned 
Public-
Central 
METU, ITU, UNR, TUBITAK, 
USGS,  supported by NATO, 
http://angora.deprem.gov.tr/pr
ojeen.htm 
2002-2003 9 9.2 ERD 
Establishment of Local Strong 
Motion Seismic Array- 
K.Maras-Antakya Strong 
Motion Network 
Earthquake 
Monitoring 
and 
Recording 
18 modern acceleration recording 
instruments around the arrays (e.g. 
Antakya-Maras) are positioned 
Public-
Central 
METU, ITU, UNR, TUBITAK, 
USGS The Same 
2000- 33 33.1 TRAC 
Wireless Communication 
Network 
Communicat
ion 
TRAC opened a permanent station in 
provinces crisis management center 
Nonpro
fit 
Nation
al 
SG, BG, KG,IPG Aziz Sasa, President of TRAC 
2000 33 33.2 TRAC 
Agreement for Emergency 
Communication 
Communicat
ion 
TRAC and interacted organizations 
agreed on logistic, technical, 
information sharing and increasing 
human resources in order to supply 
better communication for disaster 
purposes 
Nonpro
fit 
Nation
al 
IFRC, Kizilay, PMCMC, GDCD Aziz Sasa, President of TRAC 
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APPENDIX J 
TWO POPULATION PROPORTIONS TEST RESULTS 
Communication  
Test and CI for Two Proportions  
 
H0 : p1 = p2 (percentage of  communication for the Marmara and Duzce is equal) 
Ha : p1< p2  (percentage of  communication for the Duzce is more than for the Marmara) 
 
Significance level = 0.05 
 
Sample  X     N   Sample p 
1        34   274  0.124088 
2        63  1112   0.056655 
 
Difference = p (1) - p (2) 
Estimate for difference:  0.0674329 
95% lower bound for difference:  0.0327448 
Test for difference = 0 (vs > 0):  Z = 3.92  P-Value = 0.000 
 
Coordination of response 
Test and CI for Two Proportions  
 
H0 : p1 = p2 (percentage of  coordination of response for the Marmara and Duzce is equal) 
Ha : p1< p2  (percentage of  coordination of response for the Duzce is more than for the Marmara) 
 
Significance level = 0.05 
 
Sample   X     N   Sample p 
1        15   274   0.054745 
2        39  1112   0.035072 
 
Difference = p (1) - p (2) 
Estimate for difference:  0.0196726 
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95% lower bound for difference:  -0.00468531 
Test for difference = 0 (vs > 0):  Z = 1.51  P-Value = 0.066 
 
Critical assessment of disaster management performance 
Test and CI for Two Proportions  
 
H0 : p1 = p2 (percentage of  critical assessment of disaster management performance for the Marmara and Duzce is equal) 
Ha : p1> p2  (percentage of  critical assessment of disaster management performance for the Duzce is less than for the 
Marmara) 
 
Significance level = 0.05 
 
Sample   X     N   Sample p 
1         9    274   0.032847 
2        67  1112   0.060252 
 
Difference = p (1) - p (2) 
Estimate for difference:  -0.0274051 
95% upper bound for difference:  -0.00615783 
Test for difference = 0 (vs < 0):  Z = -1.78  P-Value = 0.037 
 
Damage Assessment  
Test and CI for Two Proportions  
 
H0 : p1 = p2 (percentage of  damage assessment for the Marmara and Duzce is equal) 
Ha : p1< p2  (percentage of damage assessment for the Marmara and Duzce is not equal) 
 
Significance level = 0.05 
 
Sample   X     N   Sample p 
1        13   274   0.047445 
2        52  1112   0.046763 
 
Difference = p (1) - p (2) 
Estimate for difference:  0.000682666 
95% CI for difference:  (-0.0273817, 0.0287470) 
Test for difference = 0 (vs not = 0):  Z = 0.05  P-Value = 0.962 
 
Disaster relief/human services 
Test and CI for Two Proportions  
 
H0 : p1 = p2 (percentage of disaster relief/human services for the Marmara and Duzce is equal) 
Ha : p1> p2  (percentage of  disaster relief/human services for the Duzce is less than for the Marmara) 
 
Significance level = 0.05 
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Sample    X     N   Sample p 
1         64   274   0.233577 
2        361  1112   0.324640 
 
Difference = p (1) - p (2) 
Estimate for difference:  -0.0910636 
95% upper bound for difference:  -0.0430937 
Test for difference = 0 (vs < 0):  Z = -2.93  P-Value = 0.002 
 
Health and Medical care 
Test and CI for Two Proportions  
 
H0 : p1 = p2 (percentage of  health and medical care for the Marmara and Duzce is equal) 
Ha : p1< p2  (percentage of health and medical care for the Marmara and Duzce is not equal) 
 
Significance level = 0.05 
Sample   X     N   Sample p 
1        26    274   0.094891 
2        93  1112   0.083633 
 
Difference = p (1) - p (2) 
Estimate for difference:  0.0112574 
95% CI for difference:  (-0.0270684, 0.0495833) 
Test for difference = 0 (vs not = 0):  Z = 0.60  P-Value = 0.551 
 
Legal issues/legal enforcement 
Test and CI for Two Proportions  
 
H0 : p1 = p2 (percentage of  legal issues/legal enforcement for the Marmara and Duzce is equal) 
Ha : p1< p2  (percentage of legal issues/legal enforcement for the Duzce is more than for the Marmara) 
 
Significance level = 0.05 
 
Sample   X     N   Sample p 
1            6   274   0.021898 
2          58  1112   0.052158 
 
 
Difference = p (1) - p (2) 
Estimate for difference:  -0.0302605 
95% upper bound for difference:  -0.0120458 
Test for difference = 0 (vs < 0):  Z = -2.14  P-Value = 0.016 
 
Post-disaster research   
Test and CI for Two Proportions  
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Sample   X     N   Sample p 
1            7   274   0.025547 
2        28  1112   0.025180 
 
H0 : p1 = p2 (percentage of  post-disaster research for the Marmara and Duzce is equal) 
Ha : p1< p2  (percentage of post-disaster research for the Marmara and Duzce is not equal) 
 
Significance level = 0.05 
 
Difference = p (1) - p (2) 
Estimate for difference:  0.000367589 
95% CI for difference:  (-0.0204607, 0.0211959) 
Test for difference = 0 (vs not = 0):  Z = 0.03  P-Value = 0.972 
 
Public information 
Test and CI for Two Proportions  
 
Sample   X        N  Sample p 
1        13       274    0.047445 
2         85     1112    0.076439 
 
H0 : p1 = p2 (percentage of  public information for the Marmara and Duzce is equal) 
Ha : p1< p2  (percentage of public information for the Duzce is less than for the Marmara) 
 
Significance level = 0.05 
 
Difference = p (1) - p (2) 
Estimate for difference:  -0.0289936 
95% upper bound for difference:  -0.00413355 
Test for difference = 0 (vs < 0):  Z = -1.68  P-Value = 0.047 
 
Resource support   
Test and CI for Two Proportions  
 
H0 : p1 = p2 (percentage of resource support for the Marmara and Duzce is equal) 
Ha : p1< p2  (percentage of resource support for the Duzce is less than for the Marmara) 
 
Significance level = 0.05 
 
Sample   X     N  Sample p 
1           5   274  0.018248 
2            27 1112  0.024281 
 
Difference = p (1) - p (2) 
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Estimate for difference:  -0.00603240 
95% upper bound for difference:  0.00928230 
Test for difference = 0 (vs < 0):  Z = -0.60 P-Value = 0.276 
 
Search and rescue 
Test and CI for Two Proportions  
 
H0 : p1 = p2 (percentage of search and rescue for the Marmara and Duzce is equal) 
Ha : p1< p2  (percentage of search and rescue for the Duzce is more than for the Marmara) 
 
Significance level = 0.05 
 
Sample   X     N  Sample p 
1          70   274  0.255474 
2            89 1112  0.080036 
 
 
Difference = p (1) - p (2) 
Estimate for difference:  0.175438 
95% lower bound for difference:  0.130081 
Test for difference = 0 (vs > 0):  Z = 8.16 P-Value = 0.000 
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